Can theists be rational?

[articulett]

Actually I was attempting to state that the issue is far too complex to be summed up. I'm still waiting for the existence or non-existence of gods to be demonstrated as knowable.

It's kind of hard when the thing you are talking about is so vaguely defined and has no discernible qualities.

There are lots of things that "could" exist... but we don't "believe in" them. And when something is said to exist, but has no qualities that distinguish it from a delusion (or illusion)--then it is identical to (and indistinguishable from) the nonexistent.

Theoretically, little sprites could be doing a jig on your liver... who could disprove such a thing? But I don't think anyone would find such a belief rational... though they might be able to understand how or why a person came to believe such a thing.

 

[SusanB-M1]

#598 articulett and #599 The Atheist

Spooky coincidence - two consecutive posts from articulett and TA which cmpel a response of whole-hearted agreement!

And this is my 1000th post.

 

[fls]

Any of the variables that have an "f" followed by a subscript are between 0 and 1. For example:

f_ℓ is the fraction of the above that actually go on to develop life at some point
f_i is the fraction of the above that actually go on to develop intelligent life
​

You're not seriously suggesting that once there is a variable in an equation any result is equally likely, are you?

I'm not sure what you mean by "constrict the possibilities." Depending on the values for some of the least certain variables, the result will range between 0 and whatever value is estimated for the number of planets in the galaxy (which itself is far from certain). So there isn't much constriction at all if for example you place a very large value on n_e (the average number of planets that can potentially support life per star that has planets).

So you're happy putting the average at one million?

I'm not entirely sure how you're using the word "constrained" here. But because at least one of the variables is unknown, it can return any value between 0 and 1 depending on what you speculate for the unknown variables.

Some of those values are more probable than others, though. That's kinda the whole point.

Although some of the values in cj's argument aren't entirely speculation (it would be possible to use actual data to come up with a "reasonable" number), others are pretty much completely speculation. Which means that the results are speculation.

-Bri

So no conclusions can be drawn about the difference between one in a million and one in ten?

Linda

 

[Bri]

You deny that you equate the probability of god and inteligent life on exo planets. Yet you can't tell us what that difference is.

I did tell you what the difference is. You've listed differences in nearly every post:

• We know that inteligent life has occured.
• We know that inteligent life is composed of organic materials.
• We know that these organic materials are common in our universe.
• We know that there are 100,000,000,000 (stars in our galaxy) x 300,000,000,000 (galaxies in our universe) stars.
• We know that planets which is also likely required for life are everywhere we look.

I agree (except maybe the lst one -- I have no idea what that means). The problem is that even if we knew the above with 100% certainty, there are several terms in the equation are largely or entirely based on conjecture.

I think that god is not impossible and the chance of ET Inteligent life is plausible and to some significant degree greater than god.

Plausible: Seemingly or apparently valid

I guess I'll have to disagree. I don't think either is seemingly valid. I don't think either proposition is known other than that they are not impossible. In other words, that extra-terrestrial intelligent life is plausible is seemingly valid while god isn't is opinion (a valid opinion in my opinion, but opinion nonetheless).

I don't know how to quantify the difference I only know that what we know about inteligent life is significantly greater than what we know about god which is zero.

That's kind of the problem: we can't come up with valid probabilities for either without knowing how to qualify them. There is undoubtedly some evidence for some of the variables (for both, actually) but other variables have almost no evidence. And since the most important evidence (observation) is missing altogether, all we have to rely on are theoretical equations.

One possibly interesting twist is that the absence of something when we would expect to be able to observe it could be considered evidence of non-existence (it's probably the best evidence we have against unicorns, for example). If you assume values for Drake's equation, you can come up with the conclusion that there are far more than 1 civilization that is able to communicate with us. If that's true, where are they (see Fermi Paradox).

That's also a problem for non-omnipotent gods (such as the Greek gods). Given that an omnipotent being could let us know for certain of its existence if it wanted to, it could be said that if an omnipotent being exists, it doesn't want us to know of its existence.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Actually I was attempting to state that the issue is far too complex to be summed up. I'm still waiting for the existence or non-existence of gods to be demonstrated as knowable.

The existence of gods and extra-terrestrial intelligent life is knowable (if we were to observe one or the other we would know they exist). Their non-existence is not knowable.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

You're not seriously suggesting that once there is a variable in an equation any result is equally likely, are you?

Of course not. There are variables for which we have data and can say that certain values are more likely than others. However, the presence of a fractional term for which we have no data would mean that any result from 0 to the maximum possible is speculative.

So you're happy putting the average at one million?

I didn't say that every value of every term is equally likely. What I said is that there are several terms in the equation which are largely or entirely based on conjecture.

Some of those values are more probable than others, though. That's kinda the whole point.

Some of the input values for some of the terms are more probable than others, yes. However, other terms are largely or entirely based on conjecture, which means that any conclusion is speculative.

So no conclusions can be drawn about the difference between one in a million and one in ten?

I'm not sure what you're asking here. I don't know what conclusions can be drawn from results calculated from terms that are based largely or entirely on conjecture.

-Bri

 

[fls]

Of course not. There are variables for which we have data and can say that certain values are more likely than others. However, the presence of a fractional term for which we have no data would mean that any result from 0 to the maximum possible is speculative.

So you are saying that it is equally likely that all planets in a solar system can support life or that 20% can support life?

I didn't say that every value of every term is equally likely. What I said is that there are several terms in the equation which are largely or entirely based on conjecture.

And once there is some conjecture, all values become equally likely?

Some of the input values for some of the terms are more probable than others, yes. However, other terms are largely or entirely based on conjecture, which means that any conclusion is speculative.

Once there is some conjecture it eliminates the possibility that some values are more likely than others?

Linda

 

[Bri]

So you are saying that it is equally likely that all planets in a solar system can support life or that 20% can support life?

Probably not.

And once there is some conjecture, all values become equally likely

No, not all values of all the terms are equally likely.

Once there is some conjecture it eliminates the possibility that some values are more likely than others?

In the case of the output of Drake's equation, any value between 0 and a reasonable estimation of the number of planets in the galaxy is probably equally certain as any other given the unknown variables. Because the estimation of the number of planets isn't entirely based on conjecture, some values for the number of planets are probably more likely than others.

The same can be said of the argument cj posted though. Not all output values are equally likely given that some values for the probability of a fine-tuned universe are probably more likely than others.

-Bri

 

[The Atheist]

#598 articulett and #599 The Atheist

Spooky coincidence - two consecutive posts from articulett and TA which cmpel a response of whole-hearted agreement!

And this is my 1000th post.

Thanks & great work!

That's your shout, and mine's a cold beer!

 

[cj.23]

#598 articulett and #599 The Atheist

Spooky coincidence - two consecutive posts from articulett and TA which cmpel a response of whole-hearted agreement!

And this is my 1000th post.

A heart congrats to Susan on her thousandth post! Here is to many thousands more! Skol! (cheers that is!)

cj x

 

[RandFan]

I did tell you what the difference is.

I don't think either proposition is known other than that they are not impossible.

In other words, they are different and they are not. In other words you want to have your cake and eat it too.

I'm sorry Bri but as much as I'd like to I can't take you seriously. Saying that something is both A and Not A is not being intellectually honest. If you were willing to state, as I, that there is a clear difference in likleyhood but you don't know how to quantify that difference then fine.

 

[RandFan]

We have nothing to suggest that consciousness of any sort can exist outside a body. That makes god as likely as reincarnating souls as likely as invisible pink unicorns. Really.

We have evidence of material life and how it evolves... we have evidence that life can evolve in our universe... we have a basis on which to make a speculation. But since god involves an "immaterial, immeasurable entity"-- we have NOTHING to speculate about... there is nothing to measure... there is nothing to distinguish such a god from the non existence of such---the same as an invisible pink unicorn. Imagining what it does or did or could be, is not evidence!!! If it's not evidence for the invisible pink unicorn or the woo you don't believe in-- it cannot be evidence for god.

I missed this. My thanks to Susan.

 

[Bri]

In other words, they are different and they are not. In other words you want to have your cake and eat it too.

No. They are different but have some key similarities.

I'm sorry Bri but as much as I'd like to I can't take you seriously. Saying that something is both A and Not A is not being intellectually honest.

I don't recall saying that something is both A and not A.

Wow, an ad hom and a straw man in the same sentence! I'm impressed!

If you were willing to state, as I, that there is a clear difference in likleyhood but you don't know how to quantify that difference then fine.

I don't know how to quantify the likelihood of either.

-Bri

 

[RandFan]

I did tell you what the difference is.

I don't think either proposition is known other than that they are not impossible.

In other words, they are different and they are not. In other words you want to have your cake and eat it too.

I'm sorry Bri but as much as I'd like to I can't take you seriously. Saying that something is both A and Not A is not being intellectually honest. If you were willing to state, as I, that there is a clear difference in likleyhood but you don't know how to quantify that difference then fine.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Just getting caught up after being away a couple days. . .

Does a die exist where there are 6 equally likely possible outcomes?

In the real world, it's possible to have one close enough as makes any difference to anyone at all. As a thought experiment, yes it is. A "fair die" is assumed all the time.

If you don't like it, use the card analogy I already described. 6 cards, Ace through 6. You randomly chose one card. (Yes it's possible to choose one other than randomly, but for this analogy it is random.)

It is possible to come up with a probability for the existence of something without knowing that it exists.

Is not!

And if you DID know that it exists, it would be impossible to come up with any probability other than 1.

I agree. Dressing the argument up as one of probability is just a subterfuge for trying to hide a circular argument. Same problem as the Ontological Argument.

You can argue that there isn't enough information to come up with a valid probability that isn't speculative, but that's just a rejection of the premise. It is not an example of Begging the Question.

You keep repeating the same thing. I've answered this again and again. For yet another response to this same thing, see below.

Does an argument based on Drake's equation assume the existence of aliens?

It assumes the existence of thing whose existence is already known as a matter of fact (planets, liquid water, life, intelligence, technology). It does NOT assume the existence of ET intelligence. That's why it's different that the argument you're defending.

If I plug in as a premise--the way you mean it-- a value for the probability of each factor in Drakes equation (and these values are unknown). You can reject the premises, but if you assume they're true, the probability of ET intelligence is the result.

With the argument you're defending, if you assume a probability for the existence of God, and that is the very question we're addressing (that is, it is THE unknown), you can accept the premise, but the argument is not meaningful. It would be akin to skipping all the stuff in Drakes equation that deals with stuff we know 100% exists (planets, life, intelligence) and instead making the probability of ET life the premise of the argument.

It would be circular and meaningless.

And I'm pretty sure I've already said all this before (on Tuesday morning).

Not if no aliens exist. According to your reasoning, if no aliens exist, it doesn't matter how many planets you add, there will still be no aliens. By your reasoning, Drake's equation assumes the existence of aliens.

It does not. You could put at zero probability in any one of the factors in Drake's equation and the result would be a zero probability of ET intelligence.

By the way, what you're saying here is the same thing I addressed very early on. I agree that it would be equally circular in the argument you're defending to start from a premise that the probability of God's existence is zero.

With Drake's equation, no one is asserting a probability for the existence of ET aliens as a premise. That value is only on the other side of the equal sign (that is, it's a conclusion). It's an if P-1 and if P-2 and if P-3 and if P-4. . . and if P-last, then Q. All the P's are the factors (none of which is a probability for the existence of ET intelligence), and Q is the conclusion, which is the probability of the existence of ET intelligence.

(Actually, I'm not certain, but I think it's more than that. I'm pretty sure Drake addresses the probability of us encountering an ET intelligence, so the probable lifespan of radio-technological civilization matters. It's a minor point, but it is a different question, I believe.)

 

[RandFan]

No. They are different but have some key similarities.

What is a key similarity?

I don't recall saying that something is both A and not A.

(see my previous post)

I don't know how to quantify the likelihood of either.

As articulate says, "We have evidence of material life and how it evolves... we have evidence that life can evolve in our universe... we have a basis on which to make a speculation..."

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I've never come across a perfectly fair die. Back when I taught an Intro stats course, I used to have my students do an experiment with rolling dice, recording the numbers, and checking if they meet the expectations of a 'fair' die. Even the fancy Vegas casino dice I had showed distinct variation and were off from the expected value using a 95% level of confidence. The multi-billion dollar gaming industry is based on the fact that their manufactured dice are sufficiently close to 'fair' that it doesn't affect their profits, not because they are perfect and provide an exact 1/6 chance of each number coming up.

First off, I think you might be confusing your students. How many times did you roll the die before concluding that it wasn't fair?

ETA: Ah--I see you mentioned later that it was a hundred or so times. Of course, you're talking about testing a hypothesis. You can conclude that it's safe to reject the null hypothesis with some level of confidence, but this doesn't prove that a fair die is impossible. Aside from the "there are no black swans" issue, the 1:6 probability doesn't mean that you'll have to get that ratio in any given number of rolls. At any rate, this is all aside from the point of the die analogy.

AT any rate, there are such things as near enough to a fair die in the real world for the gaming industry to be able to make highly accurate predictions and reap the profits.

More to the point, it doesn't matter. The point of all this die stuff was to get Bri to understand what the 6 means when you say a fair die has a 1:6 probability of rolling a given number. As I've said over and over again, it means that you have one possible successful outcome and 6 total equally likely possible outcomes.

ETA: The important point, too, is that Bri rejects that there is a zero probability of getting a given number on a die that doesn't have that number on it. He says it's greater than zero, because magic is possible. As I mentioned, if you're approach is that anything is possible, there's no point in discussing probability as if it actually means anything.

When someone says the probability of God's existence is 1 in a million, what does it mean? (One in a million whats? Churches? Universes? Solar systems? What does it mean to choose among these million possible things--or to have them equally likely to occur?) If you can't say what the figure means, it can't possibly have any meaning other than the premise that "God probably exists." The conclusion is also, "God probably exists". Therefore, the argument is circular and meaningless.

 

[Kthulhut Fhtagn]

Are you waiting to find out whether the existence of extraterestrial tea pots orbiting the Sun is knowable? Does it really matter?

I used to be agnostic but once you get away from the peer group and thought patterns that hold onto the possibility and you realize that in the end we are all non-believers about an infinite number of things. It's no big deal to throw god into the works.

Most people don't believe in Xenu but perhaps they should be agnostic...

Not me. You?

I certainly don't believe in the existence of gods, I'm what they call an agnostic-atheist, but I recognize that I can't prove it (which prevents me from taking the position that I know gods do not exist) and I certainly don't believe we ever will be able to prove it. To clarify, before I can take a strong position against or for their existence either way I require evidence that their existence is unknowable.

I'll refrain from stating that I know the teapot orbiting the sun does/does not exist until it can be objectively proven that you can even know if the teapot is there in the first place. Until such a time I will continue to believe that the teapot does not exist because I have no reason to assume it exists in the first place.

It's kind of hard when the thing you are talking about is so vaguely defined and has no discernible qualities.

Exactly; without a proper definition of G/god(s) being put forward in the first place all discussion on the subject is meaningless ala theological noncognitivism.

There are lots of things that "could" exist... but we don't "believe in" them. And when something is said to exist, but has no qualities that distinguish it from a delusion (or illusion)--then it is identical to (and indistinguishable from) the nonexistent.

I'm aware of that; I'm not attempting to state that the existence of G/god(s) is unknowable and therefore believing in them is perfectly fine. No, not in the least. Not knowing whether or not something exists is not a great reason for believing in it.

The existence of gods and extra-terrestrial intelligent life is knowable (if we were to observe one or the other we would know they exist). Their non-existence is not knowable.

Well that begs the question "what qualifies as an observance of the divine?" And if you saw such a thing can it be proven that this observance is in fact from a creator-deity?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Agreed, but the problem is that any value assigned to several of the terms of the Drake equation are just speculation.

As Ivor and I have both pointed out, the Drake equation invites you to speculate on the probability of things known to exist. It does not require you to presume a probability for the existence of ET life. (The conclusion--the thing we don't know whether or not it exists.)

We don't know the specific conditions here that gave rise to intelligent life, nor do we know how close the conditions would have to be elsewhere to give rise to intelligent life.

That's a different question. You don't have to know all the specific conditions that gave rise to intelligent life to know what the requirements are (a star, a planet a certain distance from it, etc.)

No one is quibbling that the values of the probabilities of those things are unknown. I'm pretty sure the Drake equation was set up to tell us that these are the things we need to learn before we can know what the probability of ET intelligence is.

Hence, the search for extra solar planets is far more useful than poring over and re-reading testimony of UFO abductees. The one gets us closer to the answer, but the other does not.

Yes, a flaw in Drake's equation might be that it assumes that life arises on a planet, and that the planet must be orbiting a star. We don't know that.

However, circularity of reasoning is not a flaw with it, as we're not asked to assume a probability for the existence of ET intelligence.

 

[RandFan]

I certainly don't believe in the existence of gods, I'm what they call an agnostic-atheist, but I recognize that I can't prove it (which prevents me from taking the position that I know gods do not exist) and I certainly don't believe we ever will be able to prove it. To clarify, before I can take a strong position against or for their existence either way I require evidence that their existence is unknowable.

I'll refrain from stating that I know the teapot orbiting the sun does/does not exist until it can be objectively proven that you can even know if the teapot is there in the first place. Until such a time I will continue to believe that the teapot does not exist because I have no reason to assume it exists in the first place.

Thanks for the response. I'm not sure I understand the difference between an infinite number of things that can't be proven to exist and god. You seem to be making a distinction but I'm not able to lock it down but I could be wrong and you are saying your disbelief in both god and the teapot is equal.

As a former agnostic I accept your position it's just that it seems that one must play an epistemological tap dance to be agnostic. You can't prove that you are not a brain in a vat or that anyone else exists. I like the talkorigins take:

...fact" doesn't mean "absolute certainty"; there ain't no such animal in an exciting and complex world. The final proofs of logic and mathematics flow deductively from stated premises and achieve certainty only because they are not about the empirical world. Evolutionists make no claim for perpetual truth, though creationists often do (and then attack us falsely for a style of argument that they themselves favor). In science "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional consent."

An ET Teapot orbiting the sun is as unlikely as any empirical fact is likely. So long as your belief in the empirical is as provisional as your disbelief in god and the unknowable and/or improvable then cool.