Consciousness: What is 'Awareness?'

[Piggy]

What is important is the idea that the nexus of associations in the limbic and hippocampal systems is available at a subconscious level (as well as at a conscious level); and that these associations constitute the ground on which meaning can be built. There is certainly some work on subconscious semantic priming to suggest that some level of what we call awareness seems to occur at these levels.

Sorry, but I don't think this makes sense.

The first part does, but that last sentence throws it into a cocked hat.

I think the best way to picture this is to think about a vertically integrated factory, which builds everything from raw materials on up.

In this factory, no one at any level has any information about what goes on at any other level. They have their raw materials, their instructions about what to do, and their directions about where to send the finished product.

So in the brain, at the molecular level, there are just the raw laws of physics and chemistry, and it's impossible to tell whether anything you're looking at is involved in this or that upper-level process.

At the neuronal level, all neurons of the same type act the same.

At the next higher level, things get interesting. Now you're talking about organizations of neurons that form various functional areas of the brain. But experience and consciousness are entirely invisible (transparent) at this level.

Dial out even farther, and you can start seeing how information (which is invisible at the neuronal level) is routed and processed.

The big question at the moment is whether or not consciousness involves still another type of physical process over and above the neurology.

But in any case, once you get below the actual machinations of consciousness itself, "awareness" disappears.

 

[Piggy]

Now, one of the issues that I raised on the first page and wish to raise again, because I am not sure that everyone can get on the same page about definitions is this: does it really make sense to use the word 'awareness' for subconscious processing?

Ok, so now I'm going to turn around and directly contradict myself.

But without apology.

Because it all depends on which meaning of that word you're using.

For instance, some interesting experiments have shown that we do remember and act on information that we were never consciously aware of, and that we can even learn without conscious attention or awareness.

So clearly, the non-conscious (I discourage the use of the term "subconscious") processes of our brains are, in some sense "aware" of the environment, in much the same way that a computer or machine can be.

So I don't see "aware" as being very useful here, unless we distinguish between being "aware" as in getting information, on the one hand, and being "aware" as in having a conscious experience, on the other.

Which, of course, begs the question.

 

[Piggy]

Perception and some type of attention and intentionality seem to occur at subconscious levels. But can we say that there is any sense of meaning or understanding that occurs at that level?

This is precisely why I'm trying to get you to abandon these terms and concepts.

You can't get there from here.

As long as you insist on using these phrases and ideas, you will chase your tail forever.

"Meaning" is a very high-level thing. Below that, there are just ad hoc webs of associations, and meaning utterly vanishes.

 

[Piggy]

I'll raise the issue of blindsight again, since it is often used in these discussions. It is true that we can feature-detect without being aware of doing so in the absence of information directly reaching the occipital cortex, but does the type of feature detection in blindsight amount to anything more -- such as understanding the stimulus at some level?

You have to step back and ask, what's the point of such a question?

What does the phrase "understanding the stimulus at some level" mean?

You're just tying yourself up in Shelob's webs unnecessarily.

What you're doing is conflating a linguistic question with a biological question, which cannot give you a satisfactory answer to either.

 

[Piggy]

I just made a thread on the science and mathematics forum that explains my model of consciousness. If you are interested in learning or discussing actual science please take a look.

Particularly you, Piggy, since you seem to want to know more details than usually gets discussed in the R&P forum.

A link would help.

Much apreech.

 

[rocketdodger]

A link would help.

Much apreech.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=163441

I anticipate some great discussion about actual science. Should be a nice break from this crud over here.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Ok, so now I'm going to turn around and directly contradict myself.

But without apology.

Because it all depends on which meaning of that word you're using.

For instance, some interesting experiments have shown that we do remember and act on information that we were never consciously aware of, and that we can even learn without conscious attention or awareness.

So clearly, the non-conscious (I discourage the use of the term "subconscious") processes of our brains are, in some sense "aware" of the environment, in much the same way that a computer or machine can be.

So I don't see "aware" as being very useful here, unless we distinguish between being "aware" as in getting information, on the one hand, and being "aware" as in having a conscious experience, on the other.

Which, of course, begs the question.

But this is the whole point of the thread: what is awareness?

If we start by saying that awareness is what happens when we become aware of subconscious information processing, and consciousness is awareness, but awareness happens unconsciously, then where have we gotten?

I'm not pushing one program at the expense of others. I am simply asking the question -- what is awareness? -- and offering one way of analyzing what we mean by that word.

So, it seems to me that we use this word in so many different ways that it will only get us in trouble if we try to define it (which is one of the subtexts that I have made explicit more than once in this thread), or there is a deeper meaning of the word that I think we are all missing (highly doubtful), or we need to speak in terms either of awareness of awareness or levels of awareness (when it comes to conscious experience).

Regardless, it still leaves us with: what is awareness?

As mentioned repeatedly, there is a sense in which we use the word "awareness" to refer to some types of subconscious information processing. If that is the case, then awareness is not what happens when subconscious information becomes conscious.

I am playing the philosopher's game of examining the word, because ultimately that is what philosopher's do and how they argue. I do not pretend for a second that this will answer the question of 'what is consciousness?' since some of your comments lead me to believe that is what you think I am after with this exercise.

Philosophy does not answer questions. It asks them. Science answers questions.

The real issue, I fear, is: do we even know how to ask the right questions? If we are stuck in a word salad unable to piece out what we mean by the words we are using, we need either to look at the questions differently or use words differently.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, we're dancing all around it, aren't we?

Okay, another approach, via intentionality.

Let's say one prerequisite for 'awareness' is something, at some level, to be aware of. Consciousness could be thought of as the integration of discrete sense and memory inputs to generate "a big picture" output, a sort of personal 'map': an unlabeled map of where you are and how you feel. Awareness is the interrogation of this personal map: "here I am, and here's how I feel about it... so how do I make the best of it?" It constantly scans the temporary map, affixing labels where helpful, for features that answer that question, that improve one's situation, that change the 'inner' map of the 'outer' world for the better.

If that makes sense at all, I think awareness as "the interrogation of the map of consciousness" might be a workable definition, or starting-point at least. Broad enough to encompass problem-solving, pattern-matching, status-monitoring and the rest; narrow enough to establish it as a directed process within consciousness, for further discussion. (probably leaves out the simple organisms like paramecia discussed earlier though; hmm...)

Anyway, another mighty cut: I must be on about strike seven by now; hard to get ahold of that darn awareness pitch, y' know (without knocking your head clean off).

So, awareness is (I'm going to put this in different words) 'looking at consciousness'? I'm pretty sure I know what you mean, but I'm not sure I would want to use the phrase 'map of consciousness'.

Isn't this really just saying 'awareness of awareness' though? If we define the 'map of consciousness' as 'lower order awareness' it seems to me that we are back at awareness of awareness for consciousness. Which is fine, though I think it might make even more sense to speak of different levels of awareness. Or jettison the word altogether since it seems to refer to so many things that equivocation is the rule of the day.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You have to step back and ask, what's the point of such a question?

What does the phrase "understanding the stimulus at some level" mean?

You're just tying yourself up in Shelob's webs unnecessarily.

What you're doing is conflating a linguistic question with a biological question, which cannot give you a satisfactory answer to either.

Yes, in a sense; but I mentioned a little more of what I meant earlier in the thread.

If you ask yourself the question "what is meaning?" or "what is understanding?" and do not stop at a linguistic analysis but allow yourself to look into the neuronal level where it must arise, then what ultimately do these words mean?

It seems to me -- and please correct me if you think I am wrong -- that they refer, in some sense, to that nexus of emotion, motivation, and prior memory that provide a context for 'making sense' of new information.

When we say that we know what a cup is (what it means), does that imply that we simply know the word, or that we know the word and the concept because we have a multitude of prior experiences with cups, some with emotional content, etc.?

Part of what I am trying to get at are the subconscious strata that provide the basis for 'meaning' and 'experience' -- some of which is involved in the way we use the word 'qualia'.

 

[Piggy]

But this is the whole point of the thread: what is awareness?

If we start by saying that awareness is what happens when we become aware of subconscious information processing, and consciousness is awareness, but awareness happens unconsciously, then where have we gotten?

But that doesn't make sense either.

We never become consciously aware of subconscious information processing. Those processes remain non-conscious.

In fact, we're not actually consciously aware of the processes that generate conscious awareness, either.

Consciousness is what those processes do. The effect is this show that seems to be our environment but more accurately is us.

Conscious awareness is something the body does. Unfortunately, it's a noun, but it's not a thing, it's an event. Should be a verb form, like shivering or hicupping.

Aware-ing.

But yes, on another level we are in a very real sense aware of lots of things that we're not conscious of.

Perhaps, then, we could define awareness as something like "having information you can use about what's around you and what's going on around you, or within your body".

Then we get the conscious/non-conscious distinction out of it. One may be consciously aware of things, and/or non-consciously aware of them.

 

[Piggy]

Yes, in a sense; but I mentioned a little more of what I meant earlier in the thread.

If you ask yourself the question "what is meaning?" or "what is understanding?" and do not stop at a linguistic analysis but allow yourself to look into the neuronal level where it must arise, then what ultimately do these words mean?

It seems to me -- and please correct me if you think I am wrong -- that they refer, in some sense, to that nexus of emotion, motivation, and prior memory that provide a context for 'making sense' of new information.

When we say that we know what a cup is (what it means), does that imply that we simply know the word, or that we know the word and the concept because we have a multitude of prior experiences with cups, some with emotional content, etc.?

Part of what I am trying to get at are the subconscious strata that provide the basis for 'meaning' and 'experience' -- some of which is involved in the way we use the word 'qualia'.

I'm starting to catch your drift a bit better.

My take on language is different from yours, tho, since in my field(s) the meaning of words is like the value of a dollar -- it's whatever two or more people agree that it is, plus it has an entirely idiosyncratic value (for intance, I hate to pay more than $10 for a shirt because I don't think a shirt should cost more than $10, and that guides my behavior, but it's totally off-market; similarly, we all have entirely personal reactions to words and our own idiolect of meanings).

As for the example of the cup, knowing what a cup is and knowing "what a cup means"... well, I simply don't see how the latter makes sense.

A cup is not a symbol, so it doesn't have a meaning.

I know what a cup is if I know what it's used for and can distinguish it from things that aren't cups.

The word "cup" has a meaning, of course.

And I suppose in some situations a cup could have a meaning. For instance, if I agree with my coworkers that I will put my coffee cup on the edge of my desk when I don't want to be interrupted at my work, then if someone's coming back to my desk to ask me something, they see the cup, they know it means "Do not disturb".

So perhaps we should tease out what happens when we see a cup, on the one hand, and when we hear or read the word cup, on the other?

But if you're talking about what might be called the "concept" of a cup, then I think we're back to the cluster of associations that we learn through experience.

That's what I'd say an abstract (not explicit) concept is: a cluster of associations.

(An explicit concept is a semantic definition.)

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

But that doesn't make sense either.

We never become consciously aware of subconscious information processing. Those processes remain non-conscious.

In fact, we're not actually consciously aware of the processes that generate conscious awareness, either.

Consciousness is what those processes do. The effect is this show that seems to be our environment but more accurately is us.

Conscious awareness is something the body does. Unfortunately, it's a noun, but it's not a thing, it's an event. Should be a verb form, like shivering or hicupping.

Aware-ing.

But yes, on another level we are in a very real sense aware of lots of things that we're not conscious of.

Perhaps, then, we could define awareness as something like "having information you can use about what's around you and what's going on around you, or within your body".

Then we get the conscious/non-conscious distinction out of it. One may be consciously aware of things, and/or non-consciously aware of them.

Yep, been using the verb argument for years.

So, what I'm after is -- let's take that sentence "having information you can use about what's what's around you and what's going on around you or within your body" and piece out what is behind it or what that all means.

So, the having information bit seems to imply that perception is important to the process -- that's how we get information ultimately (though, of course, we can generate some of it internally through memory, imagination, etc.). To speak of having that information implies that we focus on it as opposed to all the other information out there in the world. "Information" seems to imply not just bare data but data that is processed to some degree -- I am using "understand" or "mean" in a very broad way. Rocketdodger speaks of the same thing from what I gather but uses a much better word "reasoning" though that word is also covered in all sorts of verbal baggage.

We also have information about something -- intentionality.

All of these processes will undoubtedly be 'caused by' neural processes -- some want to just say correlated with, and I don't have any real problem with that because neither word is really correct. But those neural correlations are further down the line of analysis. I'm not sure we are all ready for that -- at least as far as awareness or consciousness is concerned. What we know is that there is a certain type of neural change that occurs when people become consciously aware of some percept. But that doesn't help all that much. I think it's great that we have moved beyond no helpful data to where we are now, but I think we need to nail down what's going on better so that we can move beyond the preliminary info we have.

So, let me be a little more explicit why I am doing this. There are plenty of folks who want to argue that awareness is not definable -- that consciousness or awareness are fundamental properties of the universe like matter and energy and space-time. I don't agree with that argument. I think we can show with words that it is wrong, and I think that by doing this we can hopefully arrive at better questions that can be answered scientifically.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm starting to catch your drift a bit better.

My take on language is different from yours, tho, since in my field(s) the meaning of words is like the value of a dollar -- it's whatever two or more people agree that it is, plus it has an entirely idiosyncratic value (for intance, I hate to pay more than $10 for a shirt because I don't think a shirt should cost more than $10, and that guides my behavior, but it's totally off-market; similarly, we all have entirely personal reactions to words and our own idiolect of meanings).

As for the example of the cup, knowing what a cup is and knowing "what a cup means"... well, I simply don't see how the latter makes sense.

A cup is not a symbol, so it doesn't have a meaning.

I know what a cup is if I know what it's used for and can distinguish it from things that aren't cups.

The word "cup" has a meaning, of course.

And I suppose in some situations a cup could have a meaning. For instance, if I agree with my coworkers that I will put my coffee cup on the edge of my desk when I don't want to be interrupted at my work, then if someone's coming back to my desk to ask me something, they see the cup, they know it means "Do not disturb".

So perhaps we should tease out what happens when we see a cup, on the one hand, and when we hear or read the word cup, on the other?

But if you're talking about what might be called the "concept" of a cup, then I think we're back to the cluster of associations that we learn through experience.

That's what I'd say an abstract (not explicit) concept is: a cluster of associations.

(An explicit concept is a semantic definition.)

I don't think we have a different concept of language, only that we may be using different words in somewhat similar ways to describe the same thing with different assumptions.

Your later statements -- that the abstract concept of 'cup' consists in the cluster of associations is precisely what I'm getting at. If we speak in terms of 'concept of cup' we are talking about some sense of 'meaning' or understanding what a cup "is". We do this at a subconscious level probably, though it is sometimes difficult to piece out if this level of analysis occurs subconsciously or somehow constitutes what we mean by conscious awareness.

One of the problems in discussing this issue is that we use terms such as "declarative memory" to refer to what occurs through the hippocampus, and this seems to refer to memory for 'language stuff' even though that is not really what is meant. Declarative memory is meant to contrast with procedural memory, or memory of how to do stuff (like throw a baseball), and emotional memory, or memory of the emotional impact of an experience.

As you well know we have separate memory systems for all of these activities -- frontal-cerebellar loops for procedural memory; the limbic system/amygdala for emotional memory (especially memory of fear when it comes to the amygdala), and what has been called declarative memory involving the hippocampus (which is really a memory system for a certain type of abstract concepts that we use in language as far as I can tell).

 

[yy2bggggs]

As for the example of the cup, knowing what a cup is and knowing "what a cup means"... well, I simply don't see how the latter makes sense.

A cup is not a symbol, so it doesn't have a meaning.

I know what a cup is if I know what it's used for and can distinguish it from things that aren't cups.

That's what it means to be a cup. A cup is something you can use to drink out of. It's impossible to know what a cup is used for, and to know how to distinguish a cup from other cups, without having an intension of cup. Having a word for it is simply a label for that intension, and isn't part of the meaning per se--rather, it's just a label for the meaning.

The word "cup" has a meaning, of course.

Yes. The word "cup" (sign) binds to the concept of cup (intension).

And I suppose in some situations a cup could have a meaning. For instance, if I agree with my coworkers that I will put my coffee cup on the edge of my desk when I don't want to be interrupted at my work, then if someone's coming back to my desk to ask me something, they see the cup, they know it means "Do not disturb".

That's just turning an extension into a sign for another intension.

So perhaps we should tease out what happens when we see a cup, on the one hand, and when we hear or read the word cup, on the other?

When you see a cup, you identify it as a token and it has an intension. When you hear or read the word cup, you associate that with an intension as well.

But if you're talking about what might be called the "concept" of a cup, then I think we're back to the cluster of associations that we learn through experience.

The concept is an intension. Sign, intension, and extension are all related to meaning.

So in summary, the meaning of the word cup (sign) is the conventional associations (in context) that comprise the concept of cup (intension).

ETA:

The same cup can be turned into a sign in a different way... if I, in practice, with full intent to be able to do this, put all of my dirty dishes in the dishwasher, and immediately unload the dishwasher when done, then by finding a cup in the dishwasher, I know it's dirty. And by finding it on the cupboard I know it's clean.

That's analogous to your leaving your cup on the edge of your desk to show you don't want to be disturbed... only in this example, it only communicates to myself. Meaning doesn't have to involve two people. Just one would do. You just need to associate a sign with an intension.

 

[Piggy]

Yep, been using the verb argument for years.

So, what I'm after is -- let's take that sentence "having information you can use about what's what's around you and what's going on around you or within your body" and piece out what is behind it or what that all means.

So, the having information bit seems to imply that perception is important to the process -- that's how we get information ultimately (though, of course, we can generate some of it internally through memory, imagination, etc.). To speak of having that information implies that we focus on it as opposed to all the other information out there in the world. "Information" seems to imply not just bare data but data that is processed to some degree -- I am using "understand" or "mean" in a very broad way. Rocketdodger speaks of the same thing from what I gather but uses a much better word "reasoning" though that word is also covered in all sorts of verbal baggage.

Well, let's slow down a little bit.

Perception and proprioception are necessary, of course.

The information which the brain is dealing with can either come from perception -- that is, activity in the outside world (light, heat, sound waves, chemicals, etc.) causing responses in receptors somewhere (eyes, ears, skin, nose, tongue) -- or proprioception -- that is, signals from within the body being relayed to the brain (e.g. pain) or generated from within the brain itself (e.g. tinnitus, hallucinations).

But I don't think it's correct to say that "we focus on it". That's dicey language there which, I'm pretty sure, is going to make us stumble.

But certainly, if we define awareness as "having information we can use", then we do have to examine this process of triage that occurs as all the data is sorted and some of the data is used in higher-order processing.

Let's go back to the example of you and I talking in a noisy room. A good bit of the incoming data from per-/proprio-ception is simply junked. It's not important enough to save to memory or to use in any further conscious or non-conscious processing. We don't have enough processing power for it all, so it's just allowed to dead-end with no record.

That's your level-3 stuff, just kicked out the door.

Level-2 stuff is used non-consciously (and here I'm drawing a level 2/3 distinction rather arbitrarily, tho not entirely). We can act on it, and sometimes do, but it doesn't impinge on what we're consciously aware of, which is the conversation, the taste of a drink being sipped, that pain from a sore muscle, etc. So, for instance, the weight and balance of the glass I'm holding while not paying attention to it.

Level-3 stuff is used consciously. For whatever reason, the brain decides that it's the kind of thing that needs to be dealt with by the modules that handle conscious experience.

I get engrossed in conversation, there's condensation on the glass, my hands are a bit weak from weekend gardening, the glass begins to slip from my grasp. Suddenly, the weight and balance of the glass and the level of pressure I'm using against it and the texture of the surface are now information that need to be available to Level-2 and Level-3 modules. The former so that I can stop it from falling to the floor before having to think about it, and the latter so that I can put the event "something falling out of my hand" into the larger context of what's going on because that kind of event tends to be important.

So what's happening is not so much that "we focus on it", but rather that the demons doing the triage move the information in and out of focus, so to speak.

One of my favorite examples comes from auto racing, following up with a driver who took evasive action to avoid hitting wrecked cars before he could see them.

Initially, he had no idea why he did what he did. But later, looking at the tape from his driver-POV camera, he caught the cue which alerted him to what he needed to do, even though he was never aware of what that cue had been.

As he approached the curve, his vision picked up an unusual pattern. The crowd was not looking up the track and cheering. Rather, it was looking down the track and standing still. This cue signaled "Something's wrong around that curve", but his brain didn't bother to send any information about that cue to Level-3.

All he got was a "gut feeling" that something was very wrong, and he slowed and moved off track seemingly "automatically".

So he was, in a very real sense, "aware" of what the crowd was doing -- he used the information to avoid a wreck -- but he was not consciously aware of it because his brain decided that he needed all his conscious processing space to concentrate on driving and did not need to bother with information about the crowd.

A study published just last month showed that we can learn by associating rewards with subliminal events that we never have any conscious awareness of. So we're using that information, but we don't conciously know that we're doing so.

 

[Piggy]

When you see a cup, you identify it as a token and it has an intension.

Can you explode that point a little bit? What precisely do you mean by "token" in this case?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Can you explode that point a little bit? What precisely do you mean by "token" in this case?

Well, to review, a token is a particular entity, as opposed to a type, which is a class of entities. So the concept of a cup in general--the idea that it's a type of thing we can drink out of, for example--is a type. But when I actually need to apply this to drink, I need to select a particular object; I need to, arbitrarily, pick up that cup and use it to drink out of--that's the token.

So what I precisely mean here is that we actually formulate not only the general idea that cups are things we can drink out of, but the applied, pragmatic idea that this means that this particular thing, being a cup, can be used when I want to drink.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, let's slow down a little bit.

Perception and proprioception are necessary, of course.

The information which the brain is dealing with can either come from perception -- that is, activity in the outside world (light, heat, sound waves, chemicals, etc.) causing responses in receptors somewhere (eyes, ears, skin, nose, tongue) -- or proprioception -- that is, signals from within the body being relayed to the brain (e.g. pain) or generated from within the brain itself (e.g. tinnitus, hallucinations).

I talk about this latter -- there is a technical point to discuss.

But I don't think it's correct to say that "we focus on it". That's dicey language there which, I'm pretty sure, is going to make us stumble.

Yes, absolutely correct. I have a tendency to fall back into dualistic language all the time since I was brought up on it. You are quite correct that such language is very dangerous and liable to misinterpretation. There is no "I" or "we" in this process, only an ongoing process.

But certainly, if we define awareness as "having information we can use", then we do have to examine this process of triage that occurs as all the data is sorted and some of the data is used in higher-order processing.

Let's go back to the example of you and I talking in a noisy room. A good bit of the incoming data from per-/proprio-ception is simply junked. It's not important enough to save to memory or to use in any further conscious or non-conscious processing. We don't have enough processing power for it all, so it's just allowed to dead-end with no record.

That's your level-3 stuff, just kicked out the door.

Level-2 stuff is used non-consciously (and here I'm drawing a level 2/3 distinction rather arbitrarily, tho not entirely). We can act on it, and sometimes do, but it doesn't impinge on what we're consciously aware of, which is the conversation, the taste of a drink being sipped, that pain from a sore muscle, etc. So, for instance, the weight and balance of the glass I'm holding while not paying attention to it.

Level-3 stuff is used consciously. For whatever reason, the brain decides that it's the kind of thing that needs to be dealt with by the modules that handle conscious experience.

I get engrossed in conversation, there's condensation on the glass, my hands are a bit weak from weekend gardening, the glass begins to slip from my grasp. Suddenly, the weight and balance of the glass and the level of pressure I'm using against it and the texture of the surface are now information that need to be available to Level-2 and Level-3 modules. The former so that I can stop it from falling to the floor before having to think about it, and the latter so that I can put the event "something falling out of my hand" into the larger context of what's going on because that kind of event tends to be important.

So what's happening is not so much that "we focus on it", but rather that the demons doing the triage move the information in and out of focus, so to speak.

One of my favorite examples comes from auto racing, following up with a driver who took evasive action to avoid hitting wrecked cars before he could see them.

Initially, he had no idea why he did what he did. But later, looking at the tape from his driver-POV camera, he caught the cue which alerted him to what he needed to do, even though he was never aware of what that cue had been.

As he approached the curve, his vision picked up an unusual pattern. The crowd was not looking up the track and cheering. Rather, it was looking down the track and standing still. This cue signaled "Something's wrong around that curve", but his brain didn't bother to send any information about that cue to Level-3.

All he got was a "gut feeling" that something was very wrong, and he slowed and moved off track seemingly "automatically".

So he was, in a very real sense, "aware" of what the crowd was doing -- he used the information to avoid a wreck -- but he was not consciously aware of it because his brain decided that he needed all his conscious processing space to concentrate on driving and did not need to bother with information about the crowd.

A study published just last month showed that we can learn by associating rewards with subliminal events that we never have any conscious awareness of. So we're using that information, but we don't conciously know that we're doing so.

Yes, I'm fine with all of that -- I'm sure you meant to say level one with your first example for anyone following at home. I understand what you meant, though.

This, again, is one of the serious issues with defining this word. It is not the same thing as consciousness if we are going to continue using in this way in this context.

Back to the technical issue with the first point. Proprioception is a particular form of sensation having to do with limb position. I think there may be a different word you might want to use in it's place?

Tinnitus is an internally generated type of special sensory sensation -- part of audition. Pain is just one type of somatosensation (there are two separate systems and there are potentially five different pathways for pain alone). Hallucinations are an entirely different issue. They are simply internally generated.

There is an entirely different type of internal sensation that involves baroreceptors, enteric receptors, etc.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, to review, a token is a particular entity, as opposed to a type, which is a class of entities. So the concept of a cup in general--the idea that it's a type of thing we can drink out of, for example--is a type. But when I actually need to apply this to drink, I need to select a particular object; I need to, arbitrarily, pick up that cup and use it to drink out of--that's the token.

So what I precisely mean here is that we actually formulate not only the general idea that cups are things we can drink out of, but the applied, pragmatic idea that this means that this particular thing, being a cup, can be used when I want to drink.

It's even better than that as far as evidence is concerned because we know the relevant brain areas involved.

I'm sure you all know about prosopagnosia, which is a particular instance of deficits in determining particular types from a set of tokens. Folks with damage to bilateral inferior temporal lobes can determine that they are looking at a face but cannot determine which face they might be looking at. The deficit extends often to other instances of not being able to determine members of a certain class while still being able to determine the class itself. This example concerns the concept of a particular face and not simply its name.

Another example that Damasio has described involves a man with a lacunar stroke in his inferior temporal lobe who lost the ability to name power tools. He could describe their use, so he retained the concept of a power tool, but he lost the ability to name his power tools. He could still name other tools that did not involve electricity.

 

[blobru]

So, awareness is (I'm going to put this in different words) 'looking at consciousness'? I'm pretty sure I know what you mean, but I'm not sure I would want to use the phrase 'map of consciousness'.

Isn't this really just saying 'awareness of awareness' though? If we define the 'map of consciousness' as 'lower order awareness' it seems to me that we are back at awareness of awareness for consciousness. Which is fine, though I think it might make even more sense to speak of different levels of awareness. Or jettison the word altogether since it seems to refer to so many things that equivocation is the rule of the day.

"Hmm... possibly" to all of the above. I'm responding to what I took to be your call for an 'operational' definition of awareness, one that we can work with; avoiding the versed vice of calling "awareness" consciousness and vice versa. I'm having all sorts of fun trying to identify, distinguish, and label the various phenomenological states that may comprise "consciousness" (which I think should be the category term for all 'experience' [another problematic term] and the potential for experience), without doing too much damage to ordinary language usage. To that end, I think "awareness" is better spoken of as discrete phen. events within consciousness: consciousness as the global 'map' -- the working sense we have of "where we are" in every sense of that phrase, the dread dasein, or a sort of "big picture" theory if you prefer early Wittgenstein to early Heidegger (see blobru. see blobru satisfy his pseudo-intellectual name-dropping quota for the week) -- and awareness as the subject's navigation thereof. Consciousness, the integrator; awareness, the discriminator. One problem I foresee is that it's also natural sometimes to speak of stimuli and responses even at the single-cell level as "awareness" of environment, and it's not clear to me that cells have experience that rises to the prerequisite level of consciousness in the way I've defined it (of course, under some definitions, rheostats are conscious, so it really is a name-game); maybe we shouldn't fret too much, though, so long as we're always mindful of our signal choices and animal ignorance.

Hmm... as usual, I appear to have written a lot and not said a ****ing thing. Oh well, one of these days...

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=163441

I anticipate some great discussion about actual science. Should be a nice break from this crud over here.

Hey, I resemble that remark!