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Determinists cannot answer these Questions

The idea

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Here is the classic determinist argument:

(1) The laws of physics dictate how matter behaves.
(2) Therefore, the present doesn't branch out into a multitude of possible futures. There is only one possible future and nothing that you do is your choice.

Question 1(a): According to the laws of nature, has any event ever caused another event to occur?

Question 1(b): How do you explain what it means to say "event A caused event B" without considering what would have happened if event A had not occurred?

Question 1(c): Suppose event A is some future event that we expect to occur. If there are no alternative futures and event A actually occurs, then doesn't that imply that event A had to occur and that we cannot meaningfully speak of event A as the cause of any other event?

Question 2(a): Given the assumption that we cannot meaningfully speak of what would have happened if the past had been different, does it follow that we cannot meaningfully speak of what would have happened if some observations had not been made?

Question 2(b): Is it meaningless to say, "Matter would have behaved according to the laws of physics even if no one had been watching"?

Question 2(c): Is there any reason to believe that matter obeys the laws of physics when no one is watching?

Question 3(a): The first time that you heard the word "dictate" used to describe what occurs when some active entity dictates to some controlled entity, was the active entity a human being?

Question 3(b) If you now wish to say that all power to dictate is vested in the laws of physics and that people therefore have no power to dictate anything, then aren't you trying to establish a meaning for the word "dictate" that is in conflict with its original meaning?

Question 3(c) Suppose I have no vocabulary to say that a given thing "moves." Instead I say, "It is like a Cheetah. It is not like a tree." Suppose I learn about Zeno's arguments and I become convinced that nothing moves. To express the idea "nothing moves", what would I say? To express the idea "no Cheetah moves", what would I say?

Question 4(a) If all decision-making processes are controlled by the laws of physics, then does all power to make intelligent decisions reside in the laws of physics?

Question 4(b) Is intelligence the power to make intelligent decisions? (The word "decisions" shouldn't be assumed to mean major life decisions relating to work, marriage, etc. It is intended in a broad sense that includes decisions made in the process of solving problems on pencil-and-paper tests.)

Question 4(c) If all power to make intelligent decisions resides in the laws of physics, then does no entity other than "the laws of physics" have intelligence?

Question 4(d) Is there any more reason to believe "people don't choose" than there is to believe "people have no intelligence"?
 
(1) The laws of physics dictate how matter behaves.

(2) Therefore, the present doesn't branch out into a multitude of possible futures. There is only one possible future and nothing that you do is your choice.

Minor correction: The "laws of physics" only attempt to describe and predict observed phenomena in this universe. Phenomena in the universe will more or less go on behaving the way they do, with or without these artificial descriptions of them.

The math and science does a good job, but are far from perfected. So are the very measurements and techniques that the "laws of physics" are based on.

In short, a mesh of assumptions with plenty of room for improvement. You have to keep this in mind about science, or you turn it into a religion.

So, we are quite a long way off from proving/disproving anything, either way.

The primary sticking point is that even if the universe is "deterministic", we can build a machine to simulate it. We theoretically have neither the time, nor the resources available within this universe to prove it conclusively, either way, because *EVERY* possible variable would need to be accounted for, including (but not limited to) light that is already travelling, but will not be detectible until it arrives, the precise internal state of every star and body in the universe with potential to change other state... basically, a record precisely describing every signal and atom (or relatively small cluster of atoms), that can be operated on faster than real-time atoms. Since any such device we could construct would be made of atoms, and incredibly dense (after all, shorter paths is faster work), and be subject to behaving like other observed phenomena in the universe, the "laws of physics" trivially predict it would form a singularity long before it could model our local cluster of stars with any kind of precision (i.e. collapse into a black hole), and that nuclear fusion would start at its core LONG before a portion that could do our own solar system could be completed. Not that the vast majority of initial state to seed such a device would even be accessible. Unfortunately, if you're to believe Einstein, time "slows down" in something this massive, so that's another strike against this solution. Even if it could be built based on new discoveries or more clever engineering, it would certainly "miss" something in the assumptions it was based on, producing only an approximation, thus defeating its intended purpose. (We don't even have a checklist of "all the laws", let alone all of their interactions and specific properties.)

Anyway, we have a solution to the ptoblem of too much state to make predictions: simulate unknowns with randomness and negative feedback, then run multiple times, which has (theoretically) worked fairly well with the evolution of life up to now.

Of course, once you put that in, you're assenting to the notion that what has been observed of the universe can be modelled with "randomness", which is sort of the whole point to "the laws of physics": assuming modelling what has been observed in a certain way will describe it, and produce useful results.
 
Sorry, but you made a mistake starting on (2)

Classical determinism is dead, dead, dead. It's dead. Thus, (2) is false.

In any case, causation is not dependent on multiple possibilities - your questions read like a lot of word games, not physics.

Reformulate your questions with equations, and you'll see there is no dependency on a bifurcating future in them.
 
EvilDave, I agree with just about all you have said with the exception being, that the only completely accurate model of the universe would have to be a complete replication of the universe.

You could not have a model that was smaller or denser or based on a different time frame because any arbitrary change would change the actual state of the equivalence between the model and the reality thereby changing the accuracy of the outcome of any prediction or behavior.

edit sp
damn I GOTTA get a new spel chekker
 
Which is to say, we absolutely agree.

I'm sure someone could fill several nice, fat books about a determinism proving device that modelled what we knew about "the universe", and all the technical faults and bad assumptions that such a notion contains. It has appeared in science fiction a number of times. Conveniently stowed away in black holes, alternate universes, etc., and never described in any detail at all.

Anything can be modelled without being the original - but not precisely. We can certainly model things, under controlled conditions "accurately enough", but never perfectly, because even the fabrication of the final design will have unpredictable deviations and imperfections that were never modelled by the simulation. In engineering, they over-engineer, predicting a margin of error for components, and specifying something "beefier" to handle the load, and redundant systems to ensure the system still works in case of failures. This makes for more robust designs that are tolerant of the unavoidable variance in components, and day-to-day unpredictable mishaps.

Now imagine engineers were designing a universe-simulator. Redundant systems. Over-engineered components. An unimaginably immense supply chain for the fabrication.... some sort of automated army dismantling whole solar systems - no, whole GALAXIES for "parts"....

And who will pay for it?

Actually, that may be the "key" to running the simulation. Once you've dismantled and harvested enough of the existing universe for parts for your simulation machine, there won't be much left to simulate! Then we could support any depth of detail of simulation you like on the last crumbs of leftover cosmic debris using all the matter from the previous universe to simulate it.

OK, so you destroyed the whole universe to predict what would happen to the universe. Nothing religious fanatics couldn't get their followers behind. After all, their god will just make them another "better" one. The end of the world has always been predicted, after all. See, nothing's left: determinism proven.
 
roger said:
Reformulate your questions with equations, and you'll see [...]
That's easier said than done. How do you know what the result will be?

Are you sure that the reformulation won't be controversial? If X is unclear and someone advises that we replace X with a clear thing Y and someone else advises that we replace X with a clear thing Z, then how do we choose between Y and Z? We have to go back and look at X, which is unclear.
 
The idea said:

That's easier said than done. How do you know what the result will be?
For example:

F=ma.

If a force is applied to a body, then it accelerates.

d = at^2 + vt

we can use this equation to determine the distance the accelerating object travels.

Thus, force causes the object to move some distance over time.

There is no term in these equations that depends on whether the application of the force is determined or truly random.

Thus, causation with or without determinism.
 
Dear Roger;

At last! Energy defined --

E = (Fc**2)/a

It's all clear now! :D

Have you put the final touches on M-Theory?
 
The end of the world has always been predicted, after all. See, nothing's left: determinism proven.

HAHAHA thats the second time today I had a laughing fit !
 
The idea said:
Here is the classic determinist argument:

(1) The laws of physics dictate how matter behaves.
(2) Therefore, the present doesn't branch out into a multitude of possible futures. There is only one possible future and nothing that you do is your choice.


This is an idealist take on materialism, some materialist believe that each energy particle has a seperate futue and that the future is not determined.
I have seen immaterialsts say that free wilkl does not exist under materialism, I disagree.


Question 1(a): According to the laws of nature, has any event ever caused another event to occur?


It depends on the narrowing of the question to have an answer, it seems unlikely that a galaxie acroos the universe effects my behavior.
Othere events are interdependant on each other.



Question 1(b): How do you explain what it means to say "event A caused event B" without considering what would have happened if event A had not occurred?

If event A did not occur in a certain time it is possible that event C could cause Event B to happen. depends on your focus. but the second event B is not identical to the first event B.


Question 1(c): Suppose event A is some future event that we expect to occur. If there are no alternative futures and event A actually occurs, then doesn't that imply that event A had to occur and that we cannot meaningfully speak of event A as the cause of any other event?

This is mechanistic determinism, which would say that all events are preordained, not something science predicts, given quantum theory and chaos theory.

Question 2(a): Given the assumption that we cannot meaningfully speak of what would have happened if the past had been different, does it follow that we cannot meaningfully speak of what would have happened if some observations had not been made?

That depends on the definition of observation, we cans ay thatw e are not aware that it happened unless we can find evidence that it might have occured.
Some events are changed by the means of observation.


Question 2(b): Is it meaningless to say, "Matter would have behaved according to the laws of physics even if no one had been watching"?

No.

But there is an assumption of isotropy that is born out in the appearance of the material world.

Question 2(c): Is there any reason to believe that matter obeys the laws of physics when no one is watching?

This gets into the distant observer question, it would appear that there is isotropy all the way that we can see. Distant stars seem to follow gravity.

Question 3(a): The first time that you heard the word "dictate" used to describe what occurs when some active entity dictates to some controlled entity, was the active entity a human being?

Hmm, what?


Question 3(b) If you now wish to say that all power to dictate is vested in the laws of physics and that people therefore have no power to dictate anything, then aren't you trying to establish a meaning for the word "dictate" that is in conflict with its original meaning?

Most materialists would agree that free will appears to exist.


Question 3(c) Suppose I have no vocabulary to say that a given thing "moves." Instead I say, "It is like a Cheetah. It is not like a tree." Suppose I learn about Zeno's arguments and I become convinced that nothing moves. To express the idea "nothing moves", what would I say? To express the idea "no Cheetah moves", what would I say?

There is nothing like cheetah. Which shows the problem with Xenos line of reasoning. there is no infinite interval between other intervals.


Question 4(a) If all decision-making processes are controlled by the laws of physics, then does all power to make intelligent decisions reside in the laws of physics?

Franken Wraith believes so, I believe that free will is allowed for under materialism.

Question 4(b) Is intelligence the power to make intelligent decisions? (The word "decisions" shouldn't be assumed to mean major life decisions relating to work, marriage, etc. It is intended in a broad sense that includes decisions made in the process of solving problems on pencil-and-paper tests.)

it depends upon the definition of intelligence, I believe there are many.

Question 4(c) If all power to make intelligent decisions resides in the laws of physics, then does no entity other than "the laws of physics" have intelligence?

I don't understand the question, that is the conclusion that Frankenwraith holds.
The idea doesn't make sense to me.
The laws of physics don't care if there is free will, they do not preclude it.


Question 4(d) Is there any more reason to believe "people don't choose" than there is to believe "people have no intelligence"?

Many materialists believe that there is free will and choice. Now there are immaterialists who try to say that materialism doesn't allow for free will.
 
Point 2 is certainly wrong, but not for the reasons that have been claimed.

Our models of the universe cannot be complete, and thus they can't perfectly predict how it will change over time. But the laws of physics could be partially or completely probabilistic. Point 2 makes certain assumptions about what the "laws of physics" are, and those assumptions are unjustified.
 
Dancing David said:


Many materialists believe that there is free will and choice. Now there are immaterialists who try to say that materialism doesn't allow for free will.

And even more perplexing to materialists are idealists who ask for any potentially possible mechanism -- that effects material brain stuff -- that also provides for "free-will and choice".

Idealists have the same basic problem accounting for even the possibility of free-will, but at least can contend that mindstuff should be able to effect (and perhaps affect) other mindstuff.
 
I've always found the concept to be quite annoying.

People want their choices to have a certain consistency - they don't like the idea that what they do is fundamentally random. They want to attribute their actions to some definite process.

At the same time, they don't wish to believe that their choices are part of a chain of causality - they don't like the idea that each and every 'choice' is just the end result of some definite process.

So they try to have their cake and eat it too by postulating the concept of "free will" and then never defining it, explicitly or implicitly. It's just something to cite whenever an unpleasant conclusion comes up.
 
hammegk said:


And even more perplexing to materialists are idealists who ask for any potentially possible mechanism -- that effects material brain stuff -- that also provides for "free-will and choice".

Idealists have the same basic problem accounting for even the possibility of free-will, but at least can contend that mindstuff should be able to effect (and perhaps affect) other mindstuff.

Well the last that I recall Wraith just kept insisting that the mechanisms I suggested could not provide for free will, which I define as the ability to make choices.
Wraith's argumements may not be your own, despite Pahansiri's statements. We can derail this thread if you want.
Wraith's arguement was manily one of assertion. There is enough in the brain chemmistry that is based upon a model of likelyhood(to avoid the probable hangup). I don't see why materialsim does not allow for brain events(mindstuff) to influence other brain events(mindstuff).
 
That's "Wrath", buddy.

My point is that your concept of 'choices' is self-contradictory. I'm not asking for a depiction of the mechanisms involved, just a conceptual description of their nature, but I really don't think you can manage that.

To the degree that this 'free will' incorporates probability and randomness, the choices resulting from it will be random. To the degree that this 'free will' incorporates order and causality, the choices resulting from it will proceed from the previous configuration to the new one according to set principles.

That's the same way everything behaves, from grains of sand to clusters of galaxies. Are you willing to say that rocks make choices? I will, if you're up to it.
 
Wrath, are you wraith? If not then don't be an idiot!
If you wish to know my thoughts you can ask. I have deliniated them in many a thread. And I am willing to do so again, if you aren't some ignorant and pissy troll then you can start a thread on the topic. Otherwise i choose to respond to your apparent rudeness and ignore the question.

(There was a prior discussion with Wraith/Franko about the nature of fate, in which much of this was discussed , I will certainly choose to deliniate it for you if you wish.)
 
Wrath of the Swarm said:
I've always found the concept to be quite annoying.

People want their choices to have a certain consistency - they don't like the idea that what they do is fundamentally random. They want to attribute their actions to some definite process.

At the same time, they don't wish to believe that their choices are part of a chain of causality - they don't like the idea that each and every 'choice' is just the end result of some definite process.

So they try to have their cake and eat it too by postulating the concept of "free will" and then never defining it, explicitly or implicitly. It's just something to cite whenever an unpleasant conclusion comes up.

None of this is anything I would disagree with, I am not sure about the chain of causality, I feel that there are some aggregate processes that may have likely hood of happening, But not straight deterministic meachanisms.

The point that elliotfc is making is that somehow free will is the reason that we have the capability to make the wrong choices, and I say that just proves that there is no design to the human world.

I think that free will means the ability to choose our responses to situations.

PS

It would appear that the thread has gone on to it's non-existant afterlife. I just would hate to derail this thread further.
 

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