blobru
Philosopher
- Joined
- May 29, 2007
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Can Theists be Rational? (let's see... uh-oh)
Sorry, but browsing I don't see any discussion of "rationality" as I understand it, so I'll have to rudely pop in here to respond fresh to the OP.
Rationality relates to reason, but is not the same as reason; and reason is not the same as logic. Logic comprises deduction (rules of inference, evaluating arguments' validity), induction (rules of generalisation, evaluating arguments' soundness), and arguably abduction (rules of hypothesis, evaluating arguments' relevance). Logic is the formalisation of reasoning. Trivially, if this is the sum extent of reason and rationality, then anyone who understands the rules can be rational.
But rationality as typically understood is a property not so much of arguments but of claims and beliefs (arguments advanced as most probably true, or absolutely True). A belief maintained because of anything other than the likelihood it is true is said to irrational. So rationality is the property of beliefs maintained solely because they are most probably true (best describe whatever the belief refers to). Rationality is reason properly applied.
So what is it for a claim, a belief or system of beliefs, to be rational? For rationality: beliefs and claims require justification, usually in the form of argument chains (combining the different logics above). Furthermore, philosophy uses dialectic: fair debate, weighing arguments for and against a claim. Anyone can form an argument. The real measure of rationality is how well one evaluates the arguments for and against, in terms of soundness (are the premisses likely) and legitimacy (are the inferences correct).
Note: in classical philosophy, reason and passion are opposed. While the relationship is probably more complicated than simple opposition, it still seems fair to say that strong emotion interferes with reason ("calm down, let's reason this out"). Proper evaluation calls for a high degree of emotional detachment. Reason works best with calm.
Additional points: one shouldn't confuse rationality and irrationality with good and bad. One can argue irrationality is better than rationality in certain situations. Rationality is probably best construed not as a binary value but as a gradient: a belief is more or less ir/rational than another.
Some Obstacles to Rationality:
Ego: easy for an argument to become a contest that can be won or lost, involving pride, esteem.
-- This will be an obstacle for everyone I think (you'd have to have a pretty big ego to believe otherwise).
Identity: the argument is part of who you are, your loyalties and associations.
-- In terms of god arguments, this looks like an obstacle for everyone except the strict agnostic, according to the strength of the emotional commitments to positions for and against.
Dependence: how much does the adherent depend on the beliefs for happiness, meaning, etc?
-- Where a belief system satisfies an emotional need that it would be difficult or impossible to satisfy otherwise, the believer can become emotionally dependent on it, and fearful, even resentful, of alternatives. In the case of a theism that promises ethical certitude, eternal bliss to believers and/or terrible punishment to non-believers, the possibility of irrational attachment must be quite high indeed. This sort of dependence is by no means limited to theists; however, where the consequences of belief and non-belief are, for the believer, seen as a matter of bliss and torment, life and death, one should think it extremely difficult to evaluate arguments pro and con with much rational detachment.
Absolutes: does the belief system claim access to Truth?
-- Every belief system that depends on certain and complete knowledge of reality is irrational in that respect: reason, as it's understood within philosophy, can only guarantee the absolute truth of systems of deductive logic, not belief systems. Belief systems that claim access to Truth then must rely on something beyond reason... either revelation, or arguments to a necessary hypothesis. The more revealed Truths a system is based on, the more basically irrational it is, and the more justification it requires to make the revealed Truths approach rationality. Reason for the Truth claimant is to argue that each revealed Truth is a necessary hypothesis, comes as close or closer to necessity than counter-claimants, or is at least plausible, or at the very least possible. This is metaphysics. The rationality of metaphysical arguments is notoriously hard to evaluate, as it's hard to assign probablilities to the existence of unknown or unknowable entities and processes. I think all one can say is the more a belief system relies on revealed Truth, the more it opens itself to charges of irrationality; perhaps the more likely that it is irrational (Occam's razor applied to metaphysics).
Authority: does the belief system claim infallibility for some of its principals?
-- This usually relates to the source of revealed Truth. If a principal has access to Truth, then the principal must be a final authority, and any appeal to her authority can only be questioned on grounds or interpretation, not authority. (Absolute authority shouldn't be confused here with expertise, where one contracts limited authority to a professional.) Absolute authority assumes access to absolute Truth which ultimately does not require rational justification (in other words, one is irrationally predisposed to accept the claims of the authority before evaluating them). This irrational predisposition is the obstacle authority presents for rationality. To the degree that one adheres to absolute authority, one is liable to limit rationality, the adherent deferring some or all evaluations to the authority.
Obedience: does the belief system encourage strong belief, orthodoxy; discourage doubt, dissent?
-- This is a glaring obstacle to rationality and main source of the charges of irrationality against many religions, and theism where it attaches itself to those religions. Some defenders of religions that advocate this sort of obedient faith argue that faith is necessary to revelation: until one swears obedience to god, revelation is withheld by god (the "leap of faith" argument); since faith is superior to reason as a source of knowledge, it is reasonable to have faith. This is not an argument that can be evaluated by reason (see Kierkegaard's paradox), so it must be labeled irrational by reason. Therefore, any theism which attaches to a belief system which endorses such faith, is irrational; as are theists who invoke faith [in revealed Truth].
Anyway, that's a lot of hoohah and falderal, but: can a theist be rational? Well, reasoning from the above (and assuming it rational), I have to say: "yes." With the caveat, however, that due to the higher emotional investment many forms of theism endorse and/or induce, it is often more difficult for these many theists to be rational with respect to their belief system. It is surely not an easy thing to measure; ascertaining emotional involvement seems as much psychology as philosophy; ultimately, it's up to the believer to justify to himself what reasons he has for the beliefs he holds, or whether that even matters; while those of us who believe in the value of rationality can only hope, perhaps irrationally, that it does.
Sorry, but browsing I don't see any discussion of "rationality" as I understand it, so I'll have to rudely pop in here to respond fresh to the OP.
Rationality relates to reason, but is not the same as reason; and reason is not the same as logic. Logic comprises deduction (rules of inference, evaluating arguments' validity), induction (rules of generalisation, evaluating arguments' soundness), and arguably abduction (rules of hypothesis, evaluating arguments' relevance). Logic is the formalisation of reasoning. Trivially, if this is the sum extent of reason and rationality, then anyone who understands the rules can be rational.
But rationality as typically understood is a property not so much of arguments but of claims and beliefs (arguments advanced as most probably true, or absolutely True). A belief maintained because of anything other than the likelihood it is true is said to irrational. So rationality is the property of beliefs maintained solely because they are most probably true (best describe whatever the belief refers to). Rationality is reason properly applied.
So what is it for a claim, a belief or system of beliefs, to be rational? For rationality: beliefs and claims require justification, usually in the form of argument chains (combining the different logics above). Furthermore, philosophy uses dialectic: fair debate, weighing arguments for and against a claim. Anyone can form an argument. The real measure of rationality is how well one evaluates the arguments for and against, in terms of soundness (are the premisses likely) and legitimacy (are the inferences correct).
Note: in classical philosophy, reason and passion are opposed. While the relationship is probably more complicated than simple opposition, it still seems fair to say that strong emotion interferes with reason ("calm down, let's reason this out"). Proper evaluation calls for a high degree of emotional detachment. Reason works best with calm.
Additional points: one shouldn't confuse rationality and irrationality with good and bad. One can argue irrationality is better than rationality in certain situations. Rationality is probably best construed not as a binary value but as a gradient: a belief is more or less ir/rational than another.
Some Obstacles to Rationality:
Ego: easy for an argument to become a contest that can be won or lost, involving pride, esteem.
-- This will be an obstacle for everyone I think (you'd have to have a pretty big ego to believe otherwise).
Identity: the argument is part of who you are, your loyalties and associations.
-- In terms of god arguments, this looks like an obstacle for everyone except the strict agnostic, according to the strength of the emotional commitments to positions for and against.
Dependence: how much does the adherent depend on the beliefs for happiness, meaning, etc?
-- Where a belief system satisfies an emotional need that it would be difficult or impossible to satisfy otherwise, the believer can become emotionally dependent on it, and fearful, even resentful, of alternatives. In the case of a theism that promises ethical certitude, eternal bliss to believers and/or terrible punishment to non-believers, the possibility of irrational attachment must be quite high indeed. This sort of dependence is by no means limited to theists; however, where the consequences of belief and non-belief are, for the believer, seen as a matter of bliss and torment, life and death, one should think it extremely difficult to evaluate arguments pro and con with much rational detachment.
Absolutes: does the belief system claim access to Truth?
-- Every belief system that depends on certain and complete knowledge of reality is irrational in that respect: reason, as it's understood within philosophy, can only guarantee the absolute truth of systems of deductive logic, not belief systems. Belief systems that claim access to Truth then must rely on something beyond reason... either revelation, or arguments to a necessary hypothesis. The more revealed Truths a system is based on, the more basically irrational it is, and the more justification it requires to make the revealed Truths approach rationality. Reason for the Truth claimant is to argue that each revealed Truth is a necessary hypothesis, comes as close or closer to necessity than counter-claimants, or is at least plausible, or at the very least possible. This is metaphysics. The rationality of metaphysical arguments is notoriously hard to evaluate, as it's hard to assign probablilities to the existence of unknown or unknowable entities and processes. I think all one can say is the more a belief system relies on revealed Truth, the more it opens itself to charges of irrationality; perhaps the more likely that it is irrational (Occam's razor applied to metaphysics).
Authority: does the belief system claim infallibility for some of its principals?
-- This usually relates to the source of revealed Truth. If a principal has access to Truth, then the principal must be a final authority, and any appeal to her authority can only be questioned on grounds or interpretation, not authority. (Absolute authority shouldn't be confused here with expertise, where one contracts limited authority to a professional.) Absolute authority assumes access to absolute Truth which ultimately does not require rational justification (in other words, one is irrationally predisposed to accept the claims of the authority before evaluating them). This irrational predisposition is the obstacle authority presents for rationality. To the degree that one adheres to absolute authority, one is liable to limit rationality, the adherent deferring some or all evaluations to the authority.
Obedience: does the belief system encourage strong belief, orthodoxy; discourage doubt, dissent?
-- This is a glaring obstacle to rationality and main source of the charges of irrationality against many religions, and theism where it attaches itself to those religions. Some defenders of religions that advocate this sort of obedient faith argue that faith is necessary to revelation: until one swears obedience to god, revelation is withheld by god (the "leap of faith" argument); since faith is superior to reason as a source of knowledge, it is reasonable to have faith. This is not an argument that can be evaluated by reason (see Kierkegaard's paradox), so it must be labeled irrational by reason. Therefore, any theism which attaches to a belief system which endorses such faith, is irrational; as are theists who invoke faith [in revealed Truth].
Anyway, that's a lot of hoohah and falderal, but: can a theist be rational? Well, reasoning from the above (and assuming it rational), I have to say: "yes." With the caveat, however, that due to the higher emotional investment many forms of theism endorse and/or induce, it is often more difficult for these many theists to be rational with respect to their belief system. It is surely not an easy thing to measure; ascertaining emotional involvement seems as much psychology as philosophy; ultimately, it's up to the believer to justify to himself what reasons he has for the beliefs he holds, or whether that even matters; while those of us who believe in the value of rationality can only hope, perhaps irrationally, that it does.
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And I have never, to my regret, studied Philosophy, although I am reading (having read to me) two books called 'Coffee with Plato' and 'coffee with Aristotle'.
you flatter me, twinkle toes!
