Do you believe in mental causation?

[Iacchus]

So..."no". You can't give an example.

I did not ask you to explain it, I simply asked you for an example. Can you do that?

Everything we do is a matter of mind over matter. What are you talking about? You see, and here we are trying to explain it now. In other words what rules, derived from the mind of course, rule over matter? And of course once understood, we learn how to "manipulate" matter. We define the world through the use of our minds, and through that definition, we act upon it.

 

[Mercutio]

Everything we do is a matter of mind over matter.

So there is no instance of matter without mind, then. So logically, since you have no "no mind" condition with which to compare it, you cannot know that you are in a "mind" condition.

But I know you would never make a claim that cannot be logically supported, so I will ask again, for just one example of "mind over matter". Can you provide one?

 

[bruto]

I think it really just comes down to how you classify the things that go on in your brain. If you consider your thoughts, intentions, desires, decisions, etc. to be "mind," and your body and the things it connects to as matter, then it's mind over matter. I decide in my "mind" to move my "body" and voila! It moves. Q.E.D. Of course if you can prove in a way that everyone agrees upon that "mind" is truly immaterial or "matter" is truly material, you'll have solved some useful philosophical problems that have kept people busy for several centuries. Of course maybe neither one is either one, and it's all something else. Good luck.

 

[Mercutio]

I think it really just comes down to how you classify the things that go on in your brain. If you consider your thoughts, intentions, desires, decisions, etc. to be "mind," and your body and the things it connects to as matter, then it's mind over matter.

It would help if "thoughts, intentions, desires, decisions, etc." were coherently defined. As we use the terms, these are all circularly defined or are reified metaphorical nouns standing in for physical processes. As such, they are not so much "mental" in the Cartesian sense (or Iacchian sense), as they are "illusory" (as Blackwood put it). Not "non-existent", but "illusory", as in "something that appears to be something that it is not". They are quite clearly seen as physical processes, as matter over matter. An idealist would disagree with me, but put both as mental. The dualist , however, cannot explain how the two realms connect...

 

[bruto]

It would help if "thoughts, intentions, desires, decisions, etc." were coherently defined. As we use the terms, these are all circularly defined or are reified metaphorical nouns standing in for physical processes. As such, they are not so much "mental" in the Cartesian sense (or Iacchian sense), as they are "illusory" (as Blackwood put it). Not "non-existent", but "illusory", as in "something that appears to be something that it is not". They are quite clearly seen as physical processes, as matter over matter. An idealist would disagree with me, but put both as mental. The dualist , however, cannot explain how the two realms connect...

True enough, but does a dualist have to explain how the two realms connect to assert that they do? If the dualist could come up with a good and convincing argument that the two realms exist separately, and could indeed coherently define them, would he need to explain the mechanism of connection? Of course, if he could find the mechanism it would be a lot easier to define them coherently, wouldn't it?

It's been a long time since I studied philosophy, but I seem to remember finding both idealism and pluralism of the Jamesian sort a lot easier to swallow than dualism, in part because of that unexplained interface. But however you define "mind" and "matter," it seems clear that what we commonly call the one works on what we commonly call the other. Saying that an intention doesn't move matter but a decision does is just semantics.

 

[Mercutio]

It's been a long time since I studied philosophy, but I seem to remember finding both idealism and pluralism of the Jamesian sort a lot easier to swallow than dualism, in part because of that unexplained interface. But however you define "mind" and "matter," it seems clear that what we commonly call the one works on what we commonly call the other. Saying that an intention doesn't move matter but a decision does is just semantics.

I don't say either does.

What we commonly call something, and how it actually works, need not be related. "Mind" is a remnant of Descartes; it is prescientific, and as useful in describing our reality as "sunrise" is in describing which bodies orbit which.

 

[Iacchus]

So there is no instance of matter without mind, then. So logically, since you have no "no mind" condition with which to compare it, you cannot know that you are in a "mind" condition.

But I know you would never make a claim that cannot be logically supported, so I will ask again, for just one example of "mind over matter". Can you provide one?

I personally think this whole thing is silly. It almost sounds like you're trying to reduce the human condition to nothing more than a mere equation. Which, might be okay, provided that things were strictly "physical" in nature. But they're not. To know, in and of itself, is a condition of the mind by the way.

 

[Iacchus]

I don't say either does.

What we commonly call something, and how it actually works, need not be related. "Mind" is a remnant of Descartes; it is prescientific, and as useful in describing our reality as "sunrise" is in describing which bodies orbit which.

The brain is merely a backdrop, or the stage. It is not the actual play, however.

 

[Mercutio]

I personally think this whole thing is silly. It almost sounds like you're trying to reduce the human condition to nothing more than a mere equation.

I am merely trying to understand "the human condition." I don't like to accept something, even if it sounds really nice, that is not supported by logic or evidence. If, when I examine the lack of logic and lack of evidence behind "mental causation", you think this is silly, perhaps you are happier believing things that have no foundation in reality. Your choice.

Which, might be okay, provided that things were strictly "physical" in nature. But they're not. To know, in and of itself, is a condition of the mind by the way.

And you know this how? You have never once critically examined your logic or evidence; in decades of development, you have coddled your ideas and sheltered them from any sort of challenge. And yet, you state with certainty that these things are not strictly physical. How do you know this, when you have actively avoided the scientific literature on that question? You say that to know is a condition of the mind (and add "by the way", as if that adds to the argument), but you have again actively avoided the literature on learning. You are actually proud of your ignorance, and yet you attempt to speak with authority...based on what? Your dreams?

You accuse me of trying to minimize the human condition by applying science to its understanding. Science is the best tool we have for understanding; the most important questions deserve a scientific examination. You, on the other hand, insult the human condition by suggesting that we can really understand it...by simply dreaming.

 

[Mercutio]

The brain is merely a backdrop, or the stage. It is not the actual play, however.

Yet once again...how is it you know this?

 

[hammegk]

.... An idealist would disagree with me, but put both as mental.

We agree. Now, why do you choose 'physical'? (Hint: Qualia are all *you* have to work with .... )

 

[Mercutio]

We agree. Now, why do you choose 'physical'? (Hint: Qualia are all *you* have to work with .... )

I choose physical, because I can start there and explain what you call qualia. I have never been able to start at qualia and reasonably explain (in a manner which allows me to generate predictions, for instance) the physical.

As one example...the vast majority of visual illusions are discovered perceptually, then we try to explain them through, say, the cellular organization of the retina. Examples of this would be the Hermann Grid, Mach Bands, Opponent Afterimages, etc. But there is one (I forget the name of it, it has to do with the perception of yellow--I'll try to find it) that was predicted from an analysis of the structure of the retina and the distribution of cone cells. Somebody said, "hey, I bet that I should be able to demonstrate this perceptual experience by setting up this particular stimulus."...and it worked! A physical understanding predicted a particular qualia, an illusion, yet, before it had been experienced by anyone (knowingly, at least)! What predictions about the apparently physical (I think that is how to put it--whether or not the physical does exist, it does appear to, I think you will agree) can qualia make?

Now, it could be that I am simply ignorant of a whole raft of things which would fit the bill. But...if I am, I am, and that is my reason for choosing physical.

 

[Atlas]

... But there is one (I forget the name of it, it has to do with the perception of yellow--I'll try to find it) that was predicted from an analysis of the structure of the retina and the distribution of cone cells.

Is this it?

 

[Mercutio]

Is this it?

No. (Very cool article, though--I have a serious interest in color vision and anomolous color vision, and have participated in color-matching experiments looking at (or for) unique primaries, so I am very grateful to you for pointing this one out to me.)

It is considerably simpler. If you show a rectangle (white interior, black borders, on a white background), with a blob of yellow (does not fill the entire rectangle, and spills out of the rectangle at other areas--looks sorta like somebody spilled lemonade on and around a placemat), at a certain distance, you will be unable to see it as anything but a yellow rectangle (with black borders) on a white background. The perceived yellow will fill the box, and there will be no perceived yellow outside the box.

It is a simple illusion, but the point is that it was predicted from the structure of the retina before it was actually experienced.

 

[Iacchus]

Yet once again...how is it you know this?

Because the play is constantly changing and the brain is merely passing on the information. That's like saying the music player is not the same thing as the music which is played back on it.

 

[hammegk]

..... Somebody said, "hey, I bet that I should be able to demonstrate this perceptual experience by setting up this particular stimulus."...and it worked! A physical understanding predicted a particular qualia, an illusion, yet, before it had been experienced by anyone (knowingly, at least)! What predictions about the apparently physical (I think that is how to put it--whether or not the physical does exist, it does appear to, I think you will agree) can qualia make?

Predicted perception involving processing via perceived-as-physical would be the same, sfaik.

The question is what is the illusion; the quale, or the "physical" being perceived?

 

[Atlas]

Predicted perception involving processing via perceived-as-physical would be the same, sfaik.

The question is what is the illusion; the quale, or the "physical" being perceived?

Hi Hamme,

I have a question on qualia that I've been meaning to ask. So this may be off topic but it seems related here (at least to me.)

When people refer to qualia they are generally speaking about accessible phenomena. But what of the info we block out. Like when a spouse is talking to us but we block it out.

Surely all the sound vibrations struck our eardrums and were changed into chemical/electrical impulses and raced along our nerve pathways to the brain like normal sound. But this has been filtered and disposed of and is completely inaccessible.

Is that lost info non qualia info because of it's inaccessibility. Do you even accept that there is a physical filtering occurring.

 

[Mercutio]

Predicted perception involving processing via perceived-as-physical would be the same, sfaik.

Could you elaborate on this, please? I do understand that it should be the same, but I honestly have a tough time with the idea of idealism predicting the illusion of physical "reality". I admit it is quite possibly my ignorance, but it seems to me that there need not be the constraints (such as laws of physics) from the idealist's point of view, and that the perception of such laws in the illusory physical world would be arbitrary. Other laws could just as easily exist. For that matter, each of us could have our own.

Now, I admit I may be assuming things about idealism that are part of the baggage of materialism, but if I am I am doing so out of ignorance. Which is why I am asking you to elaborate.

The question is what is the illusion; the quale, or the "physical" being perceived?

You may feel free to use this as your example if you wish. I have used it, here (on one or more of Ian's threads) and on the skeptic forum, so I'll not argue it now unless you wish it after your elaboration (assuming you are so kind as to do that).

 

[Mercutio]

Because the play is constantly changing and the brain is merely passing on the information. That's like saying the music player is not the same thing as the music which is played back on it.

See, now you are making claims again, rather than explaining them. Why do you think that the brain is merely a conduit for information from some other unperceivable dimension? Do you recognize, at least, that this particular claim of yours is not merely without evidence, but is actually counter to the observable data on brain function? The burden of proof is on your extraordinary claim...so ok, I get what you are claiming (again and again and again), now all I need to know is why.

Do you understand the difference between a claim and the presentation of data and/or logic supporting that claim?

 

[hammegk]

Hi Hamme,

I have a question on qualia that I've been meaning to ask. So this may be off topic but it seems related here (at least to me.)

When people refer to qualia they are generally speaking about accessible phenomena. But what of the info we block out. Like when a spouse is talking to us but we block it out.

Surely all the sound vibrations struck our eardrums and were changed into chemical/electrical impulses and raced along our nerve pathways to the brain like normal sound. But this has been filtered and disposed of and is completely inaccessible.

Is that lost info non qualia info because of it's inaccessibility. Do you even accept that there is a physical filtering occurring.

In the Wheeler-Feynman picture when the retarded wave is absorbed at some time in the future, a process is initiated by which canceling advanced waves from the absorbers erase all traces of advanced waves and their ``advanced'' effects, thereby preserving causality. An observer not privy to these inner mechanisms of nature would perceive only that a retarded wave had gone from the emitter to the absorber. The absorber theory description, unconventional though it is, leads to exactly the same observations as conventional electrodynamics. But it differs in that there has been a two-way exchange, a ``handshake'' across space-time which led to the transfer of energy from emitter to absorber.

This advanced-retarded handshake is the basis for the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is a two-way contract between the future and the past for the purpose of transferring energy, momentum, etc, while observing all of the conservation laws and quantization conditions imposed at the emitter/absorber terminating ``boundaries'' of the transaction.
The transaction is explicitly nonlocal because the future is, in a limited way, affecting the past (at the level of enforcing correlations). It also alters the way in which we must look at physical phenomena. When we stand in the dark and look at a star a hundred light years away, not only have the retarded light waves from the star been traveling for a hundred years to reach our eyes, but the advanced waves generated by absorption processes within our eyes have reached a hundred years into the past, completing the transaction that permitted the star to shine in our direction.

courtesy of http://mist.npl.washington.edu/npl/int_rep/ti_over/node2.html#SECTION00020000000000000000

As a further derail, a recent thread proposed "information" as a primary driver. I'd say "communication" is a better word, and communication has occured for every boson transaction, and that imho is a quale although obviously not one understood individually at homo sap level (or likely at viral level). That is, "Quale" requires "Communication", and of course what *you* perceive as a communication/quale involves a great variety of filtering.

Could you elaborate on this, please? I do understand that it should be the same, but I honestly have a tough time with the idea of idealism predicting the illusion of physical "reality".

Umm ... nor did I say it did; it predicts the same illusions that you accept "physical reality" predicts. And you have no problem accepting that "physical reality" predicts 'thought' at the level we seem to be engaged in.

I admit it is quite possibly my ignorance, but it seems to me that there need not be the constraints (such as laws of physics) from the idealist's point of view, and that the perception of such laws in the illusory physical world would be arbitrary. Other laws could just as easily exist. For that matter, each of us could have our own.

Laws exist for idealists and for realists/physicalists. Why would an idealist ignore that TLOP predicts reality as we perceive it? But, are you willing to contend our current model(s) of TLOP are complete?