Can theists be rational?

[GStan]

; {>

What the hell is that, anyway ?

I'm thinking someone with a goatee/fumanchu?

ETA: and he looks angry about it.

 

[westprog]

Which god and you'll have to also supply definitions for "will" and "manifestation" to make your last sentence have any meaningful content.

Clearly if you don't accept the possibility of god existing then you are going to find it difficult to accept the possibility of god interacting with the universe.

I don't find "will" and "manifestation" ambiguous, even in this metaphysical context. The principle is simple. If the universe exists at all because it is created by god, how can he have a problem interacting with it?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

double post, sorry

 

[westprog]

That's nice. It's also a claim, and I'd like you to demonstrate this.

The only way that "God" is not problematic is if he's not omni-anything, and obeys the laws of physics. In which case, of course, he's not a god, but just an alien being. Ergo, "God" is problematic.

If you have a problem with the existence of God, then you will inevitably have a problem seeing how a god can interact with a material universe. If you accept the possibility that a god exists, then I don't see any problem with him doing whatever he wants.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Be more specific about what you consider a "compelling reason" when there is neither compelling evidence for or against something.

Such as following along a causal chain, whether or not we have all the evidence. We had no evidence to suggest that there was a dark side of the moon before we saw it, but we had compelling reasons to accept its reality based on prior evidence of other bodies and a causal chain.

What does "not entirely rational/reasonable/logical" mean to you other than "irrational/unreasonable/illogical?"

That's pretty much what it means.

Of course, quantum theory suggests events that are uncaused. So not all events are the result of previous causes (unless you're suggesting that quantum theory is "not entirely rational"). But maybe I misunderstood.

How does quantum theory proposing that not all events are predictable make quantum theory not entirely rational?

The events are what is not predictable, not the theory. Those events are not properly part of an entirely explainable causal chain, correct. The universe does not work on entirely explainable grounds, or so it appears. At a fundamental level the universe appears entirely random, but with those random fluxuations cancelling out at higher levels.

We can see these fluxations but we cannot explain how they occur or predict them. They do not fit into our model of reason/rationality. We can, however, reason about them, as in quantum theory.

If dualism might be correct, then it's not impossible or incoherent.

Of course, and have said so several times now. It is not impossible since it could work by magic.

Granted, there is no compelling evidence to support it, but I'm not sure what other (if any) distinction you're making between a belief that dualism is correct and other beliefs for which there is no compelling evidence in order to consider dualism "not entirely rational" but other such beliefs "rational." Or do you consider all beliefs for which there is no compelling evidence "not entirely rational?"

-Bri

Belief in dualism requires belief in an otherwise organized entity (a mind, or Form) that affects the universe through even theoretically unexplainable means (magic). It consists in wanting to have your cake and eat it too.

ETA:

Lack of evidence is always an issue with this sort of conjecture, but the real problem I have with it is its inelegance. This is a fundamentally different issue from us not having evidence for something that fits within a monistic explanation.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

If the universe exists at all because it is created by god, how can he have a problem interacting with it?

The issue is not that God could not interact with the universe, but that we could not explain how the interaction happens, so it cuts off discussion and thinking. It's unfalsifiable, so there's not much sense talking about it.

It could be the way that the world works, but since we can't tell the difference in the absence of evidence of this occurring, it doesn't appreciably differ from wild dingoes in Tutus on the 4th cosmic plane affecting the world every time their noses drip.

 

[Paulhoff]

If you have a problem with the existence of God, then you will inevitably have a problem seeing how a god can interact with a material universe. If you accept the possibility that a god exists, then I don't see any problem with him doing whatever he wants.

The problem again is that a so-called god explains nothing, why is that so hard to understand. Having it do anything is wants is just so much magic, I much rather wait for the information that is missing then to have a so-called god done it answer, even if I die first.

Paul

 

[Bri]

Such as following along a causal chain, whether or not we have all the evidence. We had no evidence to suggest that there was a dark side of the moon before we saw it, but we had compelling reasons to accept its reality based on prior evidence of other bodies and a causal chain.

What do you mean based on a causal chain? Absent other evidence, how is a causal chain a reason for belief that there is a dark side of the moon?

How does quantum theory proposing that not all events are predictable make quantum theory not entirely rational?

I'm trying to understand what you mean by "causal chain." Quantum theory allows for uncaused events, so not all events are caused by other events. Also, there is no clear answer as to what causes forces such as gravity.

The universe does not work on entirely explainable grounds, or so it appears.

If the universe is unexplainable, that makes it "magic" by the definition you were using, doesn't it?

We can see these fluxations but we cannot explain how they occur or predict them. They do not fit into our model of reason/rationality. We can, however, reason about them, as in quantum theory.

So the uncaused events are magic since their mechanism can't be explained?

Belief in dualism requires belief in an otherwise organized entity (a mind, or Form) that affects the universe through even theoretically unexplainable means (magic). It consists in wanting to have your cake and eat it too.

Why would the means be theoretically unexplainable? I'm still not clear on that.

Lack of evidence is always an issue with this sort of conjecture, but the real problem I have with it is its inelegance. This is a fundamentally different issue from us not having evidence for something that fits within a monistic explanation.

I don't see the difference, personally.

Not only does inelegance not mean irrational, even by your definition, but it's possible that the material/natural universe is actually a subset of a supernatural universe, and that both consist of the same ultimate substance.

-Bri

 

[Paulhoff]

If the universe is unexplainable, that makes it "magic" by the definition you were using, doesn't it?

That does not make something "magic", it only makes it unexplainable so far.

Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What do you mean based on a causal chain? Absent other evidence, how is a causal chain a reason for belief that there is a dark side of the moon?

I don't exclude other evidence, so I'm not sure what you are getting at. Causality is one of the primary means by which we explain the world -- that is all that I mean.

I'm trying to understand what you mean by "causal chain." Quantum theory allows for uncaused events, so not all events are caused by other events. Also, there is no clear answer as to what causes forces such as gravity.

No, no clear answer yet for gravity, unless Einstein's explanation holds. That would not fit a unified field theorem, but them's the breaks.

Yes, quantum theory allows uncaused events (or, at least unpredictable events), I don't see the problem there. There are unexplainable bits to the universe.

If the universe is unexplainable, that makes it "magic" by the definition you were using, doesn't it?

No, magic means that there is an unexplainable means by which a mind can affect the universe, not that something random is unexplained. I thought you understood that we are discussing dualism -- where there are separate physical and mental realms. The characteristic feature of the mental is intentionality. The universe could be completely random and that would not make it magic, it would simply make it unexplainable.

So the uncaused events are magic since their mechanism can't be explained?

No, because there is no teleological force behind it. They just happen. Randomly. Not in a designed way. And these are not fundamentally different substances, but the single substance that material monism dieal with. It is simply that some of materialisms workings are also not explainable.

Why would the means be theoretically unexplainable? I'm still not clear on that.

Because, if there were an explainable mechanism, then that would be part of the mechanistic material universe since that is what we mean by "mechanism" -- explainable following set rules. That there are unexplainable bits to the universe that occur completely randomly doesn't change this issue. The basis of any monism is fundamentally undefinable, so it is not possible for us to provide a full account of any philosophical system for one thing. Quantum weirdness just is; if you want to call it magic, that's fine with me, but it is a different issue from an organized mind that supposedly works in a coordinated fashion with the world but through a means that cannot be explained.

Not only does inelegance not mean irrational, even by your definition, but it's possible that the material/natural universe is actually a subset of a supernatural universe, and that both consist of the same ultimate substance.

-Bri

If Idealism is correct, then everything could be divine. That is not the issue here. We aren't discussing monism, but dualism.

 

[Belz...]

If you have a problem with the existence of God, then you will inevitably have a problem seeing how a god can interact with a material universe. If you accept the possibility that a god exists, then I don't see any problem with him doing whatever he wants.

Nice try, hombre. But it's not a question of belief or predisposition.

An omnipotent god is internally inconsistent. Omni-something gods are either inconsistent with logic or with the laws of physics. In order to be part of the physical universe, a god would have to be consistent with it.

 

[Bri]

I don't exclude other evidence, so I'm not sure what you are getting at. Causality is one of the primary means by which we explain the world -- that is all that I mean.

You defined "rational" as:

Rational -- Reasonable; thinking logically; having a compelling reason to think along certain lines.​

I said:

Be more specific about what you consider a "compelling reason" when there is neither compelling evidence for or against something.​

You said:

Such as following along a causal chain, whether or not we have all the evidence. We had no evidence to suggest that there was a dark side of the moon before we saw it, but we had compelling reasons to accept its reality based on prior evidence of other bodies and a causal chain.​

I asked for an example of a "compelling reason" to believe something that doesn't involve evidence, but you gave an example and then said that you don't exclude evidence. Does "having a compelling reason" mean "supported by compelling evidence" or does it mean something different? If it's different, can you give me an example of a compelling reason to believe something that isn't also based on compelling evidence?

Quantum weirdness just is; if you want to call it magic, that's fine with me, but it is a different issue from an organized mind that supposedly works in a coordinated fashion with the world but through a means that cannot be explained.

You defined "magic" as something that is unexplainable -- like uncaused causes. I could say the same thing about dualism that you say about uncaused causes -- we don't know the mechanism, but it "just is" -- without calling it "magic." So why do you insist on calling an unexplainable mechanism "magic" for one and not the other?

If Idealism is correct, then everything could be divine. That is not the issue here. We aren't discussing monism, but dualism.

I'm not talking about idealism, at least not in the classic sense. I'm talking about us being made of the same substance that a god is (or at least a subset of that substance), not that we only exist in the mind of a god. If the natural universe is a subset of the supernatural universe, there no longer seems to be a "problem" with elegance.

-Bri

 

[fls]

You may have a different definition of "evidence" than I have, but I didn't say that the evidence was conclusive, only compelling. They aren't looking in your backyard for a reason.

Right. There's a difference between directly observing something and information that tells you where to go look for something to directly observe. And this applies to both bones and extra-terrestrial life.

Other than "not on Earth" I'm not sure that SETI is identifying any specific places to look. In fact, they're not looking at all -- they're listening.

Looking for extra-terrestrial life isn't confined to SETI. I made reference to this earlier.

No, the teapot is a comparison to what SETI does, not a comparison to what paleontologists and other scientists do. There is only evidence of intelligent life on Earth, but SETI looks for it elsewhere.

But the teapot example only refers to looking where something is unlikely to be found. Paleontologists and people looking for extra-terrestrial life start their search with places where it is more likely to be found.

As far as I know, nobody is looking for gods and claiming it's science.

You don't think that that's what the fine-tuning argument is about? Or whatever it is that this new fellow is talking about?

What about "there are no dinosaur bones in Tasmania" or "there is no CPT violation"?

What about them?

Would you say it is unscientific to attempt to address those ideas?

Nobody said he was. But Popper would likely agree that searching for gods, aliens, gnomes, invisible elephants, teapots orbiting Jupiter, or anything else for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which doesn't explain any observations doesn't exactly constitute "good" science.

That is such a beautiful example of the fallacy of 'begging the question' I feel like it should be immortalized somehow. Did you do that just for me.

By the way, this discussion is somewhat tangential to the topic of the thread. It came about because of the suggestion that searching for aliens has a scientific basis. You seem to be saying that any hypothesis or theory can have a scientific basis (unless you have some other criteria other than evidence, falsifiability, or explanation of observation), so I'm not sure it advances the discussion much.

-Bri

I am saying that any hypothesis or theory formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place can have a scientific basis. I am also saying that that is the process by which extra-terrestrial life is sought, but it has not been the process by which God has been sought.

Linda

 

[fls]

I'm not talking about idealism, at least not in the classic sense. I'm talking about us being made of the same substance that a god is (or at least a subset of that substance), not that we only exist in the mind of a god. If the natural universe is a subset of the supernatural universe, there no longer seems to be a "problem" with elegance.

-Bri

You never did explain how you a priori distinguished between something supernatural/natural and something that is supernatural only.

Linda

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You defined "rational" as:

Rational -- Reasonable; thinking logically; having a compelling reason to think along certain lines.​

I said:

Be more specific about what you consider a "compelling reason" when there is neither compelling evidence for or against something.​

You said:

Such as following along a causal chain, whether or not we have all the evidence. We had no evidence to suggest that there was a dark side of the moon before we saw it, but we had compelling reasons to accept its reality based on prior evidence of other bodies and a causal chain.​

I asked for an example of a "compelling reason" to believe something that doesn't involve evidence, but you gave an example and then said that you don't exclude evidence. Does "having a compelling reason" mean "supported by compelling evidence" or does it mean something different? If it's different, can you give me an example of a compelling reason to believe something that isn't also based on compelling evidence?

It primarily means having compelling evidence to support it, but in the absence of clear evidence for a particular claim, the existence of other support that involves a similar causal chain could serve as a compelling reason to believe something is so. So, for instance, the belief that there is likely life elsewhere in the universe rests on the evidence that life arose here and that we have similar causal influences out there in the universe and that there are plenty of other stars that could potentially support life if all the conditions apply. We can use the causal ideas that we have here and apply them elsewhere to arrive at a hypothesis -- life probably exists on other worlds.

You defined "magic" as something that is unexplainable -- like uncaused causes. I could say the same thing about dualism that you say about uncaused causes -- we don't know the mechanism, but it "just is" -- without calling it "magic." So why do you insist on calling an unexplainable mechanism "magic" for one and not the other?

Right, but it was in the context of discussing dualism, which has as its bases the existence of the mental and the physical as separate realms. The issue with dualism is that the mental -- either in the form of mind, or God, or a Form -- interacts with the physical through an unexplainable means. Mental action already has a particular form for interaction -- ideas, again, or a Form -- that constrict the activity of the physical world, so there is a teleological basis for the interaction or the form of the interaction.

I thought you understood that we were discussing that issue as it relates to the unexplainable mechanism, not just **** happens, as in quantum foam.

The whole reason that I use the word 'magic' and not the word 'random' is because dualism is not based in random occurrences. Instead it is based in a mental world that interacts through some "whatever" according to intentionality. That "whatever" gets us nowhere.

Quantum fluxuations are just something random. They are not in any way equivalent -- not only because there is no teleology behind quantum fluxuations but because that issue does not involve interaction between two entirely different kinds of substance.

As I said, though, if you want to label that magic, I don't have any real objection. I hope you can see the difference.

I'm not talking about idealism, at least not in the classic sense. I'm talking about us being made of the same substance that a god is (or at least a subset of that substance), not that we only exist in the mind of a god. If the natural universe is a subset of the supernatural universe, there no longer seems to be a "problem" with elegance.

-Bri

But that is idealism or materialism. They are indistinguishable, really. Doesn't matter what label you want to put on it, it's a monism. There is no interaction problem with monism. That's why I like it.

The interaction problem arises with dualism.

 

[Bri]

Right. There's a difference between directly observing something and information that tells you where to go look for something to directly observe. And this applies to both bones and extra-terrestrial life.

It would if there was information available for extra-terrestrial life. Other than "not on earth" there isn't. In other words, there is evidence that tells paleontologists where to look for bones, but there is no evidence that tells SETI where to look for aliens (other than "up").

Looking for extra-terrestrial life isn't confined to SETI. I made reference to this earlier.

I didn't say it was. We were talking about SETI specifically.

But the teapot example only refers to looking where something is unlikely to be found. Paleontologists and people looking for extra-terrestrial life start their search with places where it is more likely to be found.

OK, where are people looking for extra-terrestrial intelligent life? Where is it more likely to be found, and what evidence is there to determine where it is more likely to be found?

You don't think that that's what the fine-tuning argument is about? Or whatever it is that this new fellow is talking about?

Ummm...no. One is a logical argument, the other is empirical observation. Both can be evidence, but they are not alike. Specifically, nobody that I know of is sitting with listening devices waiting for a god to talk to them (certainly not anyone that would be confused with a scientist).

Would you say it is unscientific to attempt to address those ideas?

"There are no dinosaur bones in Tasmania" would be theoretically falsifiable, but not practically so (it's probably not practical to dig every possible site in Tasmania).

I don't know what a CPT violation is.

That is such a beautiful example of the fallacy of 'begging the question' I feel like it should be immortalized somehow. Did you do that just for me.

I assure you that I did it for you, but it's not an example of begging the question (i.e. circular logic).

I am saying that any hypothesis or theory formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place can have a scientific basis.

Can you give me an example of a hypothesis or theory that is not formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place?

I am also saying that that is the process by which extra-terrestrial life is sought, but it has not been the process by which God has been sought.

So the hypothesis "ET intelligent life exists" was formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place but "a god exists" was not formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place?

You never did explain how you a priori distinguished between something supernatural/natural and something that is supernatural only.

You wrote:

You and others keep saying this, but how are you making a distinction between the natural world and the supernatural a priori? Science does not make that distinction.​

I replied:

I'm not sure I understand your question. Science doesn't posit the existence of anything for which there is no evidence, including gods and aliens. If we were to discover evidence of something beyond the natural (for example, if a god were to make itself known to us) then scientific theory would have to change to include the new data.​

I still don't understand your question. Science doesn't generally posit the existence of anything for which there is no evidence, including the supernatural, particularly when it isn't falsifiable and doesn't explain any observation.

-Bri

 

[westprog]

Nice try, hombre. But it's not a question of belief or predisposition.

An omnipotent god is internally inconsistent. Omni-something gods are either inconsistent with logic or with the laws of physics. In order to be part of the physical universe, a god would have to be consistent with it.

I don't see any point in a mini-god - the kind that seems to be favoured by the fundamentalists. Either have a full-scale god that covers everything, or don't bother with the concept.

A god that is bound by the laws of physics does indeed seem to be internally inconsistent. A god that is responsible for the laws of physics is another matter. A consistent god would not be part of the physical universe - the physical universe would be, in effect, part of god.

If you don't want god, then fine, don't have one. But what's the point in having a god who's just like a big alien?

 

[fls]

It would if there was information available for extra-terrestrial life. Other than "not on earth" there isn't. In other words, there is evidence that tells paleontologists where to look for bones, but there is no evidence that tells SETI where to look for aliens (other than "up").

Well, we start by looking for life on other planets or satellites. And those with atmospheres and solvents. And those which are close to an energy source. And those which are generating ordered electromagnetic radiation. Etc.

I didn't say it was. We were talking about SETI specifically.

Well, I don't think SETI confines itself to listening, either.

OK, where are people looking for extra-terrestrial intelligent life? Where is it more likely to be found, and what evidence is there to determine where it is more likely to be found?

See above.

Ummm...no. One is a logical argument, the other is empirical observation. Both can be evidence, but they are not alike. Specifically, nobody that I know of is sitting with listening devices waiting for a god to talk to them (certainly not anyone that would be confused with a scientist).

What about all the scientists that have been listed as proposing and supporting the fine-tuning argument?

"There are no dinosaur bones in Tasmania" would be theoretically falsifiable, but not practically so (it's probably not practical to dig every possible site in Tasmania).

Can't the same thing be said about our galaxy?

I assure you that I did it for you, but it's not an example of begging the question (i.e. circular logic).

But Popper would likely agree that searching for gods, aliens, gnomes, invisible elephants, teapots orbiting Jupiter, or anything else for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis which doesn't explain any observations doesn't exactly constitute "good" science.

I was under the impression that we were discussing whether the search for aliens was good science.

Can you give me an example of a hypothesis or theory that is not formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place?

God (with the caveat that it isn't a formal hypothesis or theory).

So the hypothesis "ET intelligent life exists" was formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place but "a god exists" was not formed by considering what gave us the idea in the first place?

Yes.

You wrote:

You and others keep saying this, but how are you making a distinction between the natural world and the supernatural a priori? Science does not make that distinction.​

I replied:

I'm not sure I understand your question. Science doesn't posit the existence of anything for which there is no evidence, including gods and aliens. If we were to discover evidence of something beyond the natural (for example, if a god were to make itself known to us) then scientific theory would have to change to include the new data.​

I still don't understand your question. Science doesn't generally posit the existence of anything for which there is no evidence, including the supernatural, particularly when it isn't falsifiable and doesn't explain any observation.

-Bri

Why do you say that God is supernatural?

Linda

 

[yy2bggggs]

Please elaborate.

Quid pro quo. You haven't answered my question yet.

Your response was this:

I assume you mean today rather than yesterday.

If today was the first day that the sun rose and without knowing that the conditions by which it rose will be the same tomorrow, then no the sun rising today would not be compelling evidence that it will rise again tomorrow.

But the question was this:

Is the fact that the sun rose yesterday, evidence that it will rise tomorrow?​

That's a very simple question. And it has absolutely nothing to do with your answer. I don't think I have to explain the question--just answer it. It's phrased very precisely. It's asking about what it is asking about. It's not asking about what it is not asking about.

 

[Darat]

Clearly if you don't accept the possibility of god existing then you are going to find it difficult to accept the possibility of god interacting with the universe.

I don't find "will" and "manifestation" ambiguous, even in this metaphysical context. The principle is simple. If the universe exists at all because it is created by god, how can he have a problem interacting with it?

And a sidestep past the first and most important part of my comment.

You still haven't supplied to definition for your use of the letters "g", "o" and "d" combined into the word "god". Until you do so your statement is meaningless.