Hi RandFan,
I only saw your edited reply today, I caught your first shorter one and thought that was all you had written...I see you have made some additional points which I`ll try and address.
I would just like to state however that I think we have come to that impasse again...you know, the one where I think that if you go through the UN route then you ought to abide by it`s authority and not try to hijack it to rubber stamp the desires of one particular nation or group of nations.
If you think a unilateral approach to affairs of this nature is ok then we don`t really have a problem...although I disagree with that position I can accept it and I know many people (especially Americans) see no reason to consult the UN or abide by International Law in their foreign policy.
Where I do have a problem is when the US/UK feigns its support for a UN process in the hope of acheiving its goals and then when the UN insists on due process the US/UK ignore the very institution it was happy to use and go the unilateral route, declaring, without any authority whatsoever (apart from their self proclaimed authority), that Iraq was in breach of UNSCR 1441 and criticising other nations for not doing the same. As I said previously, France is not in the dock here...it did nothing to contradict the UNSC process. If you disagree with France`s position then fair enough, but you must concede it was not acting against UNSC and what that Council had agreed.
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Originally posted by demon
Jackson again -
"To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime, it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole"
THAT'S the immutable reality.
Very naive to think otherwise.
RandFan
"Wow, so there is only one side of the argument and it is yours?"
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I`m afraid it`s not a matter of it being my "one side" That is a definition of aggressive war and its not mine its the AMERICAN definition which applied to Nuremburg.
Are you saying it's my obligation to change an internationally recognised definition in order to be fair to America, the creator of the definition? Is this how we look at both sides? Change the meaning of the language so that America doesn`t look so bad when it ignores it?
I really don't see how you're continuing to miss the point, unless it's on purpose. 1441 was passed in order to give Iraq one final chance to comply fully with previous Resolutions. At a later date the Security Council was then to decide whether Iraq had taken this last chance. Instead, the British and Americans, impatient to attack because that was their objective regardless of WMD, tried to bounce the Security Council into authorizing an attack. France, Russia, and China all saw no reason to invade in February or March since, as Blix reported, Iraq's compliance was improving, no WMD had been found, none of the US's supposed 'intelligence' had panned out, and no one had demonstrated that Iraq was a threat. To quote Blix’s final report:
'the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following:
'The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.
'It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.”
Blix went on,
'Let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks;…”
'How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.'
In other words, inspections were proceeding -with problems, yes- but sufficient that UNMOVIC was able to plan a draft work programme and anticipated that remaining tasks would only take a few months, providing pressure was sustained.
All of this was unilaterally and illegally disregard by the US and UK. Without support in the Security Council, at the Azores summit (March 16th) Bush and Blair announced a 24 hour deadline for the UN support. When the UN refused to back down and authorize the attack, the UK withdraw the draft resolution.
So, when the US and UK tried to push for an attack, France said that there was, at that time, no need. The inspections had only been going a couple of months and things were improving -why kill people? That's not taking the issue of force of the table, that simply saying that you use force as a last resort. America and Britain had not demonstrated in any way that the only remaining option was force. If you're proposing violence then the burden is on you to prove why it is NECESSARY -it is not for anyone else to prove that it is UNECESSARY.
So France argued that inspections had barely been given any time to work (a point that is all the more valid given that the ISG is still searching and has found nothing) and that the presence of troops was bringing Saddam to heel.
Not only that but the idea that Saddam only ever played a waiting game is simply wrong. As Scott Ritter has said, ‘If this were argued in a court of law, the weight of evidence would go the other way. Iraq has in fact demonstrated over and over a willingness to cooperate with weapons inspectors.’ (Ritter and William Rivers Pitt, War On Iraq, Profile, 2002, p.25). Even Richard Butler’s own report in 1998 stated that, out of 300 inspections, there had only been incidents at a mere 5 (according to the Russian Ambassador Sergei Lavrov in December 1998, as quoted by Associated Press 17/12/98).
Under UNSCOM, Iraq was 95% disarmed and what remained was non-viable. To quote Scott Ritter, who was no patsy to the Iraqis when he was chief weapons inspector, "When I left Iraq in 1998... the infrastructure and facilities had been 100% eliminated. There's no doubt about that. All of their instruments and facilities had been destroyed. The weapons design facility had been destroyed. The production equipment had been hunted down and destroyed. And we had in place means to monitor - both from vehicles and from the air - the gamma rays that accompany attempts to enrich uranium or plutonium. We never found anything." (Scott Ritter and William Rivers Pitt, ‘War On Iraq’ Profile Books, 2002 p.26)
If you don’t trust Ritter, what about the late Dr. David Kelly, Britain’s leading expert on the subject? In his draft article published posthumously by the Observer (31/08/03) did not state that Iraq definitely had WMD, either. Indeed, he concedes that UNSCOM and the IAEA ‘destroyed or rendered harmless all known weapons and capability.’ The problem, Kelly argued, lay in what was unknown; i.e. for which inspectors could not account. According to Kelly, what was unaccounted for was ‘8,500 litres of anthrax VX, 2,160 kilograms of bacterial growth media, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, 6,500 chemical bombs and 30,000 munitions.’ To reiterate Blix’s caution, because we cannot account for these weapons, it does not mean they actually existed. Even if they had, as Ritter and others have pointed out on numerous occasions, they would have all been useless sludge by 1995. Further, Kelly conceded that these figures are based ‘in no small part on data fabricated by Iraq’. The threat from Iraq -which was so ‘modest’ that it was ‘unlikely to substantially affect the operational capabilities of US and British troops’ or ‘likely to create massive casualties in adjacent countries’ was a ‘long term’ one: that they might -one day- be developed to ‘military maturity’. This is hardly the ‘serious’ or ‘current’ threat concocted by Blair and Co. Or, as Hans Blix said in September 2002, ‘If I had solid evidence that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction or were constructing such weapons I would take it to the Security Council.’ (Quoted in The Independent, September 11th 2002)
Or, if you don’t believe any of these people what about your own Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who said on February 24th 2001 -on the record and on camera in Cairo- that ‘He (Saddam Hussein) has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours’ (US Department of State website at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/933.htm).
Or consider the US provocation of Iraq -the spying which eventually undermined UNSCOM and brought down the inspection process (and to which US officials admitted in january 1999). Or ask yourself why the US and UK violated the ceasefire resolutions and maintained that sanctions would never be lifted REGARDLESS of Iraqi cooperation over WMD.
"All possible sanctions will be maintained until Saddam Hussein is gone."
- Marlin Fitzwater, former White House Press Spokesman, May 1991
"Iraqis will be made to pay the price while Saddam Hussein is in power. Any easing of sanctions will be considered only when there is a new government."
- Robert Gates, former US National Security Advisor, Los Angeles Times, 9th May 1991 (Note that Gates said 'Iraqis', not the Iraqi regime.)
"We do not agree with those nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its 'obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted."
- Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, addressing a symposium on Iraq at Georgetown University, USA, 26th March 1997
"Sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as he [Hussein] lasts."
- Former US President Bill Clinton, quoted in The New York Times, 23rd November 1997
The games weren't just on the Iraqi side. As another example, why did the US also make it deliberately difficult to comply with the deadline for submitting a report on its weapons?
The US and UK, who wrote SCR 1441, required Iraq to report not only on its weapons programmes, but also 'all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material'. Even Blix commented that, while it was feasible for Iraq to report on its past and present weapons programmes within 30 days and that ‘the same should be true for declaring remaining permitted peaceful nuclear programmes', 'To declare all other chemical programmes in a country with a fairly large chemical industry, as well as other biological programmes might be more problematic in a short time.' (Blix, 'Notes for the briefing to the Security Council, 28 October 2002', )
Likewise, why did the US unilaterally censor the Iraqi weapons declaration, removing (if memory serves 8000 pages from an 11,000 page document)? THE 1441 required Iraq to deliver its weapons declaration to all fifteen members of the Security Council. On the eve of the delivery of the declaration, however, the Security Council agreed that the declaration should be edited before circulation, 'Diplomats said they had all but decided on Friday [6 Dec.] to allow UN experts to excise "proliferation- sensitive" material from the document, before passing copies to all 15 council members. Instead-following a weekend of telephone diplomacy that saw all but Syria agree to allow the five permanent members access to the unedited text-US officials walked into UN offices on Sunday and took the unedited declaration to Washington. The US has since forwarded copies to the other permanent members of the Security Council-the UK, Russia, China and France. The non- elected 10 members will receive an edited version later.' (Financial Times, 11 Dec., p. 8)
The memorandum was not a "snow job" as you put it, that more accurately describes the whole US-UK plan. France was simply arguing for a decent period of time for inspections and that violence -killing thousands of people- should only be done if there truly was no other option. The US and UK never came close to demonstrating that. Your contention that France would simply have played for time misunderstands the politics. France knew that it was unlikely that the US could be prevented from attacking forever because that was US policy -the invasion of Iraq had obvious intrinsic value (securing a stable base in the mid-east and controlling access to oil). However, by pushing for a further 120 days and a series of benchmarks, France could show itself as honourably making a last push for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and providing itself with a get-out clause if Iraq still failed to cooperate (assuming the US and UK would allow Iraq to cooperate fully -which is implausible for the obvious reasons). Indeed, this point was well recognized, as by the London Financial Times ‘However, diplomats observed that the memorandum could serve as the basis for an eventual French "exit strategy" if Iraq failed to comply with the benchmarks set.’ (February 25th 2003).
Or the Sunday Times:
‘"He feels strong, but that's a dangerous feeling because it could lead him to overplay his hand," said one French analyst. "Frankly, I think he needs an exit strategy." Another predicted a "fudge" allowing France not to join a war but to participate in the spoils of victory later.’ (February 23rd 2003)
Or the New York Times:
‘The more immediate question is how France will vote when the United States and Britain present a new resolution on Iraq at the Security Council. But some French politicians are also beginning to ask whether Mr. Chirac has prepared an exit strategy that will enable France to mend its ties with Washington and London as well as preserve France's political gains.’ (23 February 2003)
If France had agreed to the second resolution then the US and Uk would have attacked almost immediately -as they did anyway- but at least without the imprimatur of law. Your criticism of France is only valid if attacking Iraq is your objective -not a means to an objective...disarmament.