Can theists be rational?

[Bri]

So if a physical theory which incorporates a multiverse is shown likely to be correct you'll become an atheist?

I've already stated my rejection of the premises of the fine-tuner argument, so I doubt that disproving it would affect my personal beliefs one way or the other.

But I imagine that evidence of fine-tuning would certainly weaken the argument that a fine-tuner is probable. Whether that would be enough to convince a theist to become an atheist, I don't know. I guess it depends on how they define their god.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

<double post>

 

[articulett]

But I imagine that evidence of fine-tuning would certainly weaken the argument that a fine-tuner is probable. Whether that would be enough to convince a theist to become an atheist, I don't know. I guess it depends on how they define their god.

-Bri

Or what they imagine the punishment is for not believing in him.

 

[Paulhoff]

What I think is God is the giver of life so he has the right to decide when and how we die, can anyone fight or truly win the arguement with God? NO! the correct answer is NO! We will all surely die because of the fall of man.

To you, a so-called god made humans, and it turns out that they were not made perfect, and make mistakes that you like to call sins. Now where I come from, someone should be able to sue the maker for making a bad produce. But you like to throw the reasonably on the product (humans), not the producer of said product. What are you a lawyer and/or just blind to reality?

Paul



You don't talk like a lawyer.

 

[Belz...]

The premise of the fine-tuned universe assertion is that a small change in several of the approximately 26 dimensionless fundamental physical constants would make the universe radically different: if, for example, the strong nuclear force were 2% stronger than it is (i.e. if the coupling constant representing its strength were 2% larger), diprotons would be stable and hydrogen would fuse into them instead of deuterium and helium. This would drastically alter the physics of stars, and presumably prevent the universe from developing life as it is currently observed on the earth.​

Uh-huh, but you've forgotten important points:

- The value of those constants could be the only values they can have
- There could be a great number of universes, making the probability that one or some of them can support life as we know it close to 1.

Of course, in both cases life adapts to the universe it's in, not the other way around, so when you think about it life is fine-tuned to the universe, not the reverse.

 

[fls]

How do you figure? There is no scientific evidence for some of the variables necessary to figure a probability for intelligent aliens. Same goes for the probability of the existence of a god. On the other hand, there is some scientific evidence for other variables. Same goes for the probability of the existence of a god.

I'm not talking about the extent to which we have information about some of the variables. I'm talking about what we look to as the source of that information.

Also, wouldn't it have to meet a certain threshold of probability for it to be rational? In other words, is it rational to believe in something for which there is only a 0.0000001 probability (highly improbable)? Or does it have to at least be probable (probability greater than 0.5) for it to be rational?

I thought we agreed that attempting to pick a threshold is a fruitless endeavour?

Can you define the word conjecture for me here? Maybe we're not using the term the same. I'm using it to mean a guess. When I say that some of the premises of an argument based on Drake's equation are largely or entirely based on conjecture, I mean that there is little or no evidence to support them.

The problem is, there's no such thing as "conjecture based on evidence." If there was evidence, it wouldn't be conjecture.

Conjecture based on evidence is what scientists do. If we know that H. pylori is the cause of some stomach ulcers, will eradicating the H. pylori then lead to the reversal of those ulcers? If we know that we are unable to find life on worlds without a solvent, is a solvent necessary for life?

I'm not sure what your point is. If you give the premises values greater than 0, you're assuming that it is possible. If you give them values of 0, you're assuming it's impossible. You asked if in fact it is possible that such a thing that you described exists, and I said yes, of course it's possible.

There is reality, and then there is our guess about reality. In reality, God exists or it doesn't, Linda's Syndrome exists or it doesn't. We don't know if God exists so we make guesses and then speculate based on those guesses. We can do the same with Linda's Syndrome - speculate based on our guesses. But since we know that in reality Linda's Syndrome doesn't exist, it suggests that the results of that speculation doesn't really inform us about the possibility that Linda's Syndrome exists. If our speculation can come up with definitely wrong answers in one case, what's to stop it from being wrong in any case?

I'm not sure what that has to do with the question you asked me. But if I were to think up something (pull it out of my ass, as you put it) that doesn't mean that there is a 0 probability of it being true.

It's only true to the extent that you used information that's true. For example, it's true that 118 is a real value for a sodium measurement, as opposed to 1 or 6000. So it's true that some people have a sodium measurement of 118, but it's not true that they do so because of Linda's Syndrome (because I know that I didn't use any other information to restrict my description).

It isn't used to calculate the prior probability of the existence of a god. It is considered "new evidence" that is used to calculate the resulting probability of the existence of a god. Did you read the article on Bayesian analysis?

The volume of a box is defined by v=x*y*z. If you measure a box to determine x, y, and z, you can use this definition to also determine the volume for the box. The volume can also be determined without knowing x, y and z (measure how much water it takes to fill it, for example). If any three pieces of information are enough to define the fourth piece, does the fourth piece represent new information?

Yes, information that makes an idea more or less likely to be true - that is, if the information was different, it would weaken or destroy a particular idea. Information like the evidence of a fine-tuned universe.

-Bri

What idea do you think a fine-tuned universe would weaken or destroy if it was different?

Linda

 

[Bri]

Sorry, fls. I've been out of commission for a few days. I'll try to respond later today.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I'm not talking about the extent to which we have information about some of the variables. I'm talking about what we look to as the source of that information.

In that regard, the two seem to be about the same. For those variables about which we have information, the source of the information is similar in nature.

I thought we agreed that attempting to pick a threshold is a fruitless endeavour?

Presumably, when one says "I believe that intelligent aliens exist" they mean that they believe it's probable that intelligent aliens exist.

So, yes, I agree that coming up with an actual probability greater than 50% (i.e. probable) is fruitless in the case of aliens and gods. Because there is no probability that isn't guesswork, you can't say whether it's "probable" or "improbable." In other words, there's no preponderance of evidence one way or the other, which tends to be where most people begin to disagree on what "rational" means.

Conjecture based on evidence is what scientists do.

For some questions there is evidence upon which to make an "educated guess." In the case of intelligent aliens, the conjecture for some of the necessary variables is based on little or no evidence.

There is reality, and then there is our guess about reality. In reality, God exists or it doesn't, Linda's Syndrome exists or it doesn't. We don't know if God exists so we make guesses and then speculate based on those guesses. We can do the same with Linda's Syndrome - speculate based on our guesses. But since we know that in reality Linda's Syndrome doesn't exist, it suggests that the results of that speculation doesn't really inform us about the possibility that Linda's Syndrome exists. If our speculation can come up with definitely wrong answers in one case, what's to stop it from being wrong in any case?

Again, how do you know that in reality Linda's Syndrome doesn't exist? If you're changing the definition of it in such a way as to make it impossible, then you'd have to change the premises to make it impossible, and the conclusion would also be that it's impossible. In other words, the argument doesn't come up with definitely wrong answers unless you put in definitely wrong premises.

It's only true to the extent that you used information that's true. For example, it's true that 118 is a real value for a sodium measurement, as opposed to 1 or 6000. So it's true that some people have a sodium measurement of 118, but it's not true that they do so because of Linda's Syndrome (because I know that I didn't use any other information to restrict my description).

I don't see your point. Sure, if you think up something that's impossible (like a married bachelor or a square circle), it's impossible. If you think up something that's not impossible, it's not impossible. Linda's Syndrome as described is not impossible, even though you pulled it out of your ass.

The volume of a box is defined by v=x*y*z. If you measure a box to determine x, y, and z, you can use this definition to also determine the volume for the box. The volume can also be determined without knowing x, y and z (measure how much water it takes to fill it, for example). If any three pieces of information are enough to define the fourth piece, does the fourth piece represent new information?

No. So? Bayesian analysis is useful for determining the probability of something given a prior probability and new evidence. Did you read the article?

What idea do you think a fine-tuned universe would weaken or destroy if it was different?

If it is shown that the universe isn't fine-tuned, it would weaken the idea that a fine-tuner is probable.

Just like if it were shown that the fraction of planets that go on to develop life is very small (for example, if the rare earth hypothesis is true -- that the conditions and events necessary for life to emerge are very specific), it would weaken the idea that intelligent aliens are probable.

-Bri

 

[fls]

In that regard, the two seem to be about the same. For those variables about which we have information, the source of the information is similar in nature.

What systematic observations have been made of gods?

Presumably, when one says "I believe that intelligent aliens exist" they mean that they believe it's probable that intelligent aliens exist.

So, yes, I agree that coming up with an actual probability greater than 50% (i.e. probable) is fruitless in the case of aliens and gods. Because there is no probability that isn't guesswork, you can't say whether it's "probable" or "improbable." In other words, there's no preponderance of evidence one way or the other, which tends to be where most people begin to disagree on what "rational" means.

Right, the extent to which something is probable is the extent to which it is supported by scientific inquiry and/or faith. And rather than selecting a particular probability as some sort of dividing line between rational and irrational (how could you possibly get agreement on that?), one can look instead at what is used to support the idea - predominantly scientific inquiry or predominantly faith.

For some questions there is evidence upon which to make an "educated guess." In the case of intelligent aliens, the conjecture for some of the necessary variables is based on little or no evidence.

Right, but as I've said numerous times now, I'm not really talking about a division based on how complete our information is.

Again, how do you know that in reality Linda's Syndrome doesn't exist?

Because I made it up. I didn't relate it, in any way, to any other condition. If there does happen to be something that causes sodium to be a specific value, Linda's Syndrome is not making reference to that.

If you wish to say that some other condition that has the same result as my made up condition means that my made up condition exists, then you have simply proven that God exists and this whole argument is moot. Gravity does the same thing as God, therefore God exists.

If you're changing the definition of it in such a way as to make it impossible, then you'd have to change the premises to make it impossible, and the conclusion would also be that it's impossible. In other words, the argument doesn't come up with definitely wrong answers unless you put in definitely wrong premises.

I don't see your point. Sure, if you think up something that's impossible (like a married bachelor or a square circle), it's impossible. If you think up something that's not impossible, it's not impossible. Linda's Syndrome as described is not impossible, even though you pulled it out of your ass.

So now that you've proven God exists, what are you going to do with the rest of your day?

No. So?

It's an analogous situation but simpler and more direct, so I think it is useful to help clarify what we are referring to. The formula for the volume tells us how the four factors are related. The extent to which it is specified is the same as the extent to which we have direct measures of each of those factors. If we had a specific question, like "is the volume greater than 12" and we were given x=3 and y=4, we could say something like "if z>1, then the volume is greater than 12". If you have other information that limits the value of z, then you can say something about the limits of the volume. If you don't, then you can't.

Bayesian analysis is useful for determining the probability of something given a prior probability and new evidence. Did you read the article?

If you are going to do something useful with Bayesian analysis, you need information that limits the result. Usually the relationship is already specified, like "the Likelihood Ratio for low serum ferritin and anemia is 6", so that a prior probability of 50% can be updated to 86%. By itself it doesn't represent new information unless you already have all the information you need (i.e. if the new information is 'volume', you don't have that new information unless you know what x, y, and z are).

The problem with the fine-tuning argument is that the relationship is not specified. We don't even know whether life is more or less likely in the presence of a fine-tuner. I'm just saying that in the absence of specifics, Bayesian analysis alone doesn't limit the probabilities - even if you subsequently provide one out of the three necessary values.

If it is shown that the universe isn't fine-tuned, it would weaken the idea that a fine-tuner is probable.

It is my impression that belief in God has very little to do with whether or not any particular idea receives support from scientific inquiry. Scientific inquiry has demolished pretty much every idea about where God is necessary, yet faith seems to be unchanged.

Linda

 

[Bri]

In that regard, the two seem to be about the same. For those variables about which we have information, the source of the information is similar in nature.

What systematic observations have been made of gods?

What systematic observations have been made of aliens?

Right, the extent to which something is probable is the extent to which it is supported by scientific inquiry and/or faith. And rather than selecting a particular probability as some sort of dividing line between rational and irrational (how could you possibly get agreement on that?), one can look instead at what is used to support the idea - predominantly scientific inquiry or predominantly faith.

So instead of finding a dividing line between probable and improbable, you're going to try to find a dividing line between "predominantly scientific" and "predominantly faith?" Good luck with that!

If you count up the number of terms in Drake's equation that are based entirely on conjecture, there are certainly more unknowns in Drake's equations than in the argument cj posted. Is that the method you'd use to determine which is "predominantly" based on scientific inquiry and which on faith? Or did you have some other criteria in mind?

Right, but as I've said numerous times now, I'm not really talking about a division based on how complete our information is.

So you said, but then you keep going back to the belief in aliens being based on "scientific inquiry" rather than faith. It's not. In the case of aliens, there is no evidence that aliens are probable. Belief without evidence is what the word "faith" means.

Because I made it up. I didn't relate it, in any way, to any other condition. If there does happen to be something that causes sodium to be a specific value, Linda's Syndrome is not making reference to that.

You defined Linda's Syndrome. It is possible that such a thing that fits the defintion exists. But like I said, add some condition to it that would make it impossible if you like, it doesn't really support your objection that the argument is invalid. If L.S. is impossible, then any premises that indicate otherwise would be nonsense (i.e. the premises are easily rejected) or else the conclusion of the argument will then reflect a posterior probability of zero. But as with any argument of this type, it won't "come up with definitely wrong answers" unless you assume definitely wrong premises.

If you wish to say that some other condition that has the same result as my made up condition means that my made up condition exists, then you have simply proven that God exists and this whole argument is moot. Gravity does the same thing as God, therefore God exists.

Really? I've never heard a definition of "God" that had gravity doing the same thing. In this particular argument, "god" is defined as "fine-tuner" so are you saying that gravity is the fine-tuner of the universe?

So now that you've proven God exists, what are you going to do with the rest of your day?

Well, I thought I might do some Nobel prize polish shopping (you can't just use any old polish for your Nobel prizes you know).

It's an analogous situation but simpler and more direct, so I think it is useful to help clarify what we are referring to.

No it's not. Since it doesn't involve probabilities or new evidence, it's not suitable for Bayesian analysis.

The problem with the fine-tuning argument is that the relationship is not specified. We don't even know whether life is more or less likely in the presence of a fine-tuner.

That life is more likely with a fine-tuner (i.e. that the universe is fine-tuned) is assumed in the premise.

I'm just saying that in the absence of specifics, Bayesian analysis alone doesn't limit the probabilities - even if you subsequently provide one out of the three necessary values.

If you accept the premises it does. The same is true of any argument based on Drake's equation.

It is my impression that belief in God has very little to do with whether or not any particular idea receives support from scientific inquiry. Scientific inquiry has demolished pretty much every idea about where God is necessary, yet faith seems to be unchanged.

How are aliens "necessary?" There is little if any "support from scientific inquiry" for the notion that aliens are probable, mainly because there's not enough scientific evidence to make that conclusion. Aliens certainly aren't "necessary" and don't explain anything. Yet some people's faith that aliens exist seems to also remain unchanged.

-Bri

 

[Belz...]

What systematic observations have been made of aliens?

You know, Bri, playing this game of yours does nothing to help your credibility.

But in case you were actually, honestly asking, we're talking about life in general, not aliens.

 

[articulett]

Indeed, we'd be aliens to life on another planet. If we were to find life, we can logically extrapolate that it evolved from the bottom up--starting with autotrophs (plants)... it would be bizarre to speculate that it was part of some invisible undetectable entity's top down "plan".

 

[fls]

What systematic observations have been made of aliens?

We're the aliens, so essentially everything that has been observed about life on earth, other planets in our solar system, etc.

So instead of finding a dividing line between probable and improbable, you're going to try to find a dividing line between "predominantly scientific" and "predominantly faith?" Good luck with that!

Really? I haven't seen any examples presented in this thread that would lead to any difficulty with that line.

If you count up the number of terms in Drake's equation that are based entirely on conjecture, there are certainly more unknowns in Drake's equations than in the argument cj posted. Is that the method you'd use to determine which is "predominantly" based on scientific inquiry and which on faith? Or did you have some other criteria in mind?

Well, I can only repeat myself, yet again, and say, I am referring to conjecture based on systematic observation and hypothesis testing. The terms in Drake's equation are based on systematic observation and hypothesis testing. The term "probability of God" (or whatever it was exactly that cj started with) is conjecture based on faith. We have knowingly observed planets and solar systems and life. We haven't knowingly observed gods.

So you said, but then you keep going back to the belief in aliens being based on "scientific inquiry" rather than faith. It's not. In the case of aliens, there is no evidence that aliens are probable.

This seems to be a strawman. Who here has said that the probability of aliens is different than the evidence for that probability?

You defined Linda's Syndrome. It is possible that such a thing that fits the defintion exists. But like I said, add some condition to it that would make it impossible if you like, it doesn't really support your objection that the argument is invalid. If L.S. is impossible, then any premises that indicate otherwise would be nonsense (i.e. the premises are easily rejected) or else the conclusion of the argument will then reflect a posterior probability of zero. But as with any argument of this type, it won't "come up with definitely wrong answers" unless you assume definitely wrong premises.

Really? I've never heard a definition of "God" that had gravity doing the same thing. In this particular argument, "god" is defined as "fine-tuner" so are you saying that gravity is the fine-tuner of the universe?

I'm saying that God was defined as controller of the movement of heavenly bodies. As per your insistence that Linda's Syndrome is real if something is discovered that does the same thing as Linda's Syndrome, God is real because we have discovered something that does the same thing as God. Gravity controls the movement of heavenly bodies, therefore God is real.

No it's not. Since it doesn't involve probabilities or new evidence, it's not suitable for Bayesian analysis.

That's not what I meant. I meant the volume, x, y, and z are all related in the way the formula specifies. P(H and E), p(H and ~E), p(~H and E), and p(~H and ~E) are all related in the way Bayes' Theorem specifies. If you are given any three values (for either formula), you can also specify the fourth value.

That life is more likely with a fine-tuner (i.e. that the universe is fine-tuned) is assumed in the premise.

Exactly. This is similar to my previous example (except that I gave more information in my example than we have for the fine-tuning argument). You are asking "is the volume greater than 12, given that x=3 and y=4?" The answer is "if z>1, then the volume is greater than 12." However, this does not allow you to conclude that z>1.

If you accept the premises it does. The same is true of any argument based on Drake's equation.

In both cases we are attempting to fill in the blanks. But proceding from a guess and obtaining a particular value as a result of that guess does not allow you to go back and conclude that the guess was correct.

How are aliens "necessary?"

They're not. I'm referring to the information that is used to support the various terms in Drake's equation - e.g. if a thorough search of the universe found no planets capable of supporting life (other than our own, of course), it would weaken the probability of alien life (other than our own, of course).

There is little if any "support from scientific inquiry" for the notion that aliens are probable, mainly because there's not enough scientific evidence to make that conclusion. Aliens certainly aren't "necessary" and don't explain anything. Yet some people's faith that aliens exist seems to also remain unchanged.

But none of that is particularly relevant. The consideration of Drake's equation is meant to be of the form of scientific inquiry, regardless of whether or not a few people have an irrational response to the idea.

Linda

 

[Darat]

Would just like to ask, again, what on earth does the Drake equation have to do with whether theist are rational or even whether cj's argument was a valid argument or not?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Would just like to ask, again, what on earth does the Drake equation have to do with whether theist are rational or even whether cj's argument was a valid argument or not?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Bri has been trying to say that if the argument cj posted is circular (or begs the question) then so does Drake's Equation. Or that if Drake's is valid*, then so is the God argument.

*For purposes of this discussion, we're sort of pretending that Drake's Equation is an argument for the existence of aliens just as the argument cj posted is one for the existence of God.

Bri seems to think that plugging in possible values for any of the factors in Drake's is the same as stating a probability for the existence of God in the argument cj posted. (This despite the fact that all of the factors in Drake's Equation are things whose existence is known beyond any doubt and not the existence of ET intelligence.)

I gave up when Bri said that it's rational to believe Nigerian scam e-mails (because there is the possibility that they could be true). He (like cj and Malerin too, I think) is using a definition of "rational" whereby believing anything that is possible is rational. Possible is defined as anything that is not a logical contradiction.

Which is why I'd love to play poker with him. Any time it's possible for him to draw a Royal Flush, he thinks it's rational for him to believe that will happen. On top of that, he thinks there's never a time when he's drawing dead because magic is possible.

 

[articulett]

I think you pretty much nailed it Joe. That's what I see too. I think all woo is based on that. ("You can't prove me wrong, so I could be right.")

However I think god IS a logical contradiction... we have no more right to presume consciousness without a material brain than we have to presume sound in a vaccuum. And how would we recognize this consciousness if it were to exist? How would we distinguish it from a delusion and all the other proposed invisible entities? When has subjective "knowingness" ever been a way to actually know anything later verified as true?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

However I think god IS a logical contradiction... we have no more right to presume consciousness without a material brain than we have to presume sound in a vaccuum.

I agree, as long as they allow you to define God as immaterial consciousness.

Unfortunately, despite all the protestations of specific God-claims in churches, political speeches, televangelists' preaching, self-help books, etc., the definition of "God" seems to be incredibly elusive in discussions like these. It becomes some vague, impersonal force or first cause or whatever.

Why are so many theists reluctant to talk about the God they actually believe in?

 

[Bri]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Bri has been trying to say that if the argument cj posted is circular (or begs the question) then so does Drake's Equation. Or that if Drake's is valid*, then so is the God argument.

I'll have to correct you then. The discussion came about when I suggested that it might be difficult to come up with a reasonable definition of "irrational" that would make belief in a god irrational while other beliefs such as the existence of intelligent aliens "rational." Another poster actually suggested the Drake equation as a valid reason to believe that intelligent aliens exist, and I simply pointed out that any argument based on the Drake equation would be similar to the argument cj posted.

Bri seems to think that plugging in possible values for any of the factors in Drake's is the same as stating a probability for the existence of God in the argument cj posted. (This despite the fact that all of the factors in Drake's Equation are things whose existence is known beyond any doubt and not the existence of ET intelligence.)

The statement in bold is simply not true. Many of the terms of Drake's equation are based entirely on conjecture.

I gave up when Bri said that it's rational to believe Nigerian scam e-mails (because there is the possibility that they could be true). He (like cj and Malerin too, I think) is using a definition of "rational" whereby believing anything that is possible is rational. Possible is defined as anything that is not a logical contradiction.

A gross mischaracterization of what I said. I said that whether or not you would be rational replying to an e-mail of the type you described would depend on your reasons for doing so, and that there are certainly rational reasons for doing so.

Which is why I'd love to play poker with him. Any time it's possible for him to draw a Royal Flush, he thinks it's rational for him to believe that will happen. On top of that, he thinks there's never a time when he's drawing dead because magic is possible.

I don't believe I've ever said that it's rational to believe that one would draw a Royal Flush just because it's possible. I am well-aware of the difference between possible and probable.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

We're the aliens, so essentially everything that has been observed about life on earth, other planets in our solar system, etc.

We're aliens?

If you're saying that the argument for aliens is based in part on observed evidence of intelligent life here on earth, I agree. Likewise, the argument cj posted is based in part on observed evidence of a fine-tuned universe. The problem with both arguments is that some of the premises are based entirely on conjecture, and therefore you cannot conclude that aliens or gods are probable.

Well, I can only repeat myself, yet again, and say, I am referring to conjecture based on systematic observation and hypothesis testing.

Yes, indeed some of the variables are based on observation and testing hypotheses in both cases.

The terms in Drake's equation are based on systematic observation and hypothesis testing.

Some terms are, some are not (some are based entirely on conjecture).

The term "probability of God" (or whatever it was exactly that cj started with) is conjecture based on faith.

Similarly, some of the terms of Drake's equations are conjecture based on faith.

We have knowingly observed planets and solar systems and life.

And we have knowingly observed that the universe is fine-tuned.

This seems to be a strawman. Who here has said that the probability of aliens is different than the evidence for that probability?

I'm not sure how that's a straw man, but if it was I apologize and ask you to please clarify your position. In particular, I don't understand the sentence in bold.

To clarify what I meant, here's what I said:

For some questions there is evidence upon which to make an "educated guess." In the case of intelligent aliens, the conjecture for some of the necessary variables is based on little or no evidence.​

To which you replied:

Right, but as I've said numerous times now, I'm not really talking about a division based on how complete our information is.​

To which I replied:

So you said, but then you keep going back to the belief in aliens being based on "scientific inquiry" rather than faith. It's not. In the case of aliens, there is no evidence that aliens are probable. Belief without evidence is what the word "faith" means.​

So yes the argument for belief in aliens contains some terms that are based on scientific inquiry and some that are based on faith. The conclusion that aliens are probable (which I believe you agreed is what is usually meant by "I believe aliens exist") depends on those terms that are based on faith. So how does that differ from the argument cj posted?

I'm saying that God was defined as controller of the movement of heavenly bodies. As per your insistence that Linda's Syndrome is real if something is discovered that does the same thing as Linda's Syndrome, God is real because we have discovered something that does the same thing as God. Gravity controls the movement of heavenly bodies, therefore God is real.

I don't know of anyone who uses that definition of "God," so by the same token if I define "God" as a small rodent with a long tail that squeaks" then by that definition the existence of a mouse would mean that God exists.

In both cases we are attempting to fill in the blanks. But proceding from a guess and obtaining a particular value as a result of that guess does not allow you to go back and conclude that the guess was correct.

Bayesian analysis allows you to take a prior probability of something, apply new evidence to it, and obtain a posterior probability of the something.

It's true that if the prior probability is a guess then so is the conclusion, and it's true that you cannot conclude that the guess was necessarily correct. But given that you accept the probability that the guess in the premise is correct, you can conclude a probability that the guess is correct taking into account the new evidence.

They're not. I'm referring to the information that is used to support the various terms in Drake's equation - e.g. if a thorough search of the universe found no planets capable of supporting life (other than our own, of course), it would weaken the probability of alien life (other than our own, of course).

Sure, I agree. And if evidence was found that the universe isn't fine-tuned, it would weaken the probability of a fine-tuner.

But none of that is particularly relevant. The consideration of Drake's equation is meant to be of the form of scientific inquiry, regardless of whether or not a few people have an irrational response to the idea.

Drake's equation is meant as a framework for thinking about the possibility of communication with intelligent life. But it can't be used as an argument to make a belief in aliens "rational" without similar arguments making a belief in a god "rational."

My point is that it would be difficult to come up with a definition of "irrational" that makes belief in aliens rational but belief in a god irrational.

-Bri

 

[Beth]

Why are so many theists reluctant to talk about the God they actually believe in?

It would be probably help considerably if you were actually arguing with people who considered themselves theists. Rather than theists, you are arguing with agnostics. At least, I am and I think Bri is as well. Further, the only god concepts I find plausible are the deist creator god and the pantheistic god=universe. But I don't have any firm ideas about what such entities, if they exist, might be like.

Bri, I want to say that what you are saying makes sense to me. I agree that cj's argument is no more circular than is Drake's equation.