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Enlightenment re-start. An actionable proposal.

Mmm, paraphrasing ancient Greeks: I read your essay. When I had finished, I had forgotten the first part. Because I had forgotten the first part, the last part made no sense to me.



...Actually, I'm lying. I didn't even make it through the first part.

Hans
 
To All,

Some interesting responses. I don't have time to address them now, but will return this evening to do so.
 
Proven by what? The fact that it's always worked in the past? Hume argued persuasively that that is no reason to assume its validity for the future.

(As you can tell from my post above, this is the issue that really interests me out of all this.)
James - It interests you, fine. To me it's just silly. The fact that Wednesday preceded Thursday last week does not prove it will do so next week. We all know that. Do we care? Is it a significant fact in your life or mine? When Thursday starts coming first, I'll worry about it, not before.

Induction is a useful tool. A hammer is a useful tool. Once in a while, I bang my thumb with one, but I go on using it, because most of the time I hit the nail. I truly despair of philosophers who look for problems where none exist. There are loads of real problems in the world. We should not build sewers because next week ◊◊◊◊ may flow uphill? This is navel gazing.

- Jekyll

Jekyll- At this time, I have not felt the Earth braking or accelerating. I therefore conclude it is still rotating. Therefore, the sun will come up tomorrow, somewhere.
This is not a guess, or an inductive conclusion. If the Earth stopped rotating instantaneously NOW, the sun would still be rising somewhere and it would be tomorrow at that place from my point of view. The only exception is if the sun is about to rise where I am , today, when the Earth brakes. (Unless we include the case where the sun either vanishes or explodes taking Earth with it. Which is just silly).
 
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James - It interests you, fine. To me it's just silly. The fact that Wednesday preceded Thursday last week does not prove it will do so next week. We all know that. Do we care? Is it a significant fact in your life or mine? When Thursday starts coming first, I'll worry about it, not before.

That's not a very good example, since "Wednesday" and "Thursday" are arbitrary sequential labels anyway-- Thursday will always be the day after Wednesday, but that's a statement about convention rather than nature.

I don't think that "we all" do realize that inductive conclusions are ultimately lacking in logical validity (assuming that to be the case; I'm still holding out hope that it will ultimately prove not to be); I doubt that fact has ever occurred to the vast majority of individuals. I think it absolutely should matter to everyone reading this forum-- how can we make a consistent argument that empiricism and the scientific method are better means to discerning truth than religion and faith if both approaches lack logical validity, and ultimately rest on faith?

I truly despair of philosophers who look for problems where none exist... This is navel gazing.

Well, this is the Religion and Phliosophy forum, and philosophy often concerns itself with abstract speculations; it seems to me that whether they are important or unimportant is more a matter of taste. An argument that threatens to undermine the validity of all human knowledge strikes me as a pretty important one for philosophy to consider, though.

There are loads of real problems in the world. We should not build sewers because next week ◊◊◊◊ may flow uphill?

Of course not, but that's an engineering problem, not a philosophical one. Hume didn't advocate that we allow our empistemological skepticism to paralyze us in the face of daily problems; in fact, his solution to the problem of induction was to throw his hands up in the air and realize that, whatever doubts we may entertain in periods of quiet contemplation, as soon as the real world intrudes on us we're going to fall back into believing in things like the reality of external objects, cause and effect, and the validity of inductive reasoning despite our lack of a logical justification for doing so. I would prefer a more intellectually satisfying solution, but I'm not suggesting that Hume's pragmatic one shouldn't be applied in the interim.

At this time, I have not felt the Earth braking or accelerating. I therefore conclude it is still rotating.
What makes you think you'd be able to feel the sudden deceleration of the Earth? The laws of physics? But the laws of physics are general principles derived by induction from numerous empirical observations. As such, they rely on the principle of uniformity of nature. The very point we're discussing is that there appears to be no logical reason whatsoever to believe that the laws of physics are the same right now as they have been for the last 14 billion years, or that they will be the same one minute from now.


Jekyll,

This is interesting, and I hadn't heard of it before. If I'm interpreting it correctly, though, it still seems as though it's subscribing to the premise of uniformity of nature, so how does it resolve the induction problem?
 
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. . . .Well, this is the Religion and Phliosophy forum, and philosophy often concerns itself with abstract speculations; it seems to me that whether they are important or unimportant is more a matter of taste. An argument that threatens to undermine the validity of all human knowledge strikes me as a pretty important one for philosophy to consider, though. . . .

Sorry to butt in, but is this really an "argument that threatens to undermine the validity of all human knowledge"? Aren't you over selling it just a tad?

These types of statements seem to me to be blatant attempts by folks who spent a lot of money on Philosophy degrees to keep from admitting their field of study is not that important in the overall scheme of things.

Now don't get me wrong. I think philosophical discussion is wonderful brain exercise, but ultimately that's all it is. And to say that this is an "argument that threatens to undermine the validity of all human knowledge" smacks of melodrama.

The truth is, we could grant every proposition outlined in the OP and every supporting argument anyone has ever laid out, and it would change nothing. Nothing at all.

Reality is what we perceive it to be, and questioning whether it is solely a human construct doesn't change that. Questioning whether induction is a valuable tool doesn't change it either. It sheds no new light on the universe. It progresses no movement. It aids no one in need. It does nothing but impress undergraduate hippie chicks down at the coffee shop.

Likewise human knowledge is what it is. And its validity is tied directly to the reality we perceive. It will always be valid because of that. There is no such thing as invalid knowledge. There cannot be. Otherwise, it's not knowledge.

Yes, there are elements of our understanding that must be revised when we discover them to be outdated or even incorrect. But now . . . now we're talking science.
 
Sorry to butt in, but is this really an "argument that threatens to undermine the validity of all human knowledge"? Aren't you over selling it just a tad?

No, Phil, I don't think I am being melodramatic. Did you read my first post in this thread, in which I set out the problem of induction? If Hume's argument is correct (and, as I said, I understand that Popper has posed some rebuttal to it that I am not familiar with), then all conclusions based on inductive reasoning are logically invalid. That would encompass all scientific knowledge, which rests on inductive conclusions drawn from empirical observations. It would also include all day-to-day knowledge derived from the senses, insofar as experience from the senses is used to make conjectures about the future (e.g., this apple will taste like all the other apples I have eaten, and not like a banana). The only exception to this might be mathematical knowledge.

As Bertrand Russell put it in The History of Western Philosophy, "The growth of unreason throughout the nineteenth century and what has passed of the twentieth is a natural sequel to Hume's destruction of empiricism."

Reality is what we perceive it to be, and questioning whether it is solely a human construct doesn't change that. Questioning whether induction is a valuable tool doesn't change it either. It sheds no new light on the universe. It progresses no movement. It aids no one in need. It does nothing but impress undergraduate hippie chicks down at the coffee shop.

*shrug* Why does seeking truth have to be practical in order to be worthwhile? That sounds like an argument my engineering friends used to make in college. I don't agree with it, and I'm not going to try to defend philosophy on that ground. Much philosophical speculation probably isn't of much use in building a bridge or curing disease. In my view, that doesn't make its study any less valid or worthwhile.
 
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If Hume's argument is correct (and, as I said, I understand that Popper has posed some rebuttal to it that I am not familiar with), then all conclusions based on inductive reasoning are logically invalid. That would encompass all scientific knowledge, which rests on inductive conclusions drawn from empirical observations. It would also include all day-to-day knowledge derived from the senses. The only exception to this might be mathematical knowledge.

Let me know if that happens, okay? Because if so, I want my college to refund the cost of tuition to all those science courses.
 
Jekyll- At this time, I have not felt the Earth braking or accelerating. I therefore conclude it is still rotating. Therefore, the sun will come up tomorrow, somewhere.
Ok, what you're doing here is applying your a prior knowledge of the world rather than starting from total ignorance.
This is encoraged, but you missed one of the most important sections of the link.
Laplace, however, recognised this to be a misapplication of the rule of succession through not taking into account all the prior information available immediately after deriving the result:

But this number [the odds of the sun coming up tomorrow] is far greater for him who, seeing in the totality of phenomena the principle regulating the days and seasons, realizes that nothing at present moment can arrest the course of it.

It is noted by Jaynes (2003) that Laplace's warning had gone unheeded by workers in the field.
So Laplace (one of the greatest scientists ever) agrees with you. Which is always nice.

This is not a guess, or an inductive conclusion. If the Earth stopped rotating instantaneously NOW, the sun would still be rising somewhere and it would be tomorrow at that place from my point of view. The only exception is if the sun is about to rise where I am , today, when the Earth brakes.
Ok, shades of www.timecube.com here.
Dr. Gene Ray offers Wikipedia $10,000.00 to disprove math that 1 rotation of 4 Earth quadrants within the 4 quarter Harmonic Time Cube does create 4 simultaneous 24 hr. days. Both Americans & Wikipedia are evil to deny or ignore Cubic Creation.

Now the important thing to remember is that you have no knowledge about what makes the universe follow physics as we understand it. You have no priors to bring to the table which will guarentee that the laws of physics can't just be switched off.

As you're effectively starting from a position of pure ignorance, we can use Laplance's Law of Succession without any modification.
 
Jekyll,

This is interesting, and I hadn't heard of it before. If I'm interpreting it correctly, though, it still seems as though it's subscribing to the premise of uniformity of nature, so how does it resolve the induction problem?
I don't know Hume's argument, but the law of succession works from a corollary to Occam's razor.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/OCCAMRAZ.html

Just as "one should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain anything" one should not increase the number of types of entities to explain anything, beyond what is necessary.

Unless you have information that the day after tomorrow will differentiate substantally from yesterday, you should think that it will probably be the same.:D
 
No, Phil, I don't think I am being melodramatic. Did you read my first post in this thread, in which I set out the problem of induction? If Hume's argument is correct (and, as I said, I understand that Popper has posed some rebuttal to it that I am not familiar with), then all conclusions based on inductive reasoning are logically invalid. That would encompass all scientific knowledge, which rests on inductive conclusions drawn from empirical observations. It would also include all day-to-day knowledge derived from the senses, insofar as experience from the senses is used to make conjectures about the future (e.g., this apple will taste like all the other apples I have eaten, and not like a banana). The only exception to this might be mathematical knowledge. . . .

Perhaps melodramatic was not the best choice of words. I will try to be more selective.

But may I suggest formulating your own rebuttal to Hume to see if the inanity of his work doesn't become clear. As I said, we could grant Hume his argument, and say, yes, all conclusions based on inductive reasoning are logically invalid. But where does that leave us? Would anything really change?

I submit that it would not.

Despite the logical validity of our methods, we still progress. Whether science rests on invalid logic, or valid logic, or a toadstool in a pond matters little if it works. And as far as I can see, it works fairly well.

I guess what it boils down to is, where I see some, I don't see as much value in these types of discussions as others do.
 
I printed it out so that I could read it - trying to read the OP online gave me a migraine.

Reading it offline just made my eyes ache.

Way too long indeed.
 
As I said, we could grant Hume his argument, and say, yes, all conclusions based on inductive reasoning are logically invalid. But where does that leave us? Would anything really change?...

I guess what it boils down to is, where I see some, I don't see as much value in these types of discussions as others do.

The reason it matters to me is that, if we grant Hume's conclusion, it seems that skeptics and empiricists are being hypocritical in our debates with the credulous. I'll adopt the theist-atheist dispute as an example, without meaning to imply that all theists are irrational. A classic atheist argument is, "Belief must be based on evidence. There's not sufficient empirical evidence for the existence of God. Believing something by faith, just because you want it to be true, is irrational! Therefore, you should be an atheist." It seems that if Hume's argument is true, the theist could legitimately respond, "So what? Empiricism is ultimately based on faith, too. There's no logical reason to believe that the laws of science are an accurate reflection of the way the universe works; the scientific method rests on a circular justification. You put your faith in empiricism, I put my faith in God. You have no basis for believing that your method is any better at finding truth than mine is." Unless we find some resolution to Hume's problem of induction, what else is there to say on the matter?

But may I suggest formulating your own rebuttal to Hume to see if the inanity of his work doesn't become clear.

I have given a fair amount of thought to this matter for several years, and, far from seeing any inanity in Hume's argument, it still seems to me that he's probably right, regardless of what the practical consequences of that argument may be. I'm eager to hear more about Popper's proposed solution to this problem, but haven't had time to read up on it over the last couple of days.
 
The reason it matters to me is that, if we grant Hume's conclusion, it seems that skeptics and empiricists are being hypocritical in our debates with the credulous. I'll adopt the theist-atheist dispute as an example, without meaning to imply that all theists are irrational. A classic atheist argument is, "Belief must be based on evidence. There's not sufficient empirical evidence for the existence of God. Believing something by faith, just because you want it to be true, is irrational! Therefore, you should be an atheist." It seems that if Hume's argument is true, the theist could legitimately respond, "So what? Empiricism is ultimately based on faith, too. There's no logical reason to believe that the laws of science are an accurate reflection of the way the universe works; the scientific method rests on a circular justification. You put your faith in empiricism, I put my faith in God. You have no basis for believing that your method is any better at finding truth than mine is." Unless we find some resolution to Hume's problem of induction, what else is there to say on the matter? . . . .

You are absolutely right --- in this context.

" . . . if we grant Hume's conclusion . . ." is the key phrase here. Remember this is a hypothetical. It is not difficult to construct any number of hypotheticals where the naturalist's view is merely equally as strong or even less valid than the theist's.

But until that apple I'm going to eat tastes like a banana instead of like all the apples I've eaten before, this scenario is hypothetical and the resulting discussion simply an exercise.
 
Lots of good depate going on. I printed out the state of things as I left work, answered it all off-line, and have now come back in to post; but found lots more to deal with. Its late, so I'll post what I have, and address the rest tomorrow.
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Thanks for all of your responses; the genuine, and the flippant. To respond in order of receipt:


Jekyll: We agree that the format is bizarre. I’ve written it thus out of desperation, having tried, and failed, with many other formats. I admit to assuming shared data and prior beliefs. In the complete absence of such things no communication would be possible. As to ‘a common derivative process’, I am not assuming this. I am asserting – in Point #3 – that this is logically entrained by Point #1. I hold that Point #1 rests upon both observation and logical necessity.

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Mercutio: ‘Operationalize!’: OK. Let’s break ‘Step 1’ down into sub steps:

1A. Get some group of sufficiently like minded* people to understand what I am trying to say.

1B. Refine it, on the basis of their feedback, into a form that will be understandable by somewhat less like minded people.

1C. (to run in parallel with 1B): Bring it to the attention of our movement’s presently accepted spokespersons. (They are all far better writers then I am, and so could provide a lot of help with 1B).

1D. (general spread of the meme): The debate spreads on the ‘net, and spills over into other media. The number of people who don’t use the concept ‘truth’ in their thought, speech, or writing – and who are willing to ask those who do use it to explain what they mean by it – grows.

How will we know its working? All forms of irrational knowledge will begin to decline. As the independent basis from which we have been maintaining irrational proposals in direct opposition to rational proposals is eroded, the fundamental silliness of such proposals will become increasingly apparent. Die hard theists (for example) will always be with us – in that same sense that some flat earth believers will always be with us – but they will no longer enjoy an effective majority.

* Here, of course, is ‘the rub’. There may simply not be such a group of people. Or, in alternative statement, what I’m trying to say may be too far from the main stream (in the sense being suggested by my opening Popper quote) to be communicable. This would be a real bitch for me.

PS: Great forum name. My favorite – albeit by a narrow margin – of Shakespeare’s characters.

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Phil: Thanks for trying. But ‘just one point at a time’ is exactly what I was trying to do (with my twelve), and discussing them is what, I hope, we are doing here.

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Drkitten: Your lack of understanding does not mean that there is nothing to understand. The world would perhaps be a better place if all significant ideas could be expressed so as to be comprehensible to your niece. For one thing we could, presumably, go ahead and close down all of our universities. But then again, and to be honest, I rather like universities. I’d suggest some Rousseau. You’ll like him.

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JamesDillon: I agree with your statement of Hume’s position, but not with its final sentence. He didn’t say that science is logically invalid. He said that it is not, in any qualitative sense, superior to the rest of our knowledge. He showed the logical invalidity of the principle upon which the scientists of his day were trying to claim such a distinction. We are the intellectual descendents of those scientists. Our ‘parents’ ardently desired the distinction because they wanted their own special/superior knowledge form as a position from which to oppose the special/superior knowledge form of those who seek to maintain explicitly irrational knowledge. They wanted an objective form of ‘truth’ (conclusively verified through direct and repeatable physical observations) as a bastion from which to fight against the predominant position of religious and ideological subjective ‘truth’ (which is conclusively verified – according to its proponents – through reference to ‘authority’ in general, and ‘holy books’ in particular). Hume’s exposure of induction was therefore a terrible blow to our side. Full understanding of his position logically undercuts all forms of ‘truth’. But this hardly fazed our opposition because A. They didn’t understand it, and B. Their knowledge is already conveniently divorced from reason and logic. As to how bad it was: here’s Russell, writhing only 60 years ago: “It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The lunatic who believes that he is a poached egg is to be condemned solely on the ground that he is in a minority, or rather – since we must not assume democracy – on the ground that the government does not agree with him.”. So, what was Popper’s answer? I don’t think that I can do much better, in a statement of equal or shorter length, then I have already done in Point #9 of the essay and its second (**) endnote. But, to show willing, I will cut and paste a single endnote from the notorious 50 page version of “Truth?”


To attempt here a very brief treatment of this complex issue: Hume showed that induction was unsatisfactory because it could not be logically inferred from any other principle; or, of course, from itself. To précis Popper’s demonstration of the problem (which seems more direct than Hume’s): We may see any number of white swans, over any number of years of observation, but we cannot from this be logically justified in making the general statement “all swans are white”. To do so we would need to infer from some other principles (about the pre established uniformity of swans, and/or about the future exactly resembling the past) which would need to be inferred from still more fundamental principles…...and so on. But let us observe just one black swan, and we can now logically make a useful generalization: “Not all swans are white”. In acceptance of this, Popper’s simple and brilliant proposal to solve Hume’s problem was essentially to abandon the pretence of “proving” any of our scientific knowledge. He revised Science’s basic methodological statement to require potential disprovability, rather than proof, as the most essential characteristic for any proposed item of scientific knowledge. He said, in effect: “Let scientific knowledge be anything, and from any source - induction, deduction, dreams about twisted ladders, or tail eating snakes, we don’t care - if it can be seen to be logically suggested by some physical data, and to have some definite predictive power (which would mean: to be state-able in sufficiently clear terms as to identify at least some physical outcomes that would constitute disproof). To complete this we need only make explicit the obvious caveats: 1. That it has not yet been disproved, and 2. That it can be shown to be better overall, in regard to the two essential characteristics just outlined, than any other logically exclusive knowledge proposal”. This is both a paraphrase of Popper, to the best of my understanding, and the best statement that I can make of the valid methodology of science. There are two important things to be said about it: 1. That it clarified and thus somewhat accelerated scientific progress, but did not lead to any fundamental changes (from which we may infer that it was more a statement of what science already was - though we couldn’t previously define it so well - than of what it needed to become). 2. That it explicitly and permanently recognized all scientific knowledge as tentative and provisional, i.e. as “merely human”.

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Black Fox: I am lousy at Scrabble, and crossword puzzles. My mind works in a very slow and linear way.

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Soapy Sam: I have no indication of having succeeded yet. Possibly with 4 or 5 people (a few friends, and some respondents on the Brights’ board) but that will hardly get the job done.

I will almost certainly have to do another re-write. But I will continue to respond to this thread for as long as its debate remains genuine and interesting.

It will not do either of us any good for me to respond to your 12 specific responses. I would ask you, with the greatest respect, to reread my opening Popper quote. What it refers to is exactly what is happening here. There is – drkitten notwithstanding – a simple point onto which all 12 of mine converge. That point is what you are missing. But it is my inadequacy in communicating it, rather than your capacity for understanding, that is at fault. Maybe it will jog the tumblers of the lock just enough if I address your Point 4 response: We are not at all in disagreement about your statement. We agree that it is an excellent knowledge statement, in that it is extremely rational and extremely well supported by observation. Where we apparently disagree is in your presentation of it as a ‘truth’. We both embrace it as knowledge, for the reasons that I hope we have just agreed upon. My proposal is that we should continue to hold it and propagate it solely upon the basis of those reasons. If you mean by ‘truth’ ‘something more then those reasons’ then I am inviting you to tell me what the ‘something more’ is. If you do not mean ‘something more’ then I am inviting you to delete the redundant concept ‘truth’. At best it can be contributing only confusion to your thinking.

Also: Good to meet you, and thanks for the welcome.

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Jekyll: I’m not familiar with Laplance’s law. Will look it up as soon as I exit this reply mode, and revert to you soon.

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Nancarrow: Thank you for your reply and support. I look forward to talking again after or during the weekend. If you are unfazed by Hume and Popper, and wear the glasses!, then I think that we’re going to get along well. We may disagree, but if so then I suspect that it will at least be an interesting disagreement.

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MRC Hans: If you didn’t make it through the first part, then the last part would definitely not have made sense. You could always try again.
 
JamesDillon,

There is an excellent small book on Popper, called 'Philosophy and the Real World' subtitle: 'An Introduction to Karl Popper'. It is short, clear, and well written; by Bryan Magee (a long time friend and student of Popper). It can be read in an afternoon, and it will explain to you far better than I could how elegantly and completely Popper's solution address Hume's problem. Then let's talk some more.

All the best,

Scimystic
 

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