Yes, he does. If he is pleased, I guess he isn't hard to please. His team, and thus he, made a series of awful policy decisions in pursuit of that war.
As far as I am concerned, removing Saddam wasn't that bad of an idea. It was the gross failure to look at Bosnia, learn the political lessons there, and apply the understanding of what it takes to remake a country that fractures (Iraq fractured internally when Saddam was taken out) that created a strategic win for Iran, the real problem for US policy in the Persian Gulf. Bush tried to do it on the cheap. As I've said before, if you can't afford a Cadillac, don't try to buy one at Yugo prices.
Most people, including most people I discuss such matters with on this forum, refuse to think strategically, and won't look beyond the short term. One of the ways to look at the decision to break Iraq down to parade rest is to look at Yugoslavia, and watch what an internal fracture does to a nation cobbled together badly. Tito went down, then the wall went down, and internal corrosion finally broke Yugoslavia. (Yugoslavia and Iraq were both cobbled together by The Powers after The Great War.)
If you look mid to long term in 2002, Saddam had held the place together. It does not take a rocket scientist to foresee that if and when he falls out of the picture (for the moment assuming no intervention nor invasion) that Iraq will likely fall apart as Yugoslavia did, possibly more dramatically, thanks to the slightly different power balance.
Then what? Civil war. Something like Rwanda plays out in Iraq. Heck, there was (is??) a civil war of varying intensity for five years even with the presence of the US and its allies trying, albeit with little success, to prevent one. Nobody in the region wants that, it disrupts their regional balance. It creates mass refugee flows out of Iraq. Hmm. Guess what? That happened anyway.
There are times that I wonder if the decision to go into Iraq wasn't underwritten by the strategic idea of trying to control the change of Iraq when Saddam fell, because he was going to leave office eventually, and not willingly. That framework was certainly
not how the war was marketed. The political problem is to take a strategic concern, like the one I sketch out above, and package it as rational to act on a preventative basis. The idea is similar to preventative maintenance being done on a car: fix it before it breaks down. That, while possibly a rational idea, was not marketable. Or, if it was, the wrong sales team was trying to sell the product. The only organ that probably has the capacity to act in such a way is the UN, maybe, if the entire UNSC can be lead in a particular direction and agree on "x" as a sound policy, and then put the resources to that policy.
For the time and place, and likely for the foreseeable future, the UN was not the team to do it either.
DR