Do clever people outsmart themselves?

[Dave Rogers]

According to what you say the problem of ad hoc hypotheses is really a problem but "it's simple" and can be solved by anyone who is "conversant" with the scientific method. This is consistent with a previous idea of yours: that the scientist solves this problem intuitively. We would say that scientists and philosophers who fiercely argue the problem are wasting their time. It is already solved. Easily solved.

Can I know the simple way to solve it? If it's simple you'll be able to express it in a couple of lines, won't you?

This is getting a bit bizarre. You've been asked for a practical use of the philosophy of science, and you've chosen the handling of ad hoc hypotheses; you've then said that you don't actually know how to handle ad hoc hypotheses, but now you seem to be insisting that, if the scientific method can't handle ad hoc hypotheses either, then philosophy of science must be considered an equally valid tool for dealing with them. This seems like classic woo thinking; astrology can't predict the future accurately, but neither can science, therefore astrology is equally as valid as science.

But in fact, the scientific method can handle ad hoc hypotheses; it accepts them only provisionally, tests their validity, and attempts wherever possible to incorporate them into a simpler and more internally consistent framework. In other words, they are dealt with the same way as any scientific hypothesis. What can the philosophy of science add to that?

Dave

 

[JoeMorgue]

This is getting a bit bizarre. You've been asked for a practical use of the philosophy of science, and you've chosen the handling of ad hoc hypotheses; you've then said that you don't actually know how to handle ad hoc hypotheses, but now you seem to be insisting that, if the scientific method can't handle ad hoc hypotheses either, then philosophy of science must be considered an equally valid tool for dealing with them. This seems like classic woo thinking; astrology can't predict the future accurately, but neither can science, therefore astrology is equally as valid as science.

But in fact, the scientific method can handle ad hoc hypotheses; it accepts them only provisionally, tests their validity, and attempts wherever possible to incorporate them into a simpler and more internally consistent framework. In other words, they are dealt with the same way as any scientific hypothesis. What can the philosophy of science add to that?

You're wasting your breath. Stripped of all word salad and "Well this philosopher said" you're never going to discussion out of David that amounts to anything beyond:

"Science doesn't know everything!"
"Then what does?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"
"Then what does?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"
"Then... what... does?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"
"THEN.... WHAT... DOES?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"

 

[Robin]

I already gave an example of a philosophy of science subject that scientists themselves discuss and gave a cite to a substantial scientist saying that it was important to their work.

Do you want more? Hasn't Occam's Razor been useful in the business of doing science? The concept of falsifiability?

Mayr seemed to regard philosophical analysis of cause and effect, the "proximate-ultimate" distinction as being a matter of practical importance, not just of tangential interest.

I sometimes cross swords with an astrophysicist, himself a brutal critic of philosophy of science, who nevertheless says that Quine's "Web of Belief" concept is important to the way science builds up knowledge of the world. This is, itself, an adaptation of Neurath's "Ship of Theseus" analogy.

 

[David Mo]

You're wasting your breath. Stripped of all word salad and "Well this philosopher said" you're never going to discussion out of David that amounts to anything beyond:

"Science doesn't know everything!"
"Then what does?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"
"Then what does?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"
"Then... what... does?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"
"THEN.... WHAT... DOES?"
"Science doesn't know everything!"

We have already given you several examples of kinds of knowledge that are different of science. Not that they "know everything", obviously. It's just that your hearing aid doesn't work. No matter how much we yell at you, you won't get it.

 

[llwyd]

Well, obviously science doesn't know everything - I would be astounded if there would be a natural scientist who would claim that. And anyway, it doesn't address moral and ethical questions at all for example. Is abortion wrong, should there be a death penalty, should citizens have the right to carry arms? What is the answer of natural science to those questions?

 

[Robin]

It is probably too charged an atmosphere to talk about it properly. There is a distinction made between an ad-hoc hypothesis and the legitimate introduction of provisional or auxiliary hypotheses.

The idea is to find a set of criteria to find when something is a legitimate move like this or when it has become an immunising strategy for a poor theory.

In other words the issue is the demarcation problem. And yes, I know that a lot of scientists say the demarcation problem is not a problem, that the scientific method will sort the chaff from the wheat.

But the question is, does the fact that philosophy has not supplied a cut and dried, complete answer to the demarcation problem that everyone accepts mean that it has not made any useful contribution in this area?

How is science dealing with something like the Integrated Information Theory? Science or pseudoscience?

 

[Robin]

Also there is an odd misconception here that there is a distinction between science and the philosophy of science.

The philosophy of science is and always has been part of the scientific method.

 

[Chanakya]

You surprise me.

According to what you say the problem of ad hoc hypotheses is really a problem but "it's simple" and can be solved by anyone who is "conversant" with the scientific method. This is consistent with a previous idea of yours: that the scientist solves this problem intuitively. We would say that scientists and philosophers who fiercely argue the problem are wasting their time. It is already solved. Easily solved.

Can I know the simple way to solve it? If it's simple you'll be able to express it in a couple of lines, won't you?

Not intuitively. Nor without criteria, as you've earlier on misrepresented me as having said. These are strawmen that you, for some reason, keep putting up.

I'm saying ad hoc hypetheses are no exotic creature, that might need some exotic means of dealing with them: they can be dealt with in the normal course, using that very same equipment that science generally uses, which are: (a) the scientific method; and (b) technical expertise and knowledge specific to the field being researched.

I'm saying, I see no scope for any philosophy of science to make any contribution here.

-------

And I note that you continue trying to look for any excuse you can lay your hands on, to not answer the question.

Why do you insist on "debating" on? I believe my ideas on how science deals with ad hoc hypotheses are far more representative of reality than yours are: but whether I'm correct or not is beside the point here, really. The question, at the moment, is this: How, exactly, does philosophy of science help us in dealing with ad hoc hypotheses, in ways that simply knowing one's field of expertise and applying the scientific method does not?

Why do you not answer the question?

If you don't really know, it's okay, just admit it, or simply leave this be, and that's the end to this. I'm sorry about this persistence of mine, my intention is not to embarrass you, but only to see if you have any good reason for me to change how I think about the utility of philosophy of science, that's all.

Instead of working up a sweat in a futile attempt to pin me down on logical or conceptual errors in what I say, just answer the question, why don't you?

 

[Chanakya]

Also there is an odd misconception here that there is a distinction between science and the philosophy of science.

The philosophy of science is and always has been part of the scientific method.

Can you expand on this?

If, as you're saying, what's being referred to as the philosophy of science is simply a part of the scientific method, not in times past but today, then we may be arguing about nothing.

Okay, dumb question, if I may: What exactly is the philosophy of science then? Not historically, but today, in context of what you've just said in your comment and that I've just repeated here?


eta:
I'm not sure it necessarily matters, that some eminent scientist may have remarked to some other eminent scientist, that philosophy of science has helped them in their work. After all, they may make the same kind of remark about the grace of god, or their mutual faith in god.

Can you discuss some particular instance -- in current times -- of philosophy of science actually helping us "do science"? (Or, like I asked, elaborate on your idea that philosophy of science is simply part of the scientific method, in current times not in the past?)

 

[Chanakya]

... But in fact, the scientific method can handle ad hoc hypotheses; it accepts them only provisionally, tests their validity, and attempts wherever possible to incorporate them into a simpler and more internally consistent framework. In other words, they are dealt with the same way as any scientific hypothesis. ...

Ah, thank you! This seemed to me the common sense way to look at ad hoc hypotheses, but given that I'm not actually a scientist myself, I was just a bit unsure whether "common sense" might not be misleading me here.

You speak from personal knowledge, then? (Just checking that this isn't a case of two blind men agreeing over something neither has actually seen.)

 

[Robin]

I'm not sure it necessarily matters, that some eminent scientist may have remarked to some other eminent scientist, that philosophy of science has helped them in their work. After all, they may make the same kind of remark about the grace of god, or their mutual faith in god.

Or it may be that people like Weinberg, Mayr and Einstein have a pretty good handle on what it means, in general, to do science.

Can you discuss some particular instance -- in current times -- of philosophy of science actually helping us "do science"?

I thought I had already. Can you define "current times" then, last 20 years? The last 40 years?

(Or, like I asked, elaborate on your idea that philosophy of science is simply part of the scientific method, in current times not in the past?)

OK, but later, it might take a little longer. If I am to contradict some strongly held myths (like the idea that science was invented whole out of thin air by Galileo), then I had better get my wording right.

(Edited because I have no idea whether or not what I originally said was insensitive to other cultures).

 

[Chanakya]

Or it may be that people like Weinberg, Mayr and Einstein have a pretty good handle on what it means, in general, to do science.

Sure it could. In general, and also, perhaps, in this specific instance. Goes without saying, right? That is precisely why this question, else we could have simply discarded that observation, and this discussion, without further ado.

The point is, not everything one scientist says to another in general terms is necessarily scientific, or even correct, even when it has to do with science.

... Can you define "current times" then, last 20 years? The last 40 years?

Sure. 20 years, 40 years, would be fine.

OK, but later, it might take a little longer.

Please, take your time. No rush at all.

If I am to contradict some strongly held myths (like the idea that science was invented whole out of thin air by Galileo)

Who has shown themselves to be holding strongly held myths of that nature, and why is that of such relevance here that you feel the need to say this to me?

I seem to perceive an implied strawman here. Let go of it, please.

, then I had better get my wording right.

(Edited because I have no idea whether or not what I originally said was insensitive to other cultures).

I don't see why apologists for the philosophy of science feel the need to flail around and contort themselves endlessly, instead of simply producing one single piece of evidence, or a straightforward answer to the question actually raised.

I've given up, now, on getting a clear answer on this from David Mo. In your case also, to simply explain your earlier remark that the philosophy of science is simply part of, perhaps a subset of, the scientific method, shouldn't be such a difficult thing, should it? There's no need to tread eggshells: your observation seemed different than what I think, and also not exactly the same as what easily available sources like Wikipedia have to say, so my question was just a simple request for clarification and some explanation, not (hopefully!) the prelude to (yet another!) endless debate.



eta:

Okay, on second thoughts, let me follow your example and precisely word my questions to you, in order to prevent any possible misunderstandings:

(a) Can you expand on your comment that philosophy of science is simply part of the scientific method itself, not just historically but in practice today? A superficial read (Wikipedia) does not seem to bear you out. And, like you yourself said, the posts in this on thread, including those from those plugging the case for philosophy of science, don't seem to bear this out either.

(b) What some scientist has to say to another in general terms about philosophy of science may be interesting and not necessarily irrelevant, but can you produce any evidencr of a case where philosophy of sciencre has been of concrete use, in recent times, in actually helping to formulate or to accept/reject some hypothesis, in ways that would not have been possible without a knowledge of what philosophy of science has to say?

(Of course, depending on your answer to question-a, question-b may well turn out to be moot.)

Just answer these two questions clearly, please -- not as a challenge but simply to clarify your position to someone who'd like to know better what you mean -- without worrying about what religious or cultural or gendered or any other sensibilities you might accidentally offend. Just a single clearly worded post will probably suffice to answer, and put an end to, what I asked.

 

[David Mo]

This is getting a bit bizarre. You've been asked for a practical use of the philosophy of science, and you've chosen the handling of ad hoc hypotheses; you've then said that you don't actually know how to handle ad hoc hypotheses, (...)

But in fact, the scientific method can handle ad hoc hypotheses; it accepts them only provisionally, tests their validity, and attempts wherever possible to incorporate them into a simpler and more internally consistent framework. In other words, they are dealt with the same way as any scientific hypothesis. What can the philosophy of science add to that?

Dave

Two preliminary questions:

I didn't say that I don't know how to handle ad hoc hypotheses. You must have misunderstood something I said.

You cannot ask what philosophers have said "in addition to scientists" about ad hoc hypotheses because scientists have almost never explained ad hoc hypotheses outside the framework of philosophy. Therefore, what is said about ad hoc hypotheses has been said mainly by philosophers or scientist-philosophers. I will speak of "experts" to avoid this mess.

If you think otherwise, I would be grateful if you could give some kind of reference to ad hoc hypotheses that are exclusively scientific. Especially what you say "the scientific method". I am especially intrigued by this: "to incorporate them into a simpler and more internally consistent framework". What do you mean? The problem of simplicity has to do with Occam's razor, but not with the hypotheses ad hoc. Moreover, ad hoc hypotheses are not inconsistent with the theoretical system in which they are integrated. Their function is precisely to reinforce the coherence of the theoretical system in the face of anomalies. If you said your source we could clear this point.

Going to the substance of the issue: if an ad hoc hypothesis were simply a proposition not tested, all hypotheses would be ad hoc. You must look for a better definition of an ad hoc hypothesis. I suggest that a hypothesis is ad hoc when it is only used to save a particular anomaly of a theory (or paradigm). That is the most common use among experts. It is not perfect, but it is practical.

There are other confusing things in your commentary, but I prefer stick to the above for now.

 

[David Mo]

Not intuitively. Nor without criteria, as you've earlier on misrepresented me as having said. These are strawmen that you, for some reason, keep putting up.

I'm saying ad hoc hypetheses are no exotic creature, that might need some exotic means of dealing with them: they can be dealt with in the normal course, using that very same equipment that science generally uses, which are: (a) the scientific method; and (b) technical expertise and knowledge specific to the field being researched.

I'm saying, I see no scope for any philosophy of science to make any contribution here.

In short: you pretend that science has a method for solving the problem of ad hoc hypotheses, but there is no need to say what it is. It solves itself.

I say that this method can exist but when it comes to knowing what an ad hoc hypothesis is and why it is necessary to reject them, it must be explicitly explained and science does not do this. (Scientists frequently don't use even the name "hypotheses ad hoc"). That is why the philosophy of science is useful when the problem arises.

And the problem arises when one discusses what is science and what is pseudoscience. A scientist who is making ad hoc hypotheses to save homeopathy is not worth telling him that science does not make ad hoc hypotheses. You will have to explain what an ad hoc hypothesis is and why it should not be used. Especially if the homeopath is educated and reminds you of some cases in which science did make ad hoc hypotheses.

This is a clear example of why some scientists have been concerned about the issue along with many philosophers. If you want us to enter into the debate around ad hoc hypotheses we can do so. But it would be better if you read a little bit about what the subject is. It would be easier this debate that, according you, we have not.

It is a contribution here to a real problem. Is it not?

 

[David Mo]

Canakya and Dave:

It seems to me that what you don't understand is that standard science works with particular rules. These rules serve to solve specific cases more or less effectively. But when there are cases of opposition between alternative theories or indecision of the empirical basis, the scientist begins to consider how particular methods work and whether modifications should be made to the basis of the theory. In other words, it is necessary to interpret what science does. And this is where the scientist becomes a philosopher.

In some cases philosophical theories about science have some application, but it is not necessary that the interpretation of science has any concrete utility. It can be based on the simple need to know things. Which is useful in another sense.

 

[Robin]

I don't see why apologists for the philosophy of science feel the need to flail around and contort themselves endlessly, instead of simply producing one single piece of evidence, or a straightforward answer to the question actually raised.

People in this thread said that scientists would never ever in any circumstances be interested in discussing reductionism.

I produced direct evidence of two quite important scientists discussing reductionism in the pages of one of the most respected science journals and even saying that such discussions were important to science.

What was not straightforward about that??? Seriously. What was not straightforward about that???

But did anyone say, "Oh, apparently we were wrong, some scientists are interested in discussing reductionism and do find it important to their work"?

If there is any flailing then it is clearly being done by you guys.

You asked me to give a complete account of the philosophy of science and its relationship to the scientific method and you ask me to produce this instantly in an atmosphere where even the slightest typo or poorly phrased sentence will bring on several hysterical irrational straw man responses.

 

[Robin]

There's no need to tread eggshells

Seriously? In this atmostphere. Where after all my direct answers I say that I have to take a little time to think about an answer I am immediately accused of "flailing"?

 

[Robin]

(b) What some scientist has to say to another in general terms about philosophy of science may be interesting and not necessarily irrelevant, but can you produce any evidencr of a case where philosophy of sciencre has been of concrete use, in recent times, in actually helping to formulate or to accept/reject some hypothesis, in ways that would not have been possible without a knowledge of what philosophy of science has to say?

Wait a moment. The goal posts appear to have changed again.

Are you saying that science begins and ends with the formulation of, or the acceptance/rejection of hypotheses? Isn't science a wider term than that?

 

[Robin]

Perhaps we are talking at cross purposes and we mean different things by science.

While I am formulating my answer, maybe the others here could tell me what they mean by "science", when it began, what its scope is.

 

[David Mo]

Also there is an odd misconception here that there is a distinction between science and the philosophy of science.

The philosophy of science is and always has been part of the scientific method.

It seems to me a thesis hard to maintain from the moment that modern science lays the foundations of its method, that is to say the hypothetical-deductive method.

What could be said is that the philosophy of science is an indecisive ground in which both philosophers and scientists participate.
Not only Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg or Hawking enter into questions traditionally dealt with by philosophers, but authors considered as philosophers of science, such as Popper, Lakatos, Russell, Bunge, etc. are also scientists. Even a metaphysician like Husserl, which is rather surprising.

But the questions of philosophy of science are not settled by the hypothetical deductive method, so it can hardly be said that they are science (in the sense of the sciences that deal with nature).