Do you believe in mental causation?

[Mercutio]

Umm ... nor did I say it did; it predicts the same illusions that you accept "physical reality" predicts. And you have no problem accepting that "physical reality" predicts 'thought' at the level we seem to be engaged in.

Well, yeah, that was kinda my point. I understand the latter, and do not understand the idealist (at the same level, at least) view. I mean, I know the processes by which the physicalist view predicts some of these things, but I do not know how an idealist view would do so. That's why I thought I'd ask you to elaborate.

Laws exist for idealists and for realists/physicalists. Why would an idealist ignore that TLOP predicts reality as we perceive it?

Are there idealist mechanisms? I mean, I "get" TLOP physically, but (and it may be because my view of idealism is grounded in materialism, I don't know) I can see no reason why, if qualia are the bedrock, TLOP are "laws" at all...it seems to me that illusions and non-illusory observations should be equal if qualia are the lingua franca, whereas only (in my understanding, that is) with the assumption of a physical reality do we get a meaningful distinction between illusion and non-illusion.

But, are you willing to contend our current model(s) of TLOP are complete?

No, but that is irrelevant. They are reliable enough that changes are going to have to explain current observations, not reject them entirely. We don't throw out Newton just because Einstein comes along.

 

[Dancing David]

Everything we do is a matter of mind over matter.

Overgenralization and assertion.
What are you talking about?
Rhetorical argument
You see, and here we are trying to explain it now.
Assumption based argument, not evidence, circular assertion
In other words what rules, derived from the mind of course, rule over matter?

Totaly foundless assertion that whatever might constrain nature is mind, could be mindless gremlins, Lifegazer assertion.
And of course once understood, we learn how to "manipulate" matter.

Assumption that 'mind' is needed to act, when what you mean perhaps is brain, a child grasping a rattle does not have a mind, unless you think a bacteria does.
We define the world through the use of our minds, and through that definition, we act upon it.

That is saying that the map determines the drive, do you ever drive without a map?

 

[Iacchus]

That is saying that the map determines the drive, do you ever drive without a map?

The question is, who or "what" is driving the car? I certainly would not be driving the car if, I didn't have "a mind" to do so.

 

[Dancing David]

Can your mind drive without the body or the car, can it drive with just a map?

 

[Dancing David]

Hammegk, glad to see you posting!

I too have the same questions as Merc:

Are there idealist mechanisms? I mean, I "get" TLOP physically, but (and it may be because my view of idealism is grounded in materialism, I don't know) I can see no reason why, if qualia are the bedrock, TLOP are "laws" at all...it seems to me that illusions and non-illusory observations should be equal if qualia are the lingua franca, whereas only (in my understanding, that is) with the assumption of a physical reality do we get a meaningful distinction between illusion and non-illusion.

1. Other idealists have asserted that 'mechanics' do not apply to idealism, and therefore there should be such things as 'anomolous cognition' if idealism applies. Or is that actualy a dualistic stance?
2.Other idealists have asserted that qualia are 'all that exists', and so perhaps the 'illusion' and 'non-illusion' is hard to understand from the materialist perspective. From a materialist perspective it would seem that 'optical illusions' are a product of the apparent neurological structue of apparent perception.
This means that some qualia appear to have a stronger group validity than others.
From your stance as an idealist is it possible to have 'less valid' quale?

 

[Iacchus]

Can your mind drive without the body or the car, can it drive with just a map?

The thing which is driving the car is your "mental" intent ... or, at least that part of you which "chooses" to do so.

 

[Mercutio]

The question is, who or "what" is driving the car? I certainly would not be driving the car if, I didn't have "a mind" to do so.

Circular. Again.

The thing which is driving the car is your "mental" intent ... or, at least that part of you which "chooses" to do so.

Did you read the "power of will" thread? Do you understand what circular reasoning is? Because, you see, you use it an awful lot.

 

[Iacchus]

Circular. Again.

Did you read the "power of will" thread? Do you understand what circular reasoning is? Because, you see, you use it an awful lot.

Who "me?" Is it circular to believe that "I" exist? Is that what you're saying? Boy, wouldn't that be something if that silly old thing would go away now wouldn't it?

 

[Mercutio]

Who "me?" Is it circular to believe that "I" exist? Is that what you're saying? Boy, wouldn't that be something if that silly old thing would go away now wouldn't it?

Once again, your use of quotation marks betrays you. It is not circular to believe you exist. You do. There is (unless you are a fairly good fake) an actual physical being who you are, who posts occasionally under the name Iacchus. On the other hand, by putting "me" and "I" in quotation marks, you lead me to believe that you are using the Iacchian definitions, which of course do not count the physical body as "you", but merely as the meat puppet inhabited by and controlled psychokinetically by the Iacchian "you". The motions and behaviors of this meat puppet are all that you have (or at least, all that you have presented here) as evidence for the existence of "you", and as such, yes, it is indeed circular. And yes, it would really be something if your use of circular reasoning would go away. Maybe then you'd understand that there is nothing left of your philosophy, and go visit a library.

 

[hammegk]

Hammegk, glad to see you posting!

I too have the same questions as Merc:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Are there idealist mechanisms? I mean, I "get" TLOP physically, but (and it may be because my view of idealism is grounded in materialism, I don't know) I can see no reason why, if qualia are the bedrock, TLOP are "laws" at all...it seems to me that illusions and non-illusory observations should be equal if qualia are the lingua franca, whereas only (in my understanding, that is) with the assumption of a physical reality do we get a meaningful distinction between illusion and non-illusion.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yet *I* seem to have no problem separating an illusionary world from the one all of us seem to perceive; nor does anyone with (perceived) normally functioning brains.

1. Other idealists have asserted that 'mechanics' do not apply to idealism, and therefore there should be such things as 'anomolous cognition' if idealism applies. Or is that actualy a dualistic stance?

If its 'anomalous' I'd say it must be dualistic. I expect what we term 'anomalous cognition' is stated to have occured both by physicalists and idealists.

2.Other idealists have asserted that qualia are 'all that exists', and so perhaps the 'illusion' and 'non-illusion' is hard to understand from the materialist perspective. From a materialist perspective it would seem that 'optical illusions' are a product of the apparent neurological structue of apparent perception.
This means that some qualia appear to have a stronger group validity than others.

Optical illusions are not anomalous cognition, rather the result of 'wetware' processing. Do physicalists dream? Dream content has no group validity, nor does it involve sensory i/o -- other than (perhaps) peripherally. Where do dreams, and numinous experiences in general, fit the quale concept?

From your stance as an idealist is it possible to have 'less valid' quale?

Interesting question to ponder ... I tend to think 'no', but also note that the same sensory i/o may lead different brains to different states.



Mercutio: What is more circular than accepting that *you* think, postulating a non-thinking "what-is", and using it to explain thought?

 

[Mercutio]

Mercutio: What is more circular than accepting that *you* think, postulating a non-thinking "what-is", and using it to explain thought?

Sorry, I don't understand your question. What is a "what-is", and where does it fit into the idea of a thinking person?

 

[Iacchus]

Sorry, I don't understand your question. What is a "what-is", and where does it fit into the idea of a thinking person?

Perhaps the fact that the only means you have to explain the circularity of cognizance is through cognizance? You say it's all circular, yet this is the only means you have to observe and, explain it.

 

[Mercutio]

Perhaps the fact that the only means you have to explain the circularity of cognizance is through cognizance? You say it's all circular, yet this is the only means you have to observe and, explain it.

Please let Hammegk answer the question. At least I know he reads and understands what I say, and I can genuinely engage him in honest debate. You, on the other hand, don't know enough about your own position's logic to speak coherently of it.

If you knew anything about experimental psychophysics (invented, incidentally, by a spiritual monist, practiced currently by material monists, neither of which positions would find your philosophy coherent) or about experimental psychology or neurology, you would retract your question. It may be the case that you know of no other way to observe it, but don't worry, the rest of us are not afraid of libraries, journals, or experimental study, and there have been many methodologies developed which have replaced introspection as means by which to study thinking.

And lastly, please find somebody to take you aside and gently explain to you what circularity means. I give up. You have never once demonstrated that you understand it, despite the best efforts of many here. Your philosophy will always be hobbled by your inability to refrain from circularity. It is in your own best interest to educate yourself on this. Good luck. I mean it.

 

[Iacchus]

I have a spirit, and I know I have a spirit. And all your scientific "findings" are not going to take that away. So, do you know that you have a spirit?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I have a spirit, and I know I have a spirit. And all your scientific "findings" are not going to take that away. So, do you know that you have a spirit?

You "have" a spirit? I thought you "were" a spirit!

 

[Mercutio]

I have a spirit, and I know I have a spirit. And all your scientific "findings" are not going to take that away. So, do you know that you have a spirit?

Yeah, yeah, you know. A more honest person would say simply that he or she believes.

Ok...so you know. I have already asked how you know, and you have refused to explain how it is that you know that these particular dreams and numerology are more reliable than scientific study. But, you have made it clear that when mainstream science disagrees with your dreams and numerology, you will reject science.

In answer to your question...I have seen no evidence whatsoever that I have a spirit, by any common definition of the word. As for Iacchian definitions, perhaps "spirit" means "pancreas", so I do have one. I can't keep up with your uses of words. In any case, I do not know that I have a spirit, so the answer is "no".

 

[Atlas]

... As for Iacchian definitions, perhaps "spirit" means "pancreas", so I do have one. ...

Interestingly, you don't phrase it - I know I have a pancreas.

I wonder if Iacchus needs any evidence at all to assert things he "knows". (I mean evidence besides numerological manufacture.)

Maybe though that's just a fundamental difference between idealists and those who are not.

 

[Mercutio]

Interestingly, you don't phrase it - I know I have a pancreas.

I do have both direct and indirect evidence that I have a pancreas, but to some extent I am taking the word of doctors and technicians. I suppose it is possible that I am the victim of a conspiracy, along with being that rare human who can live without a pancreas...

So, yeah, I believe pretty strongly that I have a pancreas. But you are right, it is interesting, the way we phrase these things.

 

[hammegk]

Please let Hammegk answer the question.

The problem is that if "the fact that the only means you have to explain the circularity of cognizance is through cognizance" doesn't have meaning to you, I really don't know what else to say.

Er, "what-is" ... the whole enchilada .. the universe ... everything ...

Sorry not to be of help, M.

 

[Iacchus]

You "have" a spirit? I thought you "were" a spirit!

Well, when you and I become spirits, perhaps we can disucss it? And yes, the "I" which I refer to as myself, is "my spirit."