Do I understand epiphenomenalism now?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I was reading V. S. Ramachandran's great book A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness, where he mentions epiphenomenalism. He defines it to mean that a quale is a product of a brain event, but is causally inefficacious with respect to that event. It may well be efficacious to other parts of the brain. This gets us out of the logical bugaboo that we couldn't possibly know about a quale if it was entirely causally inefficacious.

So then I found this site:

http://publish.uwo.ca/~mcintosh/epi.htm

Property P is epiphenomenal with respect to property Q if exemplifications of the former are causally inefficacious with respect to exemplifications of the latter, yet there is some link between the two.

This sounds like it's in agreement with Ramachandran. But then further down on the page there is a diagram that looks like the usual completely inefficacious stuff. The definitions here also sound like the usual stuff:

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:epiphenomenalism

Does anyone have a clue what philosophers really mean by epiphenomenalism?

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

 

[Gestahl]

I was reading V. S. Ramachandran's great book A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness, where he mentions epiphenomenalism. He defines it to mean that a quale is a product of a brain event, but is causally inefficacious with respect to that event. It may well be efficacious to other parts of the brain. This gets us out of the logical bugaboo that we couldn't possibly know about a quale if it was entirely causally inefficacious.

Does anyone have a clue what philosophers really mean by epiphenomenalism?

~~ Paul

That begs the question we can *really* know what someone else means by anything. I'll let that slide ;-).

My take:

Epiphenomenalism is exactly what it would be like if you were a conscious computer program. Your thoughts would be a be a by-product of the computer. Furthermore, since the electrical activity is what causes your singular thought, your thought cannot modify the computation that caused it, although it might modify other computations in the future. The difference in what you are reading is simply a difference of opinion on whether epiphenomenalism is entirely non-interactive, or somewhat interactive in the non-immediate sense.

I agree with hammegk, dualism is rife with problems.

 

[El Greco]

Etymologically "epiphenomenon" means something that "appears to be" (Heracletus used to say that "balance is the epiphenomenon of counterbalancing forces") or something that is the perceivable result of something we can't observe (an EEG is the epiphenomenon of brain activity).

I guess that philosophers have freely painted upon that.

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

I was reading V. S. Ramachandran's great book A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness, where he mentions epiphenomenalism. He defines it to mean that a quale is a product of a brain event, but is causally inefficacious with respect to that event. It may well be efficacious to other parts of the brain. This gets us out of the logical bugaboo that we couldn't possibly know about a quale if it was entirely causally inefficacious.

I think one thing to note is that epiphenomenalism is a fairly general term (similar, I suppose, to 'realism' or something like that), and that epiphenomenalism about the mental, or about qualia, or about anything in particular is a distinct position. So Ramachandran's definition isn't really a definition of epiphenomenalism but about a particular sort of epiphenomenalism relating to consciousness. It's a small point, I admit, but it is somewhat related given that the other definition you found is a more general one.

So then I found this site:

http://publish.uwo.ca/~mcintosh/epi.htm


This sounds like it's in agreement with Ramachandran. But then further down on the page there is a diagram that looks like the usual completely inefficacious stuff. The definitions here also sound like the usual stuff:

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:epiphenomenalism

Does anyone have a clue what philosophers really mean by epiphenomenalism?

~~ Paul

I suppose one thing to note is that philosophers are notably recalcitrant when it comes to all agreeing on exactly what some term means. This is mostly a result of dealing with terms like 'epiphenomenalism' which are defined fairly loosely (there are a variety of different positions all of which could reasonably be called 'epiphenomenalism regarding x', for any suitable x), but also just a general feature of philosophers (try to figure out what philosophers mean by 'realism', if you want to see this tendency in full force).

Above that, though, Gestahl's computer example is probably a very good one for the purposes at hand - and I agree with him that the distinction between the two positions is fairly minimal (and most likely just a minor difference in emphasis).

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Epiphenomenalism implies that mental activities are a "sub-product" of neural activity on the brain, but have no causal link with the "real world". Causality (between the individual and its enviroment) begin and ends within the brain, and the "mental stuff" is basically, irrelevant.

Oh, and if we want to advance in what we think, we most understand what, exactly, we are saying, so I do not think philophers are "recalcitrant" they just want to be as exact as humanly possible.

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

Oh, I disagree entirely - have you ever tried to read analytic philosophy? The jerks can't even agree what symbols to use in their logical notation.

(Ok, that's just a pet peeve - but seriously, how hard would it be to just get everyone together and agree that a -> meant implication?)

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Eleatic said:
Above that, though, Gestahl's computer example is probably a very good one for the purposes at hand - and I agree with him that the distinction between the two positions is fairly minimal (and most likely just a minor difference in emphasis).

What two positions? The difference between Gestahl's take and the vast majority of descriptions I've read is immense. Every one of the definitions here:

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:epiphenomenalism

is, I humbly suggest, ridiculous. Philosophers can't really be using those definitions, so Gestahl must be correct.

Is it possible that epiphenomenalism has become, like fashion, a charicature of itself?

~~ Paul

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

What two positions? The difference between Gestahl's take and the vast majority of descriptions I've read is immense. Every one of the definitions here:

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&oi=defmore&q=define:epiphenomenalism

is, I humbly suggest, ridiculous. Philosophers can't really be using those definitions, so Gestahl must be correct.

Is it possible that epiphenomenalism has become, like fashion, a charicature of itself?

~~ Paul

I was referring to the Ramachandran version and the definition you quoted in the OP, though in retrospect I can see how that would be confusing - sorry.

I'm not entirely sure why you find those definitions to be ridiculous.

Also, the problem I suspect - as I do with a lot of defining of terms in philosophy - is that philosophic terms of this sort (general positions) aren't really very conducive to straightforward definitions. You might want to just go track down some articles by philosophers advancing epiphenomenalist positions to get a better feel for what is meant by an epiphenomenal theory.

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

Ah - I tracked down the Stanford Encyclopedia (which is really excellent as a reference, by the way), and you can find the article here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/

I should note that, in line with your above post, it includes the following disclaimer:

It should be noted that most recent writers take a somewhat dogmatic position against epiphenomenalism. They presume that epiphenomenalism is to be avoided, and they go to great lengths to try to show that they have avoided incurring that anathema, despite maintaining the sufficiency of physical causation in conjunction with some kind of distinction between the mental and the physical.

So, yeah, most philosophers don't really endorse epiphenomenalism as much as they get accused of it by their critics.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The site you linked starts with:

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events.

I don't know how it can get any more straightforward and yet bizarre than this. They just cannot mean what they are saying.

Lest I judge a book by its opening line, I have printed the article and will read it over the next few days.

~~ Paul

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

You'll be glad to read section 2.1 then...

2. Traditional Arguments (B) Con (with Epiphenomenalists' Responses)
2.1 Obvious Absurdity
Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.).....

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos
This gets us out of the logical bugaboo that we couldn't possibly know about a quale if it was entirely causally inefficacious.

Why is that a logical bugaboo? Some brain process causes us to experience a quale. While the quale itself causes nothing, that brain process causes other brain processes which cause us to know about the quale. I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "know about the quale", but in any case, I guess it's some sort of conscious experience, so why can't it be caused by suitable brain processes just as qualia can?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Oh, I disagree entirely - have you ever tried to read analytic philosophy? The jerks can't even agree what symbols to use in their logical notation.

(Ok, that's just a pet peeve - but seriously, how hard would it be to just get everyone together and agree that a -> meant implication?)

Yes, I have some experience in the subject, and Im still learing, is one of those fields that have no end. I can tell you this. I remember discussions in which we have spent HOURS trying to find out what the author of some book was telling in ONE PARAGRAPH.

It is that complex.

I dont think is possible to discuss Analytic Philosophy without sharing a common frame of reference (in this case, several books and papers on the subject).

But I do think, like Wittgensten, that most problems of philosophy, and even science, are a by product of our use of language. Analytical Philosophy is the first step to reach some agreements... or to finally see that they are impossible.

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

Some brain process causes us to experience a quale. While the quale itself causes nothing, that brain process causes other brain processes which cause us to know about the quale.

Ah, but here you're missing the problem -- because if it's the brain event that is causing us to know something then it's causing us to know something about the brain event, not about the quale in question.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Eleatic said:
Ah, but here you're missing the problem -- because if it's the brain event that is causing us to know something then it's causing us to know something about the brain event, not about the quale in question.

Which would be fine if the brain event caused additional brain events that let us know precisely what the quale felt like, even though the quale itself was causally inefficacious. But how in hell would such a thing evolve?

~~ Paul

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Eleatic Stranger
Ah, but here you're missing the problem -- because if it's the brain event that is causing us to know something then it's causing us to know something about the brain event, not about the quale in question.

If there is a problem, I am definitely missing it, yes.

So let's clarify what we mean by "know about a quale". How might we distinguish knowing about a quale from knowing about the brain event that caused it? (When I say, "knowing about the brain event that caused it," I don't mean in the sense that a neuroscientist knows about other people's brain events, from EEGs and such; I'm just repeating your phrase, which I don't quite understand, but which apparently refers to "knowing" about one's own brain events by means of the conscious experiences they produce.)

As far as I can tell, "knowing about a quale" means something like "remembering that you once experienced the quale". Remembering a previous experience is just another experience itself, so what's the problem with supposing that it too is caused by brain events, just as the original experience was?

Also, see a previous post of mine about (what I see as) the meaning of "cause," where I say,<blockquote>If a certain conscious experience is always correlated with a certain brain process, it doesn't really matter whether we say that subsequent events are caused by the conscious experience or by the brain process. Everything is the same either way, because the two always go together.</blockquote>

 

[Eleatic Stranger]

But if you say that the conscious experience (quale) is always correlated with a certain sort of brain event you're adding something to the theory that would make it questionable whether or not it's an epiphenomenalist theory at all (because then you could just characterize the two as, if not straightforwardly identical, at least necessarily linked -- and there are problems with this (here I refer you to the above link, and the semantic externalism point)). The idea that the link between the conscious experience and the particular brain event is a necessary one tends to undercut any epiphenomenalist position in the first place.

 

[69dodge]

I don't think the link between brain processes and qualia is necessary; it's just how the world happens to work, the same as any other natural law. There are well-known natural laws that say things like "energy is conserved," and there are also other natural laws, the precise details of which have yet to be discovered, that say things like "when such-and-such a brain process occurs, such-and-such a quale will be felt."

What is that position called?

 

[hammegk]

Some form of monism.