Did Citizen's United Make A Difference?

[Dymanic]

Are you trying to convince the rest of us or yourself that your promotion of censorship is justified?

Are you trying to convince the rest of us or yourself that you have an interest in participating in this discussion in a sincere manner, free of well-poisoning, ad hominem, and the like?

Can you offer any reason why de facto censorship should be regarded as any less repulsive than the de jure censorship you accuse me of promoting, or will you join those who rest their entire argument upon the claim that no such thing can possibly exist?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

No one advocates a ban on discussion. The CU ruling is about spending (or, as I've decided to call it: "spendingspeech").

I've pointed out the flaw in this reasoning. Congress cannot ban speech under the guise of banning spending. To paraphrase what Respect just said, a government that can ban someone spending money on speech acts to express their bigfoot beliefs is far more dangerous than people spending money on speech acts to express their bigfoot beliefs.

Your argument is a stawman.

Only if your conclusion is true (that people moving to amend the constitution in order to overturn Citizens United aren't trying to restrict speech). But it's not. (Allowing Congress to restrict free speech rights on anyone but natural persons would restrict speech, as has been amply demonstrated. See again, NAACP v. Alabama.)

Either way, your rejection of Respect's comment as a strawman is circular reasoning or question begging.

 

[Dymanic]

Either way, your rejection of Respect's comment as a strawman is circular reasoning or question begging.

I'm afraid this whole discussion, like the other recent one, may have reached the point where there's nothing left but for us to continue going around in circles trying to find new ways to express the reasons why our assumptions are the correct ones. I wonder if we can at least agree that the whole thing does depend on what assumptions one makes?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Can you offer any reason why de facto censorship should be regarded as any less repulsive than the de jure censorship you accuse me of promoting, or will you join those who rest their entire argument upon the claim that no such thing can possibly exist?

Your assumption that the inability of everyone to have the wherewithal to engage in speech acts in equal measure to the wealthiest entities is somehow "de facto censorship". It's not. Censorship is defined, at least for purposes of this discussion, as government restrictions on free speech.

For your argument to be true, there would have to be some government duty to provide the means for every person to engage in speech acts as effectively as the wealthiest. Similarly, it would construe the freedom of the press as entitling every person to the means to publish a newspaper (that is, to have a printing press) regardless of their ability to procure such means on their own.

But these things are not true.

This is all tied up in your misunderstanding of free speech as a zero sum thing such that restricting one person's speech somehow improves another's. As I've pointed out, that approach is anathema to a very fundamental principal of liberalism (that giving any group more freedom benefits everyone, not just that group).

So again, the question at controversy that was brought before the court in Citizens United was whether or not Congress has the authority to restrict some associations from spending their own money on a certain type of speech act (that is electioneering). The question really is a First Amendment issue, and it is wisest to regard the First Amendment, appropriately, as a restriction on what Congress can do.

There is plenty of jurisprudence that tells us that the right to free speech is not unlimited, however, and Congress can weigh legitimate public interests against it. I think the strongest argument for allowing Congress this authority is that the societal benefit outweighs the right being restricted. But I disagree with that analysis of the costs/benefits of allowing Congress this authority. I think the easiest way to understand it is the "baby with the bathwater" problem. Even if it were a good idea to keep some associations from electioneering with their own money, you'd have to play fair and restrict all of them in the same way (which would require at least a partial repeal of the First Amendment since freedom of association is an integral part of free speech rights). Also, as we saw by evidence presented earlier in this thread, the "problem" of this kind of electioneering seems to have been exaggerated. All that additional electioneering really didn't seem to have anything like an effect proportion to the money spent on it. (In other words, it was proof that money can't buy elections.)

Someone observed that the outcome of the elections aside, it would be better for those entities to have spent their money doing good for the society. I agree it would be better, but not to the extent that I'm willing to consider that to be a legitimate public interest that outweighs civil liberties. If we accepted that principle, we could simply tax wealth aggressively enough that any activity we think isn't is a good for society as any beneficial activity were no longer possible. (We could take away people's money such that it would not be possible for them to electioneer, or gamble, or go to strip clubs, or whatever else we might think is not as a good a use of that money as creating jobs or whatever.)

I don't believe that's what the person making that observation meant. I think it was just a criticism of poor spending decisions on behalf of the people donating money for this excessive electioneering. (They got such a poor return on their investment, they could have done better even for themselves doing something else with that money.) I don't think it was meant as a response to the question the court faced in Citizens United (that is, can Congress restrict speech this way?)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I'm afraid this whole discussion, like the other recent one, may have reached the point where there's nothing left but for us to continue going around in circles trying to find new ways to express the reasons why our assumptions are the correct ones. I wonder if we can at least agree that the whole thing does depend on what assumptions one makes?

It doesn't for me. I've made no assumptions that I haven't backed up with sound legal argumentation to support it.

I've also shown how the assumption you're making about the nature of free speech must be wrong since it would lead to absurd conclusions (like everyone being entitle to a printing press).

I've also pointed out that your assumption that restricting the speech of some groups can lead to more speech for other groups is anathema to a very fundamental principle of liberalism. (That is, when we improve the freedom of one group, we all benefit.) I'm happy to elaborate and support this principle if you don't accept it.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

To the point of how to construe the First Amendment right to free speech (either as a finite commodity to which everyone is entitled an equal share, as you are arguing, or as a limitation on the authority of Congress, as I am):

First, it's expressed explicitly as a restriction on what Congress can do: "Congress shall make no law. . ."

Second, for some of the other elements of the First Amendment, no construction is possible but mine. If you think of the right as pertaining only to people (and not as a limitation on Congress), and that restricting that right on some might open it up on another, the establishment clause is meaningless. What is the grant to something finite such that one person having more of it means another person gets less of it wrt the establishment clause? It can certainly only refer to a limit on Congress (extended, of course by the 14th Amendment to all of government, but I will continue to speak of it simply as a "limit on Congress" for sake of simplicity). Second, the one I've mentioned several times. We can't think of freedom of the press as anything other than a restriction on Congress' authority. To think of it as granting a zero sum right (such that one person could have more because another has less) implies that every person is entitled to an equal share in the means of publication, something there is no evidence whatsoever the framers had in mind.

[ETA: 2a: Also thinking of civil rights more generally, thinking of them as other than a limitation on government has led people to the erroneous belief that rights only apply to some people--such as citizens. In Boumedienne v. Bush, the court said otherwise. The right to writs of habeas corpus or an equivalent statutory substitute even applies to non-citizens under U.S. jurisdiction--in custody--at Guantanamo. That right too is expressed as a limitation on the authority of government: "shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."]

Third, we have the expressed language in the 9th Amendment that the enumeration of rights cannot be taken to disparage or deny any other rights of the people. So, for example that the judiciary acting under its authority to settle cases in controversy over the law including the Constitution (or as the Marbury v. Madison decision worded it, to "say what the law is") has emphatically stated that the freedom of association (the right of individuals to form associations with other people and engage in speech acts as a group) is an integral part of First Amendment rights, makes good sense. You can't use the granting of the right to free speech as an argument against the freedom of association. In fact, the court says the right to free speech (a limitation on Congress) implies the freedom of association (the specific limit on Congress considered in Citizens United). What you're trying to do is essentially argue that the right to free speech is upheld when Congress restricts the freedom of association. That goes against the principle expressed in the 9th Amendment.

 

[Dymanic]

It doesn't for me. I've made no assumptions that I haven't backed up with sound legal argumentation to support it.

I'm not seeing that as an argument against my observation that the whole thing depends on what assumptions one makes, but, whatever. Perhaps a bit more then.

Your assumption that the inability of everyone to have the wherewithal to engage in speech acts in equal measure to the wealthiest entities is somehow "de facto censorship". It's not. Censorship is defined, at least for purposes of this discussion, as government restrictions on free speech.

Government restrictions on the spending of money, I'm sure you meant to say. Spendingspeech. I love the Orwellian flavor of that word. Do you think it looks better humped? "SpendingSpeech"?

For your argument to be true, there would have to be some government duty to provide the means for every person to engage in speech acts as effectively as the wealthiest.

By way of analogy, consider a group of people gathered around a table, and charged with making some decision. A customary arrangement calls for there to be a chairperson whose responsibilities include making sure that the discussion is not dominated by the one or two participants who have the loudest voices. If such a loudmouth does attempt to drown out any opposition by taking up all of the time with an endless diatribe, it is the chairperson's job to restore order by gavelling him to silence -- a de jure act of censorship, if you will. If the chairperson fails to do this, and that one loud voice does prevent others (whose ideas may also have merit) from being heard, this de facto censorship degrades the quality of the decision making ability of the group.

There is plenty of jurisprudence that tells us that the right to free speech is not unlimited, however, and Congress can weigh legitimate public interests against it. I think the strongest argument for allowing Congress this authority is that the societal benefit outweighs the right being restricted.

You do understand that the CU ruling found that the government does not have a compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in our electoral process? Societal benefit be damned?

A report from the Center for the Study of the American Electorate put 2012 voter turnout at 57.5% of all eligible voters. In the election of 1896, it was closer to 80%. Voter turnout began its long decline immediately following that election, in which William McKinley rode to victory on a wave of mud and big business money, effectively bringing to an end the Populist movement of that time. The voters were clearly disillusioned.

As Justice Stevens argued: "A democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and sold."

and:

“Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’ ” McConnell , 540 U. S., at 144 (quoting Shrink Missouri , 528 U. S., at 390).


These observations would seem to bring into question your argument here:

Also, as we saw by evidence presented earlier in this thread, the "problem" of this kind of electioneering seems to have been exaggerated. All that additional electioneering really didn't seem to have anything like an effect proportion to the money spent on it. (In other words, it was proof that money can't buy elections.)

I'd say that it proved only that money can't buy the White House if the candidate is one which not much of anybody really likes anyway -- including many members of his own party -- during economic times which are at least prosperous enough to permit large numbers of people on the opposing side to match all that big money through small contributions (a lot of them really small, like $3 and $5).

Which brings me back to what I said on page one:

Throttle the economy back a bit (or a lot), and those small contributors will start feeling the pain long before those billionaires will, so instead of a big pile of big money up against a big pile of small money, you'll have a big pile of big money up against a smaller pile of small money . Now put that pile of big money behind a candidate who isn't so glaringly shallow and two-faced, and it's game over.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I'm not seeing that as an argument against my observation that the whole thing depends on what assumptions one makes, but, whatever. Perhaps a bit more then.

You don't understand how my observation that I'm not relying on undefended assumption refutes your statement that we're merely disagreeing on assumptions?

Government restrictions on the spending of money, I'm sure you meant to say. Spendingspeech.

No. I meant to say just what I said. You're attempting to redefine censorship such that the term "de facto censorship" has meaning.

By way of analogy, consider a group of people gathered around a table, and charged with making some decision. A customary arrangement calls for there to be a chairperson whose responsibilities include making sure that the discussion is not dominated by the one or two participants who have the loudest voices. If such a loudmouth does attempt to drown out any opposition by taking up all of the time with an endless diatribe, it is the chairperson's job to restore order by gavelling him to silence -- a de jure act of censorship, if you will. If the chairperson fails to do this, and that one loud voice does prevent others (whose ideas may also have merit) from being heard, this de facto censorship degrades the quality of the decision making ability of the group.

Analogies don't work for making arguments. They're more suited for illustrating something that's easier to explain by analogy than in the abstract. That's not the case here.

Censorship is government restriction of speech.

Your analogy can't change the fact that it makes no sense to say that we should allow the government to restrict speech in order to prevent "de jure censorship".

You do understand that the CU ruling found that the government does not have a compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in our electoral process? Societal benefit be damned?

Cite?

I think it's more accurate to say the court didn't find a state interest that outweighs the First Amendment right. Similarly, one might argue that there is a state interest in enforcing respect for the U.S. flag or the national anthem, but that state interest doesn't outweigh the First Amendment right. (Personally, I don't think there is any such state interest, but all we need to decide to dispose of the issue of flag desecration laws is to observe that there is no state interest that outweighs the First Amendment right.)

If that's what you mean by saying there's no compelling interest in something (that is, there's no interest that compels us to override the First Amendment right), then I agree there is no such compelling interest. But that doesn't mean "societal benefit be damned"; it only means that the purported societal benefit doesn't outweigh the First Amendment right.

And again, evidence from earlier in this thread suggests that the problem of lots of money spent on electioneering has been exaggerated.

A report from the Center for the Study of the American Electorate put 2012 voter turnout at 57.5% of all eligible voters. In the election of 1896, it was closer to 80%. Voter turnout began its long decline immediately following that election, in which William McKinley rode to victory on a wave of mud and big business money, effectively bringing to an end the Populist movement of that time. The voters were clearly disillusioned.

You do realize that the pool of "eligible" voters increased dramatically over that time (women's suffrage?). So I'm not sure you can make the argument you're making.

At any rate, even the argument you're making shows no correlation much less causal relationship with the Citizens United decision (2010) to strike down part of the McCain Feingold law (2002).

These observations would seem to bring into question your argument here:

No they don't. They have no logical relationship to any of my arguments. They certainly don't support your view of speech rights as a zero sum thing such that restricting speech for some will protect speech rights of others. And they don't support your notion of "de facto censorship" which is a self-contradictory concept.

I'd say that it proved only that money can't buy the White House if the candidate is one which not much of anybody really likes anyway -

Well that's just silly. Isn't the idea of the harmful influence of this type of electioneering that it wrongly changes people's minds?

Pointing out that it fails to do so in cases when people's minds weren't changed (sort of a tautology disguised as a conditional) argues as I have that it isn't as big a problem as some think.

Certainly not big enough to outweigh the First Amendment right to free speech.

 

[Ziggurat]

I'm not seeing that as an argument against my observation that the whole thing depends on what assumptions one makes, but, whatever.

Sometimes the assumptions one makes are demonstrably wrong.

By way of analogy, consider a group of people gathered around a table, and charged with making some decision. A customary arrangement calls for there to be a chairperson whose responsibilities include making sure that the discussion is not dominated by the one or two participants who have the loudest voices. If such a loudmouth does attempt to drown out any opposition by taking up all of the time with an endless diatribe, it is the chairperson's job to restore order by gavelling him to silence -- a de jure act of censorship, if you will. If the chairperson fails to do this, and that one loud voice does prevent others (whose ideas may also have merit) from being heard, this de facto censorship degrades the quality of the decision making ability of the group.

Your analogy fails on several levels. First and most dramatically, the censorship you have called for occurs before any speech happens, and has no connection to whether or not that speech has silenced anyone. Your chairperson has simply silenced someone before they could ever speak.

Secondly, your scenario presumes that there is only one venue for speech, and that speech is a zero-sum game. This is not true in the real world, and undermines everything you have claimed.

You do understand that the CU ruling found that the government does not have a compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in our electoral process? Societal benefit be damned?

They ruled no such thing.

 

[Dymanic]

You're attempting to redefine censorship such that the term "de facto censorship" has meaning.

The CU ruling is what did that. Money talks, poverty walks. Silently -- at least, without its voice being heard in the place where it counts most. Getting dizzy here.

Analogies don't work for making arguments.

Strawman argument. Poisoning the well. Slippery slope. These are analogies.

Censorship is government restriction of speech.

And spending is now defined as speech. We're going in circles again.

Cite?

Carelessly worded. The Court held that the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures. Obviously, quid pro quo corruption is still sufficient to establish compelling interest, hence limits on direct campaign contributions are still allowed (for now).

You do realize that the pool of "eligible" voters increased dramatically over that time (women's suffrage?).

I don't understand why you would think that would matter.

So I'm not sure you can make the argument you're making.

Have a look at this graph:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Voter_turnout.png
Pretty steady decline from around 80% in 1896 to around 50% in 1920 -- the year in which the 19th Amendment was passed. 1908 was the last year it was above 65%. Would you like to argue that disillusionment with our political system is not the reason why such a large segment of the elegibles consistently abstain?

And they don't support your notion of "de facto censorship" which is a self-contradictory concept.

I provided a model we might have used to test your assertion that de facto censorship is a self-contradictory concept, but you dismissed it as a flawed form of argument. Do you consider argument by assertion to be superior to argument by analogy?

Isn't the idea of the harmful influence of this type of electioneering that it wrongly changes people's minds?

Pointing out that it fails to do so in cases when people's minds weren't changed (sort of a tautology disguised as a conditional) argues as I have that it isn't as big a problem as some think.

I'd like to see your evidence that people's minds weren't changed. To arrive at an accurate calculation, we'd need to know how big the Obama win would have been without the corrupting influence of the big money backing Romney.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

You're attempting to redefine censorship such that the term "de facto censorship" has meaning.

The CU ruling is what did that.

No it didn't. I'm talking about conventional usage. Censorship, in this context, is government restriction of speech. Even more broadly the term means someone is restricting speech. The term "de facto censorship"--where free speech is somehow restricted without anyone doing it-- is logically inconsistent and meaningless.

And you're using this meaningless term to support an argument that says then it's possible to restrict speech in order to increase speech.

Strawman argument. Poisoning the well. Slippery slope. These are analogies

[ETA: Those are not analogies. Those are types of informal fallacies.]

Those terms have meanings. I have not committed any of those fallacies. I criticized your analogy as being unnecessary and not constituting an argument. The proper role of analogy is to make something more clear. I understand your position perfectly well, so there is no need for any analogizing.

And spending is now defined as speech. We're going in circles again.

Only if you keep falsely insisting that spending has been defined as speech. It has not. I've already given you a simple example of spending to influence elections that is not considered speech and is not protected by the First Amendment.

We're only going in circles because you keep insisting the facts are other than as they are.

Carelessly worded. The Court held that the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.

Cite?

The court held no such thing--unless what you mean is no anti-corruption interest that outweighs free speech rights.

I don't understand why you would think that would matter.

Math. The number of possible eligible voters dramatically increased (nearly doubled at that moment.)

At any rate none of this historical data proves that the Citizens United decisions of 2010 to strike down parts of the McCain Feingold law of 2002 somehow caused a decrease in voter participation. So whatever point you're trying to make from the historical data is irrelevant to this discussion.
Have a look at this graph:

Would you like to argue that disillusionment with our political system is not the reason why such a large segment of the elegibles consistently abstain?

Nice try, but it's not my argument, and it's irrelevant to the current discussion. I'm merely pointing out that you have not proven that disillusionment without or political system is the reason for relatively low voter participation.

I provided a model we might have used to test your assertion that de facto censorship is a self-contradictory concept, but you dismissed it as a flawed form of argument. Do you consider argument by assertion to be superior to argument by analogy?

There is no such thing as "argument by assertion". An assertion is simply an assertion. And your analogy is unnecessary. It did not "model" any test of the inherent contradiction in "de facto censorship". [ETA: And I understand your point perfectly well. You're claiming that government restriction of speech rights is justified because the fact that smaller voices are "drowned out" by the bigger voices wrt electioneering is itself a type of censorship. But that's not censorship, so your argument fails. There is no First Amendment right that your voice not be drowned out.]

I'd like to see your evidence that people's minds weren't changed.

That's also an illogical way to reason. And my thesis is not the people's minds weren't changed. I was pointing to the flaw in your holding out that people's minds weren't changed as evidence (somehow) of the need to protect them from the harmful effects of this extra electioneering.

On this point, you argued a tautology as if it had any meaning. You said the reason the extra electioneering didn't turn the election is that it couldn't possibly change people's mind about a candidate that they really disliked. I pointed out that if that's so, then it's evidence against there being a harmful effect.

You say that the voters need to be protected from this "harmful" electioneering even if they are immune to harm from it.

Is there any hypothetical election outcome that you wouldn't be able to use as evidence for the "harmful" effect of this electioneering?

And again, I point out that the liberal approach is generally to trust human nature. Your position seems to rely on a view of voters as not being able to take care of themselves in a world with free speech.

In fact, the evidence provided earlier in this thread points to the fact that all that spending doesn't make much difference. And my position is that the court made the correct call in saying the public interest in limiting speech doesn't outweigh the speech rights.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

No it didn't. I'm talking about conventional usage. Censorship, in this context, is government restriction of speech. Even more broadly the term means someone is restricting speech. The term "de facto censorship"--where free speech is somehow restricted without anyone doing it-- is logically inconsistent and meaningless.

Maybe you don't understand what de facto means. It refers to what just happens in practice and not as a matter of law.

De facto segregation, for example, was not caused by any rule requiring segregation. In fact, we learned that after we eliminated de jure segregation by striking down such laws that caused intentional segregation as unconstitutional, there was still in fact segregation that happened primarily because school districts corresponding with areas of similar socio-economic-status, which also tended to correspond with race. In other words, it was segregation that no one could be said to be causing by intention. It just happened.

Here is the dictionary definition (an accurate description of current usage) of censorship and the verb censor:

cen·sor·ship noun \ˈsen(t)-sər-ˌship\

Definition of CENSORSHIP

1
a : the institution, system, or practice of censoring
b : the actions or practices of censors; especially : censorial control exercised repressively

censor transitive verb
cen·sored cen·sor·ing
Definition of CENSOR

: to examine in order to suppress or delete anything considered objectionable <censor the news>; also : to suppress or delete as objectionable <censor out indecent passages>

What you're describing as "de facto censorship" is anything in the environment (including others exercising their free speech rights) that makes my speech acts less noticeable. That's not censorship.

And again, the First Amendment right to free speech is not a right to be heard; it's not a right to an audience. That's up to you.

 

[Dymanic]

Censorship, in this context, is government restriction of speech.

I think this will be about the last time I will restate it: In this context -- the context of the Citizens United ruling -- "censorship" is the term being applied (mistakenly, in my view) to government restriction of spending.

The term "de facto censorship"--where free speech is somehow restricted without anyone doing it-- is logically inconsistent and meaningless.

I love how you refuted this by responding to your own post:

Maybe you don't understand what de facto means. It refers to what just happens in practice and not as a matter of law.

Those are not analogies.

Well, they are, actually. They are metaphors often invoked as arguments (in these specific instances, as counterarguments used to point out logical flaws in the opponen'ts reasoning, as you note). Not all analogies are metaphors, but all metaphors are analogies.

I have not committed any of those fallacies.

No. I presented those as examples in order to make a point by using analogy as a form of argument.

Only if you keep falsely insisting that spending has been defined as speech. It has not. I've already given you a simple example of spending to influence elections that is not considered speech and is not protected by the First Amendment.

And I've presented a quote from the transcript of the oral arguments where the appellant argued that very thing:

"...these expenditures might be counterproductive when they are independent, they are not coordinated with the candidate, they are more directly expression by the party spending the money, they are not like a contribution, so they are more of an infringement on the right to speak."

Spendingspeech. (No hump; I've decided).

We're only going in circles because you keep insisting the facts are other than as they are.

No, it's because we disagree on interpretations.

The number of possible eligible voters dramatically increased (nearly doubled at that moment.

Did you LOOK at the graph? When women got the vote, voter participation -- as a percentage of the eligible voters -- increased. Weren't you arguing the opposite?

Nice try, but it's not my argument, and it's irrelevant to the current discussion.

You may find it irrelevant or unimportant, but I don't, and the dissenting Justices didn't either (nor do a great many others, and not all of them flaming liberals).

There is no such thing as "argument by assertion".

I agree. Precisely my point, actually.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I think this will be about the last time I will restate it: In this context -- the context of the Citizens United ruling -- "censorship" is the term being applied (mistakenly, in my view) to government restriction of spending.

It doesn't matter how many times you repeat it, it's still not true.


At any rate, this cuts against your assertion that there can be such a thing as "de facto censorship". If it's a restriction, it's not de facto, it's de jure.

And I've presented a quote from the transcript of the oral arguments where the appellant argued that very thing:

"...these expenditures might be counterproductive when they are independent, they are not coordinated with the candidate, they are more directly expression by the party spending the money, they are not like a contribution, so they are more of an infringement on the right to speak."

That doesn't come close to supporting your claim that the court ruled that spending money is speech. The court ruled no such thing. In the passage you quoted here, I think you have overlooked the word "these" which I have highlighted for you.

No, it's because we disagree on interpretations.

We disagree on statements of fact. You claim there can logically be "de facto censorship". You claimed repeatedly that the court ruled that money is speech (or later that spending is speech). The court did not, as a matter of fact.

And yet again, I have thoroughly disproven this claim by pointing out that the court's decision did not strike down the laws against paying voters to vote as unconstitutional which would follow if the holding were, as you claim, that spending money is equal to speech.

Instead, the point is that Congress does not have the authority to restrict free speech by restricting spending money on speech. Congress does indeed have the authority to restrict spending money in many ways, even in ways that are intended to affect the outcome of an election.

Now if you want to amend your claim further from your earlier claim that the court ruled that "money is speech" and from the claim that it ruled that "spending money is speech" to the claim that it ruled "spending money on speech acts* is the equivalent of speech" wrt Congress' authority to restrict it, I would agree.

*The "these expenditures" in the passage you quoted refers to money Citizens United spent to "publicly distribute" the electioneering movie Hillary. Without the demonstrative pronoun "these" the passage would mean something very different. It most definitely does not say that any money Citizens United spent was the equivalent of speech as far as Congress' authority to restrict it is concerned. Citizens United could not, for example, pay voters to vote. That would still be illegal even after the Citizens United decision.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

There is no such thing as "argument by assertion".

I agree. Precisely my point, actually.

Well then you're full of crap.

I have not "argued by assertion". I've repeatedly made arguments in support of my position that you continue to ignore every time you repeat as statements of fact things that are not true.

Two recent examples:

I did not simply assert that "de facto censorship" is an illogical idea. I spelled out why the term "censorship" includes the notion of restricting or suppressing of speech, and that you can't get that without someone or entity suppressing or restricting speech. (Unlike, for example, de facto segregation, since segregation is a state of racial separation that might be caused by law or just happen.)

I've repeatedly drawn from the Citizens United decision, the Constitution and other sources to support the notion that your understanding of free speech as something finite that can be thought of in a zero sum way such that restricting one person's speech rights can enhance another's.

I spent considerable time supporting my position. I did not simply make an unsupported assertion.

Your repeated assertion that the court ruled that money is speech (or now spending is speech) is an unsupported assertion. I recognize that you've been trying to support the assertion, but you keep failing. I think it's because you're misreading the decisions you're reading (as in the case above where you took "these expenditures" to refer to any spending to support your repeated claim that the court ruled that spending is speech).

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

And speaking of "argument by assertion"--were you accusing me of poisoning the well and using the slippery slope fallacy? And you didn't even attempt to show where you think I've done such a thing?

Again, these terms have actual meanings. Poisoning the well is a subtype of ad hominem fallacy (a form of irrelevant fallacy) which is a sort of ad hominem attack done in advance. Slippery slope is when you try to argue a question not included in the current question because you just assume it will happen. They're often of the "give 'em an inch and they'll take a mile" type of argument (where the question is only whether or not to give an inch). [ETA: Perhaps a better example is the one Pro Lifers used back in the '70s: if you legalize abortion, next thing you know we'll legalize euthanasia of the disabled and elderly.]

Your accusations don't even make sense, and have nothing to do with anything I've posted in this thread.

 

[Dymanic]

If it's a restriction, it's not de facto, it's de jure.

Again you refute your own assertion as nicely as I might hope to do:

De facto segregation, for example, was not caused by any rule requiring segregation. In fact, we learned that after we eliminated de jure segregation by striking down such laws that caused intentional segregation as unconstitutional, there was still in fact segregation that happened primarily because school districts corresponding with areas of similar socio-economic-status, which also tended to correspond with race. In other words, it was segregation that no one could be said to be causing by intention. It just happened.

Oh yeah, it just happened. And what a strange quirk of random fate it was indeed that produced those demographics! Here's a tip from a guy who lived in the South during the Civil Rights era: It wasn't something that "just happened". Sucka, pleeeze.

Now if you want to amend your claim further from your earlier claim that the court ruled that "money is speech" and from the claim that it ruled that "spending money is speech" to the claim that it ruled "spending money on speech acts* is the equivalent of speech" wrt Congress' authority to restrict it, I would agree.

I think "spendingspeech" pretty much covers it.

And speaking of "argument by assertion"--were you accusing me of poisoning the well and using the slippery slope fallacy?

No. Are you really this dense? I provided those as examples of analogies, as a counterargument to your assertion: "analogies don't work for making arguments", which was your way of dodging my refutation of your previous assertion that "de facto censorship is a self-contradictory concept" via an argument by analogy (the loudmouth at the table who deprives others of the opportunity to speak, unless the chairperson invokes de jure censorship by telling him to sit down and shut up because he has used his alloted time).