Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Just a quick point about solipsism and Yahweh's and Stimpy's denial that it is a metaphysical position.

I didn't say that solipsism isn't a metaphysical position. It is entirely possible for a metaphysical position to be inconsistent with a purely epistemological position.

A good example of this would be your own metaphysical position, as compared to naturalism. You have already said that you do not consider naturalism to be a metaphysical position. It is purely epistemological. But you are not a naturalist. A naturalist must necessarily reject your metaphysical position, because it is not naturalistic. But that doesn't make naturalism metaphysical.

Put simply, most metaphysical positions also imply epistemological ones. Solipsism has some very specific epistemological implications which are simply not compatible with naturalism.

Now to hold a metaphysical or ontological position is to hold that some aspect of reality exists beyond any epistemological criteria. But this is precisely what any non-solipsistic position does, and which solipsism doesn't!

As you said, any claims of aspects of reality beyond epistemological criteria are metaphysical. But naturalism does not make any. And the rejection of solipsism does not necessarily include any. In the case of naturalism, the reason for this is that the assumption that solipsism is false is a logically necessary assumption for the scientific method to be valid. Combine this with the fact that the scientific framework of naturalism is falsifiable, and we find that the rejection of solipsism is not a metaphysical claim at all, but rather a claim for which there is substantial empirical supporting evidence (not proof).

This type of thing is not specific to naturalism, either. Any epistemological framework is going to have axioms which are not compatible with all possible metaphysical frameworks. Once again, that does not mean that all epistemological frameworks are metaphysical. On the contrary, it means that some metaphysical frameworks are also epistemological.


Paul,

First, rejecting solipsism, it might be that we are observing events that are common to all of us. This is the idea that there is an external reality, though this need not be an ontological assumption, merely an assumption that what we observe obeys logical rules. And that assumption is continually tested as we do science.

Now, even though Stimpson says that the above scenario assumes the rejection of solipsism, it seems to me that it does not strictly require it. Instead, solipsism could simulate the same scenario. My mind could project a world that obeys logical rules, but at the same time mess up my perceptions in odd ways to fool me into thinking that I'm fallible. In other words, it could project incorrect perceptions for me, while at the same time projecting other people who have the correct perception of those same events.

Now, which scenario requires fewer strange assumptions?

You hit it right on the nose, Paul. The rejection of solipsism is necessary to derive that the scientific method should work. One could attempt to claim that solipsism is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though solipsism were false. But since this hypothesis is unfalsifiable, it must be rejected by the naturalistic framework.

In fact, this is a general thing in naturalism. The assumption that something is true may be unfalsifiable, and the assumption that it is false may be falsifiable. If this is the case, then the assumption that it is false is an epistemological assumption, and the claim that it is false, based on supporting empirical evidence, is an epistemological claim. On the other hand, the claim that the assumption is true is a metaphysical one.

A good example of this is the existence of a God of Weather. The hypothesis that an undetectable sentient being is actually in control of the weather, and exerts his influence is subtle ways that are completely indetectable to humans, is an unfalsifiable metaphysical claim. The hypothesis that the weather is a complex dynamical process, completely reducible to the laws of physics as we know them, is a falsifiable theory, and one for which there is substantial supporting evidence. This theory directly implies that there is no Weather God involved, but this is by no means a metaphysical claim.

The situation with solipsism is completely analogous. Solipsism is not falsifiable, but there are many falsifiable hypotheses which are incompatible with solipsism. The claim of solipsism is therefore a metaphysical one (and also an epistemological one), but the rejection of solipsism in favor of the falsifiable hypothesis is a purely epistemological claim.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Anyway, a good simile illustrating what supervience actually means can be found here

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The idea of supervenience might be introduced via an example due to David Lewis of a dot-matrix picture:

A dot-matrix picture has global properties -- it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot -- and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn't a dot (1986, p. 14).
Lewis's example gives us one way to introduce the basic of idea of physicalism. The basic idea is that the physical features of the world are like the dots in the picture, and the psychological or biological or social features of the world are like the global properties of the picture.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That sounds like reducibility to me. You said this was a simile, where does the metaphysical part come in? This example certainly doesn't involve anything metaphysical.

So likewise conscious states, although reducible to physical processes in the brain, are nevertheless identical to such processes. But note this does not mean consciousness and physical states of the brain are synonymous!

What do you mean by synonymous? Certainly I am only claiming that the physical process is identical to the mental process. They are the same thing. If you mean something other than that by "synonymous", then I don't know what you mean.

The dots and the patterns they comprise are not synonymous with the global properties ie the actual picture, although they are identical. Likewise for consciousness. No-one would suggest otherwise; oh . . .apart from Stimpy LOL

I have no idea what this means. The global properties of the picture are properties of the patterns of dots. Like you said, they are identical. I have no idea what you mean by synonymous here, or how supervenience differs from reducibility.

Ooops, just remembered you said you don't subscribe to supervenience. Is that still true now I've given an explanation of what it means?

I don't know. What you described sounds like plain old reducibility. Clearly I think that consciousness is reducible to brain processes. I see nothing whatsoever that is metaphysical about this, and I have no idea what you are talking about when you say that A and B are identical, but not synonymous. I was tought in grade school that synonymous means that two words mean the same thing.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

I didn't say that solipsism isn't a metaphysical position.

I am denying that solipsism is a metaphysical position!

A good example of this would be your own metaphysical position, as compared to naturalism.

You can't compare it to naturalism any more than a materialist/physicalist could compare their position to naturalism! Naturalism is not a metaphysical position! It has absolutely nothing to do wityh either idealism or physicalism!

You have already said that you do not consider naturalism to be a metaphysical position. It is purely epistemological. But you are not a naturalist. A naturalist must necessarily reject your metaphysical position, because it is not naturalistic. But that doesn't make naturalism metaphysical.

I reject naturalism, but certainly idealism is not incompatible with naturalism. My version of it is, yes

 

[Interesting Ian]

Put simply, most metaphysical positions also imply epistemological ones. Solipsism has some very specific epistemological implications which are simply not compatible with naturalism.

Sorry, I'm unable to think of any at all. Care to name any?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Paul,



You hit it right on the nose, Paul. The rejection of solipsism is necessary to derive that the scientific method should work.

Nonsense! Give some reasons to back this up.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Stimpy
One could attempt to claim that solipsism is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though solipsism were false.

One could attempt to claim that a non-solipsistic position is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though a non-solipsism position were false.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Solipsism is not falsifiable,

{Shrugs}

Neither is a non-solipsistic position. So what?

but there are many falsifiable hypotheses which are incompatible with solipsism.

Name one.

 

[The Central Scrutinizer]

Stimpy continually claims that he is a materialist/physicalist, but that neither ontology or metaphysics play any role in his particular version of physicalism. There is a simple disproof of this. In order to be a physicalist you necessarily must believe Consciousness supervenes on the physical. But supervenience itself is a metaphysical claim. Therefore to be a physicalist necessarily commits you to making at least one metaphysical claim

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,



That sounds like reducibility to me. You said this was a simile, where does the metaphysical part come in? This example certainly doesn't involve anything metaphysical.

I explained that but you've decided to ignore it.

What do you mean by synonymous? Certainly I am only claiming that the physical process is identical to the mental process. They are the same thing. If you mean something other than that by "synonymous", then I don't know what you mean.

Notwithstanding their identity, there are differing meanings attached to talking about the experience of pain and the actual physical process in the brain.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Nonsense! Give some reasons to back this up.

in response to Stimpy's:

The rejection of solipsism is necessary to derive that the scientific method should work.

Because the idea that solipsism could just be fooling us into believing that science works is an unfalsifiable idea. It might be right, but it seems prudent to reject it.

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I didn't say that solipsism isn't a metaphysical position.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am denying that solipsism is a metaphysical position!

Well, that raises a very important point. I actually know of two different conceptions of solipsism. One of them is metaphysical, and the other is purely epistemological.

The metaphysical view of solipsism is that all that exists is your own consciousness. Everything you experience is a construct of your own mind, and the impression that your are interacting with an external world is an illusion.

The epistemological view is that nothing other than your own experiences can ever be known. It is not possible to learn anything about the external world from your observations, nor is it even possible to know if an external world exists.

Now, clearly naturalism must reject the epistemological view of solipsism. And of course there is nothing metaphysical about doing so. But what about the metaphysical view?

That metaphysical view of solipsism has epistemological implications too. In fact, it implies the epistemological view of solipsism. So when we reject the epistemological view of solipsism, we also reject the metaphysical view of it, along with any other metaphysical views that imply epistemological views which are incompatible with naturalism.

A good example of this would be your own metaphysical position, as compared to naturalism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You can't compare it to naturalism any more than a materialist/physicalist could compare their position to naturalism! Naturalism is not a metaphysical position! It has absolutely nothing to do wityh either idealism or physicalism!

That was exactly the point I was making. Naturalism is an epistemological philosophy, and your view of Idealism is a metaphysical one. But nevertheless naturalism must reject your view of Idealism. Doing so does not make naturalism metaphysical, and neither does rejecting solipsism.

You have already said that you do not consider naturalism to be a metaphysical position. It is purely epistemological. But you are not a naturalist. A naturalist must necessarily reject your metaphysical position, because it is not naturalistic. But that doesn't make naturalism metaphysical.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I reject naturalism, but certainly idealism is not incompatible with naturalism. My version of it is, yes.

I know. I was talking about your version of it.

Put simply, most metaphysical positions also imply epistemological ones. Solipsism has some very specific epistemological implications which are simply not compatible with naturalism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sorry, I'm unable to think of any at all. Care to name any?

Science assumes that reality functions according to a set of consistent natural laws. Metaphysical solipsism claims that reality is nothing more than your experiences. Our experiences do not appear to function according to consistent natural laws. The simplest hypothesis that we can construct to account for this is that our experiences are fallible, that is, that they give us an imperfect representation of reality. Such a claim is meaningless if we assume that reality is just our experiences. In that case, we must make the completely absurd assumption that reality is not objective, but that for some inexplicable reason, it just happens to behave in every single observable way as though it were.

One could attempt to claim that solipsism is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though solipsism were false.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

One could attempt to claim that a non-solipsistic position is true, but that for some unidentifiable reason, your perceptions behave exactly as though a non-solipsism position were false.

No, one could not, because that would be meaningless. What is the expected behavior for a solipsistic position? There isn't any. Solipsism is an epistemological dead-end. The only way to make any claims about what you expect to observe after assuming solipsism is true, is to tack on the assumption that reality behaves as though it were actually objective, even though it is not. The assumption that solipsism is true adds absolutely nothing to the position. All it does is imply that for some completely unknowable reason, reality behaves as though it were something that it is not. It is far more parsimonious to simply say that since reality behaves exactly as though it were objective, that we think it probably is.

but there are many falsifiable hypotheses which are incompatible with solipsism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Name one.

Like the hypothesis that I am not special, and that other people are essentially no different than me. That is a falsifiable hypothesis. You can always invent unfalsifiable hypotheses which claim that the hypothesis is false, but in such a way that we could never tell. Such unfalsifiable hypotheses (like solipsism) are of no value.

That sounds like reducibility to me. You said this was a simile, where does the metaphysical part come in? This example certainly doesn't involve anything metaphysical.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I explained that but you've decided to ignore it.

I assume you are referring to this?

So just as the dots in the dot-matrix picure enjoy a prime reality with the picture supervening on these dots, so the physical processes of the world have the prime reality with consciousness supervening on certain special physical states; namely those found in the brain. But saying that physical processes are primary with consciousness being derived from this primary reality is a metaphysical position. This contradicts Stimpys original position that he is a physicalist who rejects metaphysics in his interpretation of reality.

I did address it, I just didn't quote it. If there is nothing metaphysical about saying that the dots "enjoy a primary reality with the picture supervening on the dots", then there is nothing metaphysical about saying that the physical processes "enjoy a primary reality with consciousness supervening on the process".

This is just semantics. You are using the word "primary" here to mean that it is the more general thing, with the supervening phenomena being a particular pattern or process. That is a completely different usage of the word "primary" than in metaphysics.

What do you mean by synonymous? Certainly I am only claiming that the physical process is identical to the mental process. They are the same thing. If you mean something other than that by "synonymous", then I don't know what you mean.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notwithstanding their identity, there are differing meanings attached to talking about the experience of pain and the actual physical process in the brain.

How do you figure? Sure, when somebody talks about the experience of pain, they may not know that it is a physical process in the brain. They may even believe that it is not. But if it is, then they are talking about that process nevertheless.

A person may not know that burning is a particular type of chemical reaction, but that doesn't mean that when he talks about something burning he isn't talking about a particular type of chemical reaction.

Once again, this is purely semantics, and has no bearing on the actual content or meaning of my position. Burning is not metaphysical. Patterns of dots forming images is not metaphysical, and consciousness being reducible to physical brain processes is not metaphysical.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Loki]

Stimpy,

I still don't understand what you mean by supervene.

In case this still applies....

From here

'Supervenience' must be broken down into (at least) logical supervenience and metaphysical supervenience. The former is a relationship of a priori necessity, requiring that we take a concept's intension as that which fixes reference for whatever world is actual.
...
By contrast, a posteriori necessity grounds 'metaphysical supervenience', which features principally in talk about consciousness:

and from here

Now back to strong supervenience, or just plain old "supervenience" for short. If we assume that the A-properties are physical properties and that the B-properties are mental properties, then this yields a materialist or physicalist supervenience.
...
When this extra constraint is added, materialist supervenience is then called "superdupervenience," because it captures the idea that the lower-level properties necessarily determine the higher-level properties in a wholly lawlike fashion.
...
Now finally we can define logical supervenience. The notion of logical supervenience means that the two occurrences of ‘necessarily’ in the formulation of strong supervenience are to be read as ‘logically (i.e., analytically, weakly metaphysically) necessarily’, as opposed, e.g., to ‘non-logically (i.e., non-analytically, synthetically, strongly metaphysically) necessarily’ or ‘physically (i.e., nomologically, naturally) necessary’, which are more restricted modalities.

Now, I'm sure that clears everything up?

 

[Upchurch]

So the argument goes on. But I haven't got any more time to further respond to you today Stimp.

Just to recap (I've been out of the country), Ian had a "final proof" that is inconclusive and requires more discussion?

JK may be gone, but the more things change, the more they stay the same.

 

[Dancing David]

Sorry Ian, you haven't convinced me,
Especialy your argument about the dots and the picture, there is no picture without the brain to give it meaning.

No go!

 

[Interesting Ian]

Sorry Ian, you haven't convinced me,
Especialy your argument about the dots and the picture, there is no picture without the brain to give it meaning.

No go!

I haven't convinced you of what? Remember I am not arguing for any position on the mind body problem in this thread. I was simply discussing the distinction between physicalism and naturalism and maintaining that the former is saying something about the nature of reality (what reality really is, or ontology) and the latter isn't (concerns itself with epistemological issues only).

I have no real disagreement with Stimpy in this thread apart from semantic quibbling about whether physicalism involves metaphysics. THis has simply transpired to boil down to a question about what the word metaphysics actually means. In other words it seems that Stimpy has a differing definition of metaphysics than I have. Now I could appeal to authority and quote loads of sources showing that my definition of metaphysics is correct. But it really isn't important.

Stimpy agrees with supervenience meaning that he holds that there is an underlying reality to . . er . .reality which consciousness supervenes upon. Nuff said. What is there to argue about further?

 

[treborf]

What is there to argue about further?

Geez, I go away for the weekend and this thread has turned into a love-fest.

To answer your question, for a start, some of the claims you've made to support your position are debatable. For example, you've said that based on current evidence, 'real' science would never say that consciousness appears to be a function of the brain. Do you want to retract that claim?

 

[treborf]

But, hey, I give you credit, Ian, for recognizing that this is simply a debate about semantics.

 

[hammegk]

Ian,



Well, that raises a very important point. I actually know of two different conceptions of solipsism. One of them is metaphysical, and the other is purely epistemological.

The metaphysical view of solipsism is that all that exists is your own consciousness. Everything you experience is a construct of your own mind, and the impression that your are interacting with an external world is an illusion.

The epistemological view is that nothing other than your own experiences can ever be known. It is not possible to learn anything about the external world from your observations, nor is it even possible to know if an external world exists.

Stimpy, are those your definitions, or do you feel these are as close to agreed definitions that philosophers will ever reach?

Stimpy addressing Ian:

But nevertheless naturalism must reject your view of Idealism.

You would agree then that naturalism is viable under some form of Idealism?

Stimpy, would you mind commenting on what you see in Ian's position that denies it?

Like the hypothesis that I am not special, and that other people are essentially no different than me. That is a falsifiable hypothesis.

I don't see any falsifiability in that hypo; would you mind being a bit more specific on how to falsify it?

To me, it's no better than Paul's reason to deny solipsism -- "it would be prudent".

Gentlemen's agreement that it is not so is still my position. I'd like to hear a logical argument that we could agree on.

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Metaphysics - The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value. (taken from dictionary.com

I believe that would include solipsism, materialism, naturalism, physicalism, etc...

Does it even matter? It's just a grouping of certain things. If one of them is wrong it doesn't affect other metaphysical ideas. It's like a building with different departments in it dealing with different things. Or something.


Quibbling with semantics usually doesn't get us very far.

 

[Crossbow]

I haven't convinced you of what? Remember I am not arguing for any position on the mind body problem in this thread. I was simply discussing the distinction between physicalism and naturalism and maintaining that the former is saying something about the nature of reality (what reality really is, or ontology) and the latter isn't (concerns itself with epistemological issues only).

I have no real disagreement with Stimpy in this thread apart from semantic quibbling about whether physicalism involves metaphysics. THis has simply transpired to boil down to a question about what the word metaphysics actually means. In other words it seems that Stimpy has a differing definition of metaphysics than I have. Now I could appeal to authority and quote loads of sources showing that my definition of metaphysics is correct. But it really isn't important.

Stimpy agrees with supervenience meaning that he holds that there is an underlying reality to . . er . .reality which consciousness supervenes upon. Nuff said. What is there to argue about further?

Well then, if that is the case (that you have no real disagreement with Stimpy), then I take it that you do not have the "Final Proof that Stimpson J. Cat is wrong", yes?