Can theists be rational?

[Bri]

Now here we are. I was asking about yesterday, and simply whether or not that is evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow. I wasn't asking about hypotheticals. I don't care if the question doesn't make sense to you. The question is very simply, whether or not you consider the sun rising yesterday as evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.

I think we are conflating "evidence" with "compelling evidence." I may have been guilty of saying "no evidence" when I meant "no compelling evidence." If that's what you're getting at, then I may have been inaccurate. Our existence would certainly be considered evidence of the existence of intelligent life elsewhere IF there was other evidence, for example if we knew the conditions and events by which intelligent life emerged here, and we had evidence that the same conditions and events were likely to have occurred elsewhere.

So, to answer your question as I understand it, whether or not the sun rising yesterday is compelling evidence that it will rise tomorrow would depend on what other evidence is available. If the sun only rose yesterday but not today, then no that's not evidence that it would rise tomorrow. If it rose yesterday AND today, that might be weak evidence that the sun will rise again tomorrow. If it rose yesterday and we knew the conditions by which it rose, and we also knew that those conditions would occur tomorrow, then that would also be evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow. In and of itself, the sun rising yesterday is not compelling evidence that it will rise tomorrow.

I hope that answers your question, but I suspect that it might not.

-Bri

 

[fls]

We are looking on the moon and Mars (and perhaps meteors that fall on our planet) out of convenience, not because there is any evidence that those are more likely to contain alien life than other planets in the universe. It would be a stretch to compare that to paleontologists use of evidence to find fossils.

I agree that the search for anything is partly constrained by convenience. Information about where/under what conditions we don't see life is also helpful. Paleontologists are also constrained by convenience - evidence suggests that the best fossils aren't on/near the surface, yet that's where they look much of the time.

I said that nobody is physically searching for God and claiming that it's science. So you honestly don't see the difference between physically searching for something and forming a logical argument for it?

I do, but you are begging the question again. The cosmological argument is not a logical argument. It's an attempt to draw information about God from observations. And those observations are the product of scientific inquiry.

Searching for something for which there is no evidence for the purpose of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which does not explain any observation (as would be the case with searching for aliens) is not science, in my opinion. If I said anything else, then I misspoke.

Right. Begging the question, since whether there is evidence, what is meant by 'unfalsifiable hypothesis', whether 'falsifiable' is a necessary condition, whether information is gathered only for the purposes of testing hypotheses, are all questions under discussion. And you have not prevailed on any of those questions which makes it a bit silly for you to assert the above as though they are proven assumptions.

I can't see any way that you could legitimately construe my comments as an example of begging the question.

"[T]he proposition to be proved is assumed implicitly or explicitly in one of the premises."

Which is? Once you define it, please explain how the hypothesis "a god exists" is not a formal hypothesis or theory but "aliens exist" is, if you feel that to be the case.

Hypothesis: a proposal intended to explain certain facts or observations
Theory: theory is a unifying principle that explains a body of facts and the laws based on them.
Explain: a useful description which may clarify causes, context, and consequences of a certain object or a phenomenon.

'God' is not based upon providing a useful description of observations. That is, the description provided by God is not useful, and the set of observations described is incoherent, inconsistent and unconstrained. There aren't any observations that would exclude God (for a believer), no predictions can be made as to consequences, it isn't necessary, etc.

'Aliens' would refer to a specific set of observations and would provide a useful explanation. It would exclude things that aren't aliens (e.g. terrestrial life, patterned non-life on other planets), predictions can be made as to consequences (e.g. patterned electromagnetic radiation), it would provide a necessary explanation (i.e. the observations would otherwise be poorly explained), etc.

I don't think you have any idea why other people might form a hypothesis that a god exists, nor is it relevant to the validity of the hypothesis.

I don't want to give the impression that there is a one-size-fits-all answer - people have complex reasons for their beliefs. This is meant to serve as a (very) rough summary in order to serve as a springboard. It should be something we all agree to.

I would argue that it is likely that the concept of gods are typically developed by looking at the complexity of the world and searching for an explanation of it. Similar to the approach taken by the fine-tuning argument.

That is what I was referring to below with the series of questions. I think that the idea of creative and controlling forces grew out of our propensity to look for patterns and explanations. And that these forces were animated (gods) because we have a strong tendency to do so. As our explanations became more sophisticated and complete, the animation was left behind as unnecessary and naive as part of the explanation. But the idea of the entity persists as does the desire to make that entity somehow necessary, and the desire to animate.

Possibly evidence of the fine-tuning of the universe, for one.

Except that it doesn't really. We no longer fill in the gaps with animated forces when we encounter unexplained observations (and haven't for quite a while). When we discovered that much of the mass of the universe was unaccounted for, scientific inquiry led to hypotheses like dark matter consisting of WIMPs or MACHOs, not a "Capricious Mass Generating Entity". When we discovered that the expansion of the universe was accelerating, it led to the proposal of dark energy, not a "Capricious Expansion Accelerating Entity". Even the possibility of apparent fine-tuning leads scientists to turn to non-animated possibilities, such as multiverses or oscillating universes.

Perhaps. Seems pretty reasonable that observations about the universe lead to both hypotheses then. So tell me, how is only one of them "formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place" and the other not?

One is based on observations (life is present, conditions that may have led to that life seem to be present elsewhere), the other is based on an idea (the universe seems complex, let's look for explanations for that complexity). Beyond 'complexity', there isn't a specific set of observations that led to the idea of God. And now that we have found a much better way of tackling that complexity, it's hard to justify erasing our understanding.

I defined the word "god" as a supernatural being at the beginning of the thread, so that's the basis for the assumption.

I get that. It's just that it seems to be a redundant add-on; like stating that, by definition, gravity has invisible purple hair. You go on to describe God in a way that makes supernaturality irrelevant, since all you have to say about it relates to the same way that we speak about everything else.

Presumably, the universal constants define the "rules" of the universe by which everything within the universe would be governed. A being that could set them presumably couldn't be governed by them. You are free to disagree I guess.

But you don't seem to saying anything that one could agree or disagree with. You seem to have made up some characteristic without giving any sort of reason why someone would wish to make up this characteristic. We have no trouble incorporating other rule-makers within the idea of 'the universe'. Gravity sets the rules by which objects with mass move, yet Gravity is considered part of the universe.

Finally, the notion of a god as a creator of the natural universe would require that the god be outside of the natural universe (unless you accept the possibility of creating oneself).

-Bri

Only because you have arbitrarily excluded it by your definition. But why is it necessary to define the universe as 'this set of forces' rather than 'all forces'?

Linda

 

[Bri]

On the contrary, it is extremely logical and rational. It is however a proof of a first cause and a necessary entity, nothing more nothing less.

Argument, yes. Proof, definitely not. Many of the premises lack compelling evidence.

Entity, maybe. It depends on which definition of "entity" you're using, but the argument comes to no conclusion of what the first cause might be, so it certainly wouldn't have to be a god or even anything godlike.

-Bri

 

[westprog]

That's nice. Any evidence ?

I'm not talking about evidence. I'm talking about the nature of a hypothetical being.

When you talk about definitions you might want to actually know them.

That wasn't a definition. I gave a definition - and a distinction between beings outside of nature, and beings that control nature - elsewhere.

 

[fls]

Methodological Naturalism simply states that any phenomena that can be studied by science must have an assumed naturalist causality, that is be in accordance with natural law.

Causality and natural law are simply a consequence of reference to natural events, not an assumption. Methodologic naturalism merely relies upon reference to natural events. The rest of what you discuss - causality, exceptions, reproducibility, the laws of physics, standard operating procedures, etc. - are not assumptions of naturalism; they are observations from naturalism. Which means that the proposed lack of these characteristics is irrelevant when considering whether or not the supernatural is amenable to scientific inquiry. If you wish to make 'supernatural' not amenable to scientific inquiry, then what you need to say is that the supernatural does not make reference to natural events. In which case, you all need to stop making reference to natural events when talking about the supernatural.

The remainder of your post deals with making reference to natural events when talking about the supernatural, and so it is not relevant to what I have been saying.

Linda

Note: the use of the word 'natural' is redundant.

 

[fls]

Duplicate

 

[cj.23]

Argument, yes. Proof, definitely not. Many of the premises lack compelling evidence.

Proof in the mathematical/philosophical sense, not proof as in it 'proves' anything. Sorry my bad, should have been more explicit!

Entity, maybe. It depends on which definition of "entity" you're using, but the argument comes to no conclusion of what the first cause might be, so it certainly wouldn't have to be a god or even anything godlike.

-Bri

Agreed. Entity. Thing. First Cause. Nothing more,nothing less - see discussion with SilentKnight in thread i linked. I think we made significant progress, and achieved some agreement.

cj x

 

[PixyMisa]

Agreed. Entity. Thing. First Cause. Nothing more,nothing less - see discussion with SilentKnight in thread i linked. I think we made significant progress, and achieved some agreement.

Stated like that, the Cosmological Argument reduces to the statement that "a caused thing has a cause".

Colour me unimpressed.

 

[Bri]

No, you still don't get it. First of all I defined magic as the unexplainable interaction between two realms. I did not define it as unexplainable stuff however much you want to argue that I did. I believe that is call a strawman argument. You don't seem to like them when you see them. I'm about to lose all respect for you since you persist in this stupid game.

I'm completely willing to let this slide, but you did not define "magic" as "the unexplainable interaction between two realms." You defined it in a much more general way. See for yourself:

Define "magic" as you're using it, please.

Working without the means of a mechanism through a completely unknowable means.

And again here:

Only magic -- the mysterious and unexplainable -- provides a solution, albeit a very intellectually unsatisfying one.

No, they are describing two different things, that is why there are two terms. Magic describes unexplainable interactions between two realms of substance where one of those substances is 'mental'. Every use of the word 'magic' that I have ever seen involves the idea of an agent behind the mysterious interaction.

A magic wishing well would be magic, wouldn't it? How about a magic rabbit's foot? Or a magic pot of gold?

The word "magic" has a specific connotation, which I suspect you knew when you redefined it. Otherwise, why not just use the word "unexplainable" instead? You were using the word "magic" in order to support the notion that belief in something "magic" is clearly irrational. But the way you defined it was either special pleading or can be used to describe things that you consider rational.

If you don't understand the question, then maybe you should contemplate it a bit more. This has been dealt with for centuries and is just as much a problem as we encounter with substance dualism.

How do I account for different properties between my nose and eye? You've got to be kidding me. There are different genetic programs followed for each; there are different ratios of particular molecules in each, etc.

But the various molecules are all the same substance, right? So you're just saying that different configurations of the substance leads to different properties. I think you answered your own question.

Those mechanisms are fairly well know at least in broad outline.

OK, so the configurations that might yield supernatural properties are unknown. So what?

This is not an issue over the attributes that a single fundamental substance can have when it is present in different amounts. It is a more fundamental issue having to do with divine and material.

In virtually all definitions of 'divine', the material is excluded; divine is something that is wholly 'other'. If the 'divine' and 'material' are ultimatly the same substance, what makes one thing divine and another purely material without divinity? Does the substance just decide how it's going to express itself?

You can ask the same questions about any two things. What makes a car entirely different from a tree if both are ultimately the same substance?

Oh, yeah, it is something that we cannot possibly know because to talk about mechanism means that we are discussing the material. So, you're just stuck with the same problem -- you can't fundamentally know how this supposed difference occurs.

Why can't there be a mechanism concerning the immaterial?

How many times must I repeat the same phrases? This is not an issue concerning what we know but can theoretically learn. It is an issue over what we cannot possibly know.

I've yet to see another source that claims that we cannot possibly know the mechanism by which the supernatural can interact with the natural. Can you please cite a source?

By the way, I'm not saying that we can know the mechanism, I'm just not sure the proposition that we can know the mechanism is impossible. Even if it is impossible (even if we cannot know the mechanism), I'm not sure why that matters. It may be impossible for us to know the mechanism that produces gravity or uncaused causes, but that doesn't make the ideas irrational.

But if there are rules, then we are talking about how we treat the material realm, not the divine. Miraculous intervention in the world is, therefore, not miraculous because it's really all just rule-following -- so it's really materialism. Unless there is some magic behind it all -- some guiding force determining an interaction that cannot be explained.

Maybe the "magic guiding force" behind it all is a conscious intelligence.

This is just neutral monism with the two sides being material and divine instead of material and mental. It's dualism in a dress. But it's still dualism. It still has a fundamentally unexplainable interaction between some mental power and the rest of the material realm.

I'm not sure the interaction would be unexplainable, but it would definitely be unexplained.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

"but there is evidence that the probability is close enough to 0 that it probably hasn't occurred elsewhere."

Bri:

How curious. You're actually making a strong claim that there is evidence that the probability of life arising is near 0?

Yes, that there is evidence is pretty uncontroversial (I posted references to the evidence). The evidence I cited suggests that the combination of events and conditions by which life emerged on Earth may have been improbable (i.e. that the probability is near 0). There is not compelling evidence that the probability was near 0, but there is evidence.

This is rhetorical--no need for a response. I'm still trying to figure out what you mean by "evidence".

I'm trying to figure out what you mean by "rhetorical" in this context.

-Bri

 

[yy2bggggs]

I think we are conflating "evidence" with "compelling evidence."

Exhibit A.

I may have been guilty of saying "no evidence" when I meant "no compelling evidence."

Exhibit B.

Our existence would certainly be considered evidence

Exhibit C.

of the existence of intelligent life elsewhere IF there was other evidence,

Exhibit D.

So, to answer your question as I understand it, whether or not the sun rising yesterday is compelling evidence that it will rise tomorrow

Exhibit E.

would depend on what other evidence is available.

Exhibit F.

... In and of itself, the sun rising yesterday is not compelling evidence that it will rise tomorrow.

Exhibit G.

I hope that answers your question, but I suspect that it might not.

Exhibit H.

Bri:

Excuse the labeling, but I'm collecting some evidence of my own.

I'd much rather approach definitions than ask people to give them, because that's more honest--people typically suck at defining terms, but they usually have something good in mind. You, however, seem to simply be playing word games. So I'm going to stop, and take the harder approach. I think it's time to treat you as hostile.

So let's get straight to the point. Please define the following terms:

• evidence
• compelling evidence

Do it precisely. FYI, your definition of "compelling evidence" I don't really care about per se, but I will use it against you.

Keep in mind... so far your definition of "evidence" must meet three criteria:

• We have evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.
• There is no evidence that there is intelligent life elsewhere.
• There is evidence that the probability of there being intelligent life elsewhere is near 0

...and your definition of "compelling evidence" had damned well better be distinct from your definition of "evidence".

Edit:

There is not compelling evidence that the probability was near 0, but there is evidence.

Just adding that this is noted.

 

[fls]

By the way, I'm not saying that we can know the mechanism, I'm just not sure the proposition that we can know the mechanism is impossible. Even if it is impossible (even if we cannot know the mechanism), I'm not sure why that matters. It may be impossible for us to know the mechanism that produces gravity or uncaused causes, but that doesn't make the ideas irrational.

I think that it's something like "we can't know the mechanism by reference to any observation". Once you make reference to an observation, then you make reference to an ability to know the mechanism. Once you make reference to something that produces gravity or a cause, it takes it out of the realm of dualism.

Linda

 

[Belz...]

Here, physically impossible means not subject to the laws of physics. Something that is not subject to the laws of physics is not possible within those laws.

Indeed. And since we have both A) Never observed any violations of those laws and B) Have no way to know what anything beyond those laws could be anyway, I can safely assume that, barring further evidence, nothing physically impossible exists.

Of course, it's even worse when it comes to logically impossible.

 

[Belz...]

I'm not talking about evidence. I'm talking about the nature of a hypothetical being.

Gotcha.

That wasn't a definition. I gave a definition - and a distinction between beings outside of nature, and beings that control nature - elsewhere.

Well, _I_'m talking about definitions, then. I don't see why "supernatural" is taken by you to mean "controls nature". "Beyond the known laws of natural physics" is the way I understand the word to mean.

 

[Bri]

I agree that the search for anything is partly constrained by convenience. Information about where/under what conditions we don't see life is also helpful. Paleontologists are also constrained by convenience - evidence suggests that the best fossils aren't on/near the surface, yet that's where they look much of the time.

In this case, it's entirely constrained by convenience. There's no compelling evidence that intelligent life exists on the moon or Mars -- in fact, there's evidence against it. So it's fairly obvious that SETI can't look in the most likely places (which would probably be other Earth-like planets). Of the places they can look (which would generally involve listening into outer space rather than actually looking), there isn't much if any evidence of where might be more likely to contain alien intelligence.

I do, but you are begging the question again. The cosmological argument is not a logical argument. It's an attempt to draw information about God from observations. And those observations are the product of scientific inquiry.

You're confusing the argument with its premises. The fine-tuning argument cj posted is a logical argument. One of the premises is supported by evidence of fine-tuning (yes, which is based on observations).

I must admit, after all the back-and-forth I had to go back and see what statement incited this branch of the discussion. I said:

As far as I know, nobody is looking for gods and claiming it's science.​

That is true. The evidence of fine-tuning has little to do with looking for gods, just as the evidence of the number of stars has little to do with aliens. SETI uses that information to justify an endeavor that, in my opinion, is pseudo-science.

Right. Begging the question, since whether there is evidence, what is meant by 'unfalsifiable hypothesis', whether 'falsifiable' is a necessary condition, whether information is gathered only for the purposes of testing hypotheses, are all questions under discussion. And you have not prevailed on any of those questions which makes it a bit silly for you to assert the above as though they are proven assumptions.

I assume you understand what begging the question means? Even if my assumptions aren't proven, it's not an example of begging the question.

That said, it's possible that there are legitimate scientific endeavors that involve collecting data without prior evidence for the purposes of falsifying a hypothesis. Or coming up with a falsifiable hypothesis that has tremendous explanatory power even without compelling evidence to support it (yet). Like I said, if I said or implied otherwise, I misspoke.

But searching for something for which there is no evidence for the purpose of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which does not explain any observation (as would be the case with searching for aliens) is not science, in my opinion.

"[T]he proposition to be proved is assumed implicitly or explicitly in one of the premises."

The proposition is that searching for aliens isn't science. I didn't assume that in the premises, sorry.

Hypothesis: a proposal intended to explain certain facts or observations
Theory: theory is a unifying principle that explains a body of facts and the laws based on them.
Explain: a useful description which may clarify causes, context, and consequences of a certain object or a phenomenon.

"aliens exist" is not a hypothesis by that definition since it doesn't explain any facts or observations. It's also not falsifiable (by other definitions of scientific hypothesis). There is no theory of aliens that I'm aware of.

'God' is not based upon providing a useful description of observations. That is, the description provided by God is not useful, and the set of observations described is incoherent, inconsistent and unconstrained. There aren't any observations that would exclude God (for a believer), no predictions can be made as to consequences, it isn't necessary, etc.

'Aliens' would refer to a specific set of observations and would provide a useful explanation. It would exclude things that aren't aliens (e.g. terrestrial life, patterned non-life on other planets), predictions can be made as to consequences (e.g. patterned electromagnetic radiation), it would provide a necessary explanation (i.e. the observations would otherwise be poorly explained), etc.

Quite a feat of semantic gymnastics there! I don't know where to begin!

"A god exists" is not a valid scientific hypothesis. It is intended to explain facts or observations (such as the universe being fine-tuned) but is not necessary to explain them. There are no observations that have to be explained by a god. There is no evidence that a god exists. The hypothesis "a god exists" is also unfalsifiable.

"Extra terrestrial intelligent life exists" is not a valid scientific hypothesis. It does not explain any facts or observations. There are no observations that have to be explained by aliens. There is no evidence that aliens exists. The hypothesis "extra terrestrial intelligent life exists" is also unfalsifiable.

One is based on observations (life is present, conditions that may have led to that life seem to be present elsewhere), the other is based on an idea (the universe seems complex, let's look for explanations for that complexity).

They are both based on observations. The universe is fine-tuned is an observation. There are a lot of stars is an observation.

Incidentally, the part is bold isn't an observation, it's an assumption. We don't know the conditions, and we don't know if they're present elsewhere.

Oddly, in the italicized part of your comments, you seem to want to penalize the god-hypothesis because it may explain observations, whereas there aren't any observations that would be explained by the alien-hypothesis. Normally, explaining observations is considered a good thing for a hypothesis.

Beyond 'complexity', there isn't a specific set of observations that led to the idea of God.

Beyond "there are a lot of stars" there isn't a specific set of observations that leads to the idea that aliens exist.

And now that we have found a much better way of tackling that complexity, it's hard to justify erasing our understanding.

There isn't really a decent explanation for the fact that the universe is fine-tuned. If there was, the fine-tuning argument wouldn't hold water. Multiple universes is one possible explanation, but it's not a great one.

I get that. It's just that it seems to be a redundant add-on; like stating that, by definition, gravity has invisible purple hair. You go on to describe God in a way that makes supernaturality irrelevant, since all you have to say about it relates to the same way that we speak about everything else.

No, I don't think the supernatural aspect is irrelevant. The fine-tuning argument seems to assume that the god in question is an intelligent, supernatural being capable of adjusting the rules that govern the natural universe. This assumption is inherent in the values that are placed on the premises. The existence of such a being would seem a more likely explanation for the universe being fine-tuned for life than if such a being didn't exist.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

<impressive list of exhibits deleted>

Guilty as charged. Look, whenever someone says "there's no evidence" then they typically mean no compelling evidence. There's evidence that God exists, but no compelling evidence, so people often say "there's no evidence that God exists."

Excuse the labeling, but I'm collecting some evidence of my own.

Is it compelling evidence? Should I go back and see if you've made the same mistake?

I'd much rather approach definitions than ask people to give them, because that's more honest--people typically suck at defining terms, but they usually have something good in mind. You, however, seem to simply be playing word games. So I'm going to stop, and take the harder approach. I think it's time to treat you as hostile.

I'm not hostile at all, but feel free to treat me that way if you like. I'm starting to get used to it by now.

So let's get straight to the point. Please define the following terms:

• evidence
• compelling evidence

Do it precisely. FYI, your definition of "compelling evidence" I don't really care about per se, but I will use it against you.

Evidence in its broadest sense includes everything that is used to determine or demonstrate the truth of an assertion.

Compelling evidence would be "strong" evidence, or evidence that clearly points to the truth of an assertion.

Uncompelling evidence would be "weak" evidence, or evidence that does not clearly point to the truth of an assertion.

A lack of compelling evidence would be a lack of evidence clearly pointing to the truth of an assertion (which sometimes occurs if there is similar evidence of an opposing assertion).

Note that I have added a words in bold to your list, because I've already admitted to being guilty of using the word "evidence" when I really meant "compelling evidence."

• We have compelling evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.
• There is no compelling evidence that there is intelligent life elsewhere.
• There is evidence that the probability of there being intelligent life elsewhere is near 0

Again, I apologize for the confusion. I've tried to be careful about adding the word "compelling" when I meant "compelling evidence" but obviously I have not succeeded in that regard on multiple occasions.

-Bri

 

[westprog]

Well, _I_'m talking about definitions, then. I don't see why "supernatural" is taken by you to mean "controls nature". "Beyond the known laws of natural physics" is the way I understand the word to mean.

I didn't say that something that is supernatural controls nature. I said that something that controls nature is supernatural.

 

[Bri]

I think that it's something like "we can't know the mechanism by reference to any observation". Once you make reference to an observation, then you make reference to an ability to know the mechanism. Once you make reference to something that produces gravity or a cause, it takes it out of the realm of dualism.

I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that because we observe gravity we can know the mechanism that causes it?

-Bri

 

[westprog]

Indeed. And since we have both A) Never observed any violations of those laws and B) Have no way to know what anything beyond those laws could be anyway, I can safely assume that, barring further evidence, nothing physically impossible exists.

You may certainly assume anything you wish.

 

[fls]

In this case, it's entirely constrained by convenience. There's no compelling evidence that intelligent life exists on the moon or Mars -- in fact, there's evidence against it.

Right. The value there comes from looking for life (a necessary pre-condition to intelligent life ).

So it's fairly obvious that SETI can't look in the most likely places (which would probably be other Earth-like planets). Of the places they can look (which would generally involve listening into outer space rather than actually looking), there isn't much if any evidence of where might be more likely to contain alien intelligence.

As I mentioned earlier, they can target their searches at sun-like stars, for example.

You're confusing the argument with its premises. The fine-tuning argument cj posted is a logical argument. One of the premises is supported by evidence of fine-tuning (yes, which is based on observations).

It is reasonable to refer to arguments about the path one follows using the rules of inference, like mathematical proofs, as logical arguments. But to claim that any statement is a logical argument makes the phrase meaningless. In that case, there is no distinction to be made between cj's argument and any other scientific endeavour (your original reason for bringing up the term), since they are both concerned with looking for information that speaks to the truth value of their premises.

I must admit, after all the back-and-forth I had to go back and see what statement incited this branch of the discussion. I said:

As far as I know, nobody is looking for gods and claiming it's science.​

That is true. The evidence of fine-tuning has little to do with looking for gods...

Then why do you think scientist believers brought it up to begin with?

I assume you understand what begging the question means? Even if my assumptions aren't proven, it's not an example of begging the question.

Right, as I said earlier, it's the process of asking a question that is answerable only by assuming as proven the premises under discussion.

That said, it's possible that there are legitimate scientific endeavors that involve collecting data without prior evidence for the purposes of falsifying a hypothesis. Or coming up with a falsifiable hypothesis that has tremendous explanatory power even without compelling evidence to support it (yet). Like I said, if I said or implied otherwise, I misspoke.

But searching for something for which there is no evidence for the purpose of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which does not explain any observation (as would be the case with searching for aliens) is not science, in my opinion.

The proposition is that searching for aliens isn't science. I didn't assume that in the premises, sorry.

Are those characteristics in bold characteristics of 'not science'? And if they aren't, why bring them up? And if they are, are you not assuming that they are the characteristics of the search for aliens, especially since you specifically state that?

"aliens exist" is not a hypothesis by that definition since it doesn't explain any facts or observations. It's also not falsifiable (by other definitions of scientific hypothesis). There is no theory of aliens that I'm aware of.

A theory of aliens would be premature. A hypothesis of 'aliens exist' would look for specific observations (in this case, patterned electromagnetic radiation). I hope you're not confusing the hypothesis with the results of testing that hypothesis.

Quite a feat of semantic gymnastics there! I don't know where to begin!

"A god exists" is not a valid scientific hypothesis. It is intended to explain facts or observations (such as the universe being fine-tuned) but is not necessary to explain them. There are no observations that have to be explained by a god. There is no evidence that a god exists. The hypothesis "a god exists" is also unfalsifiable.

"Extra terrestrial intelligent life exists" is not a valid scientific hypothesis. It does not explain any facts or observations.

It would be intended to explain electromagnetic transmissions from other planets/solar systems that contain information. It would be necessary to explain them.

There are no observations that have to be explained by aliens.

Right, but that's not relevant when you are in the process of testing a hypothesis, since the purpose of testing is to collect those observations that have to be explained by aliens.

The hypothesis "extra terrestrial intelligent life exists" is also unfalsifiable.

We agreed that that was merely a matter of practicality.

They are both based on observations. The universe is fine-tuned is an observation. There are a lot of stars is an observation.

Incidentally, the part is bold isn't an observation, it's an assumption. We don't know the conditions, and we don't know if they're present elsewhere.

We know the conditions under which intelligent life was formed here. We don't know which are necessary and whether we have identified all that are sufficient, but it's a start. It is possible to know whether suns and planets are present elsewhere, for example.

Oddly, in the italicized part of your comments, you seem to want to penalize the god-hypothesis because it may explain observations, whereas there aren't any observations that would be explained by the alien-hypothesis. Normally, explaining observations is considered a good thing for a hypothesis.

I said a useful explanation. Something that explains everything isn't useful. 'Useful' (which encompasses falsifiability) is a critical component of scientific inquiry.

There isn't really a decent explanation for the fact that the universe is fine-tuned. If there was, the fine-tuning argument wouldn't hold water. Multiple universes is one possible explanation, but it's not a great one.

The fine-tuning argument holds water?

The lack of a decent explanation for one component doesn't mean that it's useful to erase all our explanations, though.

No, I don't think the supernatural aspect is irrelevant. The fine-tuning argument seems to assume that the god in question is an intelligent, supernatural being capable of adjusting the rules that govern the natural universe.

'Adjusting the rules' doesn't require supernaturality.

Linda