I regret not having time this morning to read your long commentary carefully. I will make some notes and leave a more detailed comment for when I have time.
I’ve just now read these current posts of yours, and also re-read my previous post #280 addressed to you, and I regret the note of discourtesy that had crept in in that post. I think I’d made surmises about your intention in introducing, in your post #273, what I felt were deliberately obfuscating jargon and non sequiturs, and that impression is what I had reacted to -- and after reading these current posts of yours, I’m beginning to think my inference was incorrect. Some disagreements still remain, but those are probably straightforward misunderstandings and/or disagreements, as opposed to deliberate obfuscation. That somewhat trenchant note in my earlier post had not been called for, at all. My apologies, absolutely.
As for your re-visiting this post of yours : sure, please, whenever you’re free, and no rush! But you know what, I’ve read this post of yours (that I’m starting out responding to), and I don’t think there’s any need to re-do it all. My primary objection you seem to have agreed to, "deferred" to -- unless I am mistaken -- in this post, so that does not need re-visiting. And as to the rest, I’ll try to point out such difficulties as occur to me about them, and addressing them, that is, addressing this post of mine, should be ample.
(1) I didn't want to get into an argument about Thomas Huxley because he's an author I don't know well. I've only read you one article and a few selected texts. I don't like to talk about what I don't know. In addition, we are trying to clarify the concept of agnosticism here, and that seems to me to be a priority. If you want to defend Huxley's position here, I will refer to what you could say.
I suppose the last part of that last sentence there should read : "I will defer to what you could say"? "Defer", not "refer"? If that is what you meant -- and that seems to me the much likelier interpretation of what you've said there, basis your wording -- then I thank you for so graciously accepting my point.
(Although if I'm misinterpreting you, and if you mean instead that you would like to "refer" back, check back, read more, and revisit this argument : then yes, then absolutely you will need to do that, and to go back and respond properly to my earlier post.)
(2) Since I'm not referring to Huxley, I can't make a straw man of him.
With respect, I will ask you to permit me to disagree. You are not speaking of Huxley now, but you did speak of him earlier on. You did express what you believed was his, Huxley’s, meaning of the word ‘Agnostic’ ; and you did claim for that view of yours a “semantic authority”, even a “copyright”, that derives from the fact that it was Huxley who had coined that term.
I myself claim no especial sanctity for my particular interpretation just because I believe that that is Huxley’s interpretation as well. (Indeed, I was speaking all through for recognizing a multiplicity of meanings that are currently extant.)
However, it is your bringing up your view of Huxley’s meaning for Agnosticism that I was responding to. It is because you claimed that Huxley himself advocated some wishy-washy version of Agnosticism, that I brought out those Huxley quotes in response. I wanted to show you that you were mistaken in thinking that Huxley had intended the kind of wishy-washy meaning for the word Agnosticism, that you seemed to believe he had. That’s all.
The word “straw man” tends to carry certain connotations, and I should have been careful how I’d used it. I did not mean to suggest your strawmanning was deliberate : but yes, I did think, and do still think, you had been misinterpreting him, because you were honestly mistaken about his meaning and about his intentions.
Since you now agree to fall in with my interpretation of Huxley’s meaning, I trust this is something we no longer disagree about.
(3) To believe X and to affirm X is the same thing in this debate. I can't say anything if I don't believe in something. We are assuming the subject is not lying, of course.
I’m sorry, you’ve lost me here. I don’t see how this is relevant. Would you care to explain?
Also -- looking simply at what you’re saying here, without really being clear about your larger point when you say this -- I'm not sure I agree with this. Sure, I (or you) can argue for some POV without necessarily believing in that POV ourselves. It so happens that I find Huxley’s POV reasonable : but even if I didn’t, surely I could have spoken about what I believed he meant irrespective of my personal POV?
But like I said, I don’t understand your larger point here. Perhaps you would explain?
(4) The agnostic states that one cannot believe in something that has no justification. I do not care whether you call this a 'claim' or a 'pronouncement'. You interpret this as a statement of intentions. I think it's a rule of knowledge. We are speaking of the knowledge of gods here. Not about practical rules.
If you’d used that word, “claim”, informally like this, then I suppose my objection to it was in the nature of hair-splitting.
This is why I’d spoken about this : A claim needs to be backed up with reason, right? It needs to be justified. But an intention does not really need to be justified, it is enough that one intends it.
If I simply say “I will not believe something that has no evidence”, and further say “Someone who acts like this, I coin this new word, Agnostic, to describe him” -- which is what Huxley had done -- then, since this was just a declaration of intent and not a claim, there is no need to back it up. That is what I had meant to point out.
But of course, if your informal use of the word “claim” was only accidental, and you did not mean to imply that this claim needed to be backed up, then all of this is moot.
(5) I call a "scientist" a person who claims that we can only know or believe something justified by strict evidence (science). If that is not scientism, call it what you like.
Oh. I see now. You’re using the word “scientist”, and especially the word “scientism”, very differently from their everyday sense. But no issues, now that we know, exactly, what it is you did mean.
My point was, Huxley’s meaning for “Agnosticism” was exactly the same as what you seem to mean by “scientist”, so this additional word/qualification seemed superfluous.
(6) Many people claim that they cannot prove that God exists, but that they have faith in God. It is usually called 'fideism'. Others call them ‘agnostic theists’. The name doesn't matter, if we know what we're talking about.
I must, with respect, and with no offense intended, repeat the two objections I had raised earlier :
- I fail to see, at all, why you’re bringing in fideism in into this discussion at all. It seems to me to be an out-and-out non sequitur.
To be clear : I’ll be very happy to discuss fideism with you, if you wish, in a separate discussion. But I do not see, at all, what fideism has to do with agnosticism. Fideism appears to me to be a non sequitur, when what we are discussing is Agnosticism.
- I take your point, when you say that the “fideist” is the same as an “agnostic theist” – provided you define the word “agnostic”, when you use it as an adjective there, strictly by its philological sense.
And that is fine. I recognize that that is one of the connotations that this word carries, one of the senses in which people use the word Agnsotic. But I’m unsure where you want to go with this?
Sure, if you define “agnostic” simply as ‘someone who does not know, and knows that they do not know’, just that, then “agnostic theist” will be the same as a “fideist”. But anything that follows from using this definition in this manner will apply only to this particular definition of Agnosticism. Not to how Huxley meant to define it. You see that, right?
And -- even more importantly -- any pros and cons to this fideism, stays with fideism. It adheres to fideism, like I had said in my previous post addressed to you. How does that in any way impact Agnosticism at all?
If we agree on these points, perhaps you will understand my argument.
I will repeat it again in a simplified and nameless manner so that there will be no verbal arguments between you and me. Forget about Huxley, fideism, agnosticism and all that for a moment.
H1.: I do not believe in God.
Question: Why?
H2: Because you cannot believe in something that is not justified.
Q: Why?
H3: Because the burden of proof lies with who claims that something exists.
Q: Then you have a reason to believe that God doesn't exist.
H4: Yes.
Q: Then you say that God doesn't exist.
This is to say: H turns to be what is usually called an "atheist" (or a "gnostic atheist" according others)= someone that affirms that God doesn’t exist. Not what Huxley calls an "agnostic".
Ah, we seem to have arrived at the crux of our disagreement! (And it seems to me this is not so much a disagreement per se as a misunderstanding. That is, it seems we do agree with each other, but perhaps we’ve been talking past each other, both of us.)
I think I agree with the broad point you’re making here.
The agnostic’s position -- as Huxley defined it -- is a general position, and does not directly refer to the God question at all. But when the ‘agnostic method’ (if I may call it that) is turned to the God question, then absolutely, the end result is atheism.
And that is why I have been saying, all through, that when applied to the God question, agnosticism -- as defined by Huxley -- is synonymous with ‘soft atheism’. (Not literally synonymous, but effectively so, when the God question is what one is discussing.)
The Agnostic -- Huxely’s Agnostic -- does not believe in God because he sees no evidence for God. In other words, Huxley’s Agnostic is a Soft Atheist.
NOTE: H only can avoid the agnostic paradox denying H3 but this is inconsistent with H2.
I’m sorry, you’ll have to explain this to me. I don’t see any paradox at all here!
I wish we were sitting down together, across each other at a coffee table perhaps, then this discussion would have been so much easier! This text-only discussion is kind of cumbersome. Nevertheless, since that’s what we have, that’s what we must make the best of!
I’ll request you to explain this portion -- this “paradox” you speak of -- one more time, but before you do that, let me just point out some inconsistencies I find with your H-statements. (That is, these inconsistencies may or may not affect your explanation of your paradox, I don’t know, but I’d like to point them out, so that you may incorporate them in your explanation when you do present it.)
H2 : Because you cannot believe in something that is not justified.
Q2 (I’m calling this Q2, instead of just “Q”, for ease of reference) : Why?
H3 : Because the burden of proof lies with who claims that something exists.
While I agree with H3, if taken as a bald statement, nevertheless H3 is not the answer to Q2.
This is what I meant when I said “I will not believe in something that is not justified” (i.e., your H2) -- or, to put it more precisely, ‘I will not believe in something for which there is no compelling evidence' -- is a
declaration of intent. It is not a claim, and therefore there is no need to back it up at all. Q2 does not apply at all. Do you see this?
Suppose I were to declare : ‘I will not go out on dates with read-headed girls’. This is simply a declaration of intent, and there is no need to back it up. (That is, you may question the wisdom of this declaration, and discuss its effectivity and desirability. But having made this declaration once, the fact that I have made this declaration, it stands on its own two feet.)
Huxley said, in effect, that we will not believe in that for which there is no evidence, and that those who follow this dictum would, he proposed, be known as Agnostic. That is how we can, in our minds, break up his “definition” of Agnosticism.
So when he says “The Agnostic will not have faith in that for which there is no evidence”, there is no “Why” to it at all. It’s simply tautotological.
You may, separately, argue with Huxley (or with H) the wisdom of this declaration of his. That is a separate issue.
Like I said, I’m not clear what exactly this “paradox” is, so I’m not sure if this, what I just said, is relevant. But I’d like you to incorporate this, what I've said now, into your explanation of the paradox, when you make it.
The basis of my argument is that the burden of proof is a sufficient reason to deny that something exists.
And I agree with that statement in general terms, but again, I’m afraid I don’t see what that has to do with our discussion.
Incidentally : I don’t think, when it comes to Agnosticism, that the burden of proof is the ‘reason’, per se, of denying something. I think this is only, in effect, a re-statement of the motto of Agnosticism.
Huxley says : The Agnostic will not have faith in that for which there is no evidence.
Therefore, if you want to get an Agnostic to believe in something, then it puts on you the burden of proof, the burden of evidence, if you want him to believe something.
In other words, the burden of proof, or the burden of evidence, is merely another way of re-stating the very definition of Agnosticism. It is not a “reason”, per se.
In light of what I’ve said, would you like to revisit what you’ve said? (What you’ve said, in the form that you’ve said it, isn’t very clear to me, I’m afraid. I’m not sure what point you’re making here.)