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Consistency in morality

Wudang

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In the thread on "animal lives versus human lives" a couple of posters assumed the necessity of consistency in any morality. Btw I'm going to use the term Moral Philosophy to denote a formal philosophy based on axioms and reason rather than an informal philosophy (small p) such as "be excellent to each other".

My belief, as someone educated in the sciences who's dabbled in philosophy, is that any formal Moral Philosophy is a worthwhile endeavor as a means of questioning your own beliefs but any attempt to apply it to a real situation is the nth degree equivalent of the three-body problem - it very quickly becomes too complex to give useful results.

In the thread referenced above, a utilitarian philosophy was advocated whereby we do a cost-benefit analysis of the suffering incurred on each side of the equation and whichever is the smaller number is the most moral. So assuming we can consistently measure the suffering, we have a consistent morality. The assumption is questionable at best and we tie ourselves to a single metric.

I believe that consistency in a Moral Philosophy (or even philosophy) is a desirable trait. I don't see it as necessary or achievable. I'd be interested to hear arguments against that.
 
In the thread on "animal lives versus human lives" a couple of posters assumed the necessity of consistency in any morality. Btw I'm going to use the term Moral Philosophy to denote a formal philosophy based on axioms and reason rather than an informal philosophy (small p) such as "be excellent to each other".

My belief, as someone educated in the sciences who's dabbled in philosophy, is that any formal Moral Philosophy is a worthwhile endeavor as a means of questioning your own beliefs but any attempt to apply it to a real situation is the nth degree equivalent of the three-body problem - it very quickly becomes too complex to give useful results.

Well, you just put several zillion lawyers and judges out of business.

Which may or may not be a good thing, but I suspect that the current Moral Philosophy that the legal profession espouses -- and yes, it's explicitly based upon axioms and reason -- is better than the free-for-all anarchy that would replace it.

The real problem is that any rationally-based system of morality will of necessity be as complicated as the world it attempts to describe. There are also axioms and reason in biology, but no one seriously expects to be able to reduce everything we know about biology to a few pages of first principles. There are axioms and reason in psychology and linguistics as well --- but the human system is so complex that the axioms and reason must themselves be complex.

And one of the big things that all of these systems recognize as a fundamental axiom is that circumstances alter cases -- things that are generally true are not always true.

Ask any biologist if birds fly and he'll say "yes." It's one of the characteristics. But, of course, there are a few flightless birds.

Ask any psychologist if people have short-term memory, and he'll say "yes." But, of couse, there are a few pathological cases, like Korsikoff's psychosis.

Ask any linguist if the subject comes before the verb in English. Then recite the last verse of The Boxer to him.

It's perfectly reasonable for me to believe that something should be a general law, but that it shoudn't be applied in a specific instance. It's also perfectly reasonable for me to believe that something might be common, but shouldn't be a general law.
 
Is the legal system moral? (can, worms). Is the legal system based on axioms, whether explicit or implicit? I would have said not. There are some axioms, yes but is the law not more based on legislation and precedent.
And one of the big things that all of these systems recognize as a fundamental axiom is that circumstances alter cases -- things that are generally true are not always true.
And I think that's the missing piece. I need to think for a bit now.
 
Is the legal system moral? (can, worms).

By your definition, yes. Remember that some famous moralists have claimed that chattel slavery is moral, based on axioms and reason (Plato, for instance). Just because something is moral doesn't make it right. I don't believe in stoning adulteresses --- but evidently a number of people do.

Is the legal system based on axioms, whether explicit or implicit? I would have said not. There are some axioms, yes but is the law not more based on legislation and precedent.

Yes. The axioms are legislation, or alternatively, the legislation are, explicitly, the axioms. When the legislature passes a law stating that "Any person who carries a concealed tuna fish with intent to deceive shall be guilty of a felony to be punished by a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand ping-pong balls," that establishes as a ground truth that so carrying is felonious.

This also implicitly establishes (via reason) other truths, such as the fact that a policeman can arrest you if she believes that you are carrying such a fish, but that your guilt will be determined via a normal criminal process for a felony, and you have the right to present witnesses in your defense, et cetera.

And getting back to the "circumstances alter cases" bit, there's also some other axioms that come into play, such as the defense of necessity -- if it was necessary (to prevent the greater harm or some such formulation) for you to so carry your pet tuna, you weren't actually behaving feloniously despite the wording of the statute. If I were worried about that when I wrote the law, I might have added a clause about "Necessity of action shall not be a defense to prosecutions under this Act," et cetera, et cetera.
 
In the thread referenced above, a utilitarian philosophy was advocated whereby we do a cost-benefit analysis of the suffering incurred on each side of the equation and whichever is the smaller number is the most moral. So assuming we can consistently measure the suffering, we have a consistent morality. The assumption is questionable at best and we tie ourselves to a single metric.

How do you quantify these qualities?

Is the grotesque and savage mutilation of one non-consenting person morally acceptable payment for, say, curing stomach cancer forever?

Only one person is suffering in this scenario, and millions are saved. However, I certainly do not agree that it should be done.
 
Just because something is moral doesn't make it right. I don't believe in stoning adulteresses --- but evidently a number of people do.

I think you mean, "Just because something is legal doesn't make it right." The purpose of a society's legal system is to provide justice and maintain morality. I doubt any legal system will be able to do this perfectly and still provide members of society the freedom they desire. People will always disagree on what is moral and just.
 
I think you mean, "Just because something is legal doesn't make it right." The purpose of a society's legal system is to provide justice and maintain morality. I doubt any legal system will be able to do this perfectly and still provide members of society the freedom they desire. People will always disagree on what is moral and just.

I won't speak for drkitten, but I think she was directly making a critique of utilitarian morality, rather than legal systems.
 
I think you mean, "Just because something is legal doesn't make it right."

No, although that's certainly true as well.

Part of the problem with any sort of systematic morality is that people will disagree with the underlying axioms, whether those axioms are written into law or not. You can easily defined a system of axioms for moral behavior, and demonstrate that under those axiioms, some particular action is "moral" (and use that system of axioms as a basis to argue for a change in our existing legal structure).

But that doesn't mean that your "moral" action is in fact "right."
 
I won't speak for drkitten, but I think she was directly making a critique of utilitarian morality, rather than legal systems.

A more general critique than simply of "utilitarian" morality. I happen to be pretty happy with utilitarianism as a framework, actually -- but I recognize that there are a number of well-known traps into which a strict utilitarian can fall (handwaves vaguely at the literature). I can therefore accept that the general axioms of utilitarianism are true, while not agreeing that a strict application of the axioms will result in a "right" decision, even if it's provably "moral" under an agreed-upon framework.

However, that's not specific to utilitarianism. I could make the same statement about any proposed system -- deontologism, relativism, "natural rights" theories, and so forth. I can't think of any ethical system, with the possible exception of practical legalism, that has the necessary flexibility to always do the right thing. And, of course, practical legalism never does -- and only could do so in theory by reserving the right to throw the entire rule book out the window when necessary, for example, via jury nullification. Formal systems of morality tend to be rather like fire -- a good servant, but a fearsome master.
 
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Well, you just put several zillion lawyers and judges out of business.

Which may or may not be a good thing, but I suspect that the current Moral Philosophy that the legal profession espouses -- and yes, it's explicitly based upon axioms and reason -- is better than the free-for-all anarchy that would replace it.

The real problem is that any rationally-based system of morality will of necessity be as complicated as the world it attempts to describe. There are also axioms and reason in biology, but no one seriously expects to be able to reduce everything we know about biology to a few pages of first principles. There are axioms and reason in psychology and linguistics as well --- but the human system is so complex that the axioms and reason must themselves be complex.

And one of the big things that all of these systems recognize as a fundamental axiom is that circumstances alter cases -- things that are generally true are not always true.

Ask any biologist if birds fly and he'll say "yes." It's one of the characteristics. But, of course, there are a few flightless birds.

Ask any psychologist if people have short-term memory, and he'll say "yes." But, of couse, there are a few pathological cases, like Korsikoff's psychosis.

Ask any linguist if the subject comes before the verb in English. Then recite the last verse of The Boxer to him.

It's perfectly reasonable for me to believe that something should be a general law, but that it shoudn't be applied in a specific instance. It's also perfectly reasonable for me to believe that something might be common, but shouldn't be a general law.

I suppose Wudang should speak for him/herself, but wasn't that the point? We can have general moral laws but that these general moral laws cannot explain every aspect of our moral lives because of the complexity of human beings and the human condition? I think we have two very good moral systems -- utilitarianism and deontology. I apply one system in some situations and the other in other situations. I guess one question should be, why? Is there a deeper system that determines when one is correct in a particular type of situation? What would that look like?

Sorry, just musing a bit.
 
A more general critique than simply of "utilitarian" morality. I happy to be pretty happy with utilitarianism as a framework, actually -- but I recognize that there are a number of well-known traps into which a strict utilitarian can fall (handwaves vaguely at the literature). I can therefore accept that the general axioms of utilitarianism are true, while not agreeing that a strict application of the axioms will result in a "right" decision, even if it's provably "moral" under an agreed-upon framework.

I'd tend to think that one faulty conclusion ruins the whole pihilosophy. Utilitarianism presupposes that using one group of people for the benefit of another group may be acceptable if the numbers of people and degree of benefit are high enough. A Kantian view could say that is never allowable, even if, for example, a submarine were sinking and the lives of some people had to be lost to sealed, watertight bulkheads, to save everyone elese.

I tend to think that self-consciously building moral rubrics for all situations is a fool's errand. Morality is partly hard wired into our brains as a very adapative trait for social animals to have. Altruism and reciporicty don't need logical foundations anymore than our sex drive does. Any moral system is inevitably going to have flaws because our own hardwired moral imperatives themselves are often at cross purposes.
 
I'd tend to think that one faulty conclusion ruins the whole pihilosophy.

I don't know why you would. Does one faulty decision ruin the entire legal system? Does one faulty car ruin the whole assembly line? Does one typo ruin the entire book?

The purpose of "morality" is to provide people with a guidance for making decisions -- we can argue about the ultimate purpose of those decisions, whether to bring one into closer harmony with God, or to achieve Nirvana, to provide for a congenial working environment for the rest of society, or to perpetuate our genes, it doesn't really matter. And these decisions are independent of each other; my decision not to wear chinchilla fur (which I make on a moral basis) does not impact your decision to eat or not to eat a ham sandwich. If it so happens that you make the wrong decision about your sandwich -- well, that makes you wrong, and perhaps you may even be punished for it (if your decision, for example, were to eat it without paying the deli for it) -- but it doesn't adjust my clothing.

But one of the things that we can do is look at areas where people have made the wrong decision, and try to adjust our set of rules to help make sure that it doesn't happen again.
 
I don't know why you would. Does one faulty decision ruin the entire legal system? Does one faulty car ruin the whole assembly line? Does one typo ruin the entire book?

One fault calls the entire system into question.

The purpose of "morality" is to provide people with a guidance for making decisions -- we can argue about the ultimate purpose of those decisions, whether to bring one into closer harmony with God, or to achieve Nirvana, to provide for a congenial working environment for the rest of society, or to perpetuate our genes, it doesn't really matter. And these decisions are independent of each other; my decision not to wear chinchilla fur (which I make on a moral basis) does not impact your decision to eat or not to eat a ham sandwich. If it so happens that you make the wrong decision about your sandwich -- well, that makes you wrong, and perhaps you may even be punished for it (if your decision, for example, were to eat it without paying the deli for it) -- but it doesn't adjust my clothing.

But one of the things that we can do is look at areas where people have made the wrong decision, and try to adjust our set of rules to help make sure that it doesn't happen again.

Moral guidelines, are in my opinion, superfluous. People do not generally spend hours contemplating the works of scores of well respected pihlosophers when making a moral judgement, they consider things and then choose to act, and the nuerological mechanisms behind that contemplation don't appear to be meaningfully influenced by moral philosphies.

Conspicuously Christian countries have divorce rates at least as high as secular countries, so clearly Christian moral guidelines are irrelevant to moral decisions about marriage. The same holds true of unwanted pregnancies. The height of the Elightenment coincided with the peak of the slave trade, meaning that liberty was not for all. Civil rights were expanded to non-whites during the middle of the last century not because of a moral awakening, but because of grassroots political power. Moral guidelines don't seem to have any statistically significant influence on human behavior.
 
I don't know why you would. Does one faulty decision ruin the entire legal system? Does one faulty car ruin the whole assembly line? Does one typo ruin the entire book?

Not the same thing. One faulty decision in the legal system is generally an individual's mistake. If however the system itself is faulty to its core so as to produce such mistakes systematically, then, yes, I think it means the system is screwed.
 
No, although that's certainly true as well.

Part of the problem with any sort of systematic morality is that people will disagree with the underlying axioms, whether those axioms are written into law or not. You can easily defined a system of axioms for moral behavior, and demonstrate that under those axiioms, some particular action is "moral" (and use that system of axioms as a basis to argue for a change in our existing legal structure).

But that doesn't mean that your "moral" action is in fact "right."

Oh, sorry for the conclusion leap.
 
Not the same thing. One faulty decision in the legal system is generally an individual's mistake. If however the system itself is faulty to its core so as to produce such mistakes systematically, then, yes, I think it means the system is screwed.

Well, this is wrong at several levels. FIrst, one faulty decision in the legal system may be the result of an individual mistake, but it may also be the result of a badly-written law. The legal system is actually pretty good at handling invidual mistakes (via appeals, generally), but much worse at dealing with bad law. Here's an example -- evidently adultery has been inadvertantly defined as "first degree sexual conduct" in Michigan and is punishable by life in prison. That's the way the law has been written ("we are curtailed by the language of the statute from reaching any other conclusion.) -- someone chose a bad axiom. In this case, more or less all that the courts could do is point it out and wait for it to be fixed.

However and more seriously, that doesn't mean that the system is "screwed," as you put it. It means that there's one bad law on the books, but Michigan is still handling (reasonably) other problems of social justice and policy such as rape, murder, burglary, and so forth. Are you going to tell me that this particular stupid law taints all police procedure and as a result, any arrest for murder in the state of Michigan is inherently biased, unfair, and immoral?

Of course not. Does this fault "call the entire system into question"? Of course not. The bathwater-to-baby ratio is way out of line with reality here, I'm afraid.....
 
Of course not. Does this fault "call the entire system into question"? Of course not. The bathwater-to-baby ratio is way out of line with reality here, I'm afraid.....

I'll thank you not to put words in my mouth. Questioning the system, in the precisely the way you described, is the only way to be sure that the individual occurence of error is isolated and/or random, and not systematic. "Questioning" a system does not equate to throwing it out entirely.
 
Well, this is wrong at several levels. FIrst, one faulty decision in the legal system may be the result of an individual mistake, but it may also be the result of a badly-written law. The legal system is actually pretty good at handling invidual mistakes (via appeals, generally), but much worse at dealing with bad law. Here's an example -- evidently adultery has been inadvertantly defined as "first degree sexual conduct" in Michigan and is punishable by life in prison. That's the way the law has been written ("we are curtailed by the language of the statute from reaching any other conclusion.) -- someone chose a bad axiom. In this case, more or less all that the courts could do is point it out and wait for it to be fixed.

However and more seriously, that doesn't mean that the system is "screwed," as you put it. It means that there's one bad law on the books, but Michigan is still handling (reasonably) other problems of social justice and policy such as rape, murder, burglary, and so forth. Are you going to tell me that this particular stupid law taints all police procedure and as a result, any arrest for murder in the state of Michigan is inherently biased, unfair, and immoral?

Of course not. Does this fault "call the entire system into question"? Of course not. The bathwater-to-baby ratio is way out of line with reality here, I'm afraid.....

Right, but the analogy was to utilitarianism, which consists, essentially, of one maxim. If one maxim produces mistakes in a particular situation then there is a big flaw at the center.

If we have one bad law it does mean that the system has flaws because it can make mistakes. That means that, in an ultimate sense, the system is flawed (what I meant by screwed) because it can make those mistakes. The issue with morality is that we attempt to find a single all-encompassing rubric that will answer all moral decisions in all situations. When it shows a flaw, it means that this supposedly perfect system is not perfect. Just as we all recognize that the legal system is not perfect because it arises from the art of the possible.

I did not mean that the entire legal system must be dismantled because of one wrong law. That would be silly.

I think this means that utilitarianism has its place, but it cannot be The Answer in morality. That, I thought, was Wudang's original point.
 
Right, but the analogy was to utilitarianism, which consists, essentially, of one maxim. If one maxim produces mistakes in a particular situation then there is a big flaw at the center.

Again, no, for several reasons. As ID pointed out, utilitarianism also hinges on the axiom that we can accurately quantify harm or benefit in order to do the comparisons appropriately. As a simple example, I can derive Kantian deontologism within the utilitarian framework, by simply postulating a metric where human life is of literally infinite value. Most practicing utilitarians would reject this derivation, not because they object to utilitarianism, but because they disagree with that value assessment.

So when a particular instantiation of utilitarianism fails to achieve the "right" decision, is that the fault of the framework itself, or of the instantiation? (This is really Quine's epistemological paradox, framed in an ethical way.) I can always claim that utilitarianism itself is fine, but that we haven't yet found the right way to measure harm -- and the second half of that statement is clearly true. In a similar vein, a Marxist could argue that "pure" Marxism is fine, but that Lenin, Stalin and (independently) Mao introduced the flaws that led to the abuses of the Soviet system, and frankly, that's hard to argue against, because the data just aren't there.

If we have one bad law it does mean that the system has flaws because it can make mistakes.

No more so than the fact that a computer delivers wrong answers when I give it wrong data means that the computer is flawed.


The issue with morality is that we attempt to find a single all-encompassing rubric that will answer all moral decisions in all situations. When it shows a flaw, it means that this supposedly perfect system is not perfect.

But I don't think any moralist has seriously proposed a complete "all-encompassing rubric that will answer all moral decisions in all situations"; they tend to propose rubric frameworks (such as utilitarianism).
 

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