Split Thread Electronic voting

[Fudbucker]

There are some "do you need a blockchain?" flowcharts out there. They generally look like this:


Do you need a blockchain? -----> No.

Nice.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

You are missing another point. The people need to understand and trust the process.

Yes. Exactly. I don't think it's acceptable to have a voting system where the voters are expected to take someone's word for it that the complex mechanism behind the system is secure.

 

[psionl0]

You are missing another point. The people need to understand and trust the process.

I hear you.

It is unfortunate that a lot of misinformation gets put out by people who would rather try to make the other person look foolish than admit that there are gaps in their own knowledge.

Maybe when a blockchain puts Uber out of business we will get a better idea of what can and what can not be done with blockchain technology.

 

[lomiller]

- How votes would be stored in the block chain.
- How voters could be identified on the blockchain but how they voted would not be available to others.
- How votes could be added to the blockchain without being corrupted in transit.
- Why we don't need a centralized store for the block chain or the nodes.
.

None of these actually requires a blockchain. Without more detail on your proposed system it’s impossible to determine if the blockchain based system is better.

When I that I could answer each of your objections, you adopted a new two-pronged strategy:
- You accused me of a "blockchain is wonderful" mentality to the exclusion of everything else.
- You repeatedly made lengthy posts about flaws in originating computers.

Most of the more experienced people here will have seen people who come in and say “I want to do X with [insert buzzword here], and when you question them why they want to do it that way they can only come up with vague handwaving. You’re inability to offer a detailed description of how and why you want to use blockchain is no doubt setting off alarm bells with many of failed projects imposed by non-technical senior managers or junior employees annoying everyone with poorly thought out proposals.

You may not know how malware infested computers can be prevented from altering votes before they get "put out there" but that doesn't mean that it is impossible.

It has never been and will never be possible to come up with an un-hackable system because no one can think up all the possible exploits up front. In general, though there are some things that are impossible to fully protect because as soon as you give people access to it malware has access as well.

 

[lomiller]

Another facet is that, in a normal environment, old school pen and paper can be subverted but at only at an tiny volume. It's hard to do more than a couple of votes at a time.
If electronic voting is compromised the bad actors could alter thousands of votes at a time, more than enough to swing key seats\states.

One thing that is really important to remember is that the most likely party, by far, to manipulate election results is the government itself. Third party monitoring and validation of election results could be all but impossible with a fully electronic system.

 

[Upchurch]

Hackers break into voting machines within 2 hours at Defcon

Nopety-nope-nope.

That old video I posted still holds true. The most secure system is the one that is the most transparent. You are never going to get that with electronic voting.

 

[psionl0]

Hackers break into voting machines within 2 hours at Defcon

Nopety-nope-nope.

That old video I posted still holds true. The most secure system is the one that is the most transparent. You are never going to get that with electronic voting.

At least, not as long as politicians and public servants are in charge of the specs. Get a team of the best experts in the world and you might see a different result.

Most of the more experienced people here will have seen people who come in and say “I want to do X with [insert buzzword here], and when you question them why they want to do it that way they can only come up with vague handwaving.

I think I will stick to my original claim and leave you to deal with your strawman arguments by yourself.

 

[Upchurch]

At least, not as long as politicians and public servants are in charge of the specs. Get a team of the best experts in the world and you might see a different result.

Get the best team in the world, you can't design a computer system that is transparent when handling data. You can't see the bits being flipped.

 

[CORed]

I would like to say that voting centres aren't run by cowboys who would allow substandard voting machines to be used and that the machines would be tamper proof. Unfortunately, the "hanging chad" fiasco shows this is not always necessarily so.

BTW I thought voting machines were already universal in the US.

Not at all. Paper ballots with machine counting are quite common, and, IMO more secure than electronic voting machines.

 

[psionl0]

Get the best team in the world, you can't design a computer system that is transparent when handling data. You can't see the bits being flipped.

Can you prove that or is this just something that is "obvious" to you?

 

[Upchurch]

Can you prove that or is this just something that is "obvious" to you?

What storage device do you know of that allows you to see the current state of the actual bits stored? I'm not aware of any macroscopic abacus-based computer memory devices.

 

[JoeMorgue]

What storage device do you know of that allows you to see the current state of the actual bits stored? I'm not aware of any abacus-based computer memory devices.

Okay seriously data integrity is not some dark magic to computer users. There's entire fields dedicated to telling if data on a hard drive has been tampered with our modified.

This... frighteningly ignorant of how computers work. If you don't trust computer voting, fine but don't make up nonsense like this.

 

[psionl0]

What storage device do you know of that allows you to see the current state of the actual bits stored? I'm not aware of any macroscopic abacus-based computer memory devices.

Your earlier arguments were quite reasonable but the quality of your arguments is now going downhill rapidly.

 

[Upchurch]

Okay seriously data integrity is not some dark magic to computer users. There's entire fields dedicated to telling if data on a hard drive has been tampered with our modified.

This... frighteningly ignorant of how computers work. If you don't trust computer voting, fine but don't make up nonsense like this.

Ha. You're missing several steps of the conversation.

Fine, then you can go back to my earlier question of how you or, more importantly, your average poll worker can tell if a voting machine has been tampered with just by looking at it. Not just the final count, but the interface that adjust the final count when the user inputs their vote. And not only on-site, but before the machine reached the polling place.

 

[Upchurch]

Your earlier arguments were quite reasonable but the quality of your arguments is now going downhill rapidly.

You've addressed none them. Better technology or better experts does not fix the transparency problem you keep ignoring. The point of "seeing bits flipping" has to do with being able to see that votes are being calculated correctly. If you can't see that happening, you can't trust the count is accurate.

 

[JoeMorgue]

You've addressed none them. Better technology or better experts does not fix the transparency problem you keep ignoring. The point of "seeing bits flipping" has to do with being able to see that votes are being calculated correctly. If you can't see that happening, you can't trust the count is accurate.

You're mistaking (or deliberately misconstruing) not understanding the process for "transparency."

This is beneath first year, hell High School, hell grade school level, computer theory. This a caveman smashing a radio trying to find the tiny singer inside level of understanding.

Computer storage is not magic that cannot be seen by the eyes of mortal men lest they turn to stone.

 

[jimbob]

Can you prove that or is this just something that is "obvious" to you?

The transparency requirements make it so.

You need to have a system that most voters can understand and cqn trust.

In addition, you need a system where fraud can be investigated, which means having the ability to trace votes to voters in exceptional circumstances, whilst preserving anonymity in normal situations.

With pencils and paper, this is straightforward - you keep the ballot papers with a unique ID , but ensure that nobody does the analysis to link the id to the voter, or even the ID to the vote.

With an electronic system, the link is there, and you need to trust that it's not hacked, which is far harder than controlling physical storage.

 

[Mongrel]

With an electronic system, the link is there, and you need to trust that it's not hacked, which is far harder than controlling physical storage.

And also hope that the supplier didn't install remote access software on the machines used to tabulate the results.

 

[Upchurch]

You're mistaking (or deliberately misconstruing) not understanding the process for "transparency."

This is beneath first year, hell High School, hell grade school level, computer theory. This a caveman smashing a radio trying to find the tiny singer inside level of understanding.

Computer storage is not magic that cannot be seen by the eyes of mortal men lest they turn to stone.

Funny story, you know what else is they teach you in high school? Reading comprehension, context, and the difference between metaphors and literal statements.

Now, I know how storage works. Do you know how to read a thread and draw meaning from it?

Let's put aside the ad-homs and discuss the topic, shall we?

*ahem*


Transparency is being able to quickly and easily verify that the vote being entered into the interface matches what is being added to the voting tally. With paper ballots, this is done by having two or more people, usually from different parties, present to verify that each voter only enters one ballot into the secure ballot box and that no one opens the box until it reaches the place where the votes are counted. Again, counted by two or more people.

When you add a voting machine into the mix, there is now a blackbox mechanism between the voter and their vote entering the secure storage mechanism (blockchain, or whatever). None of the poll workers present can quickly or easily verify that what the voter chose was entered into the storage mechanism or how many times. There is no way to verify that the machine has not been tampered without a thorough audit of the machine's code and, if you want to be really paranoid, the machine's hardware. This is neither quick nor easy and almost certainly beyond the capabilities of your average poll worker.

So, you might argue, we could simply produce completely secure, unhackable voting machines. That's great, but how do you verify that it is unhackable and how can you assure the machine is not be hacked once the machine has left the control of the person/people who verified it?

Let's be honest, it naive in the extreme to believe that a device can never be hacked, especially when there is a possibility that it is in the physical control of unknown people.

 

[acbytesla]

Funny story, you know what else is they teach you in high school? Reading comprehension, context, and the difference between metaphors and literal statements.

Now, I know how storage works. Do you know how to read a thread and draw meaning from it?

Let's put aside the ad-homs and discuss the topic, shall we?

*ahem*


Transparency is being able to quickly and easily verify that the vote being entered into the interface matches what is being added to the voting tally. With paper ballots, this is done by having two or more people, usually from different parties, present to verify that each voter only enters one ballot into the secure ballot box and that no one opens the box until it reaches the place where the votes are counted. Again, counted by two or more people.

When you add a voting machine into the mix, there is now a blackbox mechanism between the voter and their vote entering the secure storage mechanism (blockchain, or whatever). None of the poll workers present can quickly or easily verify that what the voter chose was entered into the storage mechanism or how many times. There is no way to verify that the machine has not been tampered without a thorough audit of the machine's code and, if you want to be really paranoid, the machine's hardware. This is neither quick nor easy and almost certainly beyond the capabilities of your average poll worker.

So, you might argue, we could simply produce completely secure, unhackable voting machines. That's great, but how do you verify that it is unhackable and how can you assure the machine is not be hacked once the machine has left the control of the person/people who verified it?

Let's be honest, it naive in the extreme to believe that a device can never be hacked, especially when there is a possibility that it is in the physical control of unknown people.

Whether electronic voting machines can or can never be hacked is almost an irrelevant question. It is unreasonable to ask the electorate simply to 'trust' that they can't be.