Can theists be rational?

[westprog]

What makes you think the universe has to be fine-tuned to begin with. There are many other values that the universe could have and still have some form of life or not have life. We humans are not needed for the universe to exist in the first place or is life.

Paul

I'm not an expert in this subject, but I understand the following to be true-

• We can calculate how physical objects will behave using a number of fixed constants
• We could perform the same calculations with different values for the constants
• When we analyse how the universe would behave given different values for these constants, we find that it would behave quite differently
• Most of these "alternative universes" appear quite similar, and lack the granularity which would make interesting processes more likely

If this is true - and it's my understanding that it is, though I'm willing to be instructed differently - it's very unlikely that life would exist in most of the other "possible" universes.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Notice the P(H|E) that is on the left side of the equation. P(H|E) is the probability that a god exists IF the universe is fine-tuned.

The term is GIVEN, not IF--and it means something slightly different, but the technical difference is critical in this case.

All probabilities are given something. That P(H) in the equation is shorthand for U.

Only in a Bayesian treatment, U is constantly changing. So we can say that it's shorthand for U_n. The whole theory behind a Bayesian treatment relies on the fact that the real world--the actual, existing world--is somewhere in your U. You don't know where exactly, but you keep modifying your U, by culling out things you know aren't so, and thus are zooming in on actuality. Each culling is a Bayesian inference. It's a degree of belief by virtue of the fact that you're constantly getting rid of things you are ruling out, and are thus winding up with higher proportions of the possibly actual worlds where some things are true and lower proportions where other things are true.

What you really have, then, is this:

P(H|E)=P(H|U_n)P(E|H)/P(E|U_n)

A Bayesian inference occurs when you cull out everything in U_n that your evidence says isn't there. That is, when you form a U_n+1 where E is true. In this new U, P(H) can be described more accurately. Bayes Theorem, in these terms, let's you do this:
U_n+1=E
|- P(H)=P(H|U_n)P(E|H)P(E|_n)

Your P(H|E) is your key to a new P(H), in a new U. Forming a Bayesian inference is forming a new U. That's a U where E is entirely true, and if you're going to keep the actual world in your U's as you modify them (the raison d'être), you had better be sure E is true.

That's why you want your E's to be something simple you can verify. Like, "this foonomia test came back positive"--you want to make damned sure that the NOT-Es you are culling out don't include the actual world. Another way to view this is that Bayesian inferences are positive claims about the actual world.

Now, it could be that we're simply talking past each other, but I doubt it. Your Carl Sagan believes in ET intelligence analogy strongly suggests that the thing you are talking about is more than just "people who think P(H|E)>P(H)", but rather, "whether or not theists who think E is true are rational".

If it's the latter, a belief that E is true amounts to a belief that H AND E and H' AND E are the only two possibilities. If it's not the latter, what the hell does Carl Sagan's beliefs have to do with anything? And what the hell does it have to do with this entire thread--whether or not theists are rational?

Every argument assumes a premise. Stronger arguments have premises that are "merely supported by evidence" (what else would it be supported by?).

Blood on the floor is evidence supporting that there was a murder. It's weak evidence, but it is evidence. Now, in scene 2, a dead body on the floor with a knife sticking out of it is also evidence of a murder, but is much stronger. Should I form a belief that there was a murder, "merely supported by evidence", then in both cases, you have support by evidence. "Merely supported" means that this is all you're considering--that there is support. That implies that you jump to the conclusion that there was a murder at both scenes.

Your objection seems to be using the wrong interpretation, which is better described as "supported merely by evidence", as if you have to have something else. That is not what I'm saying.

Again, you can make a valid critiques of the premise and reject the conclusion of any argument (including one based on Drake's equation).

Yes, I can. But that's not what I'm doing.

You do understand what a false dichotomy is, right?

A false dichotomy is a logical fallacy where one presents two alternatives as collectively exhaustive, when in fact there are more.

That it's a premise doesn't matter. What matters is if, in your belief system about what worlds are possible--your U--you only have two kinds of entities--such as H AND Es and H' AND Es--but where, in fact, it's quite possible that the actual world is something else--such as an H AND E', or an H' AND E'. If it can be demonstrated that the alternatives actually are the only alternatives, it's not a false dichotomy.

But just assuming, presuming, or accepting premises that the two alternatives are the only two possible alternatives, does not fit the bill. That throws you back under the bus.

And I've been qualifying this since I started.

It is not a false dichotomy to propose an argument with premises that can either be accepted or rejected.

Correct. Exactly as I have been saying alternately, in just about every response to you.

But having presented that argument, if you accept the premises, and the premises hold that there are only two options, and you don't have good reason to suspect those are the only two, you are committing a false dichotomy.

I've been qualifying this in nearly every post. You're telling me nothing different than what I'm saying. What I'm having issue with is that (a) you're still disagreeing with me, and (b) I'm pretty sure your entire argument relies on people actually accepting said premises. Oh, and (c), there's a way to accept the premises without committing a false dichotomy--something else I keep saying in every single post, but you keep ignoring.

Here's an idea. Rather than disagreeing with me about something I myself contend to and am saying in every single post, why not defend the rationality of a specific set of theists who accept the premises that the universe is fine-tuned, by telling me how they aren't making a false dichotomy of presenting only that there's a god and the universe is fine tuned or there's no god and the universe is "accidentally" fine tuned...

...by telling me how they justify that those two are the only possible options? (A caveat I implicitly agree could be there in every post, but you never actually positively try to defend people qualify for in practice).

Everything else you do here is a waste of both of our time.

 

[Bri]

But having presented that argument, if you accept the premises, and the premises hold that there are only two options, and you don't have good reason to suspect those are the only two, you are committing a false dichotomy.

EVERY argument assumes premises. There are ALWAYS alternatives to the premise. An argument based on Drake's equation assumes as a premise that there are x number of planets in the galaxy. Is that a fallacy because there could be y number of planets? No, if you think there are y instead of x planets, it is a simple rejection of the premises.

The premise of the fine-tuning argument doesn't hold that there are only two options. The premise is that the universe is fine-tuned. Once you have accepted the premise that the universe is fine-tuned, there ARE only two options: the universe is fine-tuned given a god exists or the universe is fine-tuned given a god doesn't exist. Can you provide a third alternative?

Now if you're trying to get me to defend someone who might accept the premise, I won't. I've been abundantly clear that I don't accept the premise of the argument myself. But that doesn't make the argument itself any less valid than an argument based on Drake's equation. The argument itself does not contain a false dichotomy. It's also a misuse of the term "false dichotomy" to say that someone who accepts the premise is "committing a false dichotomy" any more than someone who accepts a premise that the number of planets in the galaxy is x is "committing a false dichotomy."

If you want to know the evidence of fine-tuning and form your own opinion of whether or not the universe is fine-tuned, read the article that was posted earlier in the thread. It does, in fact, appear that the universe is probably fine-tuned (that if the universal physical constants were slightly different than they are the universe wouldn't support life). However, I don't think there is any evidence that the fine-tuning has anything to do with a god.

-Bri

 

[Beth]

I'm thinking that it is non-rational. And that the attempt to make something that is really non-rational, rational, is what makes it irrational. And I realize that I may be perverting what these words are supposed to mean, but we can assign "reason" and "emotion" to the different pathways by which we process information.

Linda

I like non-rational. It's not disparaging or demeaning the way irrational is perceived to be.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Not necessarily. The universe could be fine-tuned because of perfectly natural (although currently unknown) reasons. Or it could be fine-tuned by chance (the argument being that the probability is very low, but it's not impossible).

-Bri

OK, but (and this is just a semantic quibble) I'm not sure I would use the term "fine-tuning" in such situations because the whole concept of fine-tuning implies a tuner. It could just be that we are alive because the constants are what they are. Sure, it could be that the constants themselves are contrained by some unknown process, but then it seems a bit silly to call them fine-tuned. They would just be what they are with the whole concept of "fine-tuning" being an artifact of the way we look at them.

so, basically we agree.

 

[Bri]

OK, but (and this is just a semantic quibble) I'm not sure I would use the term "fine-tuning" in such situations because the whole concept of fine-tuning implies a tuner. It could just be that we are alive because the constants are what they are. Sure, it could be that the constants themselves are contrained by some unknown process, but then it seems a bit silly to call them fine-tuned. They would just be what they are with the whole concept of "fine-tuning" being an artifact of the way we look at them.

so, basically we agree.

I don't think the term "fine-tuning" is necessarily meant to imply an intelligent fine-tuner. According to Wikipedia:

In theoretical physics, fine-tuning refers to circumstances when the parameters of a model must be adjusted very precisely in order to agree with observations. Theories requiring fine-tuning are regarded as problematic in the absence of a known mechanism to explain why the parameters happen to have precisely the needed values. Explanations often invoked to resolve fine-tuning problems include natural mechanisms by which the values of the parameters may be constrained to their observed values, and the anthropic principle.​

-Bri

 

[yy2bggggs]

EVERY argument assumes premises.

Again, you're telling me something I already know. But you're defending rationality of theists. Premises can range from Newtonian mechanics accurately describes planetary orbitals, to I am being possessed by aliens.

There are ALWAYS alternatives to the premise.

Right. It may be that the Time Cube, combined with Archimedes Plutonium's theories, describe planetary orbits more accurately. Or it might be that I am suffering from chemical imbalances in my brain and need to seek help.

So, yes, every argument has premises, but irrationality can sneak in merely from the premises you hold. And you are arguing for the rationality of people who accept certain premises, are you not?

An argument based on Drake's equation assumes as a premise that there are x number of planets in the galaxy.

Not in any way analogous to what I'm describing. I'm not arguing the values of the parameters, but the applicability of the equation. An argument based on Drake's equation assumes that you can use those parameters to estimate the number of civilizations.

The premise of the fine-tuning argument doesn't hold that there are only two options. The premise is that the universe is fine-tuned.

Don't care.

Once you have accepted the premise that the universe is fine-tuned, there ARE only two options:

Incorrect. This is begging the question, and is the critical point.

Your acceptance of the premises has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not there are only two options. Now, this doesn't fault the validity of the argument either. It faults the person who accepts the premises. You do not get to defend your rationality merely by having things follow from your premises. What your premises are matters.

Now, if the premises actually are true, it's a different story. But there's still a hole for you to have committed a false dichotomy in this case--you would merely have lucked up. What you need is precisely to be justified in holding the premises.

Now if you're trying to get me to defend someone who might accept the premise, I won't. I've been abundantly clear that I don't accept the premise of the argument myself. But that doesn't make the argument itself any less valid than an argument based on Drake's equation.

Right. But I'm not talking about whether the argument is valid. I'm talking about whether the theist accepting the premise is rational. Just like you're talking about whether Carl Sagan believes there is extra terrestrial intelligence.

It's also a misuse of the term "false dichotomy" to say that someone who accepts the premise "is committing a false dichotomy" any more than someone who accepts a premise that the number of planets in the galaxy is x.

The comparison is irrelevant. In the former case I specifically can point to the two alternatives, and a possible alternative not being considered.

If you want to know the evidence of fine-tuning and form your own opinion of whether or not the universe is fine-tuned, read the article that was posted earlier in the thread.

Objection--irrelevant. My opinion isn't on trial. The rationality of the theists you are defending is.

It does, in fact, appear that the universe is probably fine-tuned.

Again, don't care, unless you can show that it's not viable to hold that the universe isn't fine-tuned. Can you show that, or are you wasting my time again?

Edit:

I'm confused at what you're even trying to do in defense of the false dichotomy charge of said theists. Here's what your argument appears like to me:

Me: Said theists are presenting two alternatives as the only viably possible alternatives. But why does the universe have to be fine-tuned in the first place? This is a false dichotomy.
You: No, it's not a false dichotomy. The argument they use holds this as a premise. If you hold this as a premise, those are the only two possible alternatives. What else could there be?
Me: But holding that there are two possible options as a premise doesn't matter. The fact is that this other option is quite possible--unless these theists can actually rule out the other options, it's a false dichotomy.
You: No, it's not a false dichotomy. The premise itself doesn't actually state that there are those two options. It merely states that there is one class of options. It follows from this that there are those two options.

Those two options are explicitly considered in the argument, and are relied upon. Why does it matter which ones you slap the premise label on, or how many people hold premises? The logical fallacy of false dichotomy doesn't in any way specify how you come about holding that there are only two options, only that you do when there are more. Am I wrong in seeing this as nothing but an exercise in sophistry?

Maybe you don't understand what a false dichotomy is?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't think the term "fine-tuning" is necessarily meant to imply an intelligent fine-tuner. According to Wikipedia:

In theoretical physics, fine-tuning refers to circumstances when the parameters of a model must be adjusted very precisely in order to agree with observations. Theories requiring fine-tuning are regarded as problematic in the absence of a known mechanism to explain why the parameters happen to have precisely the needed values. Explanations often invoked to resolve fine-tuning problems include natural mechanisms by which the values of the parameters may be constrained to their observed values, and the anthropic principle.​

-Bri

OK, but I think there is a hidden fine tuner in there. Whenever I see a phrase like "why the parameters happen to have precisely the needed values" my teleology detector rings loudly.

 

[Bri]

I like non-rational. It's not disparaging or demeaning the way irrational is perceived to be.

I think "faith-based" or "without evidence" works just fine. No need to make up a term that sounds like "not rational" but isn't actually irrational.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

So, yes, every argument has premises, but irrationality can sneak in merely from the premises you hold. And you are arguing for the rationality of people who accept certain premises, are you not?

Yes, premises may themselves be irrational (meaning incoherent). But it is more likely the case that they have little or no evidence to back them up. Ironically, there is evidence to back up the one you seem to be objecting to (other assumptions made in the premise of the fine-tuning argument are supported by little or no evidence).

No, I'm not arguing for the rationality or irrationality of anyone. I'm suggesting that belief in a god is not necessarily irrational by any definition that doesn't make other beliefs that are often considered "rational" irrational.

Not in any way analogous to what I'm describing. I'm not arguing the values of the parameters, but the applicability of the equation. An argument based on Drake's equation assumes that you can use those parameters to estimate the number of civilizations.

Then you seem to have changed your argument, since before you were claiming that the argument in question was an example of a false dichotomy whereas an argument based on Drake's equation is not. Are you now shifting your objection from "the fine-tuning argument is invalid" to "the argument is sound, but I disagree with the premise?"

Incorrect. This is begging the question, and is the critical point.

Once you have accepted the premise that the universe is fine-tuned, there ARE only two options. Can you name a third, please?

You do not get to defend your rationality merely by having things follow from your premises. What your premises are matters.

Of course, and if you've been reading the thread you already know that I agree with that and have never said otherwise. What I said was that the argument is valid if you accept the premises. Just like an argument based on Drake's equation. The problem in both cases is that there's no evidence to support one or more of the premises that are needed to conclude that existence is probable.

Right. But I'm not talking about whether the argument is valid. I'm talking about whether the theist accepting the premise is rational. Just like you're talking about whether Carl Sagan believes there is extra terrestrial intelligence.

Then you're just agreeing with me. Someone who accepts an argument for aliens based on Drake's equation is not necessarily more rational than someone who accepts the fine-tuning argument for a god.

The comparison is irrelevant. In the former case I specifically can point to the two alternatives, and a possible alternative not being considered.

Make an argument that extra terrestrial intelligence is possible using Drake's equation, and I can show you a thousand possible alternatives to your argument. Seriously, the assumption of fine-tuning in the fine-tuning argument is the least controversial premise of the argument!

My opinion isn't on trial. The rationality of the theists you are defending is.

Again, I'm not defending anyone. I simply said that the belief in a god isn't necessarily irrational by any definition that doesn't make other beliefs that are commonly considered "rational" irrational. I have never defended any of the premises of the argument. You seem to be arguing with yourself.

Can you show that, or are you wasting my time again?

Why don't you stop wasting my time arguing with yourself?

Let's move on to a discussion of whether it's OK to call all beliefs without clear evidence "irrational" rather than resorting to special pleading.

-Bri

 

[Beth]

I think "faith-based" or "without evidence" works just fine. No need to make up a term that sounds like "not rational" but isn't actually irrational.

-Bri

Faith based is fine, but 'without evidence' bothers me because most people who believe in a god feel they have evidence for their faith. They are typically willing to acknowledge that their evidence is of a subjective nature and not something that others will find convincing, but most of the evidence we rely on in our daily lives is of that caliber. I cannot prove scientifically that my husband loves me. It's a faith-based belief, but it is not without evidence.

 

[Bri]

Faith based is fine, but 'without evidence' bothers me because most people who believe in a god feel they have evidence for their faith.

It's the quality of that evidence that's in question. Let's say "without a preponderance of evidence" or "without clear evidence" then. The point being that it's not the same as "non-rational" (which would mean "non-coherent" or "non-consistent with reality").

They are typically willing to acknowledge that their evidence is of a subjective nature and not something that others will find convincing, but most of the evidence we rely on in our daily lives is of that caliber. I cannot prove scientifically that my husband loves me. It's a faith-based belief, but it is not without evidence.

Your point is well-taken and I agree (as you know).

-Bri

 

[Belz...]

EVERY argument assumes premises.

Few arguments assume their conclusions, though.

 

[Malerin]

The term is GIVEN, not IF--and it means something slightly different, but the technical difference is critical in this case.

All probabilities are given something. That P(H) in the equation is shorthand for U.

This reminded me of an earlier conversation we had:

So there are propositions H, that there is a fine-tuner, and E, that there is life. That's all you're considering. Right off of the bat, then, there are four partitions of our universe.
A: H AND E, there is a fine-tuner and there is life.
B: H AND E', there is a fine-tuner, but no life.
C: H' AND E, there is no fine-tuner, but there is life.
D: H' AND E', there is no fine-tuner, and no life.

All of these are propositions, and they have corresponding probabilities:
P(A), P(B), P(C), P(D).

Two questions:
1. Is Pr(H and E) = Pr(H) x Pr(E)? (in other words, are you considering H and E to be mutually exclusive?)
2. Since these are the partitions of our probabilistic "universe", does
Pr(A+B+C+D)= 1?

 

[yy2bggggs]

This reminded me of an earlier conversation we had:



Two questions:
1. Is Pr(H and E) = Pr(H) x Pr(E)? (in other words, are you considering H and E to be mutually exclusive?)

No. P(H AND E)=P(H)P(E|H).

2. Since these are the partitions of our probabilistic "universe", does
Pr(A+B+C+D)= 1?

Yes.

 

[Malerin]

No. P(H AND E)=P(H)P(E|H).

Yes.

Ok.

H = The coin is two headed
E = 2 heads in a row
H =.5

A = Pr(H) x Pr(E/H) = .5
B = Pr(H) x Pr(~E/H) =.5 x ?
C = Pr(~H) x Pr(E/~H) = .125
D = Pr(~H) x Pr(~E/~H)= .5 x ?

The thing here is that I can't figure out a value for Pr(~E/H) and Pr(~E/~H). ~E means I don't get two heads in a row. But not getting two heads in a row doesn't mean I got a tails. Maybe I got 3 heads in a row, or only a single head. The negation of the evidence could be anything. There would seem to be an infinite number of ways that ~E could be expressed.

But even if Pr(~E/H) is 0 you get the same problem for Pr(~E/~H). Given that the coin is not two-headed, and if ~E ecompasses an infinite combination of coin tosses, Pr(~E/~H) = .99999....9, and A+B+C+D > 1.

You have to build into E the idea that ~E can only apply to two coin tosses. If that's the case, then A+B+C+D=1, but how do you do this? You can make E a conjunction: E= "A coin is tossed only two times and two heads are the result", but then what is ~E referring to? The two tosses or the two heads?

There might be a way to do this by sneaking the fact that there were only two tosses into our background knowledge or maybe reformulate H to "The coin that was only tossed twice is two-headed", but if you take that approach, you have the same problem with ~H. Does ~H refer to the number of tosses or the two-headedness of the coin?

 

[RandFan]

Bri has presented some evidence that it may be true...

Anything not defined as impossible may be true. That said, #2 is spurious.

Well, I certainly wouldn't call it an exact computation, but if someone wants to use such information in developing an estimate of the probability of a creator, no valid reason has been given why it's not a legitimate thing to do...

But that's not true. Not true at all. It's been explained time and time again.

Of course. That's what statistics is for. It was developed to separate patterns from the noise.

The statement means to try and find meaning where there is none. It's popular among paranormal reaserchers and the paterns disapear when subject to scientific scrutiny. For an example see white noise.

I believe that the latest information indicates that we are in an expanding universe with no indication that it will someday contract or collapse again.

Again, that's just not true.

The multiverse is a legitimate alternative explanation, but it is no less fantastic a proposal than a creator god. I see no reason to favor it as an explanation over that of a creator*.

While I completly disagree you miss the point. You can't calculate a probability of one fantastic proposal without taking into account alternate possibilities.

Already we create other creatures in other, smaller bounded universes. Now, how do we tell which type we are in: deliberately created or happenstance? Which type will be more common?

This is just nonsense.

Because it only correlates to the universe being created or not...

How? I keep asking and you keep evading the question.

I see no aspect of your analogy that correlates to fine-tuning. How would you phrase the If-Then proposition of the fine-tuning argument using your analogy?

I don't understand your point.

*There is no reason to favor the creator explantion over that of a multiverse either. But of course, I'm agnostic and willing to consider either possibility.

Misses the point. How do you include this possibility into your equation?

 

[RandFan]

And so I find it very difficult to believe that someone would spend time and money looking or listening for something that they don't believe exists.

I honestly don't understand your point.

Exactly my point. Neither invisible elephants or aliens have been shown to exist. Why would anyone look for them unless they are of the opinion that they exist?

Inteligent life has been show to exist. Invisible elephants?

I feel fairly confident in saying that most people who spend time and money on paranormal research are of the opinion that the paranormal exists or they wouldn't spend time and money on it.

And they are different from SETI in what way?

All of this is really besides the point. The question that you never answered is whether you feel that having an opinion about the existence of extra terrestrial intelligent life is necessarily irrational. Is it?

No. Of course not.

Again, I don't agree with the premises of the argument so your questions are somewhat irrelevant.

What are you talking about? I'm asking you valid questions that go directly to your argument. Both Malerin and Beth understand the validity and relevance of the questions.

• You have this theorem that you are using but you conveniently leave off important variables. Why?
• You want to extrapolate something from what you deem as a rare event. Why can't we extrapolate from other rare events?

1. Do you know for a fact that the universe hasn't been expanding and collapsing for an infinite number of times each with a different set of variables?
2. Do you know for a fact that there are not an infinite number of universes with different variables?
3. Do you know what the chances of you existing are?
4. What do you extrapolate from the unlikely event that you exist?
5. Why should we extrapolate anything from the fact that it was extremely unlikely for the universe to be as it is?

 

[RandFan]

I KNOW that if you get 30 heads in a row, you're not going to give me even odds on Tails coming up.

Malerin, this is another fallacy. It's a well known one called the Gamblers Fallacy and is also covered in the book (*explicitly it uses the example of flipping a coin as does wiki). The fallacy you are making is used by Casino owners to increase their haul.

FTR: Damn straight I would give you even odds.

I already have Choice and Chance. It's like a Bible of inductive logic.

Yet you keep making significant and classical mistakes about statistics. Take my advice, get the book. Yours seems to be missing some very important points.

*For example, if a fair coin is tossed repeatedly and tails comes up a larger number of times than is expected, a gambler may incorrectly believe that this means that heads is more likely in future tosses.[1] Such an event is often referred to as being "due". This is an informal fallacy.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Bri:

I'm pretty sure we're arguing in circles. I had a long reply prepared for this post, but I think it's best to just ditch it. Now I am fairly confident that we were merely talking past each other.

For the record, yes, I did change my argument... but it wasn't just now. That happened at the very instant you proposed a different notation. I see the underlying issues as the same--the same exact viable alternatives aren't being considered--but the flavor changes. When E is there is life, it's easily observable, yielding an easy inference, and the problem is with allocation to the bits of P(E). When E is that the universe is fine tuned, per some model you're using to estimate probabilities, then it's harder to observe, but your terms match what you mean. Being harder to observe, you need justification to apply an inference. But in either case, the same possible alternatives--K--are being left out of your U's, and the danger is that the actual world could be found in this K which isn't in your U. That danger is avoided if you can be sure that the actual world isn't in such K's, in either case, but it must be argued--it cannot merely be presumed.

The other thing is that we seem to be using different languages. Your criteria for "irrational" sounds way too high of a burden for my tastes--I would certainly hold incoherency as irrational, but I'd toss in general lack of application of reason as well. And "validity", to me, has the technical meaning--saying that an argument is valid if you accept the premises is a bit redundant--an argument that is valid if you accept the premises, is valid if you don't accept the premises. Maybe that was a tripping point as well... but the meaning of "validity" with respect to arguments is that the conclusions follow from the premises.

Regardless, I don't see us as progressing any--there's too much time being spent re-explaining respectively what we are and aren't saying.