What do you mean that "we have similar causal influences out there in the universe and that there are plenty of other stars that could potentially support life if all the conditions apply?" Couldn't the same be said of teapots orbiting Jupiter? Does that make the idea rational? The part in bold is important. There is no evidence that all the conditions that exist here apply elsewhere. Without that evidence, you cannot form a conclusion one way or the other.
The evidence of whether life exists (particularly intelligent life) is inconclusive. I don't know what "causal ideas" you know of that would lead you to a conclusion that's not supported by evidence. Sure, you can form a hypothesis about just about anything. In this case, it's unfalsifiable. You can similarly form hypotheses for "a teapot orbits Jupiter" or "a god exists."
There is a causal nexus in this universe. We observe causation. We have seen that life arose on this planet. It is rational to suppose that life could arise on other planets similar to our own, given the causal nexus resulting in life forming here.
I'm not talking about a conclusion. I'm talking about generating hypotheses. It is rational to suppose that life exists elsewhere in the universe because we have evidence of it here and we know that the same causal account could apply elsewhere.
Why do you keep turning this into "forming a conclusion" when I haven't used that phrase. I am speaking of conjecture based on previous experience and a foundation of causality. We do it all the time. What is the problem?
You have defined a phrase "it's magic" (meaning "it's mechanism is unexplainable") that is fairly general, but then you claim that it only applies to dualism and not to other things (for those things, you use a different phrase "it just is"). That definitely sounds like special pleading to me (and not any definition of "magic" that I've ever heard of).
Nobody was equating "random" to "magic" -- that they are being compared is a straw man. You said that the mechanism that causes quantum randomness is unexplainable. Similarly, the mechanism that causes gravity. You defined "magic" as applying to something for which the mechanism is unexplainable. So why aren't quantum randomness and gravity "magic" by your definition?
According to your definition, they are magic. No, I don't see the difference unless your claiming that your definition only applies to dualism (which seems like special pleading).
What? Special pleading? Please explain yourself because you look to me like you are tying yourself in knots. I'm most definitely not saying that there is something special about dualism that has not been discussed by countless others in the history of philosophy. This problem -- the interaction problem -- is a very serious issue. It does not go away by invoking quantum weirdness; nor is it a problem with my using the word 'magic'.
We were discussing dualism. I said that dualism works by magic because we cannot, by the nature of interaction of completely different substances, explain the interaction. Dualism, as it is defined, includes the mental and the physical. This isn't new or difficult stuff. If you don't know what these terms mean, then there is no sense in having any sort of discussion with you. By it's very nature we are talking about the interaction of the mental with the physical; that interaction, by the way it is defined, has no explanation. How in the world can you claim special pleading when I am only describing the nature of the issue that dualists define in the first place?
This is an interaction issue, where the interaction involves a mental program that influences the physical realm through an unexplainable mechanism. And you want to draw a parallel with quantum foam with particles appearing and disappearing randomly, as though they are somehow equivalent? That something may occur randomly is not the same as an interaction between separate realms that cannot have an explanation. How can you not understand that?
Quantum weirdness is not an interaction between different substances. It does not involve discovering a mechanism for interaction. This issue involves interactions between substances.
You seem to be focusing on a single phrase "can't be explained" and neglecting the rest -- that we are discussing interactions between incommensurate substances.
'Magic' is a descriptive word to denote the interaction problem. It is not an argument.
If you want to ignore half an issue, you can build any sort of straw elephant you want.
I don't have time for such games.
What I'm suggesting isn't idealism since it doesn't imply that we only exist within God's mind and that our universe isn't material. Perhaps it qualifies as materialism, although it doesn't imply that God is material unless you expand the notion of "material" beyond what we currently believe it to mean. I don't think many theists would object to the idea that the natural universe is a part of a supernatural God. I believe I read somewhere that Jewish theologists speak of the natural universe as being a subset or part of God.
-Bri
Yes, it does imply that God is material if he is made of the same stuff. What makes you think we have a definition of matter that makes sense or is not circular? For that matter, what makes you think that there is a difference between idealism and materialism? Examine the ideas in detail and I cahllenge you to find a difference -- if there is only one substance there can be no difference, in large part because we cannot know all the characteristics of the ur-substance. All we can do is describe how it acts. The rest is pure conjecture.
It doesn't matter if theists would object to pantheism (Reform Judaism does not but Orthodox Judaism certainly does -- they excommunicated Spinoza in the 17th century. They do though, fairly often, especially Christians. Their God is personal. The issue at play here is not monism, as I've mentioned several times, but dualism. This is a non-issue.
This whole debate is not about pantheists; it concerns theists. Theists, by most common definitions, believe in a personal God.
