Free will and omniscience

[Belz...]

Could you name that mechanism for the audience?

Oh, please don't pretend you've already forgotten. You've proposed several times that the choice of the chooser somehow informs the OB by traveling back in time. That's a mechanism through which the OB gains omniscience, Bill.

This analogy is so wrong

It illustrates that your explanation as to why they are not interdependent is wrong. I'd say it's a pretty good analogy for that purpose. You do know the purpose of analogies, right ?

Boolean logic (an axiomatic system) is to causality (a non-axiomatic system)
as the language of mathematics (an axiomatic system) is to numbers (a subset of the axiomatic system).

Fail right from the start. The representation of numbers may be a subset of math but things exist in numbers.

A sphere compares to a cube as another sphere compares to a smaller sphere.

This analogy is so wrong there are not words to clarify it. Seeing as you failed miserably to explain with words an analogy that was also so wrong as there were no words to clarify it, I won't make the same mistake.

I said, "The OB is omniscient at any time that it exists, which may be before, while, or after the chooser made his choice."
You replied, "That's not what we agreed to a few posts ago."
You may be confused about what was agreed to.
At anytime the OB is not omniscient it is not an OB.

If you actually clarified what you think we agreed to, as I did, you might have a point. As usual you're dancing around the issue rather than actually discuss it.

We are talking about a FUTURE event, Bill. That's the whole point of the discussion. The OB MUST be omniscient BEFORE the event occurs, but we have agreed, I think, that the OB need not be always omniscient.

First, this doesn't make any sense because if the OB knows the choice before it occurs, then the knowledge (not the OB) is atemporal

1) Not necessarily. I've already mentioned time travel several times.
2) How can a choice be atemporal ?

Second, you seem to think that this is not a violation of causality as compared to your following point.

I think you have no idea what causality means.

What has a violation of causality have to do with a debate about omniscience?

I've already explained this. Your lack of attention or memory is not my problem.

 

[I Ratant]

Agreed, now let's search for some way that this is relevant.

.
It puts the idea where it belongs.
There is no OB.

 

[I Ratant]

Were this OB to exist, it would by definition know who is going to rape whom today. Who is going to strap on a bomb and murder 50 people they don't even know today. It would know which fertilizations will result in terminal defects for the fetus today.
It knows all this stuff, and does nothing to alter any of it.
The word that describes this thing is "impotent".
It sits in its own universe which is full of it's waste products, and diddles itself.
Totally useless.

 

[Belz...]

Were this OB to exist, it would by definition know who is going to rape whom today. Who is going to strap on a bomb and murder 50 people they don't even know today. It would know which fertilizations will result in terminal defects for the fetus today.
It knows all this stuff, and does nothing to alter any of it.
The word that describes this thing is "impotent".
It sits in its own universe which is full of it's waste products, and diddles itself.
Totally useless.

Of course. If it's omniscient then by definition it cannot alter the course of time. Omnipotence and omniscience cannot coexist.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Oh, please don't pretend you've already forgotten. You've proposed several times that the choice of the chooser somehow informs the OB by traveling back in time. That's a mechanism through which the OB gains omniscience, Bill.

Would you point out the post where I proposed time travel as a mechanism? All I can recall is that I said that it was a power and therefore not a property of omniscience.

It illustrates that your explanation as to why they are not interdependent is wrong. I'd say it's a pretty good analogy for that purpose. You do know the purpose of analogies, right ?

It's a poor analogy because you are trying to compare things in an invalid comparison, as I pointed out.

Fail right from the start. The representation of numbers may be a subset of math but things exist in numbers.

What things exist in numbers?

This analogy is so wrong there are not words to clarify it. Seeing as you failed miserably to explain with words an analogy that was also so wrong as there were no words to clarify it, I won't make the same mistake.

It's analogous to your analogy and clearly shows why your analogy fails.

If you actually clarified what you think we agreed to, as I did, you might have a point. As usual you're dancing around the issue rather than actually discuss it.

We are talking about a FUTURE event, Bill. That's the whole point of the discussion. The OB MUST be omniscient BEFORE the event occurs, but we have agreed, I think, that the OB need not be always omniscient.

I agree with that, if we realize that any OB analysis refers to the OB when it is omniscient.

1) Not necessarily. I've already mentioned time travel several times.

This is a power outside of the definition of omniscince.

2) How can a choice be atemporal ?

I don't know what that would mean, but the knowledge of the choice is atemporal by extension of the definition that includes all knowledge past, present, and future.

I think you have no idea what causality means.

I think it is an attempt to form an argument that is irrelevant, as I have pointed out numerous times.
If you do not accept the violation of causality, then you do not accept the idea of debating omniscience, then you have relevant input to the debate.

I've already explained this. Your lack of attention or memory is not my problem.

Just answered.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

.
It puts the idea where it belongs.
There is no OB.

There is no relevance.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Were this OB to exist, it would by definition know who is going to rape whom today. Who is going to strap on a bomb and murder 50 people they don't even know today. It would know which fertilizations will result in terminal defects for the fetus today.
It knows all this stuff, and does nothing to alter any of it.
The word that describes this thing is "impotent".
It sits in its own universe which is full of it's waste products, and diddles itself.
Totally useless.

The OB or the troll?

 

[I Ratant]

See Belz.

 

[Belz...]

Would you point out the post where I proposed time travel as a mechanism? All I can recall is that I said that it was a power and therefore not a property of omniscience.

I'm going to give you one last chance to be honest, here. You are saying that the choice informs the OB. How does that work, then ?

It's a poor analogy because you are trying to compare things in an invalid comparison, as I pointed out.

I'm not comparing things. I'm comparing comparisons.

What things exist in numbers?

All of them, to my knowledge. "There are three rocks", for instance. Don't tell me that's an abstract.

I think it is an attempt to form an argument that is irrelevant, as I have pointed out numerous times.
If you do not accept the violation of causality, then you do not accept the idea of debating omniscience, then you have relevant input to the debate.

Therein lies the problem with omniscience. If you can't discuss it without breaking apart causality and logic, what's there to discuss aside from simply musing about it ? This thread's OP claims that omniscience and free will aren't incompatible. I was under the impression that in order to determine this we had to stay within the realm of the logically possible. Otherwise everything is possible and no discussion can have any value.

 

[GeeMack]

Let's review.
An OB knows any choice that is made before it is made.

So when the choice is made, which is after the omniscient being knows the results of the choice, the choice must be what the omniscient being knew it would be. The total list of options available to the chooser consists of a single item.

This may violate causality.
The OB may know the choice simply because the choice is made.

No. The omniscient being knows the results of the choice before it is made.

Synonymously, the choice may inform the knowledge.

No. The omniscient being knows the results of the choice before it is made.

This means that the OB's knowledge did not constrain the choice.

When the time comes for the choice to be made, the chooser will select the outcome already known to the omniscient being. The total list of options available to the chooser consists of a single item.

This may violate the very same causality.
The argument that this violates causality is an argument that maybe omniscience cannot really exist.

No. The argument that this violates causality is an argument that omniscience cannot be compatible with free will. Your abject inability to understand this is noted.

The argument that omniscience cannot really exist is irrelevant to this debate.
If we accept that omniscience is not real in our universe but that it is still possible to discuss it, the same as many other ideas, then there is no rebuttal to the compatibility of omniscience and free will.

You actually provide your own rebuttal by the sheer inability to support your assertion. You've given us lies, contradictions, moving goalposts, redefined terms, convoluted logic, and assorted other dishonest tactics. But you have utterly failed to make a cogent argument in favor of the position that omniscience is compatible with free will.

 

[Tricky]

Therein lies the problem with omniscience. If you can't discuss it without breaking apart causality and logic, what's there to discuss aside from simply musing about it ? This thread's OP claims that omniscience and free will aren't incompatible. I was under the impression that in order to determine this we had to stay within the realm of the logically possible. Otherwise everything is possible and no discussion can have any value.

Here's where I give AvalonXQ some style points. We reached this same point with him and the atemporality question. He admitted that by all reasonable definitions, atemporality was essentially magic. And he bowed out. That was honest. Bill, on the other hand, has agreed it's magic, but it doesn't matter, since all he's talking about is hypothetical anyway. He's essentially saying that there are no rules and no need for consistency because it's only philosophical. But he still believes it is "rational". That's another word he seems to have a private definition for.

 

[Dave Rogers]

Not necessarily. The OB could have knowledge derived from perfect knowledge of physics and the initial state of the universe. This only works in a deterministic universe, though, and it precludes Bill's proposal.

And that, quite precisely, is why omniscience and free will are incompatible.

Dave

 

[Dave Rogers]

Present that post.

#612.

Your argument builds its construct on the implicit assumption that "if god knows it, then god is the source of it". This is not a part of any common definition of omniscience, which is merely "god knows it."

You introduced the claim that the source of the knowledge was relevant; you're now saying it's absurd to claim that the source of the knowledge is relevant.

At this point, you're just babbling nonsense. I'm done.

Dave

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

I'm going to give you one last chance to be honest, here. You are saying that the choice informs the OB. How does that work, then ?

It works the same way that the choice is known to the OB, whatever mechanism that is is irrelevant.
If you are going to say that omniscience doesn't work then there is no point in participating in this debate.
If you are going to say that omniscience works in this debate then use the mechanism of omniscience.

I'm not comparing things. I'm comparing comparisons.

Comparisons aren't things--I missed that one.

All of them, to my knowledge. "There are three rocks", for instance. Don't tell me that's an abstract.

Your prior statement, "The representation of numbers may be a subset of math but things exist in numbers."
I must have misinterpreted your reference to sets and thought you were referring to sets with "exist in numbers".

When you say that everything exists in numbers I guess I'll interpret that to mean that things don't exist in numbers since a number is not a set, but that things are countable and numbers are used to communicate the extent of the count.

Therein lies the problem with omniscience. If you can't discuss it without breaking apart causality and logic, what's there to discuss aside from simply musing about it ? This thread's OP claims that omniscience and free will aren't incompatible. I was under the impression that in order to determine this we had to stay within the realm of the logically possible. Otherwise everything is possible and no discussion can have any value.

So what you are saying is that it is logically possible for a choice to be known before the choice is made, but it is not logically possible for the choice to be reason for the knowledge.
Do you get that there is no differentiation in the logical possibility of those two things?

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

So when the choice is made, which is after the omniscient being knows the results of the choice, the choice must be what the omniscient being knew it would be. The total list of options available to the chooser consists of a single item.

You are making a claim for some kind of control power by the OB, which is outside the definition of omniscience, and therefore not relevant.

"The OB may know the choice simply because the choice is made."

No. The omniscient being knows the results of the choice before it is made.

Here is where your entire argument fails.
You think that your statement negates mine, but it doesn't.
Yes, the OB knows the choice before it is made.
Yes, that is because the choice is the basis for knowledge that the OB has before the choice is made.

The argument that this violates causality is an argument that maybe omniscience cannot really exist.

No.

The argument that this violates causality is an argument that omniscience cannot be compatible with free will.

You are making two separate claims:
1) Omniscience does not violate causality.
2) Free will violates causality.
Unfortunately, you present no reason for this distinction, so it fails.

You actually provide your own rebuttal by the sheer inability to support your assertion. You've given us lies, contradictions, moving goalposts, redefined terms, convoluted logic, and assorted other dishonest tactics. But you have utterly failed to make a cogent argument in favor of the position that omniscience is compatible with free will.

Basically, when the argument gets to more than a few lines, it's time to gripe and whine and say it's too cogent for you.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Here's where I give AvalonXQ some style points. We reached this same point with him and the atemporality question. He admitted that by all reasonable definitions, atemporality was essentially magic. And he bowed out. That was honest. Bill, on the other hand, has agreed it's magic, but it doesn't matter, since all he's talking about is hypothetical anyway. He's essentially saying that there are no rules and no need for consistency because it's only philosophical.

This is a falsehood, often referred to as a lie, but it makes for a distraction from a lack of analytical talent, so it works for some.

But he still believes it is "rational". That's another word he seems to have a private definition for.

I may be the only one that thinks it's rational to debate ideas that are outside known laws of physics.
That is why physicists never speculate on things outside of or known universe--wait, that doesn't sound quite right, does it?

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

And that, quite precisely, is why omniscience and free will are incompatible.
Dave

This is a good point: free will and omniscience, mixed in with some omnipotence, are incompatible.
But it's not relevant to this debate.

 

[Myriad]

For free will to exist, there must be a choice I can make, where it is possible that I choose either one. Pick a necessary binary choice "A or not A" (e.g. "I will stand up") and examine it. For me to have free will in this choice, it must be possible for me to choose A, and it must be possible for me to choose not A.

Let us assign the choice to time T2. (So, A might be, "I will stand up at noon.") At an earlier time T1, I have not yet made the choice. Let us also define a time T0, which is earlier than T1.

We can now be more precise about the free will condition: For me to have free will in the choice at T2, it must be possible at T1 for me to choose A at T2, and it must be possible at T1 for me to choose not A at T2.

At all times T0, T1, and T2 the Omniscient Being must know whether I will choose (or have chosen) A or not A.

Now, what does it mean for it to be "possible" for me to choose a choice? There are many elements involved in assuring that a choice is possible -- for instance, it's not possible for me to choose to have lunch in Honolulu today, because it is already lunchtime and Honolulu is thousands of miles away. But that's circumstantial impossibility. Under different circumstances (lunch tomorrow, or I happen to be an astronaut on the launch pad just about to blast off for a suborbital flight intended to splash down a few minutes later near Honolulu), it would be possible.

Of more import is when a choice would cause a logical contradiction. That makes it logically impossible. For example, I cannot choose to draw a square triangle even if I'm poised with pencil and paper, because a square triangle is a contradiction, as it has three sides (being a triangle) and other than three sides (being square) simultaneously. Likewise, if there is an omniscient being, it is not possible for me to utter a fact that the omniscient being doesn't know, as the omniscient being would have to both know and not know that fact. That would be a contradiction.

Logical impossibility is therefore sufficient to prove impossibility. Just because something is logically possible (e.g. lunch in Honolulu) doesn't mean it's actually possible, but if it not logically possible, then it is definitely not possible.

The omniscient being at time T1 knows that I will choose A or that I will choose not A.

Note that it is not possible for me to do other than choose A or not A (which would be, not A and not not A, that is, A and not A) because that itself would be a logical contradiction. At T2 I can either stand up, or not stand up; I cannot do both, or neither.

So, there are two possible cases at time T1:

- The OB knows I will choose A at time T2
- The OB knows I will choose not-A at time T2

In the first case, it is not possible at time T1 for me to choose not A at time T2, because that would be a contradiction. (By the definition of omniscience, the OB's knowledge at time T1 is sufficient to prove A at T2; by the definition of choice, my choice of not A proves not A at T2, so we have A and not A, a contradiction.)

In the second case, it is not possible for me at time T1 to choose A, because that would also be a contradiction.

Since one and only one of these cases must apply at T1, in no case is it possible for me at T1 to choose A at T2 and possible for me at T1 to choose not A at T2. So, one of the the original premises must be false. Either I cannot have free will to make a choice of A or not A at T2, or an omniscient being cannot know at T1 what my choice will be (and hence, cannot exist as defined).

What Bill is trying to argue using atemporal causality is something like this:

There are two cases, A (I choose A) or not A (I choose not A).

Both cases are possible at T0 and T1 (hence, free choice is preserved) but if I choose A at T2, the OB knows A at T0 and T1, and if I choose not A at T2, the OB knows not A at T0 and T1 (so omniscience is preserved).

But the fact remains, per the argument above, that at T1, the OB must know A or not A, so at T1 one of the choices must be impossible. The same applies to T0 and right up until T2 when the choice is made. So that argument amounts to, I have free will, I just don't have it at any given time. I have it never.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

As I recall, it was you who tried to draw the meaningless distinction between knowledge of a choice before the fact informed by, or not informed by, that choice, and claim that the former was acceptable. Do you now wish to withdraw that argument, since you seem to believe it's absurd?
Dave

Present that post.

#612.

Note that if you read Post #612 it in no way supports your claim.

You introduced the claim that the source of the knowledge was relevant; you're now saying it's absurd to claim that the source of the knowledge is relevant.
At this point,....I'm done.
Dave

No, I am saying that if you present the source of knowledge as an assumption it is not valid.
If you present the source of knowledge as knowledge created by god then you are introducing a power not implicit in the definition.
If you present the source of knowledge that, through analysis, does not demonstrate an incompatibility then omniscience and free will are compatible.

 

[GeeMack]

You are making a claim for some kind of control power by the OB, [...]

No, I'm not. But since you clearly haven't understood almost anything anyone else has written in this thread, it's not surprising you completely missed my meaning, too. That is, unless your misinterpretation of my comment is more of your intentional dishonesty or willful ignorance.

[...] which is outside the definition of omniscience, and therefore not relevant.

Your wrongness about my meaning seems to be the basis of your wrongness about the relevance of my comment.

Here is where your entire argument fails.
You think that your statement negates mine, but it doesn't.

My statement doesn't negate yours. For all practical purposes it is yours.

An OB knows any choice that is made before it is made.

The omniscient being knows the results of the choice before it is made.

But your persistent and dishonest attempt to change the meaning of what you've said is noted... again. Do you ever get tired of all that backpedaling?

Yes, the OB knows the choice before it is made.

Yes...

An OB knows any choice that is made before it is made.

The omniscient being knows the results of the choice before it is made.

Yes, that is because the choice is the basis for knowledge that the OB has before the choice is made.

No. The omniscient being knows the results of the choice before it is made. The total list of options available to the chooser consists of a single item.

You are making two separate claims:
1) Omniscience does not violate causality.
2) Free will violates causality.
Unfortunately, you present no reason for this distinction, so it fails.

That isn't what I'm claiming, not even close, so you're wrong again. How does it feel to be so thoroughly trounced by your own contradictions, goalpost moving, redefining terms, convoluted logic, and assorted other dishonest tactics that you have to resort to making up crap in order to support your position?

Basically, when the argument gets to more than a few lines, it's time to gripe and whine and say it's too cogent for you.

My noting your inability to present a cogent argument isn't griping. Pretty much everyone else has mentioned how you don't make sense, how your comments are nonsense, gibberish, and yes, lies. You own your failure. At least have the decency to take responsibility for it rather than blaming other people.