A fair point. The difference however is that carbon trading is having no measurable effect on that for which it is intended.
you keep saying this, and yet I have yet to see any compelling evidence in support of this assertion. In fact, even a quick superficial search of the emperic studies of the issue seem to contraindicate your supposition:
1. The EU Carbon trading system succeeded in establishing a price on carbon pollution emissions.
2. The price for carbon has helped prompt large investments in Europe’s alternative energy sector.
3. The trial phase (2005-07) led to reductions of between 2 and 5% relative
to what emissions would have been in the absence of the program. Since 2008, the overal cap has been tightened by another 6.5%.
Lessons in carbon trading -
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v465/n7299/full/465691a.html
despite such modest successes, I do agree that cap and trade schemes are prone to more problems and have more inherent weaknesses than more straight forward carbon pricing/taxation mechanisms as their efficacy is more closely tied to high potential of bad-faith participants and legislative undermining as discussed in the Carbon Trade Watch and Corporate Europe Observatory report titled "Letting the market play: corporate lobbying and the financial regulation of EU carbon trading." They found that:
1. The European Commission adopted a deliberately light touch approach to regulating its Emissions Trading System since its launch in 2005. A series of fraud cases made this position untenable.
2. The Commission has proposed measures to tighten security, which was previously so lax that it was easier to become a carbon trader than to open a bank account. However, the new rules would also cover-up evidence of fraud and gaming by hiding carbon permit serial numbers. The Commission’s intention is to re-issue stolen permits, opening an additional hole in the scheme’s accounting for emissions.
3. The Commission has belatedly identified carbon as a commodity that is susceptible to excessive speculation. Leaked drafts of the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), a set of rules governing European financial markets, are set to be extended to include carbon trading.
4. New regulations on carbon trading have been consistently opposed by financial services lobbyists. For example, in January 2011, the European Commission halted trading on a key part of the carbon market after the latest in a series of large fraud cases was uncovered. Less than a month later and with the suspension still partly in place, the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA, the main carbon trade lobby group) were privately insisting to Brussels officials that “there might be no need to regulate this market.” This report documents how financial sector lobbying has been driven by a desire to find new opportunities for carbon market speculation by whatever means are necessary.
http://www.corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/LettingTheMarketPlay.pdf
So while I certainly feel that it is appropriate to look at the European carbon trading market flaws and failures, and learn from them, it is inappropriate to claim that Europe's cap and trade system, flawed though it was, did not achieve anything. Its accomplishments were limited but not insignificant. Unfortunately, the problems displayed are rather endemic to cap and trade systems, which is why I, and a great many others including most economists, prefer a direct carbon taxation process.
Say what you will about government and how it's run, but there are roads, and bridges and schools.
an interesting manner of responding to statement that said nothing about supporting or rejecting government.
The problem with carbon schemes is they put a figure to what they think it's worth only because the scheme is feasible at that point. Once it dilutes, it's no longer feasible and it hemorrhages money. Despite the best of intentions this pattern is repeating itself over and over again.
I see no indication that what you claim, has or is happening, please support your assertion.
The only point I see that is even tangentially related to what you claim is what happened in the initial stages of the European carbon market when they allowed many entities to set their own cap levels and these, almost without exception proved to be unambiguously too high.