Fine-Tuning Problem in Cosmology

[Dancing David]

I get the argument, I just disagree with it.

If someone fires a gun and misses your head by an inch, I don't think you'll be saying he missed you by an infinite distance.

When did the universe become a gun? That is a reductio ad absurdum, not a good way to refute a mathematical argument, which is what the FTA is. You are arguing in your analogy that the values of the universe are the result of an object/being with creative abilities firing a weapon at another object/being?


It is a mathematical argument that some level of variation would cause the universe to not exist.

Prepositions:
1. the values are variable
2. they can vary widely
3. disparate values are not linked

So it is not a science problem, it is a speculative problem.

I am saying that even if preposition 2 is true, existing universes that have a fine tuning value even within a small variance allow for an infinite number of states, within that small value.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

Here is where you go wrong. Post hoc probability is always 1.

Hans

this is silly for a number of reasons:

-say that a value needs to be fine tuned between .01 and .02 , how many possible values can exist between those two numbers?

This is old but a very good read and discusses the actual foolishness of the FTA:

Victor J. Stenger

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Cosmo/FineTune.pdf

I've often argued that the fine-tuning problem as usually posed (Which works from the premise "because the supposed interval is relatively small compared to its magnitude, the probability of a value occurring within this interval must also be small") is completely absurd, as we have no idea of the possible range of values or the shape of the probability distribution. For example, the range of possible values could've been large relative to the magnitude of the values, but one would merely need to make the range sufficiently large to run into the same issue.

Basically, the "problem" has too many unknowns to be properly called a problem. The questions of any possible mechanisms behing constants, whether there are multiple universes and whether we can study them are all interesting, but not really connected to the issue of this "problem". With a system containing a sufficient number of unknowns you can always make a range of assumptions that makes the existence or state of the system seem impossibly unlikely.

 

[Aridas]

To pop in here a little...

There are several explanations:

1. Coincidence. Other than Victor Stenger, I haven't seen any evidence that any scientists actually doing research chalk it up to this. The number of scientists who have a problem with the coincidence explanation is long and illustrious. People like Tegmark, Linde, Hawking, Rees, Davies, Dyson** are all highly respected in their fields.

Their reasoning is fairly straightforward- the universe appears to be balanced on a knife-edge for life to even be possible. If universes where life is possible are extremely (almost impossibly) rare, and yet we find ourselves in one, the question is obvious- did we win a highly unlikely cosmic jackpot or was something else at work?

That's still a false dichotomy, at last check. Again, without solid information about the actual ranges that such values actually can have, among other things, we're left in a position where trying to limit it to those options is downright dishonest.

2. The values are the result of some natural law, like super-symmetry (or some theory that hasn't even been thought of yet). It would be nice if we could derive all the values from some elegant theory, but since the LHC, a natural explanation doesn't seem likely anymore.

Maybe, maybe not. It's rather difficult to accurately predict what future revelations will happen, regardless. Conceptually, this isn't all that independent from the other options here, though.

3. A sufficiently large multiverse. This is what seems to be popular at the moment, especially with BICEP2's recent findings supporting inflation. Given enough universes, there would be a few life-permitting ones, and we happen to be on one of them.

This option, at least, has some support, yes. There's still a ways to go, though, by the look of it. To note, this is just another form of coincidence.

4. A simulation where the problem is non-existent in the unsimulated "real" universe. Nick Bostrom has a theory that there are decent odds we're in a simulation anyway. If multiverse-theory doesn't pan out, simulation-theory will get a boost.

While possible, it's quite worth questioning what forms a universe could have that would not have similar problems as we encounter.

5. The existence of a fine-tuner. The fine-tuner would have to come from outside the universe (otherwise the problem is just bumped up a level), so you'd basically be dealing with a supernatural explanation. I reject this because there is scant evidence a supernatural being exists.

There's no otherwise here. It does just bump the problem up a level, regardless of the nature of the fine-tuner.

If the coincidence explanation isn't satisfactory, then fine-tuning is a "problem". But "problem" simply means a surprising result that needs to be explained. It can be something as mundane as the hexagon cloud-structure on Saturn (nobody is suggesting coincidence for that one either), or as problematic as Mercury's eccentric orbit wrt to Newtonian Physics.

Without disputing this, I'm not convinced that it needs an explanation beyond "coincidence," much as that concept is poorly suited for describing events that were necessary for any observer to be able to observe anything and we must operate under the assumption that at least one observer exists, for all practical purposes, but I do fully support investigations that can advance our knowledge, including when it comes to learning more about how much of a "coincidence" something actually is.

As cosmologist Paul Davies puts it: "There is now broad agreement among physicists and cosmologists that the universe is in several respects ‘fine-tuned' for life."

I think why so many people voted "no" is because the creationists have gleefully hitched their wagon to the supernatural explanation, and now cosmic fine-tuning has a ton of theistic "baggage" associated with it. Just because coincidence is unsatisfactory doesn't mean "god did it".

In part, much as the Creationists have had it hitched on the general issue since long before the problem in question was proposed. As noted in the previous thread, what the actual "problem" in question is varies rather significantly in different contexts, too, and that has kept the water a bit muddied in similar discussions. I, personally, voted no, given that it was closer to my views, much as an option between the two would have been more attractive. A more accurate option for me would address that I'm fine with saying that I don't currently have enough valid cause to demand that cosmology "needs" to do the stated and that the puddle analogy works just fine at pointing out the null hypothesis, but that I do support potentially productive investigations. The poll wasn't well made enough to properly address my position, though, and seems like a bit of a caricature of both options given. The first option looks like it has a poorly thought out and executed implicit assumption that it's not pointing at some form of ...something, while the second is adopting a far more solid position on the issue than most of those who point out the puddle analogy actually hold, by my observation, among other things, given the nature of its usage.

 

[MRC_Hans]

There are several explanations:

*Snip*

6. The explanation lies in the infamous "before" the BB. Whatever reality is causing those parameters to be what they are was somehow oscillating for something like eternity and when they hit a combination that could form a universe .... *BOOM*

- in other words, the "lottery" may somehow be sequential, in which case a near infinite number of combinations might have failed "before" the right one happened to come out. So to speak, the multiverse in series.

As I see it the real problem is that we will probably never know.

Hans

 

[turingtest]

You're confusing the probability of an event (what happened), which is 1, since it already happened, with the probabilities of all the possible explanations for the event (why it happened), which fall between 0 and 1.

Consider: you walk up to a poker table, just as all the other players are leaving. You ask why they're leaving. They tell you the dealer just dealt himself a fourth royal flush in a row. The dealer confirms this, but claims he's just lucky. The odds of the four royal flushes are 1, since the events already occurred before you even got there. However, the "chance" explanation fails because the outcome is much better explained by a "cheating" hypothesis, than random chance alone. If you don't agree, then just change "four royal flushes" to "40 royal flushes". The point is, eventually you reach a point where the "chance" hypothesis is totally inadequate and another explanation is required, even though the event already occurred.

Also consider: a country decides to give a condemned person a chance at a pardon. The condemned will write down a number between one and 100 quadrillion. Right before the execution, the state will generate a random number between one and 100 quadrillion.

You are the condemned person, and this is the first time the state has ever done this. You've written down your number and are waiting for the cyanide pellet to drop after the state generates it's random number. The pellet never drops. Since you survived, the odds of you surviving the event are 1. However, you would naturally wonder why you're alive, and in a short time be convinced that someone intervened on your behalf, because the chance hypothesis is trumped massively by the hypothesis that someone rigged the new system on your behalf.

In the same way, we find ourselves in a universe that is appearing more and more unnatural (the values of the physical constants are not the result of any natural law, but random chance). We also know that if we tweak any of at least a dozen numbers by even a tiny amount, life that fits even the weirdest definition of "life" would not be possible (e.g., no life would exist in a universe where molecules can't form, or a universe that collapses back in on itself in a millisecond). The creation of the universe has a probability of 1, since it already happened. However, like the condemned man wondering how he could have possibly survived, we exist and we wonder how we could possibly be here, when the odds of a universe supporting any kind of life were so low.

If there's no natural explanation, then there are either a whole lot of condemned men (i.e., a lot of universes), and we just got lucky, or something intervened on our behalf (or we exist in a simulation in a universe that doesn't have a fine-tuning problem).

Why would you need an explanation for one outcome, among many, of a non-normative process that has no preferred outcome? WADR, I don't think I'm confusing probabilities for event with probabilities for their explanations- I think you're forcing the need for an explanation into a context where it doesn't belong, since there's no need to explain what wasn't an aim. Kevin Lowe's analogy night be more on point here- with all the possible outcomes for a process that didn't aim for Kevin Lowe, asking "why Kevin Lowe?" becomes more a religious (or at least philosophical) question than one of science.*

The problem with your "prisoner" analogy is that it begs the question; it still poses a normative process in which only one outcome- the prisoner's life or death- is the point of the process. A better way to frame the analogy would be that the prisoner isn't the only one who picks a number- everyone else on the planet does so, and either lives or dies by the number generated. The process which generates the number doesn't care who gets it or who dies; no outcome is preferred, so no explanation is necessary, since someone had to get it.

And I think before cosmology tackles the question of "why fine-tuning if not for life," it might be better for it to tackle the question of "how much life in the universe." Asking the other question first is putting the cart before the horse.

*I certainly won't bash on anyone who wants to ask that sort of question; we may be talking past each other here more as a matter of temperament than anything else. But I think that "fine-tuning" itself is an inference only, and "for the purpose of life" is an inference built on an inference. I don't think it's the kind of question that science can answer- until and unless a "Designer" steps forth and claims his design, it's not only an inference, it's an unfalsifiable one, a non-testable question. I'm just not wired for philosophy- YMMV, and that's fine. (In fact, it's to be expected- if we were all wired the same, that might be evidence for design, eh?)

 

[Hercules Rockefeller]

When did the universe become a gun? That is a reductio ad absurdum, not a good way to refute a mathematical argument, which is what the FTA is. You are arguing in your analogy that the values of the universe are the result of an object/being with creative abilities firing a weapon at another object/being?


It is a mathematical argument that some level of variation would cause the universe to not exist.

Prepositions:
1. the values are variable
2. they can vary widely
3. disparate values are not linked

So it is not a science problem, it is a speculative problem.

I am saying that even if preposition 2 is true, existing universes that have a fine tuning value even within a small variance allow for an infinite number of states, within that small value.

It's not reductio ad absurdum - it's just an analogy. But maybe you're right, maybe you're wrong, we're likely both wrong. It's just something that's fun to ponder.

 

[Fudbucker]

Then apparently you didn't understand my question, say that the Cosmological Constant ( I assume you mean lambda), can vary between .00000000000000000000001 and .00000000000000000000002, how many potential values for lambda exist between the variance?

Did you read Stengers .pdf ?

It's irrelevant how much they can vary. I'll give you an example:

You come across a machine that simply has a button and a readout on it. When you press the button, the numbers 314159265359 show up. It doesn't matter how much the numbers can vary, you're still going to assume the result was due to a non-random process.

Let's say you press the button ten more times and you discover the only "variance" is the last digit (31415926535 always shows up, but sometimes the "9" at the end is a "4", an "8", a "0", etc.). The extreme lack of variance will make you even more convinced there's something non-random going on: not only does Pi show up on the initial press of the button, but the machine always generates numbers that are extremely close to the value of Pi. You would not believe that it's merely coincidence.

Now let's back-track and say you press the button ten times after the initial Pi result and get a bunch of totally random-seeming numbers that aren't even close to Pi. In that case, the variance is huge, and the fact that the numbers vary so much makes you start to doubt there's something non-random going on.

So let's apply this to the universe. We've measured a bunch of physical constants and have found that even small changes would result in a universe where the conditions for life wouldn't exist. If the values of the physical constants can only vary a tiny amount, then we're looking at a situation where the constants seem to be "set" for a universe where life would be possible: if you run the big-bang over and over again, and you keep ending up with universes where the physical constant values are right in the "Goldilocks zone", that would be an amazing result. It would be even more amazing if you can't figure out a naturalistic explanation- that just by chance alone, you keep getting "goldilocks" universes.

Consider: if we start surveying different worlds, and every world that we discover with life on it has humanoids that look a lot like us (i.e., very little variance), would you really just chalk it up to a coincidence? That would be absurd. You would suppose there's some evolutionary principle at work. If you couldn't discover the evolutionary reason why all these advanced life forms keep looking like us, you would be extremely surprised.

Now, if the values of the physical constants can vary to a huge degree, the coincidence hypothesis is actually stronger, because then you can explain the values of the constants by invoking a multiverse or a cyclical universe.

TLDR: the smaller the variance of the values of the physical constants, the bigger the fine-tuning problem gets, and the more the need for a naturalistic explanation grows.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

It's irrelevant how much they can vary. I'll give you an example:

You come across a machine that simply has a button and a readout on it. When you press the button, the numbers 314159265359 show up. It doesn't matter how much the numbers can vary, you're still going to assume the result was due to a non-random process.

Let's say you press the button ten more times and you discover the only "variance" is the last digit (31415926535 always shows up, but sometimes the "9" at the end is a "4", an "8", a "0", etc.). The extreme lack of variance will make you even more convinced there's something non-random going on: not only does Pi show up on the initial press of the button, but the machine always generates numbers that are extremely close to the value of Pi. You would not believe that it's merely coincidence.

Now let's back-track and say you press the button ten times after the initial Pi result and get a bunch of totally random-seeming numbers that aren't even close to Pi. In that case, the variance is huge, and the fact that the numbers vary so much makes you start to doubt there's something non-random going on.

So let's apply this to the universe.

I don't think you can apply this to the universe. In your example firstly you get to push the button over and over again, but we have exactly one universe and we can't push a button to reset it. Secondly in your example we already attach special significance to pi whereas before life arose nobody attached special significance to life-supporting laws of physics. Thirdly your ability to view the number is unrelated to it being pi, so a better example might be if you found the machine in a museum of things which happen to be pi-related.

Fourthly there might well be a reason why it keeps generating those numbers which is not that is was designed to keep generating those numbers.

We've measured a bunch of physical constants and have found that even small changes would result in a universe where the conditions for life wouldn't exist. If the values of the physical constants can only vary a tiny amount, then we're looking at a situation where the constants seem to be "set" for a universe where life would be possible: if you run the big-bang over and over again, and you keep ending up with universes where the physical constant values are right in the "Goldilocks zone", that would be an amazing result.

I'd say it would be interesting, but not amazing. Based on a sample size of one, all the universes we know can support life, so if other universes could too that shouldn't amaze us.

It would be even more amazing if you can't figure out a naturalistic explanation- that just by chance alone, you keep getting "goldilocks" universes.

There's a false dichotomy for you. Just because we fallible humans can't figure out the naturalistic reason for something is very weak evidence at best that there is no naturalistic reason for that thing. This is just The God of the Gaps in a funny hat.

Consider: if we start surveying different worlds, and every world that we discover with life on it has humanoids that look a lot like us (i.e., very little variance), would you really just chalk it up to a coincidence? That would be absurd. You would suppose there's some evolutionary principle at work. If you couldn't discover the evolutionary reason why all these advanced life forms keep looking like us, you would be extremely surprised.

Well, yes, but you are the one postulating a very surprising thing, so it's no surprise that it is surprising. I might as well say that if rabbits kept appearing in my hat and nobody could explain it that we would all be extremely surprised.

TLDR: the smaller the variance of the values of the physical constants, the bigger the fine-tuning problem gets, and the more the need for a naturalistic explanation grows.

TLDR: You have no evidence these "variables" are even variable, you are getting the probabilistic cart in front of the horse, and you are conflating "reasons" with "design".

 

[MRC_Hans]

It's irrelevant how much they can vary. I'll give you an example:

You come across a machine that simply has a button and a readout on it. When you press the button, the numbers 314159265359 show up. It doesn't matter how much the numbers can vary, you're still going to assume the result was due to a non-random process.

Basically, boxes with a button and a readout ARE the result of a non-random process, no matter what they read out.

Bear with me, I'm coming to the point.

Let's say you press the button ten more times and you discover the only "variance" is the last digit (31415926535 always shows up, but sometimes the "9" at the end is a "4", an "8", a "0", etc.). The extreme lack of variance will make you even more convinced there's something non-random going on: not only does Pi show up on the initial press of the button, but the machine always generates numbers that are extremely close to the value of Pi. You would not believe that it's merely coincidence.

No, I would assume that the method used to measure/calculate pi was a bit "noisy".

So let's apply this to the universe. We've measured a bunch of physical constants and have found that even small changes would result in a universe where the conditions for life wouldn't exist.

Yes, let's: We now measure and calculate the relationship between radius, circumference, and area of a number of circles, and what do you know? PI always shows up. Random result? Obviously not. Pi is evidently an invariable constant.

So what?

If the values of the physical constants can only vary a tiny amount, then we're looking at a situation where the constants seem to be "set" for a universe where life would be possible: if you run the big-bang over and over again, and you keep ending up with universes where the physical constant values are right in the "Goldilocks zone", that would be an amazing result. It would be even more amazing if you can't figure out a naturalistic explanation- that just by chance alone, you keep getting "goldilocks" universes.

Thing is, as already pointed out, we DON'T keep getting goldilocks universes. To the best of our knowledge, this has only "ever" worked once.

Or, alternatively, we have not the faintest idea how many times the button wac pushed before the present universe showed up.

Consider: if we start surveying different worlds, and every world that we discover with life on it has humanoids that look a lot like us (i.e., very little variance), would you really just chalk it up to a coincidence? That would be absurd. You would suppose there's some evolutionary principle at work. If you couldn't discover the evolutionary reason why all these advanced life forms keep looking like us, you would be extremely surprised.

But that hasn't happend.

Now, if the values of the physical constants can vary to a huge degree, the coincidence hypothesis is actually stronger, because then you can explain the values of the constants by invoking a multiverse or a cyclical universe.

However, we can only speculate what the variance might be.

TLDR: the smaller the variance of the values of the physical constants, the bigger the fine-tuning problem gets, and the more the need for a naturalistic explanation grows.

Why? Why must we assume that the physical constants can very at all?

In the present universe, do we know of any physical constants that vary?

Why do you feel that the default position is that they can vary?

Hans

 

[ehcks]

You come across a machine that simply has a button and a readout on it. When you press the button, the numbers 314159265359 show up. It doesn't matter how much the numbers can vary, you're still going to assume the result was due to a non-random process.

I would assume that it's a machine that measures a circle and divides the circumference by the diameter, and that the variance is caused by the circles not being perfect.

The machine is not designed to output pi. Circles are not designed to output pi. The number is not intentional. It's coincidental.

 

[John Jones]

You're confusing the probability of an event (what happened), which is 1, since it already happened, with the probabilities of all the possible explanations for the event (why it happened), which fall between 0 and 1.

[...].

Jabba? Is that you?

 

[Fudbucker]

Jabba? Is that you?

If that reminds of you of anybody it's probably because a lot of people would tell you the same thing.

Another example: Mercury's orbit had been known for hundreds of years before general relativity was proposed. Yet Mercury's orbit was a huge confirmation for relativity theory. How can that be, it the probability of Mercury's orbit was already 1? It's because the probabilities of events are different than the probabilities of the theories that explain those events.

When the police find a dead body, the probability that someone died is (1). The probability of an explanation for how and why the person died is not (1).

There's no simpler way to explain it. It's how science works: you observe the phenomena, then see what the best explanation is. The probability of the universe being like it is is (1). The probability of why it is like it is differs among the different explanations- String Theory is on its last legs; Super-Symmetry was dealt a blow by the LHC; Multiverse theory is on the rise.

Or would you rather make fun of how I use words like "anybody".

 

[Fudbucker]

I would assume that it's a machine that measures a circle and divides the circumference by the diameter, and that the variance is caused by the circles not being perfect.

Right, a non-random process. You wouldn't assume you just happened to get a Pi result from a RNG in the machine, which is entirely possible. It just wouldn't be a good explanation.

The machine is not designed to output pi. Circles are not designed to output pi. The number is not intentional. It's coincidental.

I don't know what you mean here. A machine with a button and a readout could be designed to output nearly anything. If all you see is the number Pi it's still possible it's nothing but a random bunch of numbers. But your confidence in that explanation will be very low.

 

[Fudbucker]

I don't think you can apply this to the universe. In your example firstly you get to push the button over and over again, but we have exactly one universe and we can't push a button to reset it.

No, you can conclude just by pressing the button once. A Pi result is strong evidence of a non-random process. Suppose you rolled a trillion-sided die and got 314159265359. That one toss is enough for you to conclude it either wasn't a fair toss or a fair roll or a fair die. (i.e., something non-random was at work).

Secondly in your example we already attach special significance to pi whereas before life arose nobody attached special significance to life-supporting laws of physics

It's not so much that life arose(ETA I mean, it is more about the conditions necessary for life to even have a chance, like complexity), it's that a universe with complexity is very very unlikely, and yet we live in a complex universe. When extremely unlikely events occur, they have to be explained. The explanation could be coincidence, or a natural process, etc.

Thirdly your ability to view the number is unrelated to it being pi, so a better example might be if you found the machine in a museum of things which happen to be pi-related.

If you found an old machine that had displayed the number Pi when someone pressed it a hundred years ago, it wouldn't change your conclusion that something non-random happened.

Fourthly there might well be a reason why it keeps generating those numbers which is not that is was designed to keep generating those numbers.

Right, that's what they mean whey talk about a natural vs. unnatural universe. The evidence for unnaturalness is starting to pile up. It doesn't look like the values of the constants are a result of some naturalistic principle we just haven't uncovered.

I'd say it would be interesting, but not amazing. Based on a sample size of one, all the universes we know can support life, so if other universes could too that shouldn't amaze us.

A multiverse of life-permitting universes wouldn't explain anything. The reason the multiverse is used to explain fine-tuning is because the values of the constants seem like they could take on quite different values, and we happen to be in one of the few universes where the values are just right for life to be possible.

There's a false dichotomy for you. Just because we fallible humans can't figure out the naturalistic reason for something is very weak evidence at best that there is no naturalistic reason for that thing. This is just The God of the Gaps in a funny hat.

That's true, there may be some theory that will explain everything. The problem is, the LHC knocked down a couple of those theories and inflation got some confirmation from BICEP2.

To go back to another analogy: if we keep finding life that looks like us, we would assume it's some principle of evolution. As the years go by, and we can't figure out why life would always evolve to look like us, eventually other theories would be proposed. You can always assume there's a mind-blowing natural explanation that would explain it all, but after decades of dead-ends, you would naturally start entertaining other explanations.

Well, yes, but you are the one postulating a very surprising thing, so it's no surprise that it is surprising. I might as well say that if rabbits kept appearing in my hat and nobody could explain it that we would all be extremely surprised.

That the values of the physical constants appear finely balanced for life to be possible has been surprising us for decades, since the 60's. Dark Energy is the latest such observation for apparent fine-tuning.

TLDR: You have no evidence these "variables" are even variable, you are getting the probabilistic cart in front of the horse, and you are conflating "reasons" with "design".

A) in an unnatural universe the constants are variable, and there's more and more evidence that this is an unnatural universe

B) A multiverse would be a reason why we find ourselves in a life-permitting universe. There would be no "design" involved. Some explanations invoke a designer, some don't.

 

[Toontown]

Fudbucker, your explanatory skills are considerable. But you are wasting your time here.

Have you ever mud wrestled a huge hog?

It does not matter how skillful a wrestler you are. A huge, slick hog cannot be effectively wrestled. To make matters worse, in attempting to wrestle the hog you risk having ignorant observers think you are a poor wrestler and the hog is a good wrestler, when in fact it is just a big, fat, slick hog.

 

[tsig]

Fudbucker, your explanatory skills are considerable. But you are wasting your time here.

Have you ever mud wrestled a huge hog?

It does not matter how skillful a wrestler you are. A huge, slick hog cannot be effectively wrestled. To make matters worse, in attempting to wrestle the hog you risk having ignorant observers think you are a poor wrestler and the hog is a good wrestler, when in fact it is just a big, fat, slick hog.

I think I've spotted your problem, we are supposed to be using words and logic, not mud wrestling hogs.

 

[Toontown]

I think I've spotted your problem, we are supposed to be using words and logic, not mud wrestling hogs.

OK, I'm watching. Here is your big chance to demonstrate how to use words and logic productively.

Fudbucker has made some good points. Points which numerous logical, respected people have been acknowledging for decades. Here is your chance to show that you are capable of grasping and acknowledging these obviously valid points.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Another example: Mercury's orbit had been known for hundreds of years before general relativity was proposed. Yet Mercury's orbit was a huge confirmation for relativity theory. How can that be, it the probability of Mercury's orbit was already 1? It's because the probabilities of events are different than the probabilities of the theories that explain those events.

Eh... The explanation for Mercury's orbit was always the same. The probability of somebody finding the explanation is ... irrelevant.

When the police find a dead body, the probability that someone died is (1). The probability of an explanation for how and why the person died is not (1).

The reason and way the person died is there. The probability of it is (after the fact) 1.

The probability of the police finding out is ... dependent on a lot of things, but after they do it is 1.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

It's not so much that life arose(ETA I mean, it is more about the conditions necessary for life to even have a chance, like complexity), it's that a universe with complexity is very very unlikely, and yet we live in a complex universe. When extremely unlikely events occur, they have to be explained. The explanation could be coincidence, or a natural process, etc.

All true and right. However, since we have no idea how unlikely it is, we cannot use probability as an argument for anything. The probability might be anything between 1 and 1/near infinity.

Hans

 

[Toontown]

All true and right. However, since we have no idea how unlikely it is, we cannot use probability as an argument for anything. The probability might be anything between 1 and 1/near infinity.

Hans

1. It is not true that we have "no idea how unlikely it is". See inflation theory, the leading cosmological theory for the past 35 years, which now has observational support from BICEPS, the LHC results, and other large-scale observations.

2. The typical denials of the utility of probability due to lack of precise probabilistic values tend to be weak for the following reasons:

If we knew that exact probability, then we would necessarily know precisely how a universe exists and precisely what form(s) it can take. If we knew that, then obviously we would not need probability. We would simply refer to our near-complete model of the universe.

Probability is a tool to be used to reach tentative conclusions from incomplete information, and is most useful precisely when we do not have complete information.

If you are thinking we have complete information about something like a coin toss, you're wrong about that too. All we know is how many sides the coin has. We have no precise information about the forces which will be applied to the coin when it is tossed, and that is why the probability distribution is 0.5 heads, 0.5 tails. IOW, we know next to nothing about a coin toss. We know the coin has 2 sides. That's all we know. And yet, the oversimplified probability distribution will still prove accurate over repeated trials.