On 16 April, 2013, the US Supreme Court dealt another blow to actions by groups for damages (
opinion here). As I have said repeatedly, I am no fan of class actions for damages, but what five members of the Court did here has me scratching my head.
Technically speaking, the lawsuit was not a class action, but was a "collective action" lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) on behalf of an employee and other "similarly situated" employees. The Supreme Court noted that some see considerable similarity to class actions, but that "Rule 23 actions [class actions] are fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA."
Basically, the employer decided NOT to pay employees for 30 minutes of their shifts, treating these deductions as meal breaks. The named plaintiff, Symczyk, actually worked and wanted to be paid for her work; so she filed the FLSA "collective action" lawsuit on behalf of herself and others. Her employer, in a shrewd move, offered to pay her off one hundred percent on her claim (about $7,500, which would be awarded as a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68), and thereby moot the entire case. Symczyk turned down the offer.
The lower court ruled that, even though Symczyk turned down the offer, as she was allowed by law to do, her claim was mooted, so there was no case or controversy, and the lawsuit was dismissed. Thus, she lost her case and got NO money even though she was in the right... and the whole "collective action" was killed as well! The company walked away scot-free.
In an opinion by Justice Thomas (part of a 5-4 majority), the Court recognized that this sort of technique maybe ought not to work with a class action, but in the case of a "collective action," it was perfectly okay. In a stunning display of technicality over substance, the Court "assumed, without deciding" that Symczyk's claim was indeed moot. From which it followed that the whole shootin' match was a dead issue.
In dissent, Justice Kagan chided the majority for not understanding something that ought to be pretty basic:
When a plaintiff rejects such an offer—however good the terms—her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court's ability to grant her relief. An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect. As every first-year law student learns, the recipient's rejection of an offer "leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made." ... Nothing in Rule 68 alters that basic principle; to the contrary, that rule specifies that "[a]n unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68(b). So assuming the case was live before—because the plaintiff had a stake and the court could grant relief—the litigation carries on, unmooted. (emphasis added)
Justice Kagan isn't kidding about the "first-year law student" stuff; this is pretty basic. Although the majority said that its ruling does not apply to class actions, it is a virtual certainty that this same tactic will be tried to head off a potential or certified class action. If, say, a thousand named plaintiffs sue a company on the grounds that the company cheated them (and tens of millions more in the class) out of a dollar each, could the defendant company kill the potential class action by offering to confess judgment to the named plaintiffs for $1000, thereby killing their claims and the claims of the putative class, even if the offer was refused? Justice Kagan seemed to suggest that such a tactic would not work, whether in a class action or in a "collective action":
So a friendly suggestion to the Third Circuit: Rethink your mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory. And a note to all other courts of appeals: Don’t try this at home.