Determinists cannot answer these Questions

[Wrath of the Swarm]

If F not happening is ruled out, then "if F had not happened" means what? You are considering the possibility that the impossible occurs?

Bingo.

We aren't considering the statement "event F is a cause of event G." We are considering the statement "event F is the cause of event G."

Then we must consider event F to be a universe-spanning event, as the entire configuration of the universe is involved in "causing" any event.

And yes, we can ask the question "What if the universe had some other configuration?" We can debate about whether the answers we generate have anything to do with the truth, but the question can be asked.

Now, do you have a point with all of this?

 

[wraith]

Here is the classic determinist argument:
(1) The laws of physics dictate how matter behaves.
(2) Therefore, the present doesn't branch out into a multitude of possible futures. There is only one possible future and nothing that you do is your choice.

How do you define "choice"?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Would you have any problem with the proposition that Wrath could be replaced with a universal Turing machine and some sensors & servo-mechanisms? If so, why?

Any process can be represented by any one of an infinite number of simulations that accurately reproduce the properties of that process.

So yes, the correct Turing machine would generate the same outputs as I do. This correct Turing machine might need to be more complex than the entire universe, and so cannot exist in ours, but it's mathematically possible.

I have faith I have free will and cannot be so replaced. Hubris? Who knows, or will ever know?

What is the difference between hope, and faith?

Define free will first. Then we will tell you if the concept is coherent.

Judging by your statements, it is hubris. However your "free will" works, it could always be replaced by any one of an infinitely large number of equilivalent systems. But it's possible that your definition is fine, and it's your statements that are mistaken, so I await your definition.

The difference between hope and faith is that hope does not make any claims about the world. Faith asserts that reality matches the claims that are taken on faith.

And please don't insult evildave. I suspect he understands these problems much better than you do.

 

[hammegk]

Any process can be represented by any one of an infinite number of simulations that accurately reproduce the properties of that process.

True; IFF you assume materialism/atheism.

Define free will first. Then we will tell you if the concept is coherent.

Judging by your statements, it is hubris. However your "free will" works, it could always be replaced by any one of an infinitely large number of equilivalent systems. But it's possible that your definition is fine, and it's your statements that are mistaken, so I await your definition.

The difference between hope and faith is that hope does not make any claims about the world. Faith asserts that reality matches the claims that are taken on faith.

The hope v faith problem interests me. Free will is what allows me to flip a switch (in the brain as we perceive it via science) from I "hope" so, where I wait for something to happen, to "faith" at which point I actively work to achieve that something.

And please don't insult evildave. I suspect he understands these problems much better than you do.

LOFL. I had hopes for you but you are quickly becoming just another replay of ancient music.

 

[Dancing David]

Well now, that seems reasonable enough.

There is a difference between determinism and the belief that the world can be predicted reliably. It's nice to see that you're recognizing it.

[/b]
I was using the conventional baggage that comes along with determinism, mainly because it is not a philosophical viewpoint that I hold. Usualy determinism on this VB refers to mechanistic determinism. Or also the idea that any process can be reduced to it's component parts.

I usualy use causal to refer to the potential link between two events.


Now: people with OCD have just as much "free will" as anyone does, which is to say: none. They have just as much control over their emotions, desires, and impulses as anyone else, which is to say: none.

I would say that is a belief and that we can probably marshall equal amounts of reason to support our beliefs.

I am not under theillusion that I definitly have free will, I am under the illusion that I have the appearance of free will. So until I see that the appearnce is false I will continue to operate as though I make choices.

As a nihilist I can easily se all human reality and reality as illusion.


Just as things are deterministic but not predictable, they are also deterministic but not controllable.

I think that we are using the words differently for me determinsim means that if you 'turn the clock back','rewind the tape' or 'somehow alter the time stream', that events are going to play out the same each time. The ball will always land in the same slot on the roulette wheel. Given the apearance of chaotic systems and the number of parts in a system, I am just not sure that that kind of determinism holds true.
I would say that things can be causal but also random or chaotic. And while chaos is causal, it might as well be random in some places.


The question is not whether your choices can be predicted by subsystems within the universe, but whether they're determined. Your choices aren't free, even though we can't know what they'll be beforehand.

I understand your POV, I have yet to see proof of either position, as I said it appears that I can make choices, although that may all be an illusion.

 

[Dancing David]

This thread begins as follows:


Apparently, you have modified the classic determinist argument at the begin of this thread to take into account the issue of randomness:


laws of physics --> set principles

doesn't branch out into a multitude of possible futures-->
will proceed from the previous configuration to the new one

It seems that you have not simply formulated the classic determinist argument plus the randomness wrinkle. You seem to be invoking it and insinuating that it is a sound argument.

The first message in this thread asks questions about concepts that the classic determinist argument depends upon. That's what this thread is about. Why not answer the questions?

Because we are not contrained by your view of what something must be?

This seems to be the pin here;

laws of physics --> set principles


the LOP are theories that humans make to approximate the appearance of the physical world. We do not really know what the emchanisms are that underlie the appearance of the the things we see.

The LOP are merely a set of human conventions for describing the apparent behavior of observable objects.

 

[Dancing David]

Let's add a bit of information (and change the lettering).

Suppose event F is some future event that we expect to occur. Suppose that event F actually occurs. Given a distinction between random and caused events, suppose that event F is a caused event. (This bolded part is the added bit of information.)

Do you explain what it means to say "event F caused event G" without considering what would have happened if event F had not occurred?

Is "event F caused event G" a matter of fact or is it purely a figment of your imagination that arises when you imagine event F not happening?

F is a causal event, in that the reduction of the other events that led to F can be determined.

The question then depends upon the causal nature of G,

-if we say that the event F must occur for the event G to occur then it would be foolish to ask what happens to the causality of G in the instance where F was not present because we have defined F to be a nessecary causal agent in G. In this case: matter of fact.

-if we say however that other events causal or acausal can lead to event G then asking about the possibility of event G in the absense of F is not foolish.

And the nature of reality appears to frequently support both.

Examples:
at this time it is believed that the nature of radioactive decay is undeterminable and unpredictable, this is subject to future revision.

-there is a subcritical mass of uranium, it has exactly enough atoms at exactly the arrangement and density of atoms that it is subcritical and will not go Kablooie unless exactly one atom of uranium is added to the mass. Further posit that the mass is arranged so that the mass does become critical from the addition of that one atom.


Question : Is it that one atom that causes the mass to go critical or is it the threshold of aggregate probability?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

True; IFF you assume materialism/atheism.

No. My statement is true regardless of whether I believe in a deity or not; "materialism" is just a red herring. For any system A, there is always a way to make another system B such that for given inputs, B gives the same outputs as A. Of course, there is also always a set of inputs that will distinguish between A and B. But that set might never be able to be applied. In any case, there are always systems that are equivalent to A.

LOFL. I had hopes for you but you are quickly becoming just another replay of ancient music.

I was thinking something similar about you, actually.

 

[hammegk]

My statement is true regardless of whether I believe in a deity or not; "materialism" is just a red herring.

You're the person throwing red fish.

Your statement is true IFF you select "body" rather than "mind" as the monism. Choosing "mind" does not negate it, but allows some possibility for self-creation = freewill.

Or are you still stuck in some dualist nonsense?



Re our discussions, who said, "There is nothing new under the sun."?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Your statement is true IFF you select "body" rather than "mind" as the monism. Choosing "mind" does not negate it, but allows some possibility for self-creation = freewill.

Tell me, hammegk, is your mind directing your fingers as you type your messages? Or, if this were a face-to-face discussion, would your mind be directing your mouth, tongue, and vocal cords?

Am I communicating with an entity referred to as "hammegk" through a chain of interactions that includes your body, or not?

 

[hammegk]

Well, you may be getting close to some understanding of the choice-of-monism problem.

Do we perceive an objective world? Of course. Either monism works equally well for scientific inquiry into our world of objective perceptions.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Fourth grade. My science teacher was telling us that we could understand the ways atoms in a molecule could move by imagining that they were connected by springs. Then she reminded us that springs behaved the way they did because of the interatomic forces between the atoms.

How can you understand a phenomenon by referencing itself? That's when I realized there wasn't any need for metaphor: the description of the molecule's movement was all that was needed.

Body, mind - it doesn't make a bit of difference. The pattern of interactions is the same either way. Worrying about which one is real is as pointless as trying to learn whether pie a la mode has the ice cream on top of the pie or the pie underneath the ice cream.

 

[hammegk]

Body, mind - it doesn't make a bit of difference. The pattern of interactions is the same either way. Worrying about which one is real is as pointless as trying to learn whether pie a la mode has the ice cream on top of the pie or the pie underneath the ice cream.

You believe that, huh?

And I say (again) " .... (my) assumptions.

Nihilism, solipsism, super-determinism -- Truth of Falsity unknown and unknowable. Value of any of them, if true, nil-nada-zilch.

Remaining:

Dualism; logically impossible. Choice -- mind, or body -- again unknowable, and approachable only by logic. Each of us makes a choice knowingly or unknowingly."

So to me it does make a difference.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammy, could you rephrase what you just said, without using any ellipses, em dashes, parentheses, or semicolons?

~~ Paul

 

[seayakin]

It seems to me that as long as you accept the premise that causality exists in all situations. Free will cannot exist. With causality, every event is determined by previous events. Therefore, to prove freewill, causality cannot exist or at a minimum, be inconsistent.

Seayakin's definition of Free Will: The ability to select between two or more choices with no external influence be that previous events or state of being or thought.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Fair enough. And that definition is perfectly consistent with randomness, too.

So: what does the definition imply about moral and ethical decisions?

I assert that it has no usefulness in such matters, because implications only hold to the degree that causality implies. In other words, it can't help us because it's logically consistent, and anything that could help us would have to be logically inconsistent.

 

[seayakin]

So: what does the definition imply about moral and ethical decisions?

With absolute causality, there are no moral or ethical decisions. They are behaviors caused by previous events. For example, I choose not to sleep with women other than my wife because I have been conditioned by my parents to believe it is wrong a la environmental determinism.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Exactly!

So, what can we conclude about moral or ethical principles in general, if neither randomness nor causality permits them?

 

[wraith]

Exactly!

So, what can we conclude about moral or ethical principles in general, if neither randomness nor causality permits them?

There is no conflict between Fate and morality. Why do you believe that this is the case?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

There is no conflict between Fate and morality. Why do you believe that this is the case?

See Seayakin's post immediately above my penultimate one.