Gumboot,
My question is simple, and I would consider it crucial to an examination of such a correlation. It is whether the training programs used by the U.S. military are, in and of themselves, responsible for decreasing 'natural' inhibitions to kill? Or if it is also necessary to have a strong authority structure in place? That is, "natural" inhibitions are replaced, in special situations (ie. in combat) with an alternate set of inhibitions that are based on what those in authority tell you to do?
The impression I get from the book is that disabling the safeguard is solely a result of the methods used to train soldiers to shoot, and that the authority structure does not in any way contribute to the disabling process.
Your question is very valid though, and it's the sort of "counter discussion" that I think the concept could benefit from. I aren't qualified to answer for Grossman, and nor would I want to, at best I can speculate on how my understanding of his book applies.
Such questioning can only either strengthen the theory, or identify crucial flaws and lead to an amended more robust theory (or even abandonment of the theory if the flaws are serious enough). Either way, it's a win.
At the end of this post, once I've finished my response, I'll attempt to address the specific question of authority's role in disabling the safeguard, and why I get the impression it doesn't have an important role.
If the former situation is true, then I'd consider you have valid grounds for correlation between military training and video games. But if the latter is true, then there would be no such correlation.
To play the role of Devil's Advocate, I'd argue that a combination of factors are necessary to overcome our 'natural' inhibitions. That would be 1) to be desensitized, to be in an environment where natural inhibitions are decreased through deliberate activities, and 2) to have an authority structure that replaces those inhibitions with a new set of 'rules' or 'standards'.
I see where you're going. My only real question is why you think it's necessary to replace natural inhibitions with a new set of "rules".
If you have the first situation but not the second, it will result in people who react with much less horror/disgust/condemnation of such actions, but whose own inhibitions against personally committing such acts remains the same; if you have the latter, you'll have a situation much like that in your OP, describing WW II soldiers, where they will attack when forced to, but will still have strong natural inhibitions against such actions.
Only when the two factors are combined are you able to effectively overcome those natural inhibitions.
I'll address this further on, but the book does seem to suggest otherwise. In brief, the resistance to killing is presented as related but separate to our reactions when others attempt to kill us, or we are exposed to others trying to kill a third party. The book also distinguishes between overcoming the resistance to killing in a specific circumstance, and permanently removing the resistance altogether.
Or, to take your own thesis and run with it, an effective means of determining this would be simply to study new U.S. military recruits, before and after being subjected to training. Divide them into groups who have actively played first-person shooter games, and those who have not. Then see if the former group has fewer inhibitions (or loses their inhibitions more quickly) than the latter group. If you could demonstrate that those who have played such games frequently have already had some of their inhibitions decreased, and thus require less desensitizing when they are trained in the military, you'd have a strong foundation for your hypothesis. If, on the other hand, there were no appreciable difference between the two groups, then it would be a pretty solid indication that your hypothesis is wrong, or incomplete.
The problem here is we're specifically talking about an inhibition against killing another human. You can't really test it except by having the test subjects kill people. This is somewhat problematic.
Now, if you'll bear with my I just want to address what I perceive as the book's take on authority.
The first thing is there's a key distinction between temporarily overcoming the resistance, and actually disabling it so it no longer exists.
The premise is that various circumstances can temporarily overcome the inhibition, but these are not trustworthy, they are not easily controllable, they are not efficient, and they result in severe trauma, thus rendering soldiers useless.
Conditioning, on the other hand, completely removes the inhibition all together. There is no need to attempt to overcome the inhibition or manufacture specific circumstances (obviously impossible in warfare), and the psychological repercussions are delayed - potentially by years, thus ensuring soldiers maintain a high level of effectiveness. If the soldiers in question are treated properly the psychological repercussions may never manifest themselves.
Soldiers in World War Two, like all soldiers before them, had not been conditioned to kill. Brigadier General S.L.A Marshall was the official US Army Historian for the Pacific Theatre in WW2, and later became the official historian for the European Theatre. In his research (from which he produced the controversial book
Men Against Fire), he found consistently that only 15 - 20% of infantry soldiers would fire their weapons at the enemy in an engagement. The rest did not flee or hide or panic - indeed they often undertook other much more dangerous tasks such as rescuing wounded or running messages. They simply would not fire.
Officers and NCO's could produce slightly better rates of fire but only when in very close proximity to soldiers - sometimes touching. As soon as they moved along the line to other soldiers, the troops they had just got firing would stop.
This is supported by the findings of the Milgram Experiment. Most people, when confronted with an authority figure in close proximity, would kill. Once the authority was removed from immediate proximity, most people would not kill.
Marshall's findings also indicate that
all combatants refused to fire, not just Americans. Had Japanese and German soldiers all been firing, the rate of fire produced by the enemy would have been five or six times what a comparable number of American soldiers could produce. History quite clearly demonstrates that is not the case.
These conclusions are supported by a range of data produced since then, including American Civil War studies, Medieval Warfare studies, and the historic records we have of Ancient battles.
In 1986 the British conducted a thorough analysis of over 100 historic 19th and 20th Century battles, including pulsed laser weapon recreations, to assess whether Marshall's findings were evident in previous battles. By comparing the test trials with historic casualty information they found that Marshall's observations were true of historic battles as well.
The information provided by F.A. Lord (author of the
Civil War Collector's Encyclopedia) on muskets recovered from Gettysburg after the battle again indicates the same thing.
After Marshall's findings, a comprehensive effort was made to improve shooting rates. Marshall concluded that a natural resistance to killing fellow humans existed, and that weapon drill and discipline obviously weren't enough to permanently overcome it. Thus, it had to be disabled.
Of course the most obvious methodology for training soldiers to kill is simply to make them actually kill. This is problematic for two key reasons - the first obviously being that it's not practical or acceptable to train our soldiers by having them kill things.
The second is that, although authority can temporarily overcome the resistance, and thus repeated instances of authority forcing a soldier to kill will over time disable the safeguard, each act of killing will result in severe psychological trauma - with the rate of trauma gradually decreasing as the act is repeated.
However, we do see this less "civilised" form of conditioning throughout history and in other societies. Gangs, terrorist groups, and other unsavoury armed factions routinely employ a conditioning technique where new recruits to the cause are forced to kill animals or even people. In some South American gangs new recruits are given a puppy to look after, and after a period of time they are physically made to shoot it.
Historically, the fighters were also the hunters, thus over the seasons their repeated successful kills in the hunt gradually overcame their resistance to killing.
Obviously these methods were not an option for the US Army after World War Two, but they did develop a solution.
The new training methodology was very simple:
1. Human-shaped targets
2. Human-like behaviour from targets (appearing and disappearing suddenly)
3. Instant reward - a successful kill results in the target lying down
4. High rates of repetition
By the Vietnam War, a study similar to Marshall's found that 95% of combatants would fire at the enemy. The training had worked.
The role of authority in weapon drill does not appear to have significantly changed, nor the basic nature of authority in the military as a whole.
This would suggest to me, that authority does not play a significant role in the disabling process.
What appears to be happening is the mind is being tricked. Essentially the soldier is repeatedly carrying out the act of killing another human, without actually killing another human.
This is where the parallel to computer games lies. A FPS computer game contains all of the four key elements listed above. A computer game player, just like a soldier on a shooting range, has no problem with shooting the targets because they know they are not people. The resistance is not in place. But in shooting the target both the gamer and the soldier are simulating the act of killing.
-Gumboot