Caustic, the carriers weren't saved by "inexact scheduling", they were sortied by Kimmel's orders. Washington told him to reinforce the aircraft on Wake and Midway. They did not tell him how to do it. You might also note that Enterprise should have been back in port on Saturday, but was slow due to difficulty in refueling the escorting destroyers. Her crew really wanted to be in on Sunday, they had a big baseball game scheduled against Arizona.
Kimmell was indeed ordered to send two task forces out to get more planes to Wake and Midway (IIRC). It was probably up to the task force commanders (Adm. Halsey and another) to set their schedules. Now it seems that Kimmel's aim was to keep one carrier in port at all or most times. Halsey's ETA back was Saturday afternoon, 12/6 and it would perhaps be this that made Kimmel feel close enough sending the second task force out 24 hours ahead of this, leaving no carriers for a day. Instead that day stretched into Sunday morning and thus the carriers were both spared.
Reasons for this delay of Halsey's first task force: a storm, and something else. Could these have been predicted better than they were?
“Enterprise was doing her best to get back into Pearl. Her first ETA was Saturday evening, but a storm delayed her. The next time set was 7 AM, 55 minutes before the attack started, but that proved too optimistic as well.”
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/
Also, was the Yorktown really needed in the Atlantic? Was the Saratoga's retrofitting on or behind schedule? The Hornet's shakedown and deployment - delayed at all? Of five carriers that might have been there, zero were on 12/7, as it happened. I'm just not satisfied that's all coincidence.
You might also consider that it was Halsey and Brown who insisted the BBs stay in port and not escort the carriers. "If we have to run, we don't want to be slowed down by 21-knot ships."
Yeah they were trying to run, but they still wound up too slow, eh? The other thing is the BBs were obsolete and less valuable as well. Right? They took instead, collectively, 20 faster warships with them (3 Heavy Cruisers with each carrier, and 14 destroyers split 9/5, leaving only 46 war ships (mostly battleships) and 55 auxiliary ships (minesweepers, submarines, tenders, etc). So yeah, that helps my point.
So, carriers not in port: Kimmel's decision.
Spurred by the Navy's orders, based on Halsey's math and a little brinksmanship, and serving to soften the blow a bit when it came.
Battleships in port: Kimmel's okay. Washington was not informed of the movements of the carriers or battleships, such information was "housekeeping" and not required from 14th ND.
Any other questions?
Yeah. Considering the scale and gravity and relative necessity of taking the first hit, have you considered motives on anyone's part - even subconscious - that may have led to the situation there that morning? Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox (IIRC), Kimmel, Halsey, have you wondered if anyone made any bad moves because of this strange attractor event from the future? IF so, how did you dispell these concerns, and if not why not?
BTW, I am in the process of putting all forty volumes of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings online. URLs will be provided after I prove I"m not a spammer.
I read the final JCC report, but this is the raw stuff behind that, actual Q and A? That would be interesting, and kudos for getting that together. I won't have the time; earlier this year was the time for that, now I'm on the Lockerbie beat and it's too hard to switch gears or even keep up with that one as is. (Just got the trial transcripts, actual Q and A, otherwise unseen on the nets and a lot to digest)
Alright, godspeed to you in your studies good sir.
numbers. So those are the people I work for, and the people that matter.