Can theists be rational?

[Ichneumonwasp]

What do you think? How do you define "pixies?"

-Bri

Magical fairy-like creatures that muck up the works.

Irrational to believe in them. What is your answer?

 

[westprog]

So you're answer to my question above would be that God is not physically possible, since physically possible is defined as that which is possible according to the rules of physics? Supernatural is certainly not natural.

He is, however, logically possible.

That seems to be a fair summary. A god that's physically possible isn't really a god at all.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

cj.23 at one point posted a logical Bayesian argument (i.e. one that uses Bayes theorem) for the existence of a god based on evidence of fine-tuning.

And the argument has been shown to be seriously flawed and not "logical" or "rational" at all. (What about that big fat old contradiction it results in on the value of P(B) where B is something like "the universe is inhabitable"??)

It's also a validating argument in that you could put anything in for the word "God" and come out with the conclusion that that thing probably exists. (This is why people keep asking you things like, "Is it rational to believe in pixies?" We no more have to define what is meant by a pixie than you do God in the argument cj posted.)

This was compared to a hypothetical logical argument for aliens based on the Drake equation to see if a valid difference could be found.

And I agreed that if someone used the Drake Equation in the way you described to conclude that aliens exist, it would be an irrational argument. I disagree that SETI is proof that people have argued that way. I also disagree that the Drake Equation itself is useless (as is the god argument cj posted).

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I posted this first on the Makaya thread, but it probably belongs here:

"You can't test whether or not aliens exist any more than you can test whether or not a god exists -- it's unfalsifiable." - Bri

Belz--I don't think the Bri quote in your sig is as bad as it sounds. Maybe it's not so well worded, but I think Bri's point here is valid as it pertains to statements like, "There are alien intelligences in the universe."

You can't falsify that claim until you have somehow searched every last corner of the universe. You can falsify the complementary claim, "There are no alien intelligences in the universe" by finding one instance of an alien intelligence.

My own take is that even if alien intelligences are relatively abundant, we're not likely EVER to find one (just because stuff is so spread out in space and time). Failing to find one does not disprove the statement, "There are alien intelligences in the universe."

My issue with Bri is that I don't know of anyone who is making the statement, "There are alien intelligences in the universe." As with Sagan's statement, I'd be surprised if there weren't, but we have no evidence, so that statement is not substantiated.

Also, it differs markedly from the statement, "God exists" because while we do have one certain example of intelligent life in the universe (perhaps more than one depending on how you define "intelligent"), we have absolutely no certain examples of gods. The one statement assumes that something that has happened at least once will or has happened more than once. The other statement assumes something there is no reason to think has ever happened.

They're both assumptions, but the former is based on the assumption that the laws of physics and whatnot that led to our existence probably work the same way through in other places, while the latter is based on nothing.

 

[Bri]

It is rational to suppose that life could arise on other planets similar to our own, given the causal nexus resulting in life forming here.

I agree, but then again I think it's rational to suppose the opposite too, or anything for which there is no compelling evidence for or against. It has nothing to do with a causal nexus except in the case where such a causal nexus would be evidence (either for or against). In this case, it's not evidence either for or against any particular supposition you might make concerning the existence of intelligent life elsewhere.

I'm not talking about a conclusion. I'm talking about generating hypotheses. It is rational to suppose that life exists elsewhere in the universe because we have evidence of it here and we know that the same causal account could apply elsewhere.

We don't know the events or conditions by which it happened here, and we don't know if those events or conditions happened elsewhere. So, yes, you can generate an entirely inconclusive hypothesis either way, based on no compelling evidence. But I agree, it would not be irrational to do so.

Why do you keep turning this into "forming a conclusion" when I haven't used that phrase. I am speaking of conjecture based on previous experience and a foundation of causality. We do it all the time. What is the problem?

In this case, there is no previous experience or foundation of causality upon which to base a conjecture -- it would simply be a guess. Just as if I made a conjecture that the flip of a coin would wind up "tails" based on the fact that I previously flipped the coin and it landed on "tails." Of course, there is no basis for that conjecture -- it's just a guess.

What? Special pleading? Please explain yourself because you look to me like you are tying yourself in knots.

Your definition of "magic" said nothing about dualism or about it only applying to the case of the immaterial interacting with the material, nor does there seem to be any use in redefining a term that already has a definition in such a way that it only applies to a specific situation. Maybe it will help if I illustrate this conversation from my perspective:

You: Kangaroos are milk.
Me: Milk? How are you defining "milk" in that context?
You: Milk - an animal with a pouch.
Me: Oh, OK. So a opossum is milk.
You: How can you compare a kangaroo to an opossum? They're totally different! The word "milk" only applies to kangaroos!
Me: I never compared a kangaroo to an opossum. I used the word "milk" as you defined it. As you defined it, an opossum is milk.
You: Why do you keep comparing a kangaroo and an opossum? They're totally different!
Me: To say that only a kangaroo can be milk as you defined it would require special pleading.
You: What? Special pleading? Please explain yourself because you look to me like you are tying yourself in knots.

If you want to insist that "magic" only applies to dualism, then you'll need to redefine "magic" in some way other than how you defined it. Using the definition YOU gave, quantum randomness and gravity are "magic."

I'm most definitely not saying that there is something special about dualism that has not been discussed by countless others in the history of philosophy. This problem -- the interaction problem -- is a very serious issue. It does not go away by invoking quantum weirdness; nor is it a problem with my using the word 'magic'.

I don't have a problem with your saying that dualism is problematic (I agree). My problem doesn't have anything to do with quantum randomness. My problem is with your use of the word "magic" to describe an unknown mechanism for dualism, but not using the same word to describe other unknown mechanisms.

I said that dualism works by magic because we cannot, by the nature of interaction of completely different substances, explain the interaction.

You have yet to show that it would be impossible to explain the interaction. You have also yet to show how quantum randomness or gravity are not "magic" using the same definition you gave earlier (having an unexplainable mechanism).

How in the world can you claim special pleading when I am only describing the nature of the issue that dualists define in the first place?

The special pleading refers to your use of the term "magic" only to dualism but not to anything else to which your definition also applies. I suspect that you know that the usual definition of the word "magic" has specific connotations that aren't in your definition, which is why you don't want to use the term to describe other things to which it applies.

This is an interaction issue, where the interaction involves a mental program that influences the physical realm through an unexplainable mechanism. And you want to draw a parallel with quantum foam with particles appearing and disappearing randomly, as though they are somehow equivalent?

Ummm...no. I've said repeatedly that I didn't draw any parallel between quantum foam and interactions between the immaterial and material other than that they are both meet your definition of "magic," which makes it silly for you to use that term to describe only one of them but not the other.

You seem to be focusing on a single phrase "can't be explained" and neglecting the rest -- that we are discussing interactions between incommensurate substances.

Your definition of "magic" didn't mention anything about interactions between incommensurate substances, and if it did then it would be a pretty useless term (and an example of special pleading since it would only apply to a single situation for no apparent reason whatsoever).

It doesn't matter if theists would object to pantheism (Reform Judaism does not but Orthodox Judaism certainly does -- they excommunicated Spinoza in the 17th century. They do though, fairly often, especially Christians. Their God is personal. The issue at play here is not monism, as I've mentioned several times, but dualism. This is a non-issue.

This whole debate is not about pantheists; it concerns theists. Theists, by most common definitions, believe in a personal God.

I'm not talking about pantheism. In the scenario I described, God is not the same as nature. God is supernatural, and nature is a subset of the supernatural. The natural universe is a part of the supernatural, but is not the same as the supernatural. The idea I'm talking about has been around longer than Spinoza or Reform Judaism.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Belz--I don't think the Bri quote in your sig is as bad as it sounds. Maybe it's not so well worded, but I think Bri's point here is valid as it pertains to statements like, "There are alien intelligences in the universe."

You can't falsify that claim until you have somehow searched every last corner of the universe. You can falsify the complementary claim, "There are no alien intelligences in the universe" by finding one instance of an alien intelligence.

My own take is that even if alien intelligences are relatively abundant, we're not likely EVER to find one (just because stuff is so spread out in space and time). Failing to find one does not disprove the statement, "There are alien intelligences in the universe."

Thanks Joe. Yes, that's exactly what I meant (and that's generally what "unfalsifiable" means).

My issue with Bri is that I don't know of anyone who is making the statement, "There are alien intelligences in the universe." As with Sagan's statement, I'd be surprised if there weren't, but we have no evidence, so that statement is not substantiated.

Again, I don't disagree, except I think that Sagan and SETI members probably are of the opinion that alien intelligence exists whether they admit it outright or not.

Also, it differs markedly from the statement, "God exists" because while we do have one certain example of intelligent life in the universe (perhaps more than one depending on how you define "intelligent"), we have absolutely no certain examples of gods.

Again, I agree but not entirely. I'd compare the extra terrestrial intelligent life example with a teapot orbiting Jupiter. Yes, we have an example of intelligent life, and we have lots of examples of teapots. But no compelling evidence at all that they exist elsewhere.

The one statement assumes that something that has happened at least once will or has happened more than once. The other statement assumes something there is no reason to think has ever happened.

Sure, but the problem is that you can't extrapolate from one data point.

They're both assumptions, but the former is based on the assumption that the laws of physics and whatnot that led to our existence probably work the same way through in other places, while the latter is based on nothing.

Close...but not quite. The issue has nothing to do with whether or not the laws of physics work elsewhere. It has to do with how likely the conditions and events that gave rise to life on Earth are to have occurred elsewhere, which we simply don't know (and probably can't know until we know the conditions and events that gave rise to life on Earth, which we don't). There is evidence (not conclusive evidence by any means, but evidence nonetheless) that those conditions and events were extremely rare.

-Bri

 

[westprog]

Ah, I see where you're getting at.

I don't think so.

So we have supermass (a.k.a gravity), superphoton (a.k.a. electromagnetism), superboson (a.k.a. weak force), etc.

No, nothing of the kind.

But clearly your supernatural is subject to investigation by science,

No, by definition it isn't.

whereas Bri says that his/hers isn't. So thanks for jumping in I guess, but we'll have to leave it to Bri to answer my question since you guys are talking about two different things.

Linda

There's a good reason why we refer to the natural sciences. Science can't deal with what is not natural. There is no reason to suppose that the operations of the supernatural would be in any way analogous to the natural.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

That seems to be a fair summary. A god that's physically possible isn't really a god at all.

I think I might qualify it a bit, though, which I will hopefully explain below.

Since I can't get Bri to move beyond semantic quibbling that is a total waste of time, here's how I view it.

When it comes to existence, we can speak of physical and logical possibility. If something is logically impossible then it cannot exist (no square circles, no married bachelors), so we needn't discuss that further.

To be physically possible whatever existent we discuss must first be logically possible.

I can see three categories here. There is the logically possible and physically possible. There is the logically possible and physically impossible. And there is the third category.

Logically possible and physically impossible are things like the FSM, invisible pink unicorns, faeries, Santa Claus, etc. All are logically possible (no internal contradictions) but they violate one or more of the laws of physics. So, consequently there is no need to believe that they exist.

Logically possible and physically possible includes most of the stuff we normally discuss, and for this discussion the idea of extraterrestrial intelligent life. That is something that does not contain an internal contradiction and does not violate the laws of physics.

That leaves the third category, which I believe has a single constituent -- God. I don't think it is proper to speak of any real conception of God as physically impossible. Rather, I think it more proper to view God as beyond such a concern, so to place God in one of those categories (logically possible and physically possible or impossible) is a category mistake. God is transcendent, if anything.

So, where does that leave us in this discussion? We clearly have different categories of being, and that is the prime point several people have been trying to argue. We are not simply left with an issue over evidence because not every entity is in the same category. We are inclined to reject certain categories even if there is some evidence because they require extraordinary evidence to command assent. If we examine these categories, we should see something like the following:

Logically impossible -- non-existent, so don't believe it.

Logically possible but physically impossible -- don't believe it. If evidence is provided to the contrary, then we need to reassess what we mean by categorizing it as physically impossible since we may have miscategorized the entity. We don't believe in faeries, but if someone could actually show strong evidence of their existence, then we should reassess-- not because we should start to believe the physically impossible but because it would mean that they are not physically impossible. This is where 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence' comes into play. Counter-evidence also exists in the form of known human-invented stories for these entities, making their actual reality much less likely.

Logically possible and physically possible -- belief depends on the evidence. For belief that intelligent life is likely elsewhere in the universe we have the evidence of life arising here presumably through natural means; the existence of an unimaginably high number of stars and, most likely, planets to serve as hosts; and the prior experience that, however unlikely a particular scenario might be (genetic mutation to produce drug resistance), the law of large numbers seems to convert such possibilities into eventualities. The only counter evidence offered is that it is probably difficult for life to begin and also difficult for intelligent life to evolve (an objection already obviated by the law of large numbers).

For belief that I am currently licking strawberry licorice from between Heidi Klum's toes while listening to Mussorgsky's "Fire on Bald Mountain", there is no evidence to suggest that is the case; and there is strong evidence to suggest otherwise, since Heidi was just spotted on the other side of the country.

For God, we have a situation where we cannot use the crutch of physically possible and are left only with the logically possible. When it comes to theism, most people define God as a person -- most theists have no concern or interest in an impersonal God, so we can leave the impersonal definitions of God on the side. God, to be a person, must be made of some substance other than the material because he could not have created the material if it comprises what He is. So, for us to discuss God as a person, we must invoke some form of dualism. Since, by definition, the interactions between fundamentally different substances cannot be explained, we cannot understand how God works, we cannot understand the means by which He alters the physical universe. But since that idea is an integral part of many theologies, I don't see why it would bother any theist.


Finally, to the question of the rationality/irrationality/reasonableness of these various beliefs.

It is reasonable to believe in the likelihood of intelligent life existing somewhere else in the universe because: (1) this is in the category of logically possible and physically possible, so we already have the crutch of material causality to help impel some form of belief; (2) we have provided a reasonable justification based on the existence of intelligent life arising once through presumably natural means and the existence of other stars, etc. whether or not it is unlikely or even very unlikely for intelligent life to form (the evidence for this contention is poor at best since it is based on one instance and even that one instance is not entirely known)

It is unreasonable to believe in the existence of Santa Claus because: (1) this is in the category of the logically possible but physically impossible (so it requires extraordinary evidence to demonstrate); (2) we have no evidence that such an entity actually exists; and (3) we have counter-evidence that the story was invented.

It is unreasonable to believe in the existence of a personal God because: (1) this is in the category of logically possible but cannot be limited by physical possibility or impossibility (so it requires extraordinary evidence to demonstrate, since mere logical possibility is not compelling for existence); (2) physical evidence to support this claim depends on a leap in logic -- that God can miraculously interact with the world -- rather than the causal chain of evidence used for the physically possible; (3) we have only subjective reports as the form of physical evidence supplied; and (4) we have counter-evidence that every culture has created its own story for its God belief.

And this should not bother a theist in the least since the whole point of belief is that it is not rational. If it were rational, then we wouldn't be discussing it.

 

[Bri]

We have looked at samples from the moon, Mars, and meteors for evidence of life.

SETI isn't looking at Mars (I believe that NASA is though), but that's besides the point. We are looking on the moon and Mars (and perhaps meteors that fall on our planet) out of convenience, not because there is any evidence that those are more likely to contain alien life than other planets in the universe. It would be a stretch to compare that to paleontologists use of evidence to find fossils.

You said that nobody is searching for God and claiming it is science. I agree that it isn't actually science, but it really seems to me that people are claiming that it is. Otherwise, why would it be presented as a rational argument for God that involves empirical inputs?

I said that nobody is physically searching for God and claiming that it's science. So you honestly don't see the difference between physically searching for something and forming a logical argument for it?

Earlier you suggested that statements of a certain type were unfalsifiable and therefore couldn't be science. It now seems that you have backed down from that assertion.

Searching for something for which there is no evidence for the purpose of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which does not explain any observation (as would be the case with searching for aliens) is not science, in my opinion. If I said anything else, then I misspoke.

So you agree that it was a perfect example of 'begging the question' in that this discussion has centered around what it is that distinguishes good science from pseudo- or non-science.

I can't see any way that you could legitimately construe my comments as an example of begging the question.

This discussion was about the differences between belief in gods and other beliefs that are commonly considered "rational" or "irrational." We got a bit sidetracked with a discussion of whether searching for aliens would be considered science or pseudo-science. I offered my opinion on the matter. You may have the opinion that searching for something for which there is no evidence for the purpose of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which does not explain any observation is science, but then so would be all sorts of other possibly pointless endeavors such as searching for gods or teapots orbiting Jupiter.

You simply keep asserting that SETI is pseudo- or non-science because those characteristics which apply to pseudo- or non-science also apply to SETI, without ever addressing whether SETI actually has those characteristics. It's kind of funny, actually.

Huh? I think I did address whether SETI has those characteristics. SETI is searching for something for which there is no evidence for the purpose of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which does not explain any observation.

I define formal hypothesis or theory in the way that they are used as technical scientific terms.

Which is? Once you define it, please explain how the hypothesis "a god exists" is not a formal hypothesis or theory but "aliens exist" is, if you feel that to be the case.

Of the modern concepts of God that we have been considering (mostly sorta variations on Deism, I think), we start with God and look for something for it to do - like create the universe, fine-tune the universe, control/represent universal consciousness, etc.

I don't think you have any idea why other people might form a hypothesis that a god exists, nor is it relevant to the validity of the hypothesis. I would argue that it is likely that the concept of gods are typically developed by looking at the complexity of the world and searching for an explanation of it. Similar to the approach taken by the fine-tuning argument.

I think God was proposed in response to the questions I list below, but our scientific exploration of those observations that gave us the idea of God led to non-God explanations. If we were to start fresh - that is, if we started with the understanding that we have achieved through science - what would lead us to propose God de novo?

Possibly evidence of the fine-tuning of the universe, for one.

Probably the discovery of other planets and then other stars and galaxies.

Sounds about right. So we came up with the hypothesis about aliens by observing stars.

Probably questions like 'what is it that controls the weather?', 'what are those lights in the sky and why do they move in patterns?', 'why do humans seem unique among animals?', etc.

Perhaps. Seems pretty reasonable that observations about the universe lead to both hypotheses then. So tell me, how is only one of them "formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place" and the other not? Or are you saying that both have a scientific basis? It's hard to tell exactly what you're trying to suggest because you don't seem to ever come out with it.

I don't understand the implication. If God has the power to change the universal constants, and the universal constants are part of the natural universe, wouldn't that make God part of the natural universe? Why would it have to be separate?

I defined the word "god" as a supernatural being at the beginning of the thread, so that's the basis for the assumption.

Presumably, the universal constants define the "rules" of the universe by which everything within the universe would be governed. A being that could set them presumably couldn't be governed by them. You are free to disagree I guess.

Finally, the notion of a god as a creator of the natural universe would require that the god be outside of the natural universe (unless you accept the possibility of creating oneself).

-Bri

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Your definition of "magic" said nothing about dualism or about it only applying to the case of the immaterial interacting with the material, nor does there seem to be any use in redefining a term that already has a definition in such a way that it only applies to a specific situation. Maybe it will help if I illustrate this conversation from my perspective:

You: Kangaroos are milk.
Me: Milk? How are you defining "milk" in that context?
You: Milk - an animal with a pouch.
Me: Oh, OK. So a opossum is milk.
You: How can you compare a kangaroo to an opossum? They're totally different! The word "milk" only applies to kangaroos!
Me: I never compared a kangaroo to an opossum. I used the word "milk" as you defined it. As you defined it, an opossum is milk.
You: Why do you keep comparing a kangaroo and an opossum? They're totally different!
Me: To say that only a kangaroo can be milk as you defined it would require special pleading.
You: What? Special pleading? Please explain yourself because you look to me like you are tying yourself in knots.

If you want to insist that "magic" only applies to dualism, then you'll need to redefine "magic" in some way other than how you defined it. Using the definition YOU gave, quantum randomness and gravity are "magic."



I don't have a problem with your saying that dualism is problematic (I agree). My problem doesn't have anything to do with quantum randomness. My problem is with your use of the word "magic" to describe an unknown mechanism for dualism, but not using the same word to describe other unknown mechanisms.



You have yet to show that it would be impossible to explain the interaction. You have also yet to show how quantum randomness or gravity are not "magic" using the same definition you gave earlier (having an unexplainable mechanism).



The special pleading refers to your use of the term "magic" only to dualism but not to anything else to which your definition also applies. I suspect that you know that the usual definition of the word "magic" has specific connotations that aren't in your definition, which is why you don't want to use the term to describe other things to which it applies.



Ummm...no. I've said repeatedly that I didn't draw any parallel between quantum foam and interactions between the immaterial and material other than that they are both meet your definition of "magic," which makes it silly for you to use that term to describe only one of them but not the other.



Your definition of "magic" didn't mention anything about interactions between incommensurate substances, and if it did then it would be a pretty useless term (and an example of special pleading since it would only apply to a single situation for no apparent reason whatsoever).

Bri, I have no desire to continue in circles about this. This entire discussion of "magic" transpired in the context of talking about dualism. I do not now, nor have I ever, thought that merely something happening without explanation constitutes 'magic'. My definition, in the context of this discussion, has always included the idea of a particular something -- the mental -- affecting the material without a possible causal explanation. "Magic" in the way that I have been using it is merely a way to denote this problem with dualism, so it does not apply to other situations. I have always discussed it as a problem with interaction between different substances and in no other way.

For something like quantum weirdness I prefer a different word - mysterious -- rather than magic because magic implies that there is a mind behing the interaction.

Can we let this go now? If I did not express myself clearly, I apologize; but you clearly misunderstood the point I was trying to make.

I'm not talking about pantheism. In the scenario I described, God is not the same as nature. God is supernatural, and nature is a subset of the supernatural. The natural universe is a part of the supernatural, but is not the same as the supernatural. The idea I'm talking about has been around longer than Spinoza or Reform Judaism.

-Bri

If the natural is a subset of the supernatural (and for God to be separate from nature), then we must be discussing either a form of substance dualism or property dualism.

There are a few different scenarios possible -- we and God are made of the same substance, but nature is made of another. But since our bodies are clearly made of the same sort of substance as the rest of nature, then we are stuck with typical mind-body dualism. God is made of one substance and we and nature are made of another -- but that is just the same dualism we have been discussing. God is made of one substance and we (and nature) are made of the same substance, which is pantheism (which you deny). God is made of one substance and we and nature are made of the same substance, but God has different properties than we and nature. That is property dualism (one form is seen in neutral monism, which is just dualism in a dress), which suffers from similar problems as substance dualism but not as dire. How can you account for the different properties between God and nature?

The problem is that any form of dualism, either substance or property, has a central problem that cannot be explained. That is why I prefer monism. That problem disappears.

 

[Bri]

But clearly your supernatural is subject to investigation by science, whereas Bri says that his/hers isn't. So thanks for jumping in I guess, but we'll have to leave it to Bri to answer my question since you guys are talking about two different things.

I don't think I said that the supernatural couldn't be investigated by science. I think I said that science doesn't tend to posit the existence of things for which there is no evidence.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Magical fairy-like creatures that muck up the works.

Irrational to believe in them. What is your answer?

Possibly irrational, but not necessarily by that definition. At least not by any reasonable definition of "irrational" I can think of.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

And the argument has been shown to be seriously flawed and not "logical" or "rational" at all. (What about that big fat old contradiction it results in on the value of P(B) where B is something like "the universe is inhabitable"??)

Unless you think that Bayes theorm is invalid or incoherent, the fine-tuning argument itself is not illogical or irrational. However, there is no compelling evidence to support the premise, which means that there's no compelling evidence to support the conclusion.

It's also a validating argument in that you could put anything in for the word "God" and come out with the conclusion that that thing probably exists.

Nope, that's just ignorance of the argument. Unless you accept the premise that the existence of the thing in question would result in a much higher probability that the universe is fine-tuned it would not result in any such conclusion.

(This is why people keep asking you things like, "Is it rational to believe in pixies?" We no more have to define what is meant by a pixie than you do God in the argument cj posted.)

As I said, unless you think that there is a much higher probability of the universe being fine-tuned if a pixie exists, the argument in question would not produce a higher posterior probability of a pixie's existence.

And I agreed that if someone used the Drake Equation in the way you described to conclude that aliens exist, it would be an irrational argument. I disagree that SETI is proof that people have argued that way. I also disagree that the Drake Equation itself is useless (as is the god argument cj posted).

Well, then we're at least partially in agreement. I agree that IF you are going to call a belief for which there is no compelling evidence irrational, then both the fine-tuning argument and an argument for aliens would be irrational. I would also agree that the Drake equation is not useless. I would disagree with you about SETI though, as would Wikipedia:

By plugging in apparently "plausible" values for each of the parameters above, the resultant expectant value of N is often (much) greater than 1. This has provided considerable motivation for the SETI movement.​

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Bri, I have no desire to continue in circles about this. This entire discussion of "magic" transpired in the context of talking about dualism. I do not now, nor have I ever, thought that merely something happening without explanation constitutes 'magic'. My definition, in the context of this discussion, has always included the idea of a particular something -- the mental -- affecting the material without a possible causal explanation. "Magic" in the way that I have been using it is merely a way to denote this problem with dualism, so it does not apply to other situations. I have always discussed it as a problem with interaction between different substances and in no other way.

Got it. "Milk" only refers to kangaroos and not to opossums.

For something like quantum weirdness I prefer a different word - mysterious -- rather than magic because magic implies that there is a mind behing the interaction.

I suspect that you prefer the word "mysterious" rather than "magic" because you're thinking of the ACTUAL definition of "magic" rather than the one you made up, and you think it sounds ridiculous when referring to things that you aren't trying to convince me are irrational.

Can we let this go now? If I did not express myself clearly, I apologize; but you clearly misunderstood the point I was trying to make.

Yes, absolutely. I did miss the point you were trying to make. I admit that I was probably a little distracted because "magic" is a loaded term (which you likely already knew when you used it). So let's just call anything for which there is no explanation "mysterious" (which is a much more apt term) and be done with it.

If the natural is a subset of the supernatural (and for God to be separate from nature), then we must be discussing either a form of substance dualism or property dualism.

In this case, nature is a subset of the supernatural, so I don't know that "separate" is the correct term.

There are a few different scenarios possible -- we and God are made of the same substance, but nature is made of another. But since our bodies are clearly made of the same sort of substance as the rest of nature, then we are stuck with typical mind-body dualism.

That wouldn't be an apt description of what I have in mind.

God is made of one substance and we and nature are made of another -- but that is just the same dualism we have been discussing.

Right, that's definitely not what I have in mind.

God is made of one substance and we (and nature) are made of the same substance, which is pantheism (which you deny).

That is the closest to what I have in mind, but I don't think it's pantheism, at least not according to definitions I've seen which describe God AS nature rather than beyond nature. In this scenario, the supernatural and the natural are perhaps made of the same substance, but they are NOT one in the same (they don't have the same properties, for example).

God is made of one substance and we and nature are made of the same substance, but God has different properties than we and nature.

Bingo. I think that's even closer.

That is property dualism (one form is seen in neutral monism, which is just dualism in a dress), which suffers from similar problems as substance dualism but not as dire. How can you account for the different properties between God and nature?

How do you account for different properties between your nose and your eye? I'm not sure I understand the question.

The problem is that any form of dualism, either substance or property, has a central problem that cannot be explained. That is why I prefer monism. That problem disappears.

What is the central problem, other than that there is something that we don't understand (yet)? There's a lot we don't understand about the universe yet, monism or not.

-Bri

 

[Paulhoff]

What is the central problem, other than that there is something that we don't understand (yet)? There's a lot we don't understand about the universe yet, monism or not.

-Bri

And still just because we don't understand a lot about the universe does not mean we need a so-called god for the gaps knowledge. It is useless, it only divides people into, "We are right about this so-called god and you just don't get it".

Paul



I have no problem with not knowing, I will wait.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Thanks Joe. Yes, that's exactly what I meant (and that's generally what "unfalsifiable" means).

I think the confusion is that you said "whether or not". And the statement "There are no alien intelligences" is falsifiable. I'm pretty sure that's what Belz found. . . .curious.

Again, I don't disagree, except I think that Sagan and SETI members probably are of the opinion that alien intelligence exists whether they admit it outright or not.

So you think Sagan and SETI scientists are lying? Why?

Close...but not quite. The issue has nothing to do with whether or not the laws of physics work elsewhere. It has to do with how likely the conditions and events that gave rise to life on Earth are to have occurred elsewhere, which we simply don't know (and probably can't know until we know the conditions and events that gave rise to life on Earth, which we don't).

We know the likelihood of events and conditions that gave rise to life on Earth is 1 in 1. For the assertion that that's not possible to happen anywhere else does imply that the laws of physics (chemistry, etc.) don't work the same anywhere else.

There is evidence (not conclusive evidence by any means, but evidence nonetheless) that those conditions and events were extremely rare.

I've only seen conjecture. Also, since we don't know whether other conditions could be suitable for abiogenesis (not like those that led to life on Earth), we really don't know much of anything about its likelihood throughout the universe.

 

[articulett]

Here's a definition: The opposite of demon(s).

Do you believe in the possibility of demon(s)?

Are demons as much of a probability as "intelligent extra terrestrial life"? You can use whatever definition you want. Is it more rational to believe in god(s) than demons(s)?

 

[yy2bggggs]

I answered the best I could without complete information. Please clarify whether you mean "today" instead of "yesterday" since your question doesn't seem to be particularly meaningful otherwise.

Bri:

You: There is no evidence that there is intelligent life elsewhere.
Me: That there is intelligent life here is evidence that there is intelligent life elsewhere.
You: There is no evidence that there is intelligent life elsewhere.
Me: Okay. There's no evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.
You: Sure there is.
Me: You can't say that unless you make an assumption. Tell me, is the fact that the sun rose yesterday evidence that it will rise tomorrow?
You: I assume you mean today. If it rose only today, that is not compelling evidence that it will rise tomorrow.

Now here we are. I was asking about yesterday, and simply whether or not that is evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow. I wasn't asking about hypotheticals. I don't care if the question doesn't make sense to you. The question is very simply, whether or not you consider the sun rising yesterday as evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.

I'm not asking about the sun rising today. Just yesterday. I'm not asking about what it would be like if you only knew the sun rose yesterday. I'm not asking about whether or not it's convincing. I'm not asking about compelling evidence. I'm only asking you whether or not the fact that the sun rose yesterday, is evidence that it will rise tomorrow.

The question is simply being asked, exactly for what it is. The question is about what you mean by "evidence"--just evidence, unqualified, in direct response to your notion that there is no evidence that there is intelligent life elsewhere, as a direct comparison to my analogous claim that this implies there is no evidence that the sun will rise tomorrow.

 

[articulett]

The sun only appears to rise because we are on a sphere orbiting towards it each day and away each night.

 

[yy2bggggs]

The sun only appears to rise because we are on a sphere orbiting towards it each day and away each night.

Pbbbt! And what makes your geodesic so special?