Dualism and Theism are Subsets of Materialism

[rocketdodger]

It seems to me that dualism and theism are subsets of materialism (and in general, physicalism). Consider:

Materialism -- the only thing we can know exists is matter, of one form or another. Regarding things we cannot know about, there is nothing we can say at this time.

Theism -- the only things are matter, mind, and God, of one form or another. There is nothing else.

Dualism -- the only things are matter and mind, of one form or another. There is nothing else.


Now, to support my claim, I assert that the "mind" in theism and dualism is nothing more than a hasty coupling of matter + 'something we can't know about.' This assertion seems to be backed up by the fact that nobody has been able to give a definition otherwise.

Thus, "mind" is already completely encompassed by materialism.

Furthermore, god can be defined along similar lines -- part matter, part unknowable. So god is encompassed by materialism as well.

Hence, theism and dualism are nothing more than subsets of materialism, where the holder of the -ism has chosen to restrict materialism for whatever reason.

This means that theists have no basis to make claims regarding the "hollowness" of materialism. In fact, it is quite the opposite -- materialists should be attacking theists for their closed mindedness.

 

[drkitten]

It seems to me that dualism and theism are subsets of materialism (and in general, physicalism). Consider:

Materialism -- the only thing we can know exists is matter, of one form or another. Regarding things we cannot know about, there is nothing we can say at this time.

I've never met a materialist who would express herself this way. Materialism typically denies the existence of the non-material, not just the gnosis.

It's also simply wrong to claim that dualists and theists claim that mind/God is unknowable. I certainly know that I have a mind, through personal experience, and many theists claim similar certainty of knowledge for God.

So you're wrong on at least two counts, I'm afraid.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It seems to me that dualism and theism are subsets of materialism (and in general, physicalism). Consider:

Materialism -- the only thing we can know exists is matter, of one form or another. Regarding things we cannot know about, there is nothing we can say at this time.

Theism -- the only things are matter, mind, and God, of one form or another. There is nothing else.

Dualism -- the only things are matter and mind, of one form or another. There is nothing else.


Now, to support my claim, I assert that the "mind" in theism and dualism is nothing more than a hasty coupling of matter + 'something we can't know about.' This assertion seems to be backed up by the fact that nobody has been able to give a definition otherwise.

Thus, "mind" is already completely encompassed by materialism.

Furthermore, god can be defined along similar lines -- part matter, part unknowable. So god is encompassed by materialism as well.

Hence, theism and dualism are nothing more than subsets of materialism, where the holder of the -ism has chosen to restrict materialism for whatever reason.

This means that theists have no basis to make claims regarding the "hollowness" of materialism. In fact, it is quite the opposite -- materialists should be attacking theists for their closed mindedness.

Um, no. Dualism is an ontologic position holding that there are two types of substances.

Material monism posits one type of substance.

Epistemology concerns knowledge of those types of substance, but our knowledge does not determine which ontology is correct.

Materialism certainly views 'the mind' as encompassed within a monistic position. But dualism does not. It posits mind as a completely separate type of substance. That it doesn't make sense is completely beside the point.

 

[rocketdodger]

I've never met a materialist who would express herself this way. Materialism typically denies the existence of the non-material, not just the gnosis.

Isn't that the same thing when it comes to the unknowable? When materialists deny the existence of the non-material they are only saying it is impossible to consider the existence of the non-material.

It's also simply wrong to claim that dualists and theists claim that mind/God is unknowable. I certainly know that I have a mind, through personal experience, and many theists claim similar certainty of knowledge for God.

Did you read my post? If you ask any of them to define what they mean, invariably it will be some combination of matter + 'something beyond definition.'

The extent of knowledge of your mind that you can describe is limited to the material. Same with theists' knowledge of god. I contend the rest is babblygook that boils down to "the unknowable." If you think otherwise, feel free to provide a definition.

 

[JoeEllison]

This means that theists have no basis to make claims regarding the "hollowness" of materialism. In fact, it is quite the opposite -- materialists should be attacking theists for their closed mindedness.

I'm not sure that you're right, but I think you're on the right track. There's nothing that theism actually adds to our knowledge, beyond what materialism already covers. Adding a "hollow" undefined and undefinable entity to the process doesn't in any way expand or enrich our knowledge of the universe. Theists might as well insert invisible communist chipmunks into the conversation... it would serve as much good as what they "contribute" now.

 

[Robin]

I've never met a materialist who would express herself this way. Materialism typically denies the existence of the non-material, not just the gnosis.

Have you met any Materialist who even uses the expression "material"?

D'Holbach, of course, used the expression "matter", but he defined very carefully what he meant by it.

In general philosophers who could be described as materialists (and there aren't very many of them) deal with the idea of things that can be described by some physical theory.

 

[Robin]

It seems to me that dualism and theism are subsets of materialism (and in general, physicalism). Consider:

Materialism -- the only thing we can know exists is matter, of one form or another. Regarding things we cannot know about, there is nothing we can say at this time.

Theism -- the only things are matter, mind, and God, of one form or another. There is nothing else.

Dualism -- the only things are matter and mind, of one form or another. There is nothing else.


Now, to support my claim, I assert that the "mind" in theism and dualism is nothing more than a hasty coupling of matter + 'something we can't know about.' This assertion seems to be backed up by the fact that nobody has been able to give a definition otherwise.

Thus, "mind" is already completely encompassed by materialism.

Furthermore, god can be defined along similar lines -- part matter, part unknowable. So god is encompassed by materialism as well.

Hence, theism and dualism are nothing more than subsets of materialism, where the holder of the -ism has chosen to restrict materialism for whatever reason.

This means that theists have no basis to make claims regarding the "hollowness" of materialism. In fact, it is quite the opposite -- materialists should be attacking theists for their closed mindedness.

A point I have made a few times is that if something can be meaningfully classified as "mind", ie capable of conscious thought then it must be a complex entity dependent on some sort of underlying order.

Essentially the claim of Materialism is that everything acts according to an underying order (ie the laws of physics).

So by what criteria do they they distinguish the underlying order of the "non-material" portion of the mind or the underlying order that makes the mind of God possible with the underlying order we call the laws of physics?

Really the big problem is that there is no sufficient definition either for "material" or "non-material".

 

[drkitten]

Essentially the claim of Materialism is that everything acts according to an underying order (ie the laws of physics).

No. The claim of materialism is that everything is matter.

So by what criteria do they they distinguish the underlying order of the "non-material" portion of the mind or the underlying order that makes the mind of God possible with the underlying order we call the laws of physics?

They don't need to. They distinguish the material from the immaterial directly. "Soul," for example, is by definition immaterial as it persists eternally, while nothing material will. But souls, despite being immaterial, most definitely have an underlying order, in that they act "rationally" (remember "man is a rational animal"?).

 

[rocketdodger]

No. The claim of materialism is that everything is matter.

Define "matter."

They don't need to. They distinguish the material from the immaterial directly. "Soul," for example, is by definition immaterial as it persists eternally, while nothing material will. But souls, despite being immaterial, most definitely have an underlying order, in that they act "rationally" (remember "man is a rational animal"?).

Yes and my claim is that the idea of "immaterial" is simply an aggregation of various ideas of "material" supplemented with the unknowable.

As I said before, if you think differently, feel free to provide a definition of immaterial that proves otherwise.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes and my claim is that the idea of "immaterial" is simply an aggregation of various ideas of "material" supplemented with the unknowable.

As I said before, if you think differently, feel free to provide a definition of immaterial that proves otherwise.

Well, yeah, but they would simply say that you are looking through materialist lenses.

The general definition of 'mind' was that it was dimensionless rationality. While matter can be located in space and has dimensions, 'mind' does not. That is the classic definition of a non-material 'thing'.

What I hear you really saying is "They are wrong." You got no argument from me on that score. They confuse processes with "things" and the whole definition of 'matter' has changed radically since e=mc*c. Personally, I have no idea what matter is.

 

[drkitten]

Define "matter."

I don't need to. If you disagree with my definition, that doesn't make me any less of a materialist.

Yes and my claim is that the idea of "immaterial" is simply an aggregation of various ideas of "material" supplemented with the unknowable.

Cool. I disagree with your definition. Does that make you a closet dualist or theist?

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't need to. If you disagree with my definition, that doesn't make me any less of a materialist.

Um... actually, you do. You don't have to tell me, but you must have a definition -- otherwise the word means nothing. I would have thought you would know that...

Cool. I disagree with your definition. Does that make you a closet dualist or theist?

Logically, you can't disagree with my definition unless you have your own. Thus, we have established that you can provide a definition, you just choose not to. In the face of the challenge I presented, that looks suspicious -- almost like I am right.

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, yeah, but they would simply say that you are looking through materialist lenses.

The general definition of 'mind' was that it was dimensionless rationality. While matter can be located in space and has dimensions, 'mind' does not. That is the classic definition of a non-material 'thing'.

What I hear you really saying is "They are wrong." You got no argument from me on that score. They confuse processes with "things" and the whole definition of 'matter' has changed radically since e=mc*c. Personally, I have no idea what matter is.

Yes, but try to define "dimensionless" or "rationality" without resorting to material or unknowable entities. I don't think it can be done.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, but try to define "dimensionless" or "rationality" without resorting to material or unknowable entities. I don't think it can be done.

Oh, yes, of course not. Our only experience is with the material realm. It used to be easy to be a dualist in the past. I don't see how anyone can make it work nowadays.

 

[bignickel]

I don't know if you can win with this argument, Rocketdodger, but I support your efforts wholeheartedly.

Anything that makes a fundy's face twist in outraged surprise/horror during an argument makes me happy.

I also like fluffy kittens. Although I am allergic.

 

[Robin]

No. The claim of materialism is that everything is matter.

Without a definition of "matter" that statement is totally devoid of meaning. You might as well say everything is stuff, goo or shrdlu.

As far as I know the last Materialist to put it that way was d'Holbach, a couple of centuries ago and he gave a clear definition of what he meant by "matter". It is not what we mean by matter today, since the word has been given a precise technical meaning in physics in the intervening centuries.

Today Materialists talk in terms of physical theories rather that matter or material.

They don't need to. They distinguish the material from the immaterial directly. "Soul," for example, is by definition immaterial as it persists eternally, while nothing material will. But souls, despite being immaterial, most definitely have an underlying order, in that they act "rationally" (remember "man is a rational animal"?).

So "eternal persistence" is the feature that distinguishes the material from the immaterial then?

It is not completely clear that materiality implies other than this. Did the matter of the universe come into existence ex nihilo? Or was there some potential matter? Will it simply cease to exist when the universe ends? Or will it become something else?

But of course souls, were there such a thing, would have an underlying order, but the question is how is this underlying order different in kind to the underlying order we observe in our Universe?

Is there a mathematical model of the soul? Is there a mathematical model of God? Is there a mathematical model of the non-material mind? If the answer to this question is "yes" then these things are physical according to most Materialist philosophers.

If the answer is "no" then there would have to be something to account for why a non-arbitrary entity is inaccessible to mathematics.

 

[Robin]

Um... actually, you do. You don't have to tell me, but you must have a definition -- otherwise the word means nothing. I would have thought you would know that...

Yes - it seems to be a popular idea in this forum that we can use terms like material and physical without actually defining what is meant by them.

As I said before, d'Holbach is the only Materialist in the modern era, so far as I am aware, to express it in the terms "everything is matter" and he was careful to define the term:

We know nothing of the elements of bodies, but we know some of their
properties or qualities; and we distinguish their various matter by the
effect or change produced on our senses; that is to say, by the variety
of motion their presence excites in us. In consequence, we discover in
them, extent, mobility, divisibility, solidity, gravity, and inert
force. From these general and primitive properties flow a number of
others, such as density, figure, colour, ponderosity, &c. Thus,
relatively to us, matter is all that affects our senses in any manner
whatever; the various properties we attribute to matter, by which we
discriminate its diversity, are founded on the different impressions we
receive on the changes they produce in us.

d'Holbach "The System of Nature Chapter III" http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/8son110.txt

He expresses matter in terms similar to the way Neurath describes "physical".

Modern Materialist talk, not in terms of "matter" and "material" but in terms of physical theories. The above definition from d'Holbach seems to suggest that his ideas were similar.

So it follows that an immaterial entity must be some non-arbitrary entity that cannot possibly be described in terms of a physical theory. I have always asked what property immaterial things are supposed to have that makes them inaccessible to mathematical description.

 

[rocketdodger]

So it follows that an immaterial entity must be some non-arbitrary entity that cannot possibly be described in terms of a physical theory. I have always asked what property immaterial things are supposed to have that makes them inaccessible to mathematical description.

This is a very concise way to put the whole issue. Thanks for contributing to this thread Robin.

 

[Robin]

This is a very concise way to put the whole issue. Thanks for contributing to this thread Robin.

Thanks. Let me add that I agree completely with your OP. Theism and dualism are conjectures within Materialism that have yet to reach the hypothesis stage.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Thanks. Let me add that I agree completely with your OP. Theism and dualism are conjectures within Materialism that have yet to reach the hypothesis stage.

But they are not. Nonsensical from a materialist view, but not conjectures within materialism.

Not historically at least.

No one can make sense of dualism -- it's magic -- but that doesn't mean that it is a subset of materialism.

A dualist would probably just say, once again, that you guys are interpreting dualism within a materialist paradigm, which is inappropriate. I would guess that if they wanted to remain consistent they would have to admit that no one could possibly discuss mechanisms for mind-body interaction since a mechanism would imply a material process.

So, they'd be forced to say that it's all just magic.