*Phew*
This is a lot to take in. As you took the time to put forward a thoughtful response I'll read it thru and try to give some worthy feedback
Sorry that this is a bit rambling..................
Cognitive styles vary. This is not controversial nor should it seem strange. Some folks tend toward the concrete while others are malleable. Consequently, people express differing opinions. That a scientist in the past might have expressed a strong opinion based on his experiences and biases (many strong opinions prove to be religiously based on further examination and not ‘scientific’) should surprise no one and is, in fact, to be expected. That some of those opinions will prove to be wrong should also be expected.
This is how scientific reasoning works: we assume a framework, we gather data and form hypotheses rejecting those contradicted by the data, we form theories based on previous hypotheses that work, and we create a paradigm that explains the theories that survive these rigorous tests – all within the prevailing framework. The framework within which we judge scientific theories is methodological naturalism. In its simplest form, we posit that there is a set of rules that nature follows and that we can explain all that we are capable of explaining by using this set of rules.
Hypotheses obviously change with time and specifically change when new data contradicts them. Theories are more resistant to change, but do so frequently. Hypotheses live and die with single experiments; theories require more evidence, generally, than a single experiment to overturn. Paradigms resist change even more strongly, requiring considerable evidence that can best be explained only with a change in our basic view of how our theories cohere. The overarching framework for all of scientific reasoning, however, is the most resistant to change. It requires absolutely extraordinary evidence to overturn.
Many current theories and paradigms were unknown until proved; that is the nature of science. Some of these ideas were thought strange or impossible by a few and, at times, by the many. The heliocentric theory shines as the prime example, but there are others, though rare. Generally, and particularly in our current climate, a cauldron of ideas compete with the best prevailing. While somewhat strange, I have found it best to view all ideas as rationalizations (even with all the Freudian baggage that entails). It is just that some rationalizations work and are supported by evidence.
As Haldane liked to remind us, our ignorance probably trumps our knowledge – but, being ignorant, we will never really know. We will surely make new discoveries about the universe as time goes by, probably never reaching the end (I would say, based on our construction, that we definitely will never reach the end since we must begin with assumptions, but I abhor absolute statements). Recent conjectures on the multiverse, string theory and dark energy serve as good examples of ideas that are not yet part of a coherent schema.
I'm reminded of a quote by the 19th century chemist
Humphry Davy:
"Nothing is so fatal to the progress of the human mind as to suppose that our views of science are ultimate; that there are no mysteries in nature; that our triumphs are complete, and that there are no new worlds to conquer."
I do no expect to convince many
[or any, for that matter] of the reality of my own personal accounts. However, a big reason for why I bothered sharing at all was to draw attention to the fact that too many
[even among the ranks of self identified skeptics] fall into the trap of mistaking their beliefs for knowledge. As I've mentioned repeatedly, it is not the doubt being expressed regarding claims like mine that disturbs me, but the
certainty of falsehood. The truth of the matter is that skepticism involves the ability to entertain possibilities/claims as hypotheticals while suspending judgement as to their veracity.
Many here, based upon what they believe about our current scientific understanding, assume that accounts like mine cannot be true or valid. I've even had more than a few accuse me of trying to "over turn the foundations of science", as if me even mentioning my experiences is some kind of heresy. Quite a few critics here have claimed outright that what I've reported contradicts most or all of our scientific knowledge, yet they've failed to specify exactly how it is in contradiction. They start from a presumption of falsehood and demand proof contrary to their presumption. This sort of behavior is not skepticism, nor is it a display of critical thinking; its simply being critical of claims that run counter to one's own beliefs -- pure n' simple.
Do I have a complete theory to explain, in full detail, experiences like the ones linked by
Malerin and
Limbo, or the ones I've reported? Of course not. However, what I
do know is that they require a better theoretical framework than science currently has at it's disposal. I also know that, relative to my own personal experiences, such "extraordinary" claims aren't so "extraordinary" that I must assume them to be false/mistaken from the get-go. There is definitely something interesting going on with regard to these phenomena and it is neither skeptical or scientific to continue to discount them off-hand.
Philosophically, while it is possible that the observable universe (multiverse) is part of a greater whole, with mind (or experience) being more fundamental, we already have a word for that – idealism. Even with an idealist framework, we do not encounter mind independent of body in our regular observations of the world. In Idealism Mind creates matter through the action of thought; there is no additional provision for Mind to interact with what we call our minds (which are dependent on matter) unless we invoke some form of dualism; a discarnate mind interacting/speaking to someone relies on dualism and cannot be explained within a monistic framework.
Magic, by definition, contradicts methodological naturalism since only natural explanations are allowed. If the supernatural exists (an ontological possibility) science, being based in methodological naturalism, cannot account for it nor comment upon it because the supernatural would not follow the rules of the natural world. Anything that does follow the rules of the natural world, whether a part of our current understanding of physics or not, is natural and is amenable to study by methodological naturalism.
I think this touches upon the heart of this issue here. Much of the controversy regarding purported "supernatural" experiences/accounts stems not so much from actual scientific objections, but from metaphysical assumptions. IMO, any apparent physical laws that we observe are no more fundamental that the laws of the road, merely by virtue of the fact that such laws must themselves emerge from some deeper bases. Just about all of the findings at the frontiers of theoretical physics strongly suggest that our directly observable universe and its apparent constants are historical artifacts. What we consider the "natural world" is almost certainly contingent. "Magic" would simply be any mechanism or operation that supervenes upon, or works outside of, what we tentatively consider to be the "natural" laws of physics; in much the same way that messing around with the rules and parameters of a simulated world would be considered "magical" by observers within the frame of the simulation.
To be quite honest, there is nothing to suggest that what precious little we solidly know in science logically precludes the possibility of any "supernatural" phenomena. Skepticism is called for regarding such claims; a default position of dismissal is not.
Meanwhile, we do know certain facts about brain/mind function. We are prone to type 1 errors and particularly to certain kinds of type 1 errors. The classical evolutionary explanation concerns an early hominid and rustling grass – we are prone to view the rustle as due to an agent because it doesn’t hurt much to run away from the wind but hurts considerable not to run away from a crouching lion. We also know that certain people are more prone to type 1 errors, particularly to the kind of type 1 error that posits an agent behind whatever pattern we perceive. We even know how to manipulate people into committing such errors more and less often based in large part on dopamine pathways. Increase dopamine neurotransmitter levels and we tend to posit the presence of an agent; remove the action of dopamine and we are less likely to do so. This is the basis of neuroleptic treatment for delusions (an extreme form of this kind of type 1 error).
The strength of anecdotal evidence depends on the number and strengths of alternative explanations for the data. Recall, first, that evidence is data used for or against a proposition – evidence does not exist as evidence independent of some form of argument. If there are many likely explanations for why we encounter a particular piece of data, the data cannot serve as strong evidence. If there is only one likely explanation for particular data, then that data serves as strong evidence for the argument being made. Converging data points also provide better support. So, for instance, my wife is late for an appointment. She tells me that she went to the store to buy something for dinner tonight. There are a few likely scenarios, but one is most likely based on my knowledge of her and her way of acting in the world – she went to the store. If I see the new bottle of red wine vinegar in the pantry and that only reinforces the idea.
We use anecdotal data as evidence all the time. But no one considers anecdotes as strong evidence, particularly because there are often many different explanations for any anecdote (true, misrepresentation, confirmation bias, pure invention, etc.). Anecdotes cannot, therefore, be used effectively to suggest that our current way of viewing the world needs revision. Stronger evidence is needed.
If one grants that even a few of the innumerable documented "psi" experiences are accurate
[such as accounts involving OBEs] they demonstrate that common ways of viewing the world most certainly require some revision. Even disregarding personal accounts like mine, there is considerable experimental evidence that lends added credence:
Even some skeptics, such as Ray Hyman, say that some parapsychological studies may have merit:
"I have argued that the case for the existence of anomalous cognition is still shaky, at best. On the other hand, I want to state that I believe that the SAIC [Science Applications International Corporation] experiments as well as the contemporary ganzfeld experiments display methodological and statistical sophistication well above previous parapsychological research. Despite better controls and careful use of statistical inference, the investigators seem to be getting significant results that do not appear to derive from the more obvious flaws of previous research."
http://www.wikisynergy.com/wiki/ESP
TBH, I cannot say whether so-called "psi" phenomena are the products of the same underlying mechanism(s) but, for the most part, they all appear to be related to the nature of consciousness itself which, for all intents and purposes, we have only the barest scientific understanding of. What little understanding we do have is fairly superficial
[such as knowledge of certain neural correlates] with nothing in the way of understanding the physics of consciousness qua consciousness. As of now, even from the position of an individual who has no first-hand experience of such phenomena, it is premature to disregard seemingly extraordinary accounts of "psi" as impossible or in contradiction with the laws of physics. Quite frankly, we do not know enough concerning the physics of consciousness
[or physics in general, for that matter] to make such determinations.