Conditioned To Kill?

[gumboot]

I confess still to a degree of skepticism, not of phenomena itself (that is, the disinclination to kill) but rather it's extent.
One wonders, if it's as widespread amongst the various militaries of the world (and history), how we much were able to kill anyone at all....

It's certainly not hard and fast. Various factors affect how powerful the resistance is. The more factors come into play, the easier it is to temporarily overcome the resistance. The greater the effort needed to overcome the resistance, the greater the resulting psychological trauma. At least that's the theory.

We do have all those historical battles with casualties running in the many thousands (or hundreds of thousands), many killed in very intimate ways indeed. Just recently archaeologists in Europe unearthed a mass burial site from some ancient war or other, and all the remains bore the signs of close-up and personal combat. (smashed skulls being popular).

I think one of the key angles of the book is that this is a myth we've created for ourselves. The battles for which we have good information indicate that the majority of people weren't killing each other. Of course these battles only go back a short way.

But even in very old battles, military historians will tell you that the overwhelming majority of combat deaths (which actually made up a small part of deaths in historic armies) occurred once one side had routed.

Another thing I've been thinking is what influence class structures may have in dehumanisation processes that can help overcome the resistance.

If you look at medieval warfare, killing between knights was rare, but knights killing peasants or peasants killing knights was much more common.

If you look at english longbowmen, they were more removed from their enemies than their fellow soldiers, meaning they would have a lesser resistance. This might help explain their legendary lethality.

As we've seen Romans employed a great deal of psychological warfare tactics, and also employed forms of "field artillery" (onagers, ballistas, etc).

Grossman contends that our perception of the lethality of the ancient warrior is totally distorted by story telling etc, and basically false.

I am inclined to hover elsewhere.

A big difference between ancient cultures and the more modern ones which he provides conclusive data for, is the role of the soldier in that society.

It has been a very long time in the west since the warrior had supreme status. Basically the collapse of the feudal system saw to this.

I suspect that a population's attitude towards their soldiers has an even greater affect on a soldier's ability to overcome their resistance to killing than Grossman proposes. At the extreme end, you would have absolute martial societies such as the Spartans of Ancient Greece. Not only was being a soldier the absolute pinnacle of achievement in Spartan society, but killing on the battlefield was considered noble and worthy of great praise. They didn't just praise their soldiers as soldiers, they praised them as killers.

At the other extreme end you have modern liberal society where soldiers are certainly not universally liked, let alone respected, let alone especially praised, and even those that do respect soldiers passively demonstrate distaste for the soldier's primary duty (killing) by refusing to acknowledge or talk about it (let alone reaffirm it).

I mean, very few modern westerners from the WW2 allied nations would disrespect their WW2 veterans, and the majority would consider them heroes, but when was the last time you ever heard an adult praise a WW2 vet for killing lots of enemy?

I early on mentioned Chuck Yeager's "10 percent" comment about fighter pilots. If my hypothesis about the percentage of the populace having little disinclination to kill is correct, then that 10 percent (or whatever figure it might be...) would have to be effective all out of proportion of their numbers.

Well, again, there is some evidence to support this. If you consider, for example, that in black powder battlefields (where there's evidence very few men shot at each other) there's also accounts of men firing 400 rounds in a battle. If you consider that 40 rounds was a typical infantry issue, and a musket is fouled so bad it cannot fire after about that many rounds, you've got men firing ten times the maximum number of rounds it should be possible for them to fire. Where did they get those additional nine muskets and nine full loads of shot? From nine of their fellow soldiers.

-Gumboot

 

[gumboot]

Funnily I had this type of discussion once with a bunch of friends after a car accident (speeding + alcohol + inexperience = real bad combination) which killed a teenager of the local high school. The government paid for an additional staff of psychologists to allow all the kids to "consult" since they were considered "in shock" after the death of their comrade (yeah, they were so much in shock that the kid's best friend broke through my uncle's fence to retrieve the car's modified engine from the wreck ).

Hah, I've had several friends or fellow students killed or kill themselves throughout my life, and never once been offered counselling.

I have a theory that we have a major "victim" mentality in modern society, which is exceedingly harmful, especially to genuine victims. We're encouraged, after a traumatic event, to remain in the victim mindset. For some crimes - rape, for example - society constantly suggests that the victim should never really recover.

It also manifests itself in things like school shootings where everyone instantly tries to blame someone else, so they themselves can feel like a victim too.

Indeed you see it in things like the 9/11 attacks, when relatives of those killed claim the title "victim". I'm sorry. You're not a victim. The victims are the people who were shredded into pieces by an airliner. The victims were the ones who had limbs torn off, or were engulfed in flames.

Everyone seems to want to be a victim. And it's a big taboo to offer the tried and true "never mind, you'll get over it, just keep on living" piece of advice to a victim (genuine or otherwise).

We dwell on our tragedies, instead of letting them make us stronger.

Of course this is all just my own theory, without any study to back me up.

-Gumboot

 

[gumboot]

I wonder if the low firing rate in WWII had more to do with the nature of the warfare than anything else. There was a lot of artillery involved, and keeping your head down was a good survival tactic. The officers could make you move forward, but they couldn't make you keep your head up long enough to aim.

It just seems unlikely to me that most people in that situation just wouldn't fire, and it seems even less likely that the phenomenon would be across the board equally in the different armies.

It might do, but Marshall's study was very comprehensive. He interviewed thousands of soldiers from 400 different combat units, immediately after engagements. The results are specifically for non-firing rates while engaged in direct combat with enemy units.

It doesn't appear to be a survival thing, because many a time those not firing would carry out tasks that exposed them to greater danger than the shooters. Running messages, bringing ammunition, recovering wounded, etc.

It also seems almost impossible to think that when the Redcoats and the Rebels squared off, that those people weren't shooting their muskets, or were deliberately missing. I could be wrong, but it doesn't seem so.

Sure, it might seem that way, but there's truly a lot of evidence to support these notions.

Even simple logic shows that something funny was going on. Accuracy rates for units was very high, because of drilling levels. If a given unit should be able to kill at a rate of 500+ men a minute (as evidence indicates) and this unit is standing 30ft from an enemy unit of 1,000 men, the entire enemy unit should be wiped out in a matter of minutes.

Yet there are countless records of units like this firing at each other for hours. And I'm not exaggerating. There are accounts of units actually having to withdraw because it got dark and the day ended, and they were still shooting at each other! For hours and hours and hours on end.

Still, I think there is something to the study. I think there is a powerful aversion to killing, and I think violent video games or other forms of simulated combat might "help" overcome it. The more realistic, the better. On the other hand, I don't think all this simulated violence makes anyone want to kill, but if they have that inclination, it might wear down that last line of defense.

I'm with you, and I think Grossman is too. Video games don't make you want to kill. But it means if you do want to kill (and motivation for murder is an entire large topic of it's own) being conditioned means you can).

-Gumboot

 

[gumboot]

Well, mass-killings, who could pass the Holocaust itself? How does that fit into the scenario? Were all SS members involved psychopathic? Or had the de-humanisation process been so accepted that it was no different to killing cows?

Grossman's take on this is in his atrocity section.

Basically, the way he sees it is, committing atrocity gives the perpetrators considerable immediate benefit, thus its attraction. It's also a trap, however, as Grossman puts forwards that those who commit atrocity are doomed to continue committing atrocity.

Imagine a new recruit to an army unit that has a history of atrocity. They commit atrocity because it makes the soldiers feel superior to the enemy, and frankly it also scares the [rule8] out of them. This countryside of peasants is much easier to control now.

For reasons to be explained below, the new recruit is a direct threat to the sanity of his fellow men. As such, they're going to need him to partake in atrocity as soon as possible.

So the recruit is resistant to killing, but against that he has the massive force of his fellow soldiers and his superiors demanding that he commit atrocity. So he gives in (just as civilians in the Milgram Experiment gave in) and shoots a prisoner. A young girl, maybe.

Now he has killed someone. He has two choices at this point. He either keeps his previous moral compass, and is driven insane with guilt and self loathing, or he rationalises in his mind that the act of atrocity PROVES he is superior to his victim. What he did was just right and proper. Nothing wrong. He knows that, because all of his fellow atrocity-committing friends did it, and they can't all be wrong. Right?

Now the unit comes along to another village. He sees people just like his victim; eating, sleeping, farming. Their young children playing. A pair of lovers holding hands.

That won't do at all. All of this clearly shows his victim was human. His victim was just like him. Up comes the guilt. He has to kill all of these people too, and destroy their village. Because that proves they're inferior. That reinforces his desperate need to believe that his previous victim was not human, and was not like him.

So they destroy that village too.

And then they find another village. And then a town. And so it grows. Each time, in order to protect their own sanity, the atrocity-committing unit has to commit further atrocity. And as they kill again and again, their resistance to killing is slowly disabled - just like the soldier on the modern shooting range, except more effective. Soon they don't even care any more. They've lost all empathy towards humans outside their unit.

And then a new fresh recruit comes to the unit. Our soldier sees this recruit. Sees his moral purity. See's how the recruit recognises their prisoners as fellow humans. Well that won't do at all. Our soldier can't have a fellow soldier reminding him that he is totally morally bankrupt!

So the recruit is forced to kill a prisoner. Just like our first soldier was. And so the cycle continues.

-Gumboot

 

[Corsair 115]

Marshall's WW2 research focused on American soldiers, however by extrapolation one can conclude that all forces were about the same.

If Americans are shooting at a rate of about 20%, but enemy forces do not have the same resistance, enemy units of comparable size will be able to produce 5x the firepower.

Just to be clear about something, the research indicating poor firing rates only looked at combat infantry, correct? It didn't mix in support troops by mistake, did it? I ask because though a division might include in the area of 14,000 soldiers, only about 2,000 of those would be actual infantry expected to be shooting at the other side's infantry.

Also, what about more specialized units like airborne infantry? It'd be hard for paratroopers to do their mission if most of their guys are doing any shooting.

I early on mentioned Chuck Yeager's "10 percent" comment about fighter pilots.

Do you have the exact quote? From my understanding, if most fighter pilots didn't hit anything, it wasn't because they couldn't bring themselves to shoot, it was because actually hitting something in aerial combat was a very hard task to accomplish. It required both good piloting and good marksmanship, and only a small number of pilots excelled in these areas.

 

[Meadmaker]

Even simple logic shows that something funny was going on. Accuracy rates for units was very high, because of drilling levels.

I remember reading of a study that Frederick the Great did. I don't remember the details, but he lined up a company facing what might be termed the broadside of a barn at a range frequently found in combat of the day, had them fire at it, and counted the bullet holes. There weren't very many. He concluded that the weapons just weren't all that accurate. (I'll see if I can google and find a reference to the study. I read it long ago in the front column of a Strategy and Tactics magazine.)

 

[ImaginalDisc]

I remember reading of a study that Frederick the Great did. I don't remember the details, but he lined up a company facing what might be termed the broadside of a barn at a range frequently found in combat of the day, had them fire at it, and counted the bullet holes. There weren't very many. He concluded that the weapons just weren't all that accurate. (I'll see if I can google and find a reference to the study. I read it long ago in the front column of a Strategy and Tactics magazine.)

IIRC On Killing cites that study, and another contemporary Prussian study where hit rates against starw filled dummies representing an enemy legion were counted, and then compared to hit rates in the field. It was found that in tests, units had far, far higher hit rates than they did in the field. Lt. Col. Grossman attributes that to the inherent reluctance to fire directly at other humans, the limited influence officers and sergeants can have, and other causes.

That's from memory, however. I let someone borrow my copy two years ago.

 

[TX50]

I think this is a good topic, and I think Grossman is onto something. I hadn't realized that the military specifically developed techniques to deal with this very issue.

I do have a minor quibble.



In this case, I think there's an easier explanation. Speaking from some experience with martial arts training, slashing is a lot easier and requires less training than stabbing. You really have to practice to get in a good stab, and if you do it wrong, you are a lot more vulnerable.

The short swords used by the Romans are also perfectly adequately
balanced for cutting. Evidence from Roman iconography, literature and
archaeology unequivocably shows that it was thus used by the Romans
on the battlefield (the emphasis on thrusting derives from one line in
Vegetius, it is not mentioned anywhere else in Roman literature. Vegetius
also wrote at a time when the swords used in the Roman army were no
different from those of the "barbarians" they were fighting). I'd say
it's probably more realistic to think of swordsmen trained in the Roman
tradition as pragmatic opportunists, attacking in the most appropriate
manner, cutting or stabbing as the enemy presented openings.

That said, however, it's apparent even in ancient times that battles seldom
ended in sword duels; a close study of ancient battles suggests that the
majority of the fighting was done with missiles (arrows, javelins, stones,
sling-bullets) and the issue was often decided before swords briefly crossed.

 

[Bikewer]

I couldn't give you a specific source for Yeager's comment. I believe it was on one of those History channel shows that features dissections of various battles coupled with interview footage from survivor/participants.

To the best of my recollection, he said (paraphrasing of course) that in a given mission, only ten percent of fighter pilots would actively seek out and engage the enemy. There would also be a percentage who simply would not make it. It was "understood" that if one were not feeling up to snuff for one reason or another (like simply being worn out, or psychologically shaken), you could drop out of formation because your "engine was running rough" or some such thing. Nothing was said, at least if it didn't happen too often.

The majority of the fighter pilots (mind, this was late in the war) would simply carry on with protecting bomber formations and indulging in ground attacks.

Now, as I said, this was late in the war and in Europe air superiority was essentially won. Pilots often had to actively seek out the Luftwaffe, or even "bait" them into the air.
I wonder how the Brits comported themselves in entirely different circumstances during the Battle of Britian?
Or, even more to the point, the Luftwaffe pilots who were working on the ragged edge trying to defend the Fatherland? Many of these Luftwaffe aces had hundreds of kills to their credit, and the standard for "confirming" kills was tougher in the Luftwaffe.

 

[gumboot]

Just to be clear about something, the research indicating poor firing rates only looked at combat infantry, correct? It didn't mix in support troops by mistake, did it? I ask because though a division might include in the area of 14,000 soldiers, only about 2,000 of those would be actual infantry expected to be shooting at the other side's infantry.

Correct, this is specifically combat troops in units engaged directly against enemy units. From my understanding, part of the data gathering included two very straight forward questions:

1) Did you see the enemy?
2) Did you fire?

Even if your units was engaged in combat directly, if you personally couldn't see the enemy (as often happened in Vietnam, for example) you would not be included as a "non-firer"

Also, what about more specialized units like airborne infantry? It'd be hard for paratroopers to do their mission if most of their guys are doing any shooting.

I haven't read Men Against Fire so I'm not sure what specific units or operations were looked at. One thing that subsequent studies have found is that the 2% who don't appear to have a resistance to killing are heavily concentrated in special forces type units. This may also mean a heavier percentage in other specialist units such as paratroopers. Or it may not. Airbourne operations in WW2 were consistently catastrophes, with the German operation at Crete and Allied operations on D-day and at Arnhem being examples.

-Gumboot

 

[gumboot]

I remember reading of a study that Frederick the Great did. I don't remember the details, but he lined up a company facing what might be termed the broadside of a barn at a range frequently found in combat of the day, had them fire at it, and counted the bullet holes. There weren't very many. He concluded that the weapons just weren't all that accurate. (I'll see if I can google and find a reference to the study. I read it long ago in the front column of a Strategy and Tactics magazine.)

Prussian accuracy was based on shooting at a 100ft by 60ft target with a smooth bore musket:

25% hits at 225yds
40% hits at 150yds
60% hits at 75yds

Actual black powder engagements often took place at distances as close as 30 or even 15yds. Yet you had a hit rate of 1 or 2 rounds a minutes, or 1 hit every second volley (based on 4 volleys per minute, 2 kills per minute).

If you're talking a Regiment of 500 men, that's an accuracy rate of 0.1%.

-Gumboot

 

[Meadmaker]

It was probably this study that was summarized in that old S&T magazine.

On Target!




Although the old smoothbore musket dominated the battlefield for nearly 200 years, from the late 17th Century until well into the 19th, its accuracy was hardly something to brag about. As one contemporary officer put it, " . . . a soldier must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aimed at him." This can be seen in the results of a number of musketry firing tests that were conducted during the late 18th century.

In an English firing test conducted in 1779, "a battalion of excellent Norfolk militia" using the Brown Bess hit its targets about 20% of the time at 70 yards. In another test, a British "marksman" with a Brown Bess scored 100-percent hits firing at a one square foot target at 60 paces. His accuracy at 100 yards was only about 14%.

In 1790 the Prussian Army tested its 1782 musket. The results were not particularly more impressive. The target was an elaborate wood and canvas construction supposed to represent the front of an infantry company (32m by 1.8m). It actually offered roughly 42% more solid surface area than would have been occupied by the troops (30 sq. m rather than 52 sq. m). Moreover, the firing troops were performing under ideal conditions, with no one shooting back.



Range Hits

300m 20%

140 40%

70 70%



A later similar test, in which the target surface was actually painted with the figures of troops in ranks, suggested that about 25% of the rounds would entirely miss the men. Even rounds hitting the painted figures were not necessarily injurious, since many would strike hats, coat tails, and equipment. An analysis of combat statistics suggests that no more than 15% of the rounds fired seem to have hit anyone. And range was important to lethality: beyond 100 meters serious casualties were relatively few, at 50 meters the slaughter could be terrific. It was these basic facts that molded tactics

Yes, it seems that this was considerably better than found under real combat conditions. It seems to me still unlikely that the problem was an aversion to killing, but Grossman does seem to have studied the matter pretty thoroughly. If shooting at man-shaped dummies really changed the behavior of men in combat, it doesn't seem easy to find another explanation.

 

[Bikewer]

In studies of police combat marksmanship, (for as long as anyone kept records) it's been apparent that police officers in combat shooting incidents achieve about 25% accuracy. That is, one out of four shots hit the target. This has remained unchanged for the entire period during which records have been kept, despite the fact that for the last 20 years, there has been much more emphasis on training, and much improvement in the manner of training.

This has gone (rather as with the military) from stance-shooting at paper bullseye targets to shooting the "PPC" (Practical Pistol Course), to much more realistic training including "Hogan's Alley" type shooting-houses, video systems such at F.A.T.S. (an interactive video), and even one-on-one shooting at each other using a variety of "safe" ammo.
Despite the fact that all of these contemporary training methods are techniques that fall under the parameters discussed already, combat accuracy has not noticeably improved over the last 100 years or so.

The reason for this (or so goes current theory) is stress-related physiological effects on fine motor control. Most people, under the stress of combat, are simply unable to perform complex or well-controlled actions (like shooting) very well.
Many police departments put their officers through a training course called "Preparation For Armed Combat" which seeks to familiarize the officer with these physiological/psychological effects.

Interesting... We do note that in terms of police combat, there has been very little tendency for officers not to engage the opponent. In fact, rather more the other way...Everyone shooting at once. (much to the horror of police administrators and the public!)

Not perhaps relative to all this, but in my own experience spending many hours shooting at standard police silhouette targets (usually a gun-pointing thug with superimposed target grid), I'd say that rapidly one pays no attention whatever to the representation of a human on the target, but only to the point of impact of one's rounds. In other words, you concentrate on shooting, rather than what's being shot at. Does this tend to confirm this hypothesis of Grossman?
Finally, in line with my own hypothesis about a percentage of individuals having no disinclination to "engage", I'd note that in the history of police gunfighting, there have always been very "cool cats" who obviously do not suffer from combat-induced stress. These people tend to be very effective...

We'd note the case of Sgt. York as well, a very cool customer indeed. Shooting an entire squad of charging German infantry with a .45 automatic (seven rounds, seven down as I recall) is about as cool as it gets.

 

[gumboot]

In studies of police combat marksmanship, (for as long as anyone kept records) it's been apparent that police officers in combat shooting incidents achieve about 25% accuracy. That is, one out of four shots hit the target. This has remained unchanged for the entire period during which records have been kept, despite the fact that for the last 20 years, there has been much more emphasis on training, and much improvement in the manner of training.

This has gone (rather as with the military) from stance-shooting at paper bullseye targets to shooting the "PPC" (Practical Pistol Course), to much more realistic training including "Hogan's Alley" type shooting-houses, video systems such at F.A.T.S. (an interactive video), and even one-on-one shooting at each other using a variety of "safe" ammo.
Despite the fact that all of these contemporary training methods are techniques that fall under the parameters discussed already, combat accuracy has not noticeably improved over the last 100 years or so.

The reason for this (or so goes current theory) is stress-related physiological effects on fine motor control. Most people, under the stress of combat, are simply unable to perform complex or well-controlled actions (like shooting) very well.
Many police departments put their officers through a training course called "Preparation For Armed Combat" which seeks to familiarize the officer with these physiological/psychological effects.

Interesting... We do note that in terms of police combat, there has been very little tendency for officers not to engage the opponent. In fact, rather more the other way...Everyone shooting at once. (much to the horror of police administrators and the public!)

Not perhaps relative to all this, but in my own experience spending many hours shooting at standard police silhouette targets (usually a gun-pointing thug with superimposed target grid), I'd say that rapidly one pays no attention whatever to the representation of a human on the target, but only to the point of impact of one's rounds. In other words, you concentrate on shooting, rather than what's being shot at. Does this tend to confirm this hypothesis of Grossman?
Finally, in line with my own hypothesis about a percentage of individuals having no disinclination to "engage", I'd note that in the history of police gunfighting, there have always been very "cool cats" who obviously do not suffer from combat-induced stress. These people tend to be very effective...

We'd note the case of Sgt. York as well, a very cool customer indeed. Shooting an entire squad of charging German infantry with a .45 automatic (seven rounds, seven down as I recall) is about as cool as it gets.

Have you looked into the FBI's studies? They appear to directly refute your claims. They had major non-firer problems until they introduced "shoot or not shoot" training systems (much like the Time Crisis video game).

-Gumboot

 

[Bikewer]

I have not looked at the FBI studies, in fact, my own opinions are conditioned by being "in the biz" since 1968. During this period, I've been exposed to an almost constant dissection of police shooting incidents, which are constantly circulated by word of mouth, by training, and by formal reports (such as the FBI's own annual summary of police "killed in the line of duty" incidents.)

I wonder if the FBI's recruit base has (or had) anything to do with this? Police officers are most often taken from decidedly "middle class" populations. Though there has been a strong tendency to require college in more recent years, this has frankly been rather perfunctory, with an Associates degree in Criminal Justice Studies from a community college sufficing.

The FBI has long sought out individuals with advanced degrees, often in accounting and similar disciplines which are of use in combating white-collar crime. Not to be "classist", (I'm one of those middle-class lads myself, rather entirely self-educated) but I wonder if there's any correlation?

In fact, during my almost-40 years of police work, I can't recall a single incident amongst local departments where an officer was taken to task for failing to shoot when shooting was required. (believe me, word gets around!)

Of course, police shooting incidents are often much more more intimate than are military encounters. Frequently the officer is alone, or assisted by at best one other. Frequently the suspect is actively trying to attack the officer directly, wheras in military battles things tend to become more generalized.

 

[gumboot]

In fact, during my almost-40 years of police work, I can't recall a single incident amongst local departments where an officer was taken to task for failing to shoot when shooting was required. (believe me, word gets around!)

Of course, police shooting incidents are often much more more intimate than are military encounters. Frequently the officer is alone, or assisted by at best one other. Frequently the suspect is actively trying to attack the officer directly, wheras in military battles things tend to become more generalized.

Do you have any idea of what it was like before you joined? I only ask because apparently the FBI's problems were in the 1950's and during the 1960's they implemented their new training techniques which solved the problem.

Grossman focuses more on the area of military action so he doesn't really go into a lot of detail about these FBI studies.

-Gumboot

 

[Bikewer]

I haven't seen any formal statistics, but I can testify (since officers from that time period were my trainers) that there prevailed (at least locally, I assume generally) a rather "cowboy" attitude towards shooting.

Back then, (and when I started) it was legal to shoot at "fleeing felons", even if the fleeing individual posed no risk. A fellow running from the scene of a burglary might well be shot down, and a nice pat on the back for it as well!

That all changed about 1970 or so, when states generally decided that police could only use deadly force to protect themselves or others against same.

I agree that the military scenario is quite different than the typical police shooting encounter.

 

[Darth Rotor]

I wonder if the low firing rate in WWII had more to do with the nature of the warfare than anything else. There was a lot of artillery involved, and keeping your head down was a good survival tactic.

Since the days of the rifled musket in the US Civil War, and then smokeless powder, both of which gumboot seems to have overlooked in his discussion, the problem of the dispersed, "invisible" battlefield has created complex psychological problems for noncoms and officers to solve.

I will also point out that SLA Marshall did not do a particularly rigorous scientific experiment, but based most of his book, which I have read, on interviews and oral histories. Thus, his error band was rather large, but what he did uncover was a consistent training deficiency that the Army addressed in more than one way.

One was in how it trained small units, which method seems to have broken down (depends on who you read) in Viet Nam now and again as the replacement system, rather than a unit replacement system, came into place.

You will note that Grossman fails to dig into how the Wehrmacht trained its infantry. His Americo centric approach ought to raise an enormous flag to anyone tackling his book.

The last Army range I went to for qualification was in 2004, and the sillouhette/center of mass method was still the method used. This was not small unit qualification, but an individual task training. (Shot a 280, damnit, missed a couple.) What is not being discussed is the training beyond individual task training, AKA small unit tactics training at the JRTC, at small ranges on various bases, at the USMC MOUT training center, or the Fort Irwin National training center. When in the company of others, the practice of using your weapon, either in aimed fire or in providing supporting fire, is a habit pattern formed that is useful in subsequent combat. I think the psychologists call it pattern training, or patterning.

While MILES gunnery has its artificialities, it trains a simply ingrained process. When there is the noise and confusion of the battlefield to deal with, a well disciplined pattern of tasks and motions allows one to function without a great deal of direction. Since the Army spends quite a bit of time on small unit tactics, which is a matter of fire teams, squads, and platoons practicing fire and maneuver, and the synergy of being a member of a team and a contributor is reinforced again and again, this method has as much to do as does individual training in conditioning a soldier to shoot when shooting is needed.

Gumboot, on the Civil War: while artillery was indeed a mass killer in the Civil War, thanks to Napoleonic line tactics still being used, I think you under appreciate the effect and use of the rifled weapon, and the Meinie Ball. Yes, there were smoothbores in the hands of some troops, but there were a lot of rifles. My uncle still has his great grandfather's Rifle (rifled muzzle loader) over his fire place. It was used in the Civil War.

DR

 

[Hellbound]

DR has a good point, one I didn't consider until now.

During any small-unit movement courses, the standard is a staggered advance. One person (or team, or squad, depending on how big a unit you're talking about) moves forward while the other unit(s) provide covering fire. And typical covering fire is shooting off a round every 3 seconds or so...not with the intention of necessarily hitting anything, but just to keep the enemy under cover (and reduce their willingness to expose themselves to shoot).

The squad ranges focusing on firing from a fortified position were similar: each pair of firers shot at a 45 degree angle or so, one to left one to right, roughly parallel to the ground, and firing a shot every couple seconds. With a line of fortified positions, this creates a "cross-hatched" area of covering fire in the field in front of the fortifications. Again, though, the focus is not to hit a target, but to prevent the enemy from crossing that area (and over-running your position). Any hits are just extra icing on the cake.

A large portion of unit tactics is to accomplish two goals:
1. Deny the enemy access to an area.
2. Deny the enemy the chance for return fire.

Covering fire is the rule in small unit operations, aimed fire the exception. I wonder how this was controleld for or taken into account (if it was)?

 

[gumboot]

Since the days of the rifled musket in the US Civil War, and then smokeless powder, both of which gumboot seems to have overlooked in his discussion, the problem of the dispersed, "invisible" battlefield has created complex psychological problems for noncoms and officers to solve.

I will also point out that SLA Marshall did not do a particularly rigorous scientific experiment, but based most of his book, which I have read, on interviews and oral histories. Thus, his error band was rather large, but what he did uncover was a consistent training deficiency that the Army addressed in more than one way.

One was in how it trained small units, which method seems to have broken down (depends on who you read) in Viet Nam now and again as the replacement system, rather than a unit replacement system, came into place.

You will note that Grossman fails to dig into how the Wehrmacht trained its infantry. His Americo centric approach ought to raise an enormous flag to anyone tackling his book.

The last Army range I went to for qualification was in 2004, and the sillouhette/center of mass method was still the method used. This was not small unit qualification, but an individual task training. (Shot a 280, damnit, missed a couple.) What is not being discussed is the training beyond individual task training, AKA small unit tactics training at the JRTC, at small ranges on various bases, at the USMC MOUT training center, or the Fort Irwin National training center. When in the company of others, the practice of using your weapon, either in aimed fire or in providing supporting fire, is a habit pattern formed that is useful in subsequent combat. I think the psychologists call it pattern training, or patterning.

While MILES gunnery has its artificialities, it trains a simply ingrained process. When there is the noise and confusion of the battlefield to deal with, a well disciplined pattern of tasks and motions allows one to function without a great deal of direction. Since the Army spends quite a bit of time on small unit tactics, which is a matter of fire teams, squads, and platoons practicing fire and maneuver, and the synergy of being a member of a team and a contributor is reinforced again and again, this method has as much to do as does individual training in conditioning a soldier to shoot when shooting is needed.

Gumboot, on the Civil War: while artillery was indeed a mass killer in the Civil War, thanks to Napoleonic line tactics still being used, I think you under appreciate the effect and use of the rifled weapon, and the Meinie Ball. Yes, there were smoothbores in the hands of some troops, but there were a lot of rifles. My uncle still has his great grandfather's Rifle (rifled muzzle loader) over his fire place. It was used in the Civil War.

DR

Thanks for you post DR. I have one question. What's your point?

I mean that seriously. I don't understand what point you're trying to make here.

In regards to your comments on Marshall, what was deficient about his methodology? What is a better practical method of determining troop firing rates than after-action interviews with said troops?

If Marshall's study is incorrect, surely the same studied carried out on Vietnam War engagements (using the same methodology) would have produced similar results.

In regards to your Civil War comments, I really don't understand what your point is with the rifled musket remark. A rifled musket is much more accurate than a smooth bore musket. As such, this reinforces the theory that Civil War soldiers were not shooting at the enemy, rather than just shooting and missing.

Indeed, the military has implemented a host of new training methods to improve combat effectiveness of infantry squads. They implement new training techniques constantly. The examples cited by Grossman indicate quite convincingly that the resistance to killing can not be overcome by "technical drilling" in the methods of waging war. Only the very specific conditioning techniques mentioned seem to have an affect. This is not to say other drilling methods will not enhance other aspects of the combat unit's effectiveness.

In regards to the training of German units, if Marshall's findings are correct, and 80-85% of American combat soldiers were not engaging the enemy during combat, it must be assumed that either German soldiers fighting against them had similar non-firing rates, or German units produced five times as much fire as comparable American units.

I hope you can appreciate the significance of a unit having 5x the volume of fire that their enemy produces. There's plenty of evidence that German units did not produce 5x the volume of fire that American units produced. Therefore, either German soldiers also resisted firing their weapons, or Marshall's findings are totally wrong - in which case thousands of American combat soldiers and officers from hundreds of unconnected companies consistently lied about their behaviour in combat. That's quite a claim.

-Gumboot