Doubting your disbelief?

Look, I realise you put a winky on the end there, but string theory itself tells us you can't build any such thing.

Does it? What would the limiting factor be?

No, the terms are rigorously consistent. They are not operationally defined. String theory is self consistent, but what predictions does it make as to the nature of the universe? (Predictions that are different to existing QM and/or Relativity.)

This is a valid criticism to an extent - although ongoing tests on inverse square violation and particle collider experiments soon to take place at CERN both offer opportunities for evidential confirmation of predictions....


Even though the natural length scale of string theory is much much much much too small to be measured directly in particle experiments, there are aspects of string theory that might be measurable with today's technology or with technology of the near future.
One of the predictions of string theory is that at higher energy scales we should start to see evidence of a symmetry that gives every particle that transmits a force (a boson) a partner particle that makes up matter ( a fermion), and vice versa.
This symmetry between forces and matter is called supersymmetry. The partner particles are called superpartners

In current particle experiments we can't yet see any direct evidence for the existence of superpartners for known elementary particles (there is some indirect evidence, however). There is a good chance we could start to see superpartners in future particle experiments. If that happened, it could turn out to be evidence for string theory.

Superstring theory is a possible unified theory of all fundamental forces, but superstring theory requires a 10 dimensional spacetime, or else bad quantum states called ghosts with unphysical negative probabilities become part of the spectrum.
Now this creates a problem in d=10 string theory: how to get the d=4 world as we know it out of the theory.
So far there are two main proposals:
1. Roll up the extra dimensions into some very tiny but nonetheless interesting space of their own. This is called Kaluza Klein compactification.
2. Make the extra dimensions really big, but constrain all the matter and gravity to propagate in a three dimensional subspace called the three brane. (For an analogy, your computer screen could be said to be a two brane of three dimensional space.) These types of theories are called braneworlds.
The attribute of superstring theory that looks the most promising for experimental detection is supersymmetry. Supersymmetry breaking and compactification of higher dimensions have to work together to give the low energy physics we observe in accelerator detectors.

both from
http://www.superstringtheory.com/experm/index.html

which is a pretty nifty string theory website :)
 
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time distinction - ie between past present and future is...
That's not right either. Saying that an event is in my past is a perfectly meaningful statement, though of course you have to take Relativity into account. Past and future are relative to any given point in space-time, and mark out the boundaries of causality.

that's pretty much it - but the remarkable thing is that the variance can be predicted - newton initially proposed the inverse square law to describe how gravitational attraction diminishes as two objects are separated - if you double the distance between two objects, their gravitational attraction will fall by a factor of 4 (22), triple the distance and the attraction falls by a factor of 9 (32)
Right.

so with each extra dimension, we would see an increase in factors

in four space dimensions, it would become an inverse cube law

double the distance, gravitational attraction falls by 8 (23
in five space dimensions, it would become an inverse fourth power law

double the distance, gravitational attraction falls by 16 (24
and so on.....
Well, fine. This doesn't happen.


unfortunately, gravitational attraction is so weak realative to the other forces, we have some way to go with the experiments -
Gravity is incredibly weak, but conveniently we have some incredibly large masses to play with, like, say, the Earth, the Moon, and the Sun. And two of those are a long way away, making for huge differences between inverse square and inverse cube.

Gravitation absolutely does not follow a simple inverse-cube law (or any higher power). It appears to follow an inverse square law very closely; there may be subtle variances, but no major ones.

when measuring the other 3 non gravitational forces [electromagnetic etc] we can probe down to a billionth of a billionth of a mm (10-18)
I'm not sure exactly what you're referring to here, but they are indeed all many orders of magnitude stronger than gravity.

but we've only got as far as one tenth of a mm separation between two objects in gravity tests - and at this level no violation with the inverse square law has been found. But if we were to find a violation, it should tell us precisely how many dimensions there are.....
Except that this is backwards if you're talking about a universal inverse-cube law. It has to be something more complicated than that, because even Copernicus would have noticed.

(if you have fabric of the cosmos this is off p398-400)
I'll go upstairs now and see if I can find it. I still haven't finished unpacking since my last move - and I seem to have lost some books in the process. :(
 
It's a conditional semantic argument. There's no way to "prove" it wrong because of your set definitions. You say that nothing immaterial exists. If something exists then by definition it's material. You ask me to prove that something immaterial exists but in doing so I simply prove it's material since it exists.

No, Dustin. A premis is that all that exists and can be measured is material. All you have to do is show me something which exists and can't be measured. It is not my problem if you can't do this, but the argument is valid.

Can you provide evidence the world outside your consciousness exists? Evidence that can't be explained by the whole brain in a vat scenario? No, of course you can't. Then you use pragmatism to assume it to be true to go about your daily life because assuming otherwise would mean sure death.

No, Dustin. I use Materialism, not Pragmatism.
 
That's not right either. Saying that an event is in my past is a perfectly meaningful statement, though of course you have to take Relativity into account. Past and future are relative to any given point in space-time, and mark out the boundaries of causality.

well - in you take your relativity into it then that's ok - but then concepts of existence are wholly subjective :)


Well, fine. This doesn't happen.

up to 1/10th of a millimetre....


Gravity is incredibly weak, but conveniently we have some incredibly large masses to play with, like, say, the Earth, the Moon, and the Sun. And two of those are a long way away, making for huge differences between inverse square and inverse cube.

Gravitation absolutely does not follow a simple inverse-cube law (or any higher power). It appears to follow an inverse square law very closely; there may be subtle variances, but no major ones.

I'm not sure exactly what you're referring to here, but they are indeed all many orders of magnitude stronger than gravity.

There is as i said no violation of the inverse square law on the macrolevel - up to 1/10th of a millimetre that is - beyond that we do not know. It is gravity's weakness that makes it so difficult to measure.

Except that this is backwards if you're talking about a universal inverse-cube law. It has to be something more complicated than that, because even Copernicus would have noticed.

it doesn't need to be more complicated at all - on the microlevel, hypothesied extra dimensions would be sufficiently large for gravity diffusing into it to be significant to fulfil the (say) universal inverse cube law - however, on macroscopic levels this diffusion would be irrelevant to the degrees we can measure - and so to our measurements objects would appear to follow the inverse square law. In exactly the same way that classical mechanics presents a macroscopic approximation that is not applicable on the microscopic.

a good article on the inverse square law http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/18/4/6

and as you suggest, tests can be done on the astronomical bodies - but they require exceptional precision....
Although most attention has focused on the behaviour of gravity at short distances, it is possible that tiny deviations from the inverse-square law occur at much larger distances. In 2003 Dvali, who is now at New York University, and two colleagues, Andrei Gruzinov and Mattias Zaldarriaga, explored the possibility that non-compact extra dimensions could produce such deviations at astronomical distances (see further reading).

By far the most stringent constraints on a test of the inverse-square law to date come from amazingly precise measurements of the Moon's orbit about the Earth. However, this marvellous sensitivity is obtained for values of the order of the Earth-Moon separation. These experiments involve reflecting laser beams off retroreflector arrays placed on the Moon by the Apollo astronauts and by an unmanned Soviet lander. Even though the Moon's orbit has a mean radius of 384,000 km, the models agree with the data at the level of 4 mm!

The observable that is best suited to testing the inverse-square law in this system is the precession of the major axis of the Moon's orbit (see figure 4). According to classical mechanics, the major axis should not precess at all in the presence of a 1/r2 gravitational interaction. Indeed, it was a major triumph for general relativity when Einstein was able to explain the previously mysterious precession of the major axis of Mercury's orbit by 420 milliarcseconds per year.

When the effects of general relativity and the influence of the Sun and the other planets are included, the predicted value for the precession of the Moon's orbit (19 milliarcseconds per year) is in very good agreement with the measurements, and any discrepancy caused by a possible breakdown of the inverse-square law must be less than 270 microarcseconds per year. However, if we could measure the Moon's orbit even more accurately, we might be able to detect small deviations from the inverse-square law at large distances that some theorists have predicted.

Tom Murphy of the University of California at San Diego and colleagues at Harvard University and the University of Washington have recently started a new lunar laser-ranging programme called APOLLO that will use a larger telescope at a better location (a mountain top near White Sands in New Mexico) and a more sophisticated photon detector in order to improve the precision of these measurements by a factor of 10. Instead of receiving about one reflected photon for every 100 laser shots, APOLLO should count several photons per shot (see Physics World June 2004 p9).

ETA

this seems to have morphed somewhat from the original OP :)
 
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I still haven't finished unpacking since my last move - and I seem to have lost some books in the process. :(

I may have (somehow) lost volume 23 of my Encyclopaedia Britannica, but I still have The Fabric of the Cosmos. :)

Okay, from those pages, Greene is saying that it does indeed depend on the size of the extra dimensions. That's what I thought.

So the distance over which you measure gravity matters because the effect is only apparent over distances on the order of - or smaller than - the size of the fifth dimension itself. And unfortunately the theory doesn't predict that.

To re-summarise Green: If the nuclear, weak, or electromagnetic forces propagate through any dimension beyond the familiar four, those dimensions are rolled up to a diameter of less than 10-18 metres; far smaller than a proton. But gravity can only be accurately measured with current equipment at distancesdown to 10-4 metres, so if it is only gravity that propagates through these extra dimensions, they could be as large as that and we wouldn't (yet) know.

I do consider this a reasonable and operational definition. The fact that we can't yet measure below 0.1mm doesn't matter. What might matter is whether the laws of physics themselves define a limit to our measurement.
There are in fact such limits - the Planck scale, for one; the size of subatomic particles, for another. Physicists are tricksy peoples, and have indirectly measured things in ways you and I would never have thought of, but the Planck scale is a hard limit.

You could, in principle, measure gravity extremely precisely by shooting neutrons at each other and measuring their trajectories, but in practice there are a whole bunch of problems with that.

So to get back to the point of the debate, if I remember what it was... For this class of theory, I'd say that claims of the existence of extra dimensions are highly speculative but meaningful. (Which, yes, is not what I said before. I sit corrected. :))
 
So to get back to the point of the debate, if I remember what it was... For this class of theory, I'd say that claims of the existence of extra dimensions are highly speculative but meaningful. (Which, yes, is not what I said before. I sit corrected. :))

fair enough :D

you should read the rest of Greene now you've found it! It's one of my favourite books....and i'm sometimes guilty of shoehorning its contents into threads because i enjoy discussing them so much :)
 
well - in you take your relativity into it then that's ok - but then concepts of existence are wholly subjective :)
No, not subjective, just relative. I'll insist on that.

Something may exist for me, but not for you, because it is in my light cone and not yours. It is perfectly possible for you to be in my light cone and object Q to be in my light cone but not in yours. In that case, object Q exists as far as I'm concerned, and so do you, but object Q doesn't exist for you until you take relativity into account. By the time I can observe Q and send a message to you, you can observe Q yourself. (Subject to practical limitations.)

Relative, yes. Subjective, no.

up to 1/10th of a millimetre....
Yep, I read up in Greene, and there was a bit you didn't explicitly state, or you did somewhere and I missed it - the size of the extra dimensions is indeed key. Which is what I thought was the case, so that bit was just a miscommunication somewhere between us.

There is as i said no violation of the inverse square law on the macrolevel - up to 1/10th of a millimetre that is - beyond that we do not know. It is gravity's weakness that makes it so difficult to measure.
Yep. Agreed now.

(Snipped the rest because there's nothing there I disagree with...)
 
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No, not subjective, just relative. I'll insist on that.

Something may exist for me, but not for you, because it is in my light cone and not yours. It is perfectly possible for you to be in my light cone and object Q to be in my light cone but not in yours. In that case, object Q exists as far as I'm concerned, and so do you, but object Q doesn't exist for you until you take relativity into account. But by the time I can observe Q and send a message to you, you can observe Q yourself. (Subject to practical limitations.)

Relative, yes. Subjective, no.

hmmm....that which we percieve as existing is a subjective interpretation of existence - but this is just one slice of a relative existence independent of our perception. How about that? Short of descending into a materialism/sophilism (sp?) debate i think this is sufficient....
 
Maybe this will help:

By relative, I'm referring to the Theories of Relativity, and the limits they put on what you can know.

In addition to that, there are practical limits to what you can observe. Those are very real, but I don't care about them.

If I say that there is a cat in my garden right now, that is a meaningful and plausible claim of existence - not one you can practically test, assuming that you are not also in my garden, or nearby - but that is not a problem of meaning.

If I say I possess the ability to control the outcome of, say, dice rolls, that is also a meaningful claim of existence. It is implausible only because we have tested many such claims and none have ever been borne out by evidence.

If I say, though, that my talent doesn't work when I'm being examined, then my claim is not meaningful. Same if I say I have a tiger in my garden... but it disappears when you look at it. Something that exists only when no-one is observing it (and leaves no tangible evidence behind)... doesn't exist.

Now, saying that the Will of God exists, and what it does is give meaning to the universe, that is subjective. It is neither true nor false in relation to the universe because it is not defined by way of its relation to the universe.
 
How is this different to what would happen if it did not exist?
Determinism? Purpose to our existence? I call these big differences, only not measurable.

The point is that you cannot ever know this. The Theory of Evolution certainly appears to be true; the supporting evidence is superabundant. But all we know is that it is very well supported and that there is no contradictory evidence. We assume it is true, but we can never prove it.

X has been proven (or I know that X is true) => X is true
X is true =/> X can be proven (or I can know that it is true)

As I said, you are making this up. It's nonsense.

Our eyes cannot see beyond a small band of the electromagnetic spectrum; cannot see very dim objects, or very small ones; burn out in short order when looking at very bright ones; have limited spatial resolution; have limited colour resolution even in the visible range (and even that is frequently faulty or missing entirely); cannot go at all into hostile environments without the host body dropping dead of heat or cold or asphyxiation or radiation damage or whatever; and are very commonly misfocused.

That's just our physical eyes. Our vision is much worse. We see things that aren't there and don't see things that are. There is, for example, a well-known optical illusion that will reset your colour perception based on whether lines are horizontal or vertical (!!), and the effect can last for months after a single viewing.
Ok. Again, a problem of semantics (as Dustin would put it!). Of course science makes up for the flaws of our 5 senses. But I was not refering to these. I was refering to the general methodology that consists in relying on a certain vision of the world (the human vision and logic) to gain knowledge. If we assume that the knowledge gained based on this vision is valid, then we must also assume that this vision a proper way to know! But if this vision is not a proper way to gain knowledge, at least partially, the knowledge in itself will never make up for this.

Technologies at best improve our senses, our perceptions. But we still rely on the same method to understand the world, that is we rely on human observation. The axiom of science holds this as a valid way to understand the world. But how can you prove, without a doubt, that this is a valid method? Evidence is not proof. And evidence does not completely chase away my doubt as a proof would.


As for theories, they may be true, but you cannot know that. It is impossible.
The fact that you cannot know it does not diminish the 'truthness' of the statement.

Saying that it could be true is irrelevant to the point of... Well, something. Let's look at Godel's work in mathematics. Godel showed that in any system of mathematics, there are statements that cannot be shown to be true or false. It is both impossible to reach those statements from the axioms of the system, and impossible to show that they can't be reached.
X is true =/> X is provable

Now, that's just an analogy. But in science, theories are models that produce predictions. X => Y. So we observe that yes, X is true, and here we go, Y is also true. Confirming evidence.
No.

If we observe that Y is not true, that immediately falsifies the theory, by the standard laws of logic.

But we can't go the other way; no number of observations can ever prove the proposition.[/QUOTE]
Absolutely.

I remain un-smote. Insofar as religion has given me testable cases, my atheism has survived those tests. Insofar as religion cannot give me testable cases, I fail to see the point in it.
Don't compare your atheism to religion, compare it to simple theism. "There exists a being that consciously rules our universe" is not something that can be proven to be false.

The axioms are beliefs - probably, in fact, hypotheses, though I'm not entirely convinced of that.

You cannot prove them. They are tentative assumptions used in an attempt to make sense of the world, and they happen to be assumptions that work. So far, they are the only assumptions that work.

You cannot prove science, because it is a tool, and the concept is not even applicable.

And you don't need to believe anything. You can believe that science is entirely poppycock; you can be a dualist, of all things, and still conduct valid scientific research as long as you do it by the rules.
The theories of science are statements which can be true or false. Believing that they are true, or that they may one day develop into something true is what we are speaking of. And I claim that this is a form of belief since it requires a belief into unprovable axioms.

The point is, we know that theories are by definition not provable. Constantly saying "But it could be true!" is pointless because you cannot ever know.
Again, the fact that you cannot know whether it is true does not take away the fact that it can be. Don't fool yourself into thinking that we are the know-it-all of the universe.

Even if you don't believe in the axioms of science, it consistently produces accurate predictions of the behaviour of the universe. Nothing, NOTHING besides science has ever achieved that.
And? What does that prove? I did say that science was a superior belief...

So belief in itself is irrelevant.
But that's what we are discussing!

As for other metaphysics, other epistemologies, well: Either they are compatible with naturalism, and thus redundant,
...or more general?
 
No, not subjective, just relative. I'll insist on that.

Something may exist for me, but not for you, because it is in my light cone and not yours.
If it exists for somebody, anybody, then it exists. Existence is a perfectly objective concept imho. We must only admit that we may have no knowledge of some of these existing things.
 
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No, Dustin. A premis is that all that exists and can be measured is material. All you have to do is show me something which exists and can't be measured. It is not my problem if you can't do this, but the argument is valid.

By your definitions I can't. It wouldn't be possible.



No, Dustin. I use Materialism, not Pragmatism.

Can you prove that anything material exists? That it's not all some fantasy of your mind? No. You must assume it exists for pragmatic purposes. Pragmatism is using what "works" best. You can't provide evidence the world outside your consciousness exists. Evidence that can't be explained by the whole brain in a vat scenario. You use pragmatism to assume it to be true to go about your daily life because assuming otherwise would mean sure death.
 
Determinism? Purpose to our existence? I call these big differences, only not measurable.
If they are such big differences, then what actual difference do they make?

Ok. Again, a problem of semantics (as Dustin would put it!). Of course science makes up for the flaws of our 5 senses. But I was not refering to these. I was refering to the general methodology that consists in relying on a certain vision of the world (the human vision and logic) to gain knowledge. If we assume that the knowledge gained based on this vision is valid, then we must also assume that this vision a proper way to know! But if this vision is not a proper way to gain knowledge, at least partially, the knowledge in itself will never make up for this.
What do you mean by "vision"? This paragraph doesn't make much sense to me, and I'd rather not guess.

Technologies at best improve our senses, our perceptions. But we still rely on the same method to understand the world, that is we rely on human observation. The axiom of science holds this as a valid way to understand the world.
No!

I've stated what the axioms of science are, and that is not one of them.

However, it is an axiom of all non-solipsistic metaphysics that our senses confer information of a world external to us in some sense. If you don't accept this, then Cogito, ergo sum is the whole of your existence, forever.

But how can you prove, without a doubt, that this is a valid method?
You can't.

Evidence is not proof.
You don't get proof. This is the real world.

And evidence does not completely chase away my doubt as a proof would.
Well, see above.

The fact that you cannot know it does not diminish the 'truthness' of the statement.
I'm not talking about whether the theory is true, because it's pointless to do so, because it is impossible ever to know that it is true.

I'm talking about statements that a theory is true. These are pointless, because it is impossible ever to know that it is true.

"Well, it could be!"
"It is impossible to know."
"But it could be."
"It is impossible to know."
"But... but it could be!!"

And so on.

That's leaving aside the definition of "truth" for a theory, which is something we should take a quite look at. A theory is true if all possible predictions made by the theory are correct. A theory is false if any possible prediction made by the theory is incorrect. A theory is successful if all predictions tested so far have been correct, and that's as good as you can hope for.


X is true =/> X is provable
I realise that.

The point is, saying that a theory is true can never be justified, not even in principle.

Don't compare your atheism to religion, compare it to simple theism. "There exists a being that consciously rules our universe" is not something that can be proven to be false.
Whereas my atheism can be. Atheism is therefor a more powerful statement.

The theories of science are statements which can be true or false.
Sort of.

Believing that they are true, or that they may one day develop into something true is what we are speaking of.
(A) No belief is involved.
(B) You will never know that they are true. That's impossible.

And I claim that this is a form of belief since it requires a belief into unprovable axioms.
No, it doesn't. It just requires that you apply them. You can believe they are false, or unsupported, or not take a position on their validity at all, and science still works.

Again, the fact that you cannot know whether it is true does not take away the fact that it can be.
The fact that you cannot know something is true, even in principle, makes arguments that it is true unsupportable and hence foolish. Which is why science does not do this.

Don't fool yourself into thinking that we are the know-it-all of the universe.
What's this "we" stuff? We don't matter.

There are two points here:

(A) If you accept the axioms of scientific naturalism, you cannot ever prove a statement regarding the universe; in other words, all knowledge is conditional.
(B) This works.

And? What does that prove? I did say that science was a superior belief...
The point is, you don't need to believe anything, because it produces valid predictions regardless.

But that's what we are discussing!
There you are then. Science is clearly not a belief, because you don't have to believe in it to do it.

Can you be a Christian without accepting the tenets of Christianity? (No metaphors that really mean "humanist" or "charitable", thanks.) Can you be a Deist without believing in a non-intervening being outside the universe? Can you be an animist without believing in in spirits?

No.

But even a solipsist can be a scientist.

...or more general?
No, you can't do that.

Look at the requirements again:

(A) Universe is causally closed.
(B) Universe follows consistent behaviour.

How can you be more general without being incompatible? Solipsism doesn't provide any method for understanding the universe. Dualism is more general, but it posits an inconsistent universe. Idealism is either compatible with naturalism, actually dualism in disguise, or ill-defined nonsense (there are as many forms of idealism as there are idealist philosophers). Materialism is compatible, but less general than naturalism.
 
If it exists for somebody, anybody, then it exists.
Yes, and no.

If something is outside my light-cone, I cannot observe it, it cannot observe me, and it cannot affect me in any way. This is identical to not existing at all. And any observer I can communicate with will necessarily come to the same conclusion.

Once it is inside my light cone, I can interact with it, and any observer I can communicate with will come to the same conclusion.

Existence is a perfectly objective concept imho.
I agree there, which is why I objected to andyandy's phrasing.

We must only admit that we may have no knowledge of some of these existing things.
If you can't in principle know of something, in what sense does it exist? That's why I say existence is relative: Areas of space-time are causally disconnected from other areas of space-time by the limitation of the speed of light. Existence is a statement of potential causal interaction, and if there is no such potential, there is no possible difference - ever - between a universe where the object exists and a universe where the object does not exist.

In such a case, we say the object does not exist.

But if it's simply the case that we cannot interact with the object right now, that's just a case of relative existence. If it is possible, in principle, that one day a signal from the object will reach us, we can say it exists.

(That still leaves open the question of whether the universe beyond the observable universe exists. Since it is retreating from us faster than the speed of light, we cannot ever interact with it.)
 
By your definitions I can't. It wouldn't be possible.

No Dustin. Nevermind, you obviously don't get the argument.

Can you prove that anything material exists? That it's not all some fantasy of your mind? No. You must assume it exists for pragmatic purposes. Pragmatism is using what "works" best. You can't provide evidence the world outside your consciousness exists. Evidence that can't be explained by the whole brain in a vat scenario. You use pragmatism to assume it to be true to go about your daily life because assuming otherwise would mean sure death.

No Dustin. I use Materialism. I cannot prove that materialism is 100% correct, but I work under the assumption that it is correct. I do not use pragmatism, because I actually understand the difference.
 
No Dustin. I use Materialism. I cannot prove that materialism is 100% correct, but I work under the assumption that it is correct. I do not use pragmatism, because I actually understand the difference.

You work under the assumption that materialism is correct...because from a practical point of view that makes the most sense. That's pragmatism.
 
Not even remotely. Let's check out the wiki page for materialism for a moment:
In philosophy, materialism is that form of physicalism which holds that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions; that matter is the only substance. As a theory, materialism belongs to the class of monist ontology. As such, it is different from ontological theories based on dualism or pluralism. In terms of singular explanations of the phenomenal reality, materialism stands in sharp contrast to idealism.
That's a good definition of materialism, in my opinion. By that definition, I also hold to materialism.

Now let's look at pragmatism:
Pragmatism is a philosophic school that originated with Charles Sanders Peirce (who first stated the pragmatic maxim) and came to fruition in the early twentieth-century philosophies of William James and John Dewey. Most of the thinkers who describe themselves as pragmatists consider practical consequences or real effects to be vital components of both meaning and truth. Other important aspects of pragmatism include anti-cartesianism, radical empiricism, instrumentalism, anti-realism, verificationism, conceptual relativity, a denial of the fact-value distinction, a high regard for science and evolution, and fallibilism.
That's a rotten definition; it leaves it unclear as to what pragmatism actually is.

So perhaps you can show, by reference to that wiki page, exactly what tenets of pragmatism it is that Taffer holds? With quotes, please.
 
Wow, this is complete gobbledygook. (Hey, Mozilla recognises that as a word!)

Let's look at the wiki page for the Pragmatic Maxim. You'd expect it to start with a statement of the Pragmatic Maxim, yes? Well:
The pragmatic maxim, also known as the maxim of pragmatism or the maxim of pragmaticism, is a maxim of logic formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce. Serving as a normative recommendation or a regulative principle in the normative science of logic, its function is to guide the conduct of thought toward the achievement of its purpose, advising the addressee on an optimal way of "attaining clearness of apprehension".
Yes, but what is it?
Peirce stated the pragmatic maxim in many different ways over the years, each of which adds its own bit of clarity or correction to their collective corpus.
Yes, but what is it?
The first excerpt appears in the form of a dictionary entry, intended as a definition of pragmatism.

Pragmatism. The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
Oh. So, it means... Uh.

Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.
That's not much better, but as near as I can make out, what he's saying is what you think an object might do is what you think an object is. That's a philosphy of knowledge, which has nothing to do with materialism.

In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.
Peirce is a master of ham-handed phrasing.

In order to be admitted to better philosophical standing I have endeavored to put pragmatism as I understand it into the same form of a philosophical theorem. I have not succeeded any better than this: Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood.
He should have shot his editor.

The seventh excerpt is a late reflection on the reception of pragmatism. With a sense of exasperation that is almost palpable, Peirce tries to justify the maxim of pragmatism and to correct its misreadings by pinpointing a number of false impressions that the intervening years have piled on it, and he attempts once more to prescribe against the deleterious effects of these mistakes. Recalling the very conception and birth of pragmatism, he reviews its initial promise and its intended lot in the light of its subsequent vicissitudes and its apparent fate. Adopting the style of a post mortem analysis, he presents a veritable autopsy of the ways that the main idea of pragmatism, for all its practicality, can be murdered by a host of misdissecting disciplinarians, by what are ostensibly its most devoted followers.

This employment five times over of derivates of concipere must then have had a purpose. In point of fact it had two. One was to show that I was speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of intellectual purport. The other was to avoid all danger of being understood as attempting to explain a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by anything but concepts. I did not, therefore, mean to say that acts, which are more strictly singular than anything, could constitute the purport, or adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol. I compared action to the finale of the symphony of thought, belief being a demicadence. Nobody conceives that the few bars at the end of a musical movement are the purpose of the movement. They may be called its upshot.
No wonder pragmatism is dead as a philosophical school. That's incoherent.

Mind you, that hasn't stopped post-modernism.
 
Not even remotely. Let's check out the wiki page for materialism for a moment:

That's a good definition of materialism, in my opinion. By that definition, I also hold to materialism.

Now let's look at pragmatism:

That's a rotten definition; it leaves it unclear as to what pragmatism actually is.

So perhaps you can show, by reference to that wiki page, exactly what tenets of pragmatism it is that Taffer holds? With quotes, please.

Sure.

Most of the thinkers who describe themselves as pragmatists consider practical consequences or real effects to be vital components of both meaning and truth.




Wow, this is complete gobbledygook. (Hey, Mozilla recognises that as a word!)

Let's look at the wiki page for the Pragmatic Maxim. You'd expect it to start with a statement of the Pragmatic Maxim, yes? Well:

Yes, but what is it?

Yes, but what is it?
Oh. So, it means... Uh.

That's not much better, but as near as I can make out, what he's saying is what you think an object might do is what you think an object is. That's a philosphy of knowledge, which has nothing to do with materialism.

Peirce is a master of ham-handed phrasing.

He should have shot his editor.

No wonder pragmatism is dead as a philosophical school. That's incoherent.

Mind you, that hasn't stopped post-modernism.


Since you're so confused by the wikipedia explanation...

1.character or conduct that emphasizes practicality. 2.a philosophical movement or system having various forms, but generally stressing practical consequences as constituting the essential criterion in determining meaning, truth, or value.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pragmatism
 
Sure.
Most of the thinkers who describe themselves as pragmatists consider practical consequences or real effects to be vital components of both meaning and truth.
And where does Taffer speak of meaning? And if he does not speak of meaning, how does this apply? And what do the other thinkers say?

As Taffer says, he holds to materialism, one of several possible escape routes from solipsism (all of which are unfounded assumptions).

Materialism itself is not related to pragmatism, either in the common or philosophical sense; it is a statement about the nature of reality. The common sense of pragmatism is a statement of utility; the philosophical school makes a collection of statements about the nature of knowledge.

What exact claims are you making?
 

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