Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

Well, that raises a very important point. I actually know of two different conceptions of solipsism. One of them is metaphysical, and the other is purely epistemological.

The metaphysical view of solipsism is that all that exists is your own consciousness. Everything you experience is a construct of your own mind, and the impression that your are interacting with an external world is an illusion.

The epistemological view is that nothing other than your own experiences can ever be known. It is not possible to learn anything about the external world from your observations, nor is it even possible to know if an external world exists.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stimpy, are those your definitions, or do you feel these are as close to agreed definitions that philosophers will ever reach?

As I said, they are the only two definitions of solipsism that I know of. If you know of some others, then by all means feel free to share.

But nevertheless naturalism must reject your view of Idealism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You would agree then that naturalism is viable under some form of Idealism?

Stimpy, would you mind commenting on what you see in Ian's position that denies it?

Ian has specifically stated that he does not think that consciousness can be explained scientifically, even though it has an observable effect on the world. That violates naturalism. He has also claimed to believe in Libertarian free-will, which violates naturalism.

Like the hypothesis that I am not special, and that other people are essentially no different than me. That is a falsifiable hypothesis.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I don't see any falsifiability in that hypo; would you mind being a bit more specific on how to falsify it?

Simple, just demonstrate some fundamental difference between me and everybody else.

To me, it's no better than Paul's reason to deny solipsism -- "it would be prudent".

The supporting evidence for the above hypothesis is exactly why it is prudent to do so.

Gentlemen's agreement that it is not so is still my position. I'd like to hear a logical argument that we could agree on.

It's pretty simple. If you accept the epistemological position of naturalism, then the rejection of solipsism is the most parsimonious explanation for the fact that the world seems to behave exactly as though reality were objective.

Of course, if you reject naturalism, then unless you have some other epistemological position to replace it, you can't draw any conclusions from your observations. If you settle on some other epistemological framework, then your conclusions will, of course, depend on that framework.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well then, if that is the case (that you have no real disagreement with Stimpy), then I take it that you do not have the "Final Proof that Stimpson J. Cat is wrong", yes?

{shrugs}

Not with his erroneous definition of metaphysics no.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Well then, if that is the case (that you have no real disagreement with Stimpy), then I take it that you do not have the "Final Proof that Stimpson J. Cat is wrong", yes?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

{shrugs}

Not with his erroneous definition of metaphysics no.

That's odd. I don't recall ever giving a definition of metaphysics. If want to define "metaphysics" in such a way as to include things which are empirically verifiable, that's fine with me.

The fact still remains that my position makes no claims which are not, at least in principle, empirically verifiable, and makes no reference whatsoever to things which are not, even in principle, empirically verifiable.

Dr. Stupid

 

[treborf]

In a nutshell: Stimpy requires evidence; Ian does not.

Of course, Ian rarely makes claims that anyone can understand, let alone examine.

 

[ceptimus]

Do these guys really type all those long words: epistemological, naturalism, solipsism, ontological, consciousness, supervenience, metaphysical, and so on, every time they use them? I would have to set up some keyboard shotcuts.

 

[treborf]

Do these guys really type all those long words: epistemological, naturalism, solipsism, ontological, consciousness, supervenience, metaphysical, and so on, every time they use them? I would have to set up some keyboard shotcuts.

Hee hee. Me too. I'd be worried about typos. Someone (I'll let you guess) might jump on it and declare victory!

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Solipsism (only thing you can truly know is self) is somewhat right as you can never know for complete certainity that what you see and observe is reality. This is infact echoed in science because you cannot know things for sure when observing an outside system (there is a name for it, remind me what it is...). However, that does not mean one must seriously consider it...

Also, if conciousness and interpretation of the senses ARE done in the brain, and the brain does not interpret reality incorrectly, then technically we can know things because we are not really observing an outside system but the same one.

I might be wrong. Correct me if I am.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Lord Kenneth,

Solipsism (only thing you can truly know is self) is somewhat right as you can never know for complete certainity that what you see and observe is reality. This is infact echoed in science because you cannot know things for sure when observing an outside system (there is a name for it, remind me what it is...). However, that does not mean one must seriously consider it...

Also, if conciousness and interpretation of the senses ARE done in the brain, and the brain does not interpret reality incorrectly, then technically we can know things because we are not really observing an outside system but the same one.

I might be wrong. Correct me if I am.

It is a question of semantics. If you define "knowledge" to mean "absolute proof", then you can never know anything other than abstract analytical tautologies. That is not a very useful definition of knowledge.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ceptimus said:

Do these guys really type all those long words: epistemological, naturalism, solipsism, ontological, consciousness, supervenience, metaphysical, and so on, every time they use them? I would have to set up some keyboard shotcuts.

Ha! Might I suggest *suf for all those words. That is, some sequence of letters followed by a suffix chosen from ism, ical, ness, ence.

For example, with apologies to Stimpson:

Ian has specifically stated that he does not think that *suf can be explained *suf, even though it has an observable effect on the world. That violates *suf. He has also claimed to believe in *suf, which violates *suf.

~~ Paul

 

[DialecticMaterialist]

The statement that consciousness might be metaphysical makes no sense. I assume you mean might be non-physical?

So what's the problem? He's assuming a parsimonious position if he's a physicalist. I hardly see how that is proof he is wrong.

 

[Interesting Ian]

So what's the problem? He's assuming a parsimonious position if he's a physicalist. I hardly see how that is proof he is wrong.

He's assuming a parsimonious position? How is it more parsimonious than idealism?

BTW this has nothing whatsoever to do with the topic of this thread

And also BTW I do not believe that it could remotely be thought that Ockhams razor can be used in such a context.

And if it could then denying an entire physical Universe would certainly seem more parsimonious than hypothesising its existence such as all physicalists do!

 

[davidsmith73]

Ian,

Science assumes that reality functions according to a set of consistent natural laws. Metaphysical solipsism claims that reality is nothing more than your experiences. Our experiences do not appear to function according to consistent natural laws. The simplest hypothesis that we can construct to account for this is that our experiences are fallible, that is, that they give us an imperfect representation of reality. Such a claim is meaningless if we assume that reality is just our experiences. In that case, we must make the completely absurd assumption that reality is not objective, but that for some inexplicable reason, it just happens to behave in every single observable way as though it were.

The assumption of an objective reality is born out of observations that are quantitative, reasonably stable, reasonably consistent and roughly adhere to contructed mathematical relationships we call logic. We equate these aspects of experience with an external objective reality and assume that it functions according to our contructed logical rules. Thus some aspects of experience do appear to roughly follow consistent logical relationships. However, the assumption that these stable and consistent observations relate to an external reality beyond the experiential realm is an unfalsifiable position and therefore should be rejected. Furthermore, science works just as well without this assumption. Science does not need to have anything to say about the nature of reality for the method to function.

All Solipsism implies is that for some completely unknowable reason, reality behaves as though it were something that it is not.

Not quite. There are aspects of our experience that are not consistent and stable and significantly stray from the contructed framework of logic. There are also aspects of our experience that are not quantifiable and are therefore not subject to mathematical relationships simply by default. Solipsism implies is that for some as yet unknown reason, reality (experience) behaves as if it were operating according to an external, logically based objective reality.

It is far more parsimonious to simply say that since reality behaves exactly as though it were objective, that we think it probably is.

In order to say this, you first have to assume that reality is external to experience. That is a fallacy based on an unfalsifiable premise.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

And if it could then denying an entire physical Universe would certainly seem more parsimonious than hypothesising its existence such as all physicalists do!

I am not a physicalist, remember?

Anyway, the hypothesis I make is that an external objective reality exists. This is a very parsimonious position, and here is why.

First of all, I think we can all agree that at the very least science (and thus naturalism) must assume that reality appears to be objective, in every observable way.

That implies an external reality. There is no way around it. Even if you imagine that you perceptions are purely constructs of your own mind, the above assumption means that those experiences must be following rules which you are not aware of. You must assume that there is some component to your own mind that you are not directly aware of.

Clearly the assumptions of naturalism imply that there is more to reality than just our perceptions, and furthermore that it must behave in all observable ways as though it were objective.

At this point, assuming that reality is objective does not involve postulating the existence of some external reality. It is nothing more acknowledging that reality being objective is the most parsimonious explanation for the fact that it behaves in every observable way as though it were.


davidsmith,

The assumption of an objective reality is born out of observations that are quantitative, reasonably stable, reasonably consistent and roughly adhere to constructed mathematical relationships we call logic. We equate these aspects of experience with an external objective reality and assume that it functions according to our contructed logical rules. Thus some aspects of experience do appear to roughly follow consistent logical relationships. However, the assumption that these stable and consistent observations relate to an external reality beyond the experiential realm is an unfalsifiable position and therefore should be rejected. Furthermore, science works just as well without this assumption. Science does not need to have anything to say about the nature of reality for the method to function.

See my above response to Ian. If reality behaves according to logical rules, and is objective, then there must be more to reality that just our experiences. Even if it is nothing more than some aspect of your own mind that you don't have direct conscious access to, it is still something beyond your experiences.

It is no less parsimonious to assume that this external reality is some objective reality of which you are just a part, then it is too assume that it is just some aspect of your own mind. In fact, it is far more parsimonious to do so, since that it exactly what the evidence seems to indicate is the case.


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

....
In order to say this, you first have to assume that reality is external to experience. That is a fallacy based on an unfalsifiable premise.

Seems obvious to me, and you. So far as I can tell Stimpy doesn't agree.

That continues to confuse me in that he eliminates dualism, but has no ontological belief, yet is not a monist of either kind. Either idealism(I'd say "life"=mind) or physicalism-materialism(I'd say non-life=body).

Consideration of the life/non-life boundry (or lack thereof) and various aspects of homo sap "consciousness" lead me to the side of idealism.

It is no less parsimonious to assume that this external reality is some objective reality of which you are just a part, then it is too assume that it is just some aspect of your own mind. In fact, it is far more parsimonious to do so, since that it exactly what the evidence seems to indicate is the case.

To me still supports either "mind" or "body". What am I missing?

 

[Dancing David]

Hmmm,

I find this interesting, where does experience come from, it is not self standing.

If I see the color of a bird is red , it is because a photon came from some where and then refelected off the bird, entered my eye and interacted with the receptor in my eye.

There is no experienec outside of external reality, without an external reality there would not be experience.

The way to break the tautology is that there is experience, scienfce allows us to predict the behavior of that experience, the prediction is consistent with thier being an objective reality.

All the rest is just masturbation with words.

 

[DialecticMaterialist]

He's assuming a parsimonious position? How is it more parsimonious than idealism?

BTW this has nothing whatsoever to do with the topic of this thread

And also BTW I do not believe that it could remotely be thought that Ockhams razor can be used in such a context.

And if it could then denying an entire physical Universe would certainly seem more parsimonious than hypothesising its existence such as all physicalists do!

Well then you obviously don't understand the principle of parsimony very well.


The principle of parsimony is used to keep people from making things up, because if a person can add as many assumptions or excuses as he or she wants, he or she can literally invent and prove any sort of story.

Basically then its used to avoid endless controversy and prevent people from imagining things.


Now obviously in a universe of subjective idealism this does not apply, because a person cannot make things up: his or her thought is what exists.




So Occam's Razor's very validity demands one accept an objectivist position, not a subjectivist one. This means Ian that the Principle of Parsimony's very justification for its existence demands one assume some sort of objectivist position.

Hence subjective idealism is not compatible with Occam's Razor and can hardly then be justified as parsimonious.



Lastly you Ian may not think Occam's Razor applies to this situation but simply thinking that does not make it true. You have to give a reason for this.

Remember the Principle is used to avoid endless controversy and avoid people making stuff up. This is just as important in philosophy as it is in science.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

To me still supports either "mind" or "body". What am I missing?

What is the point, in an ideal world where all is consciousness, of having some mechanism to make everyone's view of "external reality" consistent? What necessary purpose does it serve?

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

What is the point, in an ideal world where all is consciousness, of having some mechanism to make everyone's view of "external reality" consistent? What necessary purpose does it serve?
~~ Paul

Those darn Laws of Physics -- some math that predicts what our perceptions will perceive -- are handy to keep the perceived universe chugging along as it seems (to intend )to.

WHY?

That's the part of the Question idealism can at least offer "possible" rationales. What do you non-idealists think is the "necessary purpose served"?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk asked:

That's the part of the Question idealism can at least offer "possible" rationales. What do you non-idealists think is the "necessary purpose served"?

Well, touché, I suppose. I just find it easier to swallow an external reality using a bunch of laws to maintain its coherence. Why should a purely Beingness-based reality care to force all its little mini-beingnesses into a consistent framework?

Geez, that sounds absurd. Never mind.

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

What do you non-idealists think is the "necessary purpose served"?

The physical universe serves no "necessary purpose" under materialism - it "just is". If consciousness arises from this state, and seeks "purpose" then there is no conflict. But under idealism, what purpose does the universe serve? How can you decide amongst the endless stream of potential alternatives?