That looks like a very useful and detailed document, indeed, gumboot.
I am fairly certain that I have seen it before but I am not sure if I have ever read it in full, and I am sure that I have never printed it out before. As I did not have time to read all of it this weekend, (and because I prefer to read lengthy documents on paper rather than on my computer monitor) I have emailed it to myself at my work address so that I can print it out and read it more closely as and when time permits, but having skimmed through it this weekend, I can tell that it will be very useful on many points. Thanks for posting it
It was one of those lucky finds...
I think it gives a better understanding of why there were delays between "first sign of hijacking" and "notifying military" and that sort of thing.
I had suspected, but now I can see how it would have occurred clearly. Of course it's easy in hindsight to think the moment something odd happened fighters should have been scrambled.
What we see is a gradual understanding by the "system" of what was actually happening. If you look at each flight, you can see how unique features affected the response:
AA11
-No expectation of suicide attack
-Caught off guard by lack of historic hijackings
-No confirmation of impact with WTC
UA175
-Same ATC already handling AA11
-Very short flight time
-System still dealing with shock of AA11
AA77
-Tracked by ATC out of the Boston/New York loop (didn't know what was going on)
-Assumed crashed
-Lost in primary radar gap
UA93
-Everyone knew what to expect (including passengers)
-Everyone knew what was going on (including passengers)
-NORAD had fighters in the air
-121st Fighter Squadron had fighters in the air
-FAA tracking UA93
-Gumboot