I'll demonstrate what I mean by reading from a book.
Physical realism is false: the physical world (assuming it exists) is the logical creation of a more fundamental reality which is poorly nonphysical. But it does not immediately follow from this that idealism is true. The idealist claims that the physical world is entirely created by the Organisation of human experience call on the external reality is relevant only in so far as it is responsible for this organisation. So there is room for a middle position, between realism and idealism, which concedes that the physical world is metaphysically derivative, but insists that the external reality contributes to its creation directly, and not just by the way it affects human experience.
However, although there is room for this compromise position, it is hard to find any rationale for it. For on what principles would external reality directly contribute, and why? We cannot insist on an external reality which is isomorph they quickly physical realities sustains; for we have already seen that such isomorphism is not necessary. Thus the structure of the physical world will deviate from the structure of the external reality if the latter (as it were) runs counter to the normal logical organisation. Nor can we insist on something approaching isomorphism; for there could be a radical discrepancy between the physical and external structures. Take, for example, the case in which a two-dimensional external sense feels get a three-dimensional organisation call on our again, envisaged a case in which something like the Oxford -- Cambridge set up is widespread. We cannot even insist that the external reality be as rich as a physical reality in its ontology. Follow is surely no crucial difference between a case in which the external reality is organised as if its materials were differently structured and a case in which it is organised as if its materials were augmented. Thus we could presumably envisage the case in which the external correlates of physical space is a three-dimensional sense feels with an internal "all", but where everything is organised as if, by the standards of uniformity, the Hall were filled in.
CORRECTED VERSION BELOW (mistakes bolded)
Physical realism is false: the physical world (assuming it exists) is the logical creation of a more fundamental reality which is wholly nonphysical. But it does not immediately follow from this that idealism is true. The idealist claims that the physical world is entirely created by the Organisation of human experience: the external reality is relevant only in so far as it is responsible for this organisation. So there is room for a middle position, between realism and idealism, which concedes that the physical world is metaphysically derivative, but insists that the external reality contributes to its creation directly, and not just by the way it affects human experience.
However, although there is room for this compromise position, it is hard to find any rationale for it. For on what principles would the external reality directly contribute, and why? We cannot insist on an external reality which is isomorphic with the physical reality it sustains; for we have already seen that such isomorphism is not necessary. Thus the structure of the physical world will deviate from the structure of the external reality if the latter (as it were) runs counter to the nomological organisation. Nor can we insist on something approaching isomorphism; for there could be a radical discrepancy between the physical and external structures. Take, for example, the case in which a two-dimensional external sense field get a three-dimensional organisation: or again, envisage a case in which something like the Oxford -- Cambridge set up is widespread. We cannot even insist that the external reality be as rich as the physical reality in its ontology. For there is surely no crucial difference between a case in which the external reality is organised as if its materials were differently structured and a case in which it is organised as if its materials were augmented. Thus we could presumably envisage a case in which the external correlates of physical space is a three-dimensional sense field with an internal "hole", but where everything is organised as if, by the standards of uniformity, the hole were filled in.
edited to add call on
the extract is from a book called "objections to physicalism".
