No, I don't believe I have. There are limits to the LVT; you can only collect the full land rent. But up to that point, it does not undermine its own basis of taxation. When you tax production, you immediately start reducing production.
Well I think you've expressed the view that private ownership of land (in the absence of--say--a 100% tax on rent) is unjustifiable/exploitative. Therefore you would set up a system where, effectively, all land is nationalised. At that point, there is no private rent that can be collected and your basis for "tax collection" is simply that government owns all land and government can charge what rent it likes in lieu of tax.
Impossible at rates 100% or below. But then, if you were to tax land rents at more than 100%, it wouldn't really be a land value tax at all.
If land tax is 100% of land rent, then private land value drops to zero and private land rent drops to zero. It amounts to state appropriation of all land, not tax. And that removes all market mechanisms for allocating land to use, or leaving it idle. And there is nothing necessarily wrong with leaving some land idle. Using it for "tax" reasons when market price mechanisms would not justify this is wasteful.
This is wrong on two separate levels. First of all, I don't understand why private owners would sell to the government; presumably, owners who did not intend to use land would sell to other individuals who did.
Evidently you don't. But that doesn't make it wrong, it makes you wrong. And usage rights and ownership rights are quite separable and transferable--except that there is no non-arbitrary way to separately assess site value from the value of internal and external site improvements if you abolish the market. People might want to
use land; nobody would want to
own land. Thus, again, this is not "tax", it is non-market state appropriation of land capital.
Sure governments may be able to get rich indeed via monopoly ownership of land and the ability to charge usage fees as they liked. If they did it sensibly they might even not distort/kill economic efficiency. But it is a step backwards, away from a market mechanism.
Secondly, the government of Hong Kong actually does own the land there, and the land generates substantial revenue (though substantially less than it could if their lease system were restructured).
Not from LVT they don't, since nobody owns the LV.
Right: the largest land bubble in recorded history, and the resulting stagnation since it deflated, has nothing to do with the private collection of land rents!
Oh sure real estate bubbles and crashes can arise from private land ownership. But state ownership is no magic bullet for efficiency. It is laughable that you regard it as the curer of all ills from economic meltdown to real estate bubbles to a sore finger and a runny nose. Your posts have a "one trick pony" characteristic in that regard.
As for "exempting" retired and near retired in Japan from your desired "tax"--that's probably more than a quarter of the population. So at a stroke you impose a huge cost on the shrinking labour force which is struggling enough as it is. That is not exactly the first thing Japan needs, suggesting you don't exactly know the first thing about it.