Can theists be rational?

[JoeTheJuggler]

All the way back to post #87 where cj posted the Forster & Marten argument:

and I'm not saying this proves anything at all -- it merely demonstrates why there is a problem, and why invoking design for the universe is not actually at all irrational.

As long as you define rationality in such a way that it is also "not actually at all irrational" to believe the Nigerian scam e-mails.

 

[Bri]

Bah, I meant more in terms of the mock legalese for hostile witness^WP (browse for the rules of engagement if you're curious).

I knew what you meant.

Alright. So what sort of things count as this kind of evidence?

That's not a "kind" of evidence -- that's all evidence. The problem is that it can include just about anything, and isn't necessarily something by which you can conclude whether or not the assertion is true.

Alright, but I'll use your notion of compelling evidence. Let's compare two scenarios. You don't seem to be compelled by single pieces of evidence... that's fine.

Not so! There are plenty of single pieces of evidence that I find compelling. In most cases, we have to look at both quantity and quality of evidence both for and against the assertion in order to come to some sort of conclusion about the truth of the assertion. Unfortunately, that evaluation is rarely objective.

So, I'll introduce these two scenarios. Now, however, we'll speak of them hypothetically... in both scenarios, there are exactly two pieces of evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow, and you're to consider them to the exclusion of other evidence. Do you find both of these scenarios "minimally compelling"?

Neither are particularly compelling, but scenario B is less compelling than scenario A in my opinion.

Scenario B, on the other hand... well.... it's kind of missing something.

Don't you think?

Both are "missing something" but I agree that scenario B is less compelling than scenario A.

And I'll have you note--in both cases, we have the "same" amount of evidence. In both scenarios, the pieces of supporting evidence are independent from each other--so we have exactly two pieces of evidence. And in both cases, we need to make a metaphysical assumption. Somehow, though, the metaphysical assumption doesn't bother me a whole lot in Scenario A.

The number of "pieces" of evidence isn't really what I meant by "quantity" of evidence. I mean that if there are several different types of evidence (for example, several different types of tests) all leading to the same conclusion, that could be considered stronger than if there was only one type of evidence. But really it comes down to the totality of the evidence.

But that coin flip... that doesn't sound like it should even count.

I agree, the coin flip probably isn't evidence of the assertion at all.

...Terrestrial intelligence counts.[/INDENT]

Sure, it might count as extremely weak evidence of aliens, as might the existence of teapots count as extremely weak evidence of teapots orbiting Jupiter, as might the fine-tuning of the universe count as extremely weak evidence of a god. In other words, there is not compelling evidence for any of those assertions.

All might also count as very strong evidence in conjunction with other evidence, particularly other pieces of the puzzle which are currently missing.

No, I don't think any of them have enough evidence to conclude that any of them are likely, nor that one is more likely than another.

-Bri

 

[Herzblut]

I'm sorry, but you're just wrong.

That's an extremely irrational notion. The probability that a physicist is wrong here while a layman like you is right, is identically zero.

The ISS is in a stable orbit (as far as I know), and is not accelerating. A positive acceleration would push it into a higher orbit, and a negative one would drop it into a lower one (or a death spiral destined to crash to the Earth).

ETA: To explain further--the gravity between the EArth and the ISS is a force that would otherwise pull the ISS down to the Earth. It is exactly equalled to the part of the ISS's forward velocity which, in the absence of the Earth's gravitational pull would otherwise send it flying in a straight line (away from the Earth at a tangent to its current orbit). Since these forces equal out, there is no net acceleration to be felt.

This is totally wrong. I'm sorry, but you're lacking most basic understanding.

Humans can directly sense acceleration due to gravity (or any other acceleration).

This is not only wrong, but a direct contradiction to the Principle of Equivalence, a fundamental postulate of Einstein's To General Relativity.

As a thought experiment, imagine yourself in an isolated elevator. Thus, you cannot "look outside" by any means. Now, whether you're falling freely down to Earth, or whether you're located somewhere in the middle of nothing in space, with the next object being 1mio light years away, is absolutely indistinguishable for you.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Hetzblut, your claim was that we cannot directly sense gravity and acceleration, right?

I've shown that we have anatomical mechanisms that do just that.

You move the goalposts to point out that we can't detect microgravity or certain kinds of accelerations.

Similarly, I can't see a single photon or smell a single molecule of limburger cheese. Does it follow that I can't directly see and smell things?

Again, my claim is easily proven. I can detect the orientation of my head with regard to the center of mass of the Earth (even with my eyes closed, or in total darkness). Similarly, I can detect a linear acceleration. In the elevator, I can detect the acceleration of going from stationary to descending (wrt to the mass of the Earth). If the elevator were out in space far from a mass, and it went from stationary to moving in one direction, there would be an acceleration (caused by a rocket or something), and I could sense it and what direction it is accelerating me. (I could be deceived by this engine firing into believing I were on the Earth descending toward its center of mass, but similarly my ability to see things can be tricked. Motion pictures really don't move!)

If I the elevator were moving without acceleration, I couldn't sense any acceleration.

 

[Tubbythin]

This is not only wrong, but a direct contradiction to the Principle of Equivalence, a fundamental postulate of Einstein's To General Relativity.

Depends whether you interpret JTJ as saying we can distinguish different forms of acceleration or merely we can distinguish acceleration (such as gravity) from constant motion.

 

[articulett]

I just want add "Hail Linda: The Boss of This Thread!"

 

[PixyMisa]

Speculative, but not incoherent, in the way Hawking claims ("What is North of the North Pole?"). And you're right about PixyMisa. I thought he was referring to time starting with the Big Bang (which I'm guessing he does believe, but that would be speculation on my part).

Yes, as far as we can tell, time is a property of our Universe, and hence started with the Big Bang. To speak of any sort of "before" is tricky - something that cosmologists are very aware of.

Theologists less so.

 

[yy2bggggs]

That's not a "kind" of evidence -- that's all evidence.

It's not what you've been talking about.

The problem is that it can include just about anything,

Exactly. That's the problem.

In most cases, we have to look at both quantity and quality of evidence both for and against the assertion in order to come to some sort of conclusion about the truth of the assertion. Unfortunately, that evaluation is rarely objective.

Perhaps it is rarely objective. But I'm going to make a strong claim here. I'll concede that there may not be an objective means of ruling on evidence, but I most certainly do not concede that legitimate means of ruling on evidence is arbitrary.

In other words, given two non-specific means by which one can rule on the quality and quantity of evidence, it does not follow from "it is rarely objective", that these two means are equivalent, or equally valid, or equally sound--or, more to the point, equally rational. They may be. They may not even be comparable. But there are means of judging evidence that are comparable, and not all means of judging evidence are equal.

Now I'll simply ask the question--do you agree?

Neither are particularly compelling, but scenario B is less compelling than scenario A in my opinion.

That's a start. Can you tell me why you hold this opinion then? What's wrong with B? What feels wrong about it? What is it about this piece of evidence that makes it not count?

Note that evidence "1" in both scenarios is merely a proxy. We're really comparing A.2 with B.2. The only reason 1 is there is to keep you from backsliding into the red herring of compelling evidence, since it's solely the quality of evidence that is under discussion, and not the quantity, nor the overall judgment.

I agree, the coin flip probably isn't evidence of the assertion at all.

So at the very least, you should contend that there's stuff that can be proposed as evidence that has zero evidential value--and stuff that has more than zero evidential value. And there's a definite difference--after enough sunrises, after all, "the sun rose yesterday" definitely does contribute to your belief that it will rise tomorrow, but "the coin landed heads" never does.

So if these pieces of evidence ipso facto have this quality of potential value, do they not hold this quality, even when they stand on their own? Can't we say that the coin flip simply doesn't count, before we even consider that there may or may not be enough other evidence to push us over the edge? And that the fact that the sun rose yesterday does count?

Sure, it might count as extremely weak evidence of aliens, as might the existence of teapots count as extremely weak evidence of teapots orbiting Jupiter, as might the fine-tuning of the universe count as extremely weak evidence of a god.

No no no no no! Those three things do not compare. In fact, all three of them are different from each other:

• Existence of intelligent life in the universe is beyond question. We definitely came to exist--this proves that intelligent life can exist beyond all reasonable doubt. All that has to happen for intelligent life to be elsewhere is for the same mechanisms to happen somewhere in the 100 nonillion cubic light years of the universe, again.
• Teapots also exist, beyond question, but by a known mechanism. In order for teapots to orbit Jupiter, either they would have to be put there, into the minuscule fraction of possible positions and trajectories that are describable as "orbiting Jupiter", which requires tremendous effort, or there would have to be an unknown mechanism that we have no reason to suspect exists, that would put them there.
• The fine tuning (proper) of the universe is theoretical, and suggests nothing about why the parameters happen to be such that life is supported, or even how likely it is in the first place, nor is it even comparable to a hypothetical entity's probable existence.

Sure, they're all the same in that they aren't compelling evidence of respective claims, but you're slipping back into the irrelevant. They are all different in quality. Without further argumentation, you can't judge on even the improbability of extra terrestrial intelligent life--that we know for damned sure we exist at all lends a high degree of plausibility that it could exist elsewhere. Of course, you would note, rightly so, that we also can't judge in itself the probability that there's intelligent life elsewhere, because that's extrapolating from a single data point--but you lack standing to argue specifically that it is improbable; extrapolation is extrapolation is extrapolation.

The teapot orbiting Jupiter we can pretty much immediately start out with as unlikely. It's really a biased example, so it shouldn't surprise us--after all, we, intelligent life, which we're fairly sure isn't independently elsewhere in the solar system, are the producers of teapots, and we're fairly grounded, so it's just an ordinary, anthropocentric example--were we to consider a rock orbiting Jupiter, it would be different.

And as for the argument for God, we're not even out of the ontology box... we've yet to establish that there's even an existing entity of the class in the first place. The fine tuning argument doesn't even establish this--it requires you to interject a prior, which is entirely up to the opinion of the theist going through the exercise or the atheist debating her. We know damned well intelligent life exists. Hell, we even know damned well teapots exist. Gods? Well, you sort of "need" faith, right?

In other words, there is not compelling evidence for any of those assertions.

Which is not interesting.

All might also count as very strong evidence in conjunction with other evidence, particularly other pieces of the puzzle which are currently missing.

But they are vastly different in quality. See above--evidence can be judged in terms of its quality in support of a claim aside from judgments of whether or not the totality of the evidence supports the claim.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Depends whether you interpret JTJ as saying we can distinguish different forms of acceleration or merely we can distinguish acceleration (such as gravity) from constant motion.

Mostly I was objecting to the statement that we can't sense gravity directly but can only observe something falling.

We certainly can directly sense gravity and acceleration. Maybe not in all cases and all types, but the fact that we can't see infrared or ultraviolet does not mean that we can't directly sense light. If you think sensing the orientation of my head wrt to the center of mass of the Earth isn't directly sensing gravity, then is it also true that we can't directly see objects but only light reflecting off of them? (As I said before, if you carry this far enough, all we've got are action potentials in neurons.)

 

[Tubbythin]

Mostly I was objecting to the statement that we can't sense gravity directly but can only observe something falling.

We certainly can directly sense gravity and acceleration. Maybe not in all cases and all types, but the fact that we can't see infrared or ultraviolet does not mean that we can't directly sense light. If you think sensing the orientation of my head wrt to the center of mass of the Earth isn't directly sensing gravity, then is it also true that we can't directly see objects but only light reflecting off of them? (As I said before, if you carry this far enough, all we've got are action potentials in neurons.)

I'm kinda agreeing with you (I think). We can sense acceleration and common sense tells us when that acceleration is gravity.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I'm kinda agreeing with you (I think). We can sense acceleration and common sense tells us when that acceleration is gravity.

Just as we can sense light and common sense tells us when that light is an object in our environment.

ETA: And the same way we can fool ourselves into perceiving a series of 2-D still images as moving objects, we could fool ourselves into perceiving the forces felt inside a spinning spacecraft as gravity.

Anyway, I'm not sure how this came up in this thread, but I imagine someone was making an assertion something like, "the case for God is as rational as (or somehow analogous to) the case for gravity since we can't directly sense either one".

And I think that's just nonsense.

 

[articulett]

Of course it is nonsense. We know much about gravity and it allows us to learn more because being on the "right track" in science does that-- we know what the gravitational pull is on other planets and why mass and weight can be different depending on the acceleration of gravity. We have a formula for gravity. We don't even have a coherent definition of any god.

When people talk about gravity, we know what it is they are talking about-- but we have no real "meaning" to give the term "god exists"-- no way to distinguish such a god from the non-existence of such a god. It is no more a coherent concept than saying "demons exist".

I think humans can be very irrational in many ways and rational in many ways. But I don't see how a "belief in" god or even saying "I know god exists" is more rational than a belief in reincarnation or demons. I can understand why people would believe in such things, but the lack of supporting evidence for the proposition makes the belief irrational to the nonbeliever of such things. Subjective experiences and "inner knowingness" are NOT evidence that support "supernatural" explanations. Having "believed in" all sorts of irrational things in my life, I can understand why people could tell themselves such beliefs are rational--and why they might try to convince others of this case.

But the fact that there is no empirical verifiable evidence or even a coherent definition makes me find all such beliefs as "irrational" as the similar irrational beliefs I once held. People are free to believe what they want, but it takes a much higher standard to convince me that belief in supernatural entities of any sort is rational.

Gravity and aliens are not supernatural. They are far more clearly defined entities. Orbiting teapots is a coherent concept and it's one we can use our powers of reasoning to deduce as an irrational belief to hold (Though Carolyn Porco notes that all teapots on planet earth are, indeed, orbiting the sun.) I thought yyw was clear in his explanation of this.

God is not a coherent concept, and there is nothing to measure or nothing to compare it to except other supernatural forces and entities like magic and ESP and ghosts and angels and Thetans. Belief in god is fine, but why does the believer need the non believer to think such a belief is rational when the believer can make no more of a case for it being rational than believers in things they don't believe in can make for their claims?

Theists can certainly be rational, but that is a long way from convincing a nonbeliever that a belief in god is more rational than a belief in demons or voo doo spells.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Anyway, I'm not sure how this came up in this thread, but I imagine someone was making an assertion something like, "the case for God is as rational as (or somehow analogous to) the case for gravity since we can't directly sense either one".

And I think that's just nonsense.

Sort of. It was actually over the issue of what mechanism means. I have been arguing that to speak of a mechanism for something is to give a causal account for that thing. The mechanism by which cholera produces diarrhea is that there is a toxin produced by Vibrio cholera that ramps up cyclic AMP production leading to secretion of chloride, sodium, etc. ions that carry water with them, leading to diarrhea and dehydration and possible death.

Linda threw out a comment, in relation to gravity, about science working through observations, so our consistent observations of gravity can lead to a mechanism. To which Bri responded that if we saw God we should be able to speak of a mechanism by which God works.

[rant on]But, here's the problem......while we see gravity's effects, we don't have a complete mechanism worked out. We do have general relativity, which is pretty darn good, but it's not complete, as far as a thorough reconciliation with quantum dynamics is concerned. We use the consistency of our models as one of the justifications for believing observations, so this incompleteness bother us a bit.

But when it comes to God, even frequent observation of Him would not lead to a mechanism because God is not part of the physical world. By definition, He is transcendent; so discussion of a mechanism is completely misguided (a causal account not being possible; causal accounts being a function of beings in the material world -- which is why I have been going off on dualism which is the general case showing this problem).

Linda was completely correct in saying that we discover mechanisms by means of observation; by means of observation, generalizing to theories, testing those theories, correlating the information gained with other theories to build a coherent model of the world, etc. That is how we deal with things that are logically and physically possible.

But God is not in that category. I've been trying to push across the point that we are not talking about things in the same categories, and it is wrong to do so. Stuff like faeries and pixies (however hot they might be) are logically possible and physically impossible; and God is logically possible and physically unbounded. We cannot talk about the probability of God in the same way that we talk about the probability of extraterrestrial intelligent life because they are in different categories of thought and we need to treat evidence for them differently.

Bri has been trying to call this special pleading, but it isn't. Theologians put God in a different category, theists of all stripes put God in a different category. To suggest that discussion of the probability of God is analogous to discussion of the probability of extraterrestrial intelligent life is special pleading -- it attempts to put God back into the category of the physically possible, since that is where extraterrestrial intelligent life belongs (OK, it's nt really special pleading, it's a category mistake, but I hope the point is made).[/rant off]


OK, I'll stop now. But that's how I recall it beginning and I guess I've repeated myself enough in this thread.

 

[Malerin]

And as for the argument for God, we're not even out of the ontology box... we've yet to establish that there's even an existing entity of the class in the first place. The fine tuning argument doesn't even establish this--it requires you to interject a prior, which is entirely up to the opinion of the theist going through the exercise or the atheist debating her. We know damned well intelligent life exists. Hell, we even know damned well teapots exist. Gods? Well, you sort of "need" faith, right?

Whoah, whoah, whoah. Are you claiming that believing God is possible is faith-based? That Pr("God exists") shoud be <<.5 right out of the starting gate? What do you base such a low prior on? What is wrong with the atheist and theist both setting aside their biases and assuming <gasp> an agnostic position?

 

[fls]

Whoah, whoah, whoah. Are you claiming that believing God is possible is faith-based?

What else can we base our belief on?

That Pr("God exists") shoud be <<.5 right out of the starting gate? What do you base such a low prior on? What is wrong with the atheist and theist both setting aside their biases and assuming <gasp> an agnostic position?

If I were to show you and a dozen of your friends a large, windowless building and ask you to guess what was inside, without giving you any clues whatsoever, what probability would you give to each of those guesses?

Linda

 

[articulett]

Is the possibility that demons possess people faith based?

How is the notion that people can "know" there is a god less faith based? How can it be more probable? Are you agnostic about demon possession? Thetans? Angels? Aren't all proposed invisible forms of consciousness in the same category of "probability? Aren't they equally faith based propositions? Aren't they all "explanations" for things that humans don't understand? I cannot see how a belief in god can be more rational nor a god more probable than any of the above. Are those that are agnostic about god, equally as agnostic about those things? And why shouldn't they be if not? It seems like the only thing that changes is "definitions and semantics"-- never anything measurable or useful for verifying the veracity or rationality of the "god exists" claim.

Nobody including me can know about any invisible immeasurable entities-- so we are all technically agnostic-- but I do not believe such entities can exist because there is not evidence for any such entity. And if scientists cannot access such evidence, then I have no reason to believe that anyone else has either-- especially given the prevalence of humanity's propensity to fool themselves with such false explanations.

I don't see a rational explanation for distinguishing a belief in a god from any other delusion humans are known to have. There is no differential diagnosis for such beliefs is there? There may be valid reasons that people believe in such things, but there is no reason to consider such beliefs less of a delusion than known delusions, right?

 

[Tubbythin]

Whoah, whoah, whoah. Are you claiming that believing God is possible is faith-based? That Pr("God exists") shoud be <<.5 right out of the starting gate? What do you base such a low prior on? What is wrong with the atheist and theist both setting aside their biases and assuming <gasp> an agnostic position?

How many times... 0.5 is not agnostic.
I'm about to throw a dice. I could throw a six. I might not. You could say I'm agnostic about that. Is it, therefore, reasonable for me to assume the probability of throwing a 6 is 0.5?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Given a binary choice -- God, yes; God, no -- 0.5 is the agnostic position assuming the least possible knowledge.

When it comes to Baye's theorem, though we can approach from a theoretical lack of knowledge, which is an arbitrary point 9since none of us are really in that position), but at least it is fair to both sides, or we can try to assign a closer prior probability. When it comes to God none of us can get anything like a reasonable prior probability, so for a binary choice, what's wrong with 0.5?

You just have to run it through Bayes several times including all the potential characteristics of whatever this God is that you want to investigate to get a reasonable answer.

I don't think an unbiased accounting would get anyone above 0.1 and probably much closer to zero.

 

[articulett]

But it's not a binary choice any more than "Satan exists" yes or no or "Fairies exist" yes or no. Any given human may or may not be pregnant, but the odds are not 50-50.

I can see why people would like it to be a 50-50 proposition-- but having two different options does not mean each is equally likely.

As far as I can tell, the claim "god exists" is as likely to be true as "demons exist" or "Thetans exist". They are in the same category or "irrational claims" with the same probability of being coherent and/or accurate. I see nothing to distinguish one such claim from the other in terms of probability. Is there anything?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Whoah, whoah, whoah. Are you claiming that believing God is possible is faith-based?

No, believing God is probable or plausible is faith based.

That Pr("God exists") shoud be <<.5 right out of the starting gate?

Yes. And not just <<.5; it basically shouldn't even be considered until you have good reason to believe it plausible.

What do you base such a low prior on?

I think I gave the rule to you already. The entity has not even been demonstrated to exist in the first place.

What is wrong with the atheist and theist both setting aside their biases and assuming <gasp> an agnostic position?

I don't believe the most effective means of obtaining true belief is to eliminate bias. I believe, instead, that the most effective means of obtaining true belief is to specifically be biased against a priori claims with ontological implications, and towards a posteriori claims.

I'm just being consistent.

And FYI, I'm not biased because I'm an atheist. I'm an atheist because I'm biased.