I’m not sure this supports your argument. Rather it supports the idea that this is a present day accounting problem rather than a case of “future generations being screwed”.
No. It is indeed a "present day accounting problem" (accounts that contain "forward-looking statements", that is), but it is not possible to travel back in time and demand higher contributions (meaning lower take-home pay) and/or lower retirement benefits from those who have already paid/received those. Any funding shortfall (for a funded scheme) or increase in liabilities (for an unfunded one) can only be corrected by either increasing
future contributions (either by taking them out of take-home pay or general taxation) or reducing
future benefits. Even if you correct it all next week this is the case.
In my case, for example, I currently work in a government job. My pension is ostensibly funded by employer contributions to a defined benefit pension plan. Normally I’d be able to contribute $22K of my pre tax earnings into a private pension plan, but because my employer is ostensibly contributing ~$20K on my behalf this is reduced to ~$2K of voluntary contributions. The problem is that the pension is being underfunded. IOW they are not contributing $20K per year to the pension fund, rather they are paying pensions out of revenue.
The level of funding paid into public sector (funded) plans in the UK is set by the government's actuary. For them to take no risk of failing to match future liabilities, there should be a high-frequency re-assessment of real pension costs (each time an employee joins, becomes inactive or dies), and the present value of their benefit entitlement should immediately be raised from taxation and invested in index-linked gilts (where the real return is vanishingly small, so you can gather the NPV sum that would be involved). Even this would not immunise the fund against insurance risk (unexpected and unforecastable claims) nor against longevity risk (sounds macabre, but the "risk" people live longer, and the opposite of mortality risk). As soon as either of these risks crystallised there would need to be an open-ended call on more public money.
I contend that no government in the OECD would try to do this, and that they would all (as would an independent observer) regard it as much less ethical than breaking the promise of a defined benefit.
Even if they did do it, the experience over the last 20 years, and very likely the next 20, would be that the
taxpayers of the past would have unfairly faced much lower bills (as a percent of household income, not just in prevailing currency terms) due to public pensions than those of the future.
Unfair because the only reason for it would be the year of their birth / the generation they were born into.
Unfunded schemes, which, contrary to the posts of other members above, describe the
majority of public sector pensions, would simply need to exercise an open-ended call on general public spending at all times. These would impart greater inter-generational unfairness
By your logic, if budgets get tight it’s acceptable for them to simply say “sorry, we’re not going to live up to the terms we agreed on because we want to save money” when the real issue is that they knowingly underfunded the plan and failing to book all the current expenses associated with that plan.
Who, in particular underfunded the pension schemes? Please furnish evidence that they did this knowingly (IE being in possession of correct multi-decade predictions of inflation, real risk-free interest rates, equity risk premia, longevity and fertility rates. Might as well throw in net inward migration trends too).