Consciousness: The Fun Part. :)

[Cynic]

I do think it's more complicated than that-- for one thing, the mechanism of these drugs is really not known. Even the prescribing info for the amphetamines has to say that, and they've been used for over seventy years. The serotonin hypothesis of depression was thoroughly debunked over thirty years ago; all we really know is that it's how the SSRI's work, but not why they work. An article was posted on www.cnn.com today about new research into the effects of PTSD on children's brains (the hypothalamus is consistently smaller). This isn't news at all, but previously, the work's been done only on adults. Nobody knows exactly what this means, but the findings are very consistent.

Ultimately, we really don't know how all of these pieces of inforamtion might relate to the question of whether consciousness resides only in the brain. But it's a question that can't be answered, and a lot of others can. I am officially an ignostic about the entire thing. (Cool new word!)

Hey, that is a cool new word. I was reading an interview with Henry Markram recently. He heads the Blue Brain project, which is working toward building computer-based brain simulations, based on the idea that if we want to understand brains, but real brains are hard study, why not build one and tinker with that? In the interview he was giving some updates on the project, which has been ongoing for a few years now. At the moment he's got a fully simulated neocortical column of a two-week-old rat, built out of 16,000 processors standing in for 1,000 neurons each. One very interesting thing so far from all that is that the thing produces gamma oscillations all by itself -- it's not programmed.

So many mind diseases manifest themselves as disruptions in such patterns, it'll be great to have a tool like this with which to study systematic changes introduced by drugs, things that can't really be figured out with imaging technolgies currently available. I bring it up, not just because it relates to the question of what, exactly, drugs like SSRIs do, but because it represents a relatively near-future test of the question of what is required for consciousness. Dr. Markram thinks a full-scale human brain could be simulated in ten years (given nigh-unlimited funds). Appling my usual conversion for such statements, that means in 40 to 50 years, we might know the answer to this -- which is still long before the philosophers will have come to any testable conclusions.

To quote him: "It's significant that we didn't specifically try to model the phenomenon in the brain. All we have to do is pay attention to the fact that we are building it correctly, and these phenomenon emerge. ... As we've taken steps closer to the biology, the circuit has started to display more and more of the actual biologogical phenomena that we find in experiments, with more and more precision and accuracy and elegance."

Only time will tell, of course, but this is possibly evidence that input from some phantom "extra-material source" isn't required to get what we observe, and thus perhaps isn't required to make the observation.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hi AMM

So basically, you think the problem isn't so much science, per se, but the philosophical approach of current science, right?

No. That would imply some sort of failing on the part of science which I am not suggesting. The problem isn't science but the fact that it just doesn't happen to be the right tool for tackling this particular problem - not on its own anyway.

According to the dictionary definition of science it's the systematic acquisition and organization of knowledge. In other words, science deals with acquiring facts about the world and understanding how those facts relate to one another. It isn't about subjective evaluation or the pursuit of spiritual/moral truth but getting down to objective facts.

I think I can understand your misgivings about whether consciousness is an appropriate subject matter for science because consciousness is inherently subjective. Even so, I still think science can still be useful to gain objective knowledge -about- the subjective since it is undeniably a facet of the world. After all, we're here talking about it

I am not objecting to people using science to gather whatever information it is possible to gather which is relevant to this discussion. What I am objecting to is the making of metaphysical assumptions on scientific grounds, simply in order to be able to claim that consciousness is more amenable to scientific study than it actually is.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

(Bolding mine.)

First off, I'm sorry I invoked intelligent design. In a setting like this, that's almost tantamount to Godwin-ing the thread and I should have known better.

The essence of my problem with your stance is this:

What is consciousness?

You don't know the answer to that anymore than anyone else does, but here you are declaring that sticking strictly with physics, we don't have it.

I am not sure I would agree that I don't know the answer anymore than anyone else does. I'd say I don't have access to any scientific evidence that other people do not have and that I cannot answer questions about consciousness to a scientific standard. I spent twenty years trying to understand consciousness from a scientific viewpoint and got nowhere. Then my philosophical views changed and I ended up approaching the whole question from a completely different perspective and I think this did get me somewhere. A complete answer? Maybe not, but enough of an answer to convince me that it was impossible even to frame the question scientifically. The problem isn't even the definition/concept of consciousness - it is the definition/concept of matter or "external material reality" which is at the root of the problem. When somebody says "let's assume consciousness arises from the brain" then not only do we not really know what "consciousness" is supposed to mean in this question, we don't even know what "brain" means! The reasons for this only become clear when you have spent a considerable amount of time trying to understand the work of people like Kant and Wittgenstein.

At the risk of Godwin-ing the thread again, isn't this a lot like saying science can't prove the existance of a god when the problem isn't with science, but the fact that said god has no coherent definition to prove?

Some similarity but not exactly the same. Science can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God, partly because there is often a lack of a coherent definition and partly because even where a coherent definition has been provided then such a God would, by definition, be undetectable by science.

I submit that in the absence of any genuine understanding of what consciousness is, but knowing that it is very clearly tied to the biological structure known as the brain, what we ought to be doing is reverse engineering the brain and what we end up with is what consciousness is.

I have no problems with people trying to reverse engineer the brain, all I am objecting to is any initial assumption that no other component is going to be required as part of a complete explanation. I am objecting to this because I believe that some other component is necessarily required.

This is how science is done. If you want to know how circulation works, you look at the circulatory system, see what's doing, how everything ties together and how it's regulated. Even something as "simple" as the circulatory system isn't entirely understood yet in vivo. Why, with an organ that is easily much, much more complicated and vastly more difficult to study would we toss up our hands and declare that it can't be the whole story?

Because this problem involves metaphysics and this cannot be avoided.

I'm not at all clear how quantum mechanics helps, but naturally I wouldn't rule it out as part of the mechanisms. Even chlorphil operates on quantum principles, because efficient is efficient, and evolution is blind to process. That doesn't make leaves conscious.

QM is relevant to this debate not because I have any scientific reason to associate QM and consciousness but because QM is one of the few (possibly the only) other areas where science runs into a similar metaphysical obstacle. In fact it is exactly the same metaphysical obstacle: the relationship between the physical world as directly experienced (that of the phenomenalists) and the presumed external physical world of the materialists and external realists. For 99.9% of the areas of enquiry that science tries to tackle, this distinction is totally irrelevant. If you are going to study the mechanics of flying objects or the biochemistry of DNA replication then it makes no difference whether you consider that you are studying phenomenal objects/DNA or external/noumenal objects/DNA. However, when we are talking about QM or consciousness then this usually-irrelevant distinction suddenly takes centre stage. Schroedinger's cat causes us problems because it switches between categories when the box is opened. Consciousness causes us problems because, unlike any object science might try to study, it doesn't appear as a component part in either of these concepts of material reality. In the phenomenal version it becomes the whole thing - consciousness IS the whole of phenomenal reality. And in the noumenal version, which science couldn't theoretically have access to anyway, it doesn't exist at all - it doesn't even exist conceptually, which is why I can say it doesn't exist at the same time as claiming science has no access to the reality I am saying it doesn't exist in.

But the bottom line is, unless we first know exactly what consciousness is and what all of its requirements are, declaring that the physical brain can't be the sole source of it is premature. I agree that problems can and should be solved from many different assumptions and starting points, which is why I began defending Maia's proposal for this thread in the first place. But in terms of which approach is more justified, I cannot help but see this one, assuming the brain is all that is required, is clearly the most parsimonious.

Parsimony can only help you distinguish between options which definately exist.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Hi AMM

So basically, you think the problem isn't so much science, per se, but the philosophical approach of current science, right?

No. That would imply some sort of failing on the part of science which I am not suggesting. The problem isn't science but the fact that it just doesn't happen to be the right tool for tackling this particular problem - not on its own anyway.

So, in other words, its just one of multiple tools that would be needed in order to fully answer the HPC. Am I following right?

I am not objecting to people using science to gather whatever information it is possible to gather which is relevant to this discussion. What I am objecting to is the making of metaphysical assumptions on scientific grounds, simply in order to be able to claim that consciousness is more amenable to scientific study than it actually is.

So what you're really objecting to is people trying to put the issue of consciousness into a conceptual box that it doesn't doesn't really fit?

Just out of curiosity:

You mentioned that consciousness, by its very nature, is not very amenable to scientific study alone. To the best of your current understanding, what other approaches do you feel would be of help on this topic, and what kind of answers would be most appropriate in resolving the HPC, IYO?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So, in other words, its just one of multiple tools that would be needed in order to fully answer the HPC. Am I following right?

Not quite. Science isn't any use at all if the specific problem you are trying to solve is the Hard Problem. Understanding consciousness also involves trying to solve other problems, some of which can be tackled by science.

So what you're really objecting to is people trying to put the issue of consciousness into a conceptual box that it doesn't doesn't really fit?

Yes. There are genuine reasons why consciousness can't just be treated like any normal scientific problem and I am objecting to people trying to comparing it to, and treating it like, these other problems. You have to address the reasons why it doesn't fit in that normal scientific box rather than trying to ram it into the box even though it doesn't really fit.

Just out of curiosity:

You mentioned that consciousness, by its very nature, is not very amenable to scientific study alone. To the best of your current understanding, what other approaches do you feel would be of help on this topic, and what kind of answers would be most appropriate in resolving the HPC, IYO?

Two obvious ones: firstly various philosophical disciplines including ontology and epistemology and also Wittgensteinian analysis of the way we are being led astray by sloppy language use, secondly some form of "inner reflection" of the sort provided by eastern mysticism and by western phenomenology i.e. subjective observation of your own conscious experiences. I don't think the Hard Problem can be "solved" in isolation. The solution can only become clear as part of a co-ordinated attempt to solve several other problems at the same time, including the relationship between physics and mathematics and questions like "why is there something instead of nothing?" or "why/how does anything exist?"

 

[Maia]

Hi AMM






I am not objecting to people using science to gather whatever information it is possible to gather which is relevant to this discussion. What I am objecting to is the making of metaphysical assumptions on scientific grounds, simply in order to be able to claim that consciousness is more amenable to scientific study than it actually is.

I don't really care for this either, and I agree that I do think it's what someone like Dennett is doing at least part of the time. I'm not so sure that it's "simply in order to be able to claim that consciousness is more amenable to scientific study than it actually is." I tend to think it's got a lot to do with his not being willing to go outside of his field of study in order to understand more about consciousness (e.g., to take evidence from neuropsychiatry into consideration.)

But there's something else to think about... say, in 50 years, we model a human brain. Let's just assume that this is possible (yes, yes, I know. We're assuming it for the sake of argument. Don't make me come over there!) There it is, a fully functional human brain. But the next question has to be, what would it be? A human being? A citizen? A sentient creature? Would it have rights? What sort of ethical obligations would we have towards it? Would it be somehow equipped with means of communication? What would it say? What would it want? What would it need? What would it express? How would it interact with its environment? In order to model a human brain in any meaningful way, all of these questions would need to be answered, not just once, but continuously. This brain would represent a complex, changing life form, capable of taking action on its own, of making decisions, of expressing preferences, of feeling emotions, because if it didn't, then it could not actually represent human consciousness, and we couldn't claim that it did. In that case, we would have created another human being.

And that means that God would be....


US.

 

[AkuManiMani]

But there's something else to think about... say, in 50 years, we model a human brain. Let's just assume that this is possible (yes, yes, I know. We're assuming it for the sake of argument. Don't make me come over there!) There it is, a fully functional human brain. But the next question has to be, what would it be? A human being? A citizen? A sentient creature? Would it have rights? What sort of ethical obligations would we have towards it? Would it be somehow equipped with means of communication? What would it say? What would it want? What would it need? What would it express? How would it interact with its environment? In order to model a human brain in any meaningful way, all of these questions would need to be answered, not just once, but continuously. This brain would represent a complex, changing life form, capable of taking action on its own, of making decisions, of expressing preferences, of feeling emotions, because if it didn't, then it could not actually represent human consciousness, and we couldn't claim that it did.

I agree. I think the Turing test isn't the really pertinent test of consciousness. If we ever really create a conscious entity, then ethical questions come into play. Then the question isn't "is this machine as smart as a human?" but, "would destroying this machine be murder or property damage?"

In that case, we would have created another human being.

And that means that God would be....


US.

Meh...thats a rather disturbing prospect. I don't think our species is ready for the responsibility

 

[Robin]

Two obvious ones: firstly various philosophical disciplines including ontology and epistemology and also Wittgensteinian analysis of the way we are being led astray by sloppy language use,

If we use a Wittgensteinian analysis we will only be led further astray by even sloppier language

Nothing else in philosophy is an improvement. Two dimensional semantics can be ripped to shreds in seconds.

There is no perfect language and we should probably just accept the fact and move on.

Really the only way we can avoid being led astray is to stick to what works - falsifiable testable hypotheses.

What can't be done by that method, probably can't be done.

...secondly some form of "inner reflection" of the sort provided by eastern mysticism and by western phenomenology i.e. subjective observation of your own conscious experiences.

But we are subjectively observing our own consciousness all the time.

What does adding a bit of pseudo-Eastern window dressing add to it?

I don't think the Hard Problem can be "solved" in isolation.

This first thing that we would need to do would be to state what that problem is.

First step to solving any problem. Hasn't been done so far.

The solution can only become clear as part of a co-ordinated attempt to solve several other problems at the same time, including the relationship between physics and mathematics and questions like "why is there something instead of nothing?" or "why/how does anything exist?"

By asking non-questions like that you will only get non-answers.

 

[!Kaggen]

If we use a Wittgensteinian analysis we will only be led further astray by even sloppier language

Nothing else in philosophy is an improvement. Two dimensional semantics can be ripped to shreds in seconds.

There is no perfect language and we should probably just accept the fact and move on.

Really the only way we can avoid being led astray is to stick to what works - falsifiable testable hypotheses.

What can't be done by that method, probably can't be done.

Robin you certainly display a form of pessimistic dualism.
You argue very well that reducing consciousness to algorithms is incoherent and that analytic philosophy has put the nail in the coffin of perfecting language.
What makes you think that a "falsifiable testable hypothesis" avoids these pitfalls, especially when it comes to something like consciousness?

But we are subjectively observing our own consciousness all the time.

What does adding a bit of pseudo-Eastern window dressing add to it?

This first thing that we would need to do would be to state what that problem is.

First step to solving any problem. Hasn't been done so far.

Certainly appealing to eastern mysticism is not helpful for a "falsifiable testable hypothesis", but I do not read UCE as saying that.
The subjective observation of our own consciousness is the bread and butter of eastern mysticism.
We could learn a lot from these techniques to refine our own subjective observations.
The problem arises when we want to observe and act in the world and relate our subjective experiences to these experiences.
Here eastern mysticism has nothing to say except that the objective world is an illusion.
When we are dealing with the objective world, our subjective experience of consciousness needs to find a correlative foothold.
This I believe is where phenomenology becomes useful especially the phenomenology developed by Goethe which he used to study colour phenomena . The main result of Goethe's phenomenological work with colour has to do with describing the relationship between subjective experience and objective reality.
IMO very useful starting point for defining the problem of consciousness.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But there's something else to think about... say, in 50 years, we model a human brain. Let's just assume that this is possible (yes, yes, I know. We're assuming it for the sake of argument. Don't make me come over there!) There it is, a fully functional human brain. But the next question has to be, what would it be? A human being? A citizen? A sentient creature? Would it have rights? What sort of ethical obligations would we have towards it? Would it be somehow equipped with means of communication? What would it say? What would it want? What would it need? What would it express? How would it interact with its environment? In order to model a human brain in any meaningful way, all of these questions would need to be answered, not just once, but continuously. This brain would represent a complex, changing life form, capable of taking action on its own, of making decisions, of expressing preferences, of feeling emotions, because if it didn't, then it could not actually represent human consciousness, and we couldn't claim that it did. In that case, we would have created another human being.

I'd agree that there are perilous ethical aspects to any attempt to artificially recreate consciousness, either in organic or inorganic form.

 

[westprog]

we would have created another human being.

And that means that God would be....


US.

Some people have already created other human beings. Possibly even some people reading this topic.

 

[westprog]

I certainly don't have a problem with that. But one thing I don't understand is why nobody seems to have done this from the POV of neural/psychiatric pathology. That's one way where we could really use the scientific method to try to learn more about consciousness, because there's a subject group and control group. As DD notes, you can start out with a subject who has trouble with something like frontal lobe executive control and then measure the changes after medication. And I do have to wonder if neglecting this POV in the philosophical debate has something to do with the fact that it doesn't start out with the premise that we have to choose between materialism and dualism.

I certainly agree that the way to study the brain is to look at brains.

 

[Robin]

Robin you certainly display a form of pessimistic dualism.
You argue very well that reducing consciousness to algorithms is incoherent and that analytic philosophy has put the nail in the coffin of perfecting language.

I don't think there is anything pessimistic about this - only realistic. If we avoid tilting at windmills we might start to get somewhere.

What makes you think that a "falsifiable testable hypothesis" avoids these pitfalls, especially when it comes to something like consciousness?

Experience has shown that. Even with consciousness, the things we do understand we understand with the scientific method.

Certainly appealing to eastern mysticism is not helpful for a "falsifiable testable hypothesis", but I do not read UCE as saying that.

No, I am not saying that he is.

The subjective observation of our own consciousness is the bread and butter of eastern mysticism.

Indeed I was on hindsight much too harsh. The Eastern mystic tradition is, apart from being beautiful and poetic, the source of some useful methods - such as meditation.

We could learn a lot from these techniques to refine our own subjective observations.

Indeed - I take it back.

But again, I feel that it will eventually have to be tied up with something testable.

After all there are serious clinical trials of the use of meditation in the treatment of some types of depression.

 

[Robin]

Some people have already created other human beings. Possibly even some people reading this topic.

I was thinking just that.

We are all related to at least one person who has created a human being.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, but I've heard that those people who are certain they know are happier than those of us who are certain we don't.

So goes one version of the story. The other claims that by the time you get to the bottom of the rabbit hole, you have realised that it is the pursuit of happiness which is at the root of a lot of unhappiness. Acceptance instead of happiness or unhappiness.

 

[Limbo]

This should be fun. A 2006 documentary, Mystical Brain, which...

"...reveals the exploratory work of a team from the University of Montreal who seek to understand the states of grace experienced by mystics and those who meditate. Filmmaker Isabelle Raynauld offers up scientific research, which proposes that mystical ecstasy is a transformative experience and could to contribute to people's psychic and physical health, treat depression and speed up the healing process when combined with conventional medicine."

http://www.dailygrail.com/Mind-Mysteries/2009/12/Mystical-Brain

 

[quarky]

I find it odd how quickly the super-organism is dismissed; i.e., advanced ant colonies, as per consciousness or not.

Knee-jerk rejection of non-human consciousness strikes me as steeped in quasi-religious, 'crown-of-creation' anthropomorphic chauvinism, rather than science.

 

[Cynic]

I find it odd how quickly the super-organism is dismissed; i.e., advanced ant colonies, as per consciousness or not.

Knee-jerk rejection of non-human consciousness strikes me as steeped in quasi-religious, 'crown-of-creation' anthropomorphic chauvinism, rather than science.

How do you mean? I think it's probably just hard to fathom. Too many questions leading up to being able to even consider it. For instance, can we be sure individual ants aren't conscious? Or that human colonies don't represent their own super-organisms, comprised of members that are merely more flexible? In the absence of a coherent definition of consciousness, questions like this aren't so much dismissed, I think, as moot.

 

[quarky]

How do you mean? I think it's probably just hard to fathom. Too many questions leading up to being able to even consider it. For instance, can we be sure individual ants aren't conscious? Or that human colonies don't represent their own super-organisms, comprised of members that are merely more flexible? In the absence of a coherent definition of consciousness, questions like this aren't so much dismissed, I think, as moot.

Shamefully, I only read page one.
I wouldn't reject a human colony as a super organism, though it would need to be cooperative, with an active feed-back mechanism capable of problem solving with the intent of the survival of the organism.

Initially, it was dolphin pods that had me questioning our definitions, though later, I found that this too was loaded with my expectations and prejudices about brain size...i.e., a certain threshold of neurons was required.
Hence, slime molds didn't make the grade.

Now that some ant colonies have essentially 'teamed up' in a non-competitive way, it is clear that they have more neurons working together than I do.

I guess I'll have to read the whole thread if I want to argue the 'mootness'.

 

[westprog]

I was thinking just that.

We are all related to at least one person who has created a human being.

Using entirely physical means, they tell me.