It expresses neither a need nor a desire for a “New Pearl Harbour”/”catastrophic and catalyzing event.” In fact, it assumes such an event will not occur and goes on to discuss how to bring about the “process of transformation”.
This would only be the interpretation from a catastrophically slack reading og the document. Let's have a closer look.
The quote refers to the technological and operational transformations that have been outlined in the doc
The United
States cannot
simply declare a
“strategic pause”
while
experimenting
with new
technologies and
operational
concepts....
A transformation strategy that solely
pursued capabilities for projecting force
from the United States, for example, and
sacrificed forward basing and presence,
would be at odds with larger American policy goals and would trouble American
allies.
(Note here also the stress on the need for this transformation to be pursued under one global umbrella, a la the WOT)
It then goes onto the famous quote
Further, the process of transformation,
even if it brings revolutionary change, is
likely to be a long one, absent some
catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a
new Pearl Harbor.
The question is a simple one. Which transformation do they deem more propitious? One that takes many decades, or rather one that happens sooner and faster? Whether a group of ideologues would want their peace love and happiness bringing transformation to happen in yrs, or in decades, is clearly not a question that any rational person would need ask, but on this forum I am happy to make it clear for you all. We can get our answer, quite simply, from the rest of the paragraph (I have outlined this many times, to no sensible reponse, on the CF thread.)
A decision to suspend or terminate aircraft
carrier production, as recommended by this
report and as justified by the clear direction
of military technology, will cause great
upheaval. Likewise, systems entering
production today – the F-22 fighter, for
example – will be in service inventories for
decades to come. Wise management of this
process will consist in large measure of
figuring out the right moments to halt
production of current-paradigm weapons
and shift to radically new designs. The
expense associated with some programs can
make them roadblocks to the larger process
of transformation – the Joint Strike Fighter
program, at a total of approximately $200
billion, seems an unwise investment.
The segments I have bolded show the reason for the length of transformation- difficulties. Roadblocks, barriers, obstructions etc, all of which a new PH would help bypass. Thus, to state that they did not deem a new PH propitious, is to say that they wanted a difficult and long transformation process, rather than a faster and easier one. Given that this is nonsense, we conclude quite easily that a new PH is deemed propitious to policy.
Just to pre empt some of the sillier, and categorically refuted responses to this, the doc does state that:
this report advocates a two-stage process of
change – transition and transformation –
over the coming decades.
This is not a problem, if one is honest to ask oneself a simple question- what is the alternative here? The doc has to advocate one course or the other, else it would be highly deficient. So either the doc can state
openly "We advocate the ocurrence of a new PH"; or they can state what they did. It is obvious, again to all sensible minds, that the former is not really an option, hence the latter. And in any case, this does
not, logically preclude the conclusion that a new PH was considered propitious to policy.