Former conspiracy believer here

[chipmunk stew]

When you see in humans the degree to which they will cling on to the undemonstrable notion of personal selfhood, the way they will fight tooth and nail and even die to preserve it, then it's reasonable to assume that there's some serious hard-wiring in here!

Examples?

 

[Belz...]

Possibly valid. Though not yet demonstrated!

It was a joke, Nick.

My mistake anyway. I should have said "the lesion which removes the sense of personal identity but which leaves all other processes intact."

Yeah, we call those people vegetables.

I think you're trying to make "I" special. But it isn't. Everything you're saying, so far, shows this. You don't understand what this feeling of personal identity is.

I also notice you consistently ignore several points of mine. And I have to tell you, I don't wonder why.

 

[Nick227]

Nick, I get the distinct feeling that you're trolling, now. You MUST know that this is not what Pixy said.

Well, I said it in all honesty. Let's ask him again. PixyMisa, do you experience thoughts?

I've asked him this question before and he appears to evade answering. I'm interested because he is proposing a neurobiological foundation for the experience of having a personal self, and at the same time claiming it is thought-based. Thus, he has to answer the question "No." Because if he answers the question "Yes," I will likely ask him "What then is experiencing thoughts?" At which point the neurobiological foundation theory proceeds to collapse in rather spectacular fashion. That is, unless he has thought of something I haven't, by no means impossible!

Did you understand the analogy with the calculator ?

Please, take some time to answer my points.

You can take a systemic viewpoint on personal identity, and thus claim it exists as people believe it exists. This is valid. However, in reductionist terms, in more dialectical debate, the argument for personal identity is weak as hell.

Personally, I'd rather not bother with philosophy or interpretation any more than necessary. There is no hard evidence for the existence of a personal self, thus to me it does not exist. Or rather, it's a fun thing, it's not some big heavy deal.

What is that supposed to mean ?

People are so identified with beliefs. They will fight tooth and nail over them. Beliefs are another manifestation of identification. You see, the real problem is is that, actually, there is no "I." Yet, the mind does not want to deal with this possibility. It will wriggle and wrangle and do pretty much anything rather than actually look. PM is desperately trying to construct a physical foundation for the arisal of personal identity. Why bother? Why deal with concepts? Why not just look?

What ? What else COULD it mean ? Please, humour me. If it is not physical, how can it POSSIBLY be affected by physical acts ?

It's a reasonable question, I have to admit it, and I'd have to read more about the effects of corpus callosum severance to answer it fully. However, firstly I'm not convinced that the experience of identification is actually split in two, I would have to look at reports more. And, secondly, if it were true, this only demonstrates that an experience is split, not that it could cease to be through physical causes. It's much stronger evidence to find where to cut to stop identification arising, without changing anything else. I'm not saying that a neurobiological foundation absolutely does not exist. I'm skeptical but it could be true. I'll have a look at the corpus callosum thing tomorrow.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Examples?

People die for beliefs. It happens in religion all the time. Politics too. Understand that no one is actually having these beliefs. They don't belong to anyone. Yet the identification is so strong, the mind is so rigid and so convinced it has a personal identity that it will cause the body to kill and be killed rather than examine if actually there is even anybody inside. It's completely insane. There is no one in there. Really. They're just thoughts. They're just passing through.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I think you're trying to make "I" special. But it isn't. Everything you're saying, so far, shows this. You don't understand what this feeling of personal identity is.

Well, I don't fully understand it. I mean, the only means I have to understand it is thoughts, all of which are simply arising and buggering off again pretty quick. Unless they can convince the mind that they're my thoughts, of course. In which case they get rattled around for a while but, anyway, understanding wise, I'm clearly not onto a winner!

I also notice you consistently ignore several points of mine. And I have to tell you, I don't wonder why.

I'm not ignoring your posts. It's just that some of your lines of inquiry weren't really so relevant, imo. I also can't just answer every post. There are quite a lot.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Aren't they ?

No, they're not. The keyboard is a keyboard. It is not a thought. Least not unless you're a Platonist or neo-Platonist in which case it is, but only by belief. There can be thoughts about the keyboard, but it itself is just a keyboard. Look at it! It's just a keyboard and it's, well, keyboard-ing, for want of a better verb!

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, I said it in all honesty. Let's ask him again. PixyMisa, do you experience thoughts?

Nick, you see to have lost the trail of the argument. Let's recap:

In a purely systemic viewpoint of life, I think I would agree that ego exists, in that many humans certainly believe that they have a personal identity and behave as though this were the case. However, I would point out that this belief in personal identity arises unexamined. Very few people look to see if there actually is anything in there that can distinguish them from a machine. They assume there is, or they subscribe to a belief system that tells them there is.

To which I replied simply:

People are machines, Nick.

And in answer to a related question:

It's simple logic. If I understand PM correctly, his contention is that the notion of limited selfhood results from a brain process. (Personally I prefer mental process). What I'm saying is that, if this is true, then what is it that is experiencing this process?

If the experience of "I" arises solely as a mental process, what then experiences this process? Because, quite logically, whatever it is has far more right to be termed "I" than the process itself.

I said:

Nothing experiences the process; the process generates the experience. But the process isn't linear; it can also interact with itself. In computer science terms, it's reflective. This sort of thing is very common in the world of electronics and computing, and the brain is just a squishy computer after all.

You completely ignored all this, and asked:

What then experiences the machine? For every process you are personally aware of, the seat of experience deepens.

My answer:

This question arises from a deep misunderstanding of the nature of the mind, and of information processing in general. Nothing "experiences the machine". The machine generates experiences.

And you somehow came up with:

You are saying that you have never experienced thoughts?

To which I replied, very reasonably:

Non-sequitur.

As I said, the machinery of the brain generates experiences. You don't experience the machine.

To which you responded:

If you don't experience thoughts then that's your reality. It's not mine.

Which makes me doubt that there is any value in responding to you at all, as you certainly don't read what people are posting.

 

[PixyMisa]

If you ask the question that way it is somewhat loaded!

Not my problem.

I would certainly agree that for other primates some form of neuro-adaptation relating to identity could well have taken place to increase the chance of survival. A unreal and heightened sense of personal identity could have arisen as a biological necessity to preserve the species. It's for sure possible. I don't know the pathways involved but it doesn't seem unreasonable. However, this doesn't mean that this personal identity actually exists rather that the animal developed the capacity to imagine it did as a survival aid.

Sorry, that was my fault. I said "personal self" when I was responding to the subject of "limited self". Limited self is empirical and applies as much to amoebas as to humans.

When you see in humans the degree to which they will cling on to the undemonstrable notion of personal selfhood, the way they will fight tooth and nail and even die to preserve it, then it's reasonable to assume that there's some serious hard-wiring in here!

You mean it's real? How about that.

I can't see that this has anything to do with it personally. That an phenomena can be made to be split in half through a physical act does not demonstrate that it arises physically. Even in conditions such a Multiple Personality Disorder there is nothing to suggest that any of the experienced senses of selfhood are actually real.

Uh, Nick, by the nature of selfhood, if it is experienced, it is real. The only way they could not be real is if the patient were faking the condition.

Why don't you simply find a medical condition or a brain lesion that can be made where there is no sense of personal selfhood, where this sense is removed? I think this would be great proof that the experience of personal identity arises from the structure of the brain.

You have been presented with multiple conditions that drastically alter the way we experience personal identity - even one that creates new identities - and you ignore them all. What difference would this hypothetical condition make, and why?

As I have said before, and even immediately above, it is not a question of thoughts belonging to someone else, but of them belonging to anyone at all. They are just thoughts.

Thoughts do not occur by themselves, Nick. They are generated by brains.

Sure, but can we locate the source of the sense of personal selfhood?

Sure. It's in the brain. Remove the brain and it goes away.

 

[PixyMisa]

If you relate an experience, if you frame it, then it is certainly created by thoughts. I agree. However, the raw materials of experience, sensory perceptions, are not thoughts.

What do you mean by "raw materials"?

None of these creatures need a sense of selfhood in order to survive. They need simply to react defensively.

They need to identify that the thought or experience is theirs, Nick. Otherwise there is no reason to react at all.

The experience of hunger arises. It does not need any "I" for it to do so. The thought that food is required arises. It does not need any "I" to do so.

There is no need for an abstract notion of self. There is a absolute need for a concrete notion of self.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, the phenomenon of identification I don't see so much as a separate thought, rather a quality in the thought, a quality that somehow gives the thought an intensely personal flavour.

So? We already agree that thoughts are generated by the brain. This signifies nothing/

This quality suggests to the mind that there is something so personal about the thought that it must be expressed, that it must be acted upon. It cannot be allowed to simply come and pass away.

Again, I don't know what you are talking about.

Thus there develops within the mind the idea that there is something somewhere within that is unique and precious, and that it is this that is having these thoughts. This "thing" the mind conceives of as "I," it's own unique personal identity. It cannot find this "I." It cannot demonstrate the existence of this "I." Yet it will surrender even its life on occasions to protect it.

I tried to find any coherent meaning in that paragraph, and failed.

Now, this phenomenon of identification, and the assumption of personal identity that arises in its wake, could certainly arise as a brain function. However I've not seen anyone try and locate it.

It's a thought, Nick. Now, where do thoughts come from?

There's an interesting chap called Ramachandran at the University of California in San Diego who studies a lot of similar stuff. Maybe I will search a bit more.

I think Ramachandran would be an excellent source if you wish to actually understand this. Of course, Ramachandran is an empiricist and argues pretty much the same points that I do (only better) so you may not like what he has to say.

 

[PixyMisa]

No, they're not. The keyboard is a keyboard. It is not a thought. Least not unless you're a Platonist or neo-Platonist in which case it is, but only by belief. There can be thoughts about the keyboard, but it itself is just a keyboard. Look at it! It's just a keyboard and it's, well, keyboard-ing, for want of a better verb!

You said "the raw materials of experience, sensory perceptions, are not thoughts".

So why are you wittering on about keyboards?

 

[Belz...]

You can take a systemic viewpoint on personal identity, and thus claim it exists as people believe it exists. This is valid.

I'm not saying that it exists because people believe they have it. I'm saying it exists because it causes precisely the kind of behavior that we expect. Look up P-zombies.

However, in reductionist terms, in more dialectical debate, the argument for personal identity is weak as hell.

Yours is becoming more and more like an argument from personal incredulity.

Personally, I'd rather not bother with philosophy or interpretation any more than necessary.

And yet that's all you're doing. Philosophy. You have no argument, whatsoever. You just keep repeating your mantra that we don't know, and ignoring the evidence that we keep shoving down your throat that we DO know.

There is no hard evidence for the existence of a personal self, thus to me it does not exist.

See what I mean by "ignoring" ?

People are so identified with beliefs. They will fight tooth and nail over them. Beliefs are another manifestation of identification. You see, the real problem is is that, actually, there is no "I." Yet, the mind does not want to deal with this possibility.

Although this may work with stuff like God, fairies and UFOs, it's just not applicable to the "I". Personal identity exists, because I can make the difference between me and you. "Red" exists as a colour, because I can distinguish between stuff that emit the light wavelength known as "red" from those who emit the wavelength "blue".

Why bother? Why deal with concepts? Why not just look?

Look what ? If you're so sure you can access this vaunted subjective plane of yours, why haven't YOU done it ?

It's a reasonable question, I have to admit it, and I'd have to read more about the effects of corpus callosum severance to answer it fully.

No, no, no. It has nothing to do with the brain. I'm asking you: what else can it possibly mean ?

However, firstly I'm not convinced that the experience of identification is actually split in two, I would have to look at reports more.

Be convinced. In some extreme cases, one brain tries to kill the other. I'd call that pretty much split.

And, secondly, if it were true, this only demonstrates that an experience is split, not that it could cease to be through physical causes.

Nick, if it proves that it is split, it proves that it exists, and yourself can't think of another reason for it to be affected by the physical than the fact that it IS physical. I believe that settles the argument.

 

[Belz...]

Well, I don't fully understand it. I mean, the only means I have to understand it is thoughts, all of which are simply arising and buggering off again pretty quick. Unless they can convince the mind that they're my thoughts, of course.

Who's else would they be ?

No, they're not. The keyboard is a keyboard. It is not a thought. Least not unless you're a Platonist or neo-Platonist in which case it is, but only by belief. There can be thoughts about the keyboard, but it itself is just a keyboard. Look at it! It's just a keyboard and it's, well, keyboard-ing, for want of a better verb!

We're talking about perceptions, not keyboards. I guessed you missed a part of the conversation, now. Perceptions ARE thoughts. It's why we call it self-awareness.

 

[chipmunk stew]

People die for beliefs. It happens in religion all the time. Politics too. Understand that no one is actually having these beliefs. They don't belong to anyone. Yet the identification is so strong, the mind is so rigid and so convinced it has a personal identity that it will cause the body to kill and be killed rather than examine if actually there is even anybody inside. It's completely insane. There is no one in there. Really. They're just thoughts. They're just passing through.

Nick

I don't see the connection between dying for a belief and dying to protect one's "personal selfhood". Generally, people who die for their beliefs have striven to suppress their sense of personal selfhood in order to be of service to something they believe is larger and more important than themselves. Radicalization is a denial of the self.

edit: I agree that there is no one (separate from the whole organism) "in there". "In there" is a supporting subfunction of an organism's interaction with the world around it. It's a complex set of processes that the organism inherited as an historically effective means of its species' survival.

 

[Nick227]

Nick, you see to have lost the trail of the argument. Let's recap:


To which I replied simply:



And in answer to a related question:



I said:


You completely ignored all this, and asked:


My answer:


And you somehow came up with:


To which I replied, very reasonably:


To which you responded:


Which makes me doubt that there is any value in responding to you at all, as you certainly don't read what people are posting.

I am reading and following what you write, PM. That is why I stated that I experience thoughts whilst you apparently do not. This accounts for the difference between our two perspectives.

In becoming aware of the process of thinking, so arises the understanding that I am not thought. Indeed, if there is an "I," then it is clearly that which is experiencing thought, not the thoughts themselves. Thus the notion that personal identity is thought-based and arising from the physical hardware of the brain is dismissed.

This is why I am saying that personal identification is not simply thought-based, rather it arises from some quality in the thought that causes the mind to believe that it has personal identity. Experiencing only a lifetime of identified thoughts, this notion would naturally seem a crazy or just ridiculous proposal, but if and when there is a shift in the phenomenon of identification, the change in perspective reveals the presence of the assumption that could not be imagined before.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Well, I don't fully understand it. I mean, the only means I have to understand it is thoughts, all of which are simply arising and buggering off again pretty quick. Unless they can convince the mind that they're my thoughts, of course.

Who's else would they be ?

They don't belong to anyone! They are just thoughts. They have a quality to them which seduces the mind into believing that there exists a personal self who is having them. Yet they are just thoughts. It's amazing. No one is in there. No one is reading this. It is just being read.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I don't see the connection between dying for a belief and dying to protect one's "personal selfhood". Generally, people who die for their beliefs have striven to suppress their sense of personal selfhood in order to be of service to something they believe is larger and more important than themselves. Radicalization is a denial of the self.

Hi CS,

Yes, I agree. However, in my experience, people who want to die for causes are acutely afraid of simply being themselves. I feel it is definitely an identification-driven phenomenon. They are afraid of self-examination, afraid of simply being themselves with all the fear and doubt that that inevitably entails.

edit: I agree that there is no one (separate from the whole organism) "in there". "In there" is a supporting subfunction of an organism's interaction with the world around it. It's a complex set of processes that the organism inherited as an historically effective means of its species' survival.

Yes, this could certainly be the case. I don't know how complex it is, though. Observing it first-hand it seems pretty simple, though if it does have a neurobiological foundation for sure this could be complex.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

So? We already agree that thoughts are generated by the brain. This signifies nothing

It's a thought, Nick. Now, where do thoughts come from?

The brain. I experience thoughts.

I think Ramachandran would be an excellent source if you wish to actually understand this. Of course, Ramachandran is an empiricist and argues pretty much the same points that I do (only better) so you may not like what he has to say.

Why would I not like what he has to say? I've emailed him to ask him if he is aware if it is yet scientifically established how humans come to have a sense of personal identity....

Dear Vilayanur,

I wondered if I might ask you a question that has come up from a
lengthy discussion on an internet forum. It's about the phenomenon of
identification with thought, and the apparently subsequent experience
of personal selfhood. Do you know if either of these two phenomena have
been studied scientifically, and if a source or mechanistic pathway for
their arising has yet been located in the brain?

Very grateful for any time you can spare to answer this question.

Regards etc

Nick

 

[Belz...]

In becoming aware of the process of thinking, so arises the understanding that I am not thought.

Of course "you" are thought. Haven't you been paying attention: SELF-awareness.

Indeed, if there is an "I," then it is clearly that which is experiencing thought, not the thoughts themselves.

It's not "clear" at all. You're making a distinction for no apparent purpose.

They don't belong to anyone! They are just thoughts. They have a quality to them which seduces the mind into believing that there exists a personal self who is having them. Yet they are just thoughts. It's amazing. No one is in there. No one is reading this. It is just being read.

You admitted that the thoughts arise from brain processes, so clearly they "belong" to that brain. If by "don't belong" you mean that you challenge the very idea that anything belongs to anyone, then be my guest.

 

[Nick227]

Of course "you" are thought. Haven't you been paying attention: SELF-awareness.

But I am experiencing thoughts. If I am thoughts, what then is experiencing them?

It's not "clear" at all. You're making a distinction for no apparent purpose.

It's not for a purpose other than articulating my experience. Are you saying that you don't experience thoughts? I must admit that I had rather assumed that everyone did.

You admitted that the thoughts arise from brain processes, so clearly they "belong" to that brain. If by "don't belong" you mean that you challenge the very idea that anything belongs to anyone, then be my guest.

I'm not challenging the idea that thoughts arise in the brain. I'm saying that the brain's notion that they are "my thoughts" is assumption. The brain is assuming a sense of selfhood inconsistent with perceptual reality.

Nick