Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Malerin]

... is really consciousness.

What's the alternative, Malerin?

Dualism?

Magic?

Or just flat out logical fallacies in your argument?

What do you want to say here?

I'm not the one arguing that simulated things are real in any sense. Your side seems to want a dualistic division between the "simulated" world and the "real" world, as if these are two different modes of existence. That creates problems: if simulated water isn't real water, then simulated consciousness isn't real consciousness.

 

[Meed]

Simulated water is really wet in the simulation.

There is no "in the simulation" in reality. That is just an abstraction.

Already have. Already have dozens - actually, hundreds - of times. No coherent counter-argument has been provided at any point.

You can't interact with simulated water in all the ways you can interact with water in your world.

You can interact with a simulated mind in all the ways you can interact with a mind in your world.

We don't interact with minds directly. We interact with things (people for example) that we infer have minds, but of course the actual direct interaction occurs between bodies. Thus, if the the simulated mind wasn't implemented in the same hardware that a human mind is implemented in (i.e. a human body) then we could not interact with it in the same ways as we interact with a human mind. Therefore, a mind that we can interact with in all the ways we can interact with a human mind "in our world" would have to be a model replication of a human or something similar.

 

[Malerin]

Simulated water is really wet in the simulation.

You're making a category error.


Already have. Already have dozens - actually, hundreds - of times. No coherent counter-argument has been provided at any point.

You can't interact with simulated water in all the ways you can interact with water in your world.

You can interact with a simulated mind in all the ways you can interact with a mind in your world.

1. What the hell does "your world" mean? How is this not dualistic?


2. I can't interact with simulated water at all. Simulated water doesn't act upon me. I don't get wet from it, I can't drink it, etc.

3. If what I bolded is true, this would make mind unique as the only simulation where you can interact with it in all the ways you can interact with a mind in "your world". So now you've got two categories: simulated mind (full interaction) and all other simulated things (some interaction).

Now, I'm happy to see you claiming that mind is unique and exists apart (in its own category) from all other things. I didn't know you were a closet idealist

 

[Malerin]

But they don't need to show a "qualitative" difference because intuitively there is one (or at least it seems that way ) -- our consciousness. The process is a sort of sick obsession with that old religious strawman "science says we are nothing but particles, so obviously science is wrong because clearly we can do all kinds of things that particles cannot." As with any strawman, efforts to get rid of it are resisted in full by those clinging to it.

At the root of the argument the two camps can be broken down like this:

On the one hand, the computationalists like you and I say "hey, there is no *strictly* qualitative difference, but if you have enough quantitative differences stacked on top of each other it ends up looking like a qualitative difference." And of course those stacked quantitative differences are exactly what you mentioned recently -- the information thing, the entropy thing, the computation thing, etc.

On the other hand, the anti-computationalists say "we know there is a qualitative difference -- human consciousness -- and if you can't account for that qualitative difference with science then there must be some non-science going on that is responsible for it."

Of course there are outliers like Piggy who want to be computationalists but still think there is a strictly qualitative difference, etc, but for the most part everyone falls nicely into the two above camps.

So the strategy employed by westprog for years now, and more recently by Malerin and all the other anti-computationalists who jumped on the bandwagon, is to oppose every effort we make to show any objective scientific difference at all between life, computers, and all the rest. They know from life experience (they aren't stupid, after all ) that yes, actually, stacked quantitative differences can appear qualitative and they know that every little quantitative difference science can show is just another step towards the computationalist position. Thus they fight every little step.

It becomes pretty obvious when you look at their posting history in totality: Well, computation exists in everything, so the brain isn't special in that regard. Well, even if computation is based on switching, switching occurs everywhere. No, transistors don't behave any differently than the rest of the universe. No, neurons don't exhibit any kind of special behavior compared to rocks. No, life is no different thermodynamically than anything else, all kinds of stuff decreases local entropy just like life does.

I have been part of this discussion for like 4 years now and the debate strategy has been crystal clear the whole time -- minimize objective scientific differences between people and rocks in order to make room for religious differences between people and rocks.

Do you feel persecuted by the anti-computationalists?

 

[PixyMisa]

How can something exist not in the world?

By existing in another world.

Are you now arguing that a simulated orange is an orange in our world?

Or are you using the word "exist" as a semantic red herring?

Or just being inconsistent?

Everything a computer simulation "does" can be described in terms of real physical activity inside the computer.

Certainly. So?

There is no separate world created by the simulation.

Yes there is. That is the very definition of a simulation.

 

[PixyMisa]

Snails have brains

Actually, no, they don't. They do have multiple clumps of nerve cells that control their bodies, but they don't have centralised organised brains like vertebrates or the more complex invertebrates.

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm not the one arguing that simulated things are real in any sense. Your side seems to want a dualistic division between the "simulated" world and the "real" world, as if these are two different modes of existence.

No.

That creates problems: if simulated water isn't real water, then simulated consciousness isn't real consciousness.

Which in no way addresses the point. You're just reiterating the same fallacy.

 

[PixyMisa]

1. What the hell does "your world" mean? How is this not dualistic?

In what way is it dualistic?

2. I can't interact with simulated water at all.

Of course you can.

Simulated water doesn't act upon me. I don't get wet from it, I can't drink it, etc.

So? Is that truly the limit of your understanding of how you can interact with water?

3. If what I bolded is true, this would make mind unique as the only simulation where you can interact with it in all the ways you can interact with a mind in "your world".

No. You haven't read anything anyone has written in this thread either, have you?

So now you've got two categories: simulated mind (full interaction) and all other simulated things (some interaction).

No.

Now, I'm happy to see you claiming that mind is unique and exists apart (in its own category) from all other things. I didn't know you were a closet idealist

Nor am I. The mind is a physical process. But it's a process of information, and information can by definition cross the boundary between our world and the simulation.

Anything that's information - a story, a theory, a song, a mind - is necessarily identical whether it is in our world or the simulation. There is, and can be, no distinction.

Any position other than that is dualistic.

 

[PixyMisa]

There is no "in the simulation" in reality.

That sentence is incoherent. That's your problem.

We don't interact with minds directly.

Ding! Give the man a kewpie doll!

We interact with things (people for example) that we infer have minds, but of course the actual direct interaction occurs between bodies. Thus, if the the simulated mind wasn't implemented in the same hardware that a human mind is implemented in (i.e. a human body) then we could not interact with it in the same ways as we interact with a human mind.

You just contradicted yourself.

Therefore, a mind that we can interact with in all the ways we can interact with a human mind "in our world" would have to be a model replication of a human or something similar.

Are you saying that if it doesn't have a face it can't have a mind? Really?

 

[Malerin]

PM, you know you haven't really added anything to the recent discussion.

 

[Meed]

By existing in another world.

There is no other world.

Are you now arguing that a simulated orange is an orange in our world?

No, in fact I've just said the exact opposite. There is no actual orange created by the simulation.

Certainly. So?

So, the simulation's behavior is entirely describable within "our world". Saying it produces an "other world" when it's entirely reducible to our own world is both baseless and serves to explain nothing.

Yes there is. That is the very definition of a simulation.

No.

 

[Meed]

That sentence is incoherent. That's your problem.

No.

You just contradicted yourself.

No.

Are you saying that if it doesn't have a face it can't have a mind? Really?

No, the quesiton was whether "you can interact with a simulated mind in all the ways you can interact with a mind in your world". The nature of our interaction with minds in the world depends on the associated bodies. So, the answer to the question is clearly no.

 

[PixyMisa]

There is no other world.

Really.

No, in fact I've just said the exact opposite. There is no actual orange created by the simulation.

What does "actual" mean?

Because there is an orange in the simulation.

So, the simulation's behavior is entirely describable within "our world".

Sure.

Saying it produces an "other world" when it's entirely reducible to our own world is both baseless and serves to explain nothing.

Really.

So the only fields of study that explain anything are particle physics and number theory?

No.

But yes. It doesn't matter if you don't like it; it is what it is.

 

[PixyMisa]

No.

Okay, it might not be your only problem, but it's certainly one of your problems.

No.

But yes.

No, the quesiton was whether "you can interact with a simulated mind in all the ways you can interact with a mind in your world".

That's not a question, it's a fact.

The nature of our interaction with minds in the world depends on the associated bodies.

Certainly. Because those minds are taking place in bodies in our world.

However, your statement does not address the point in any way.

So, the answer to the question is clearly no.

Another subscriber to Non-sequitur of the Month Club, I see.

 

[PixyMisa]

PM, you know you haven't really added anything to the recent discussion.

Well, sure. The case has been settled; we're right, you're wrong. There's not a whole lot to add.

 

[!Kaggen]

Actually, no, they don't. They do have multiple clumps of nerve cells that control their bodies, but they don't have centralised organised brains like vertebrates or the more complex invertebrates.

Wrong, the snail brain has been extensively used as a model brain to study how the human brain might work. Kandel being a pioneer in this work for which he received a Nobel Prize in Physiology in 2000.

 

[!Kaggen]

Actually, no, they don't. They do have multiple clumps of nerve cells that control their bodies, but they don't have centralised organised brains like vertebrates or the more complex invertebrates.

Now answer the original question, do snails have minds?

 

[westprog]

No, the quesiton was whether "you can interact with a simulated mind in all the ways you can interact with a mind in your world". The nature of our interaction with minds in the world depends on the associated bodies. So, the answer to the question is clearly no.

The simulation argument depends on too many hypotheticals to be entirely convincing. If we could play poker with Commander Data, would we accept that he was as conscious as we were? Well, we'd have to think about that one - but for the time being, we can't play poker with Commander Data, and there's no particular reason to assume we will ever be able to do so.

 

[Clive]

Should we consider enough rocks arranged in an appropriate pattern conscious?

 

[westprog]

How can something exist not in the world? Everything a computer simulation "does" can be described in terms of real physical activity inside the computer. There is no separate world created by the simulation.

It all seems to get odder and odder. This is the trouble with accepting things as real which are just in our minds - you end up going through a magic door into Narnia.

A simulation of an orange is a system which reproduces some of the relationships that exist with an orange. Most of the relationships are not reproduced - just the ones we are interested in. There is no "other world" where the oranges are real.