Can Atheists Be Good Citizens?

Stone Island just sent me a PM saying he's going to "plonk" me. That's either code for "ignore" or ****. In the later case, he's not my type. If it's the former, he's a coward.

I agree. His unwillingness to admit error seems to me to be almost pathological.
 
Let me see if I can break down a couple terms here.

A skeptic, broadly speaking, is someone who tries to base all statements of fact on evidence.

An atheist is someone who does not believe in the existence of any gods.

The atheists I think Stone Island is talking about are members of both of the above sets. They are atheists because they are skeptics. If anyone wants a Venn diagram let me know and I'll throw one together.

The laws of nature are descriptions of how nature behaves. Force equals mass times acceleration. First law of thermodynamics.

One thing to note about these laws is that they are always true. Raindrops don't have a choice about how to fall to the ground. They don't have the option of breaking the laws of motion with the risk of suffering punishment later. They have to fall at a certain rate of acceleration in a certain direction. If the wind blows on them, they don't get to decide whether to comply with the wind's demands.

So we can make statements of fact about the laws of nature, and we can support these statements with scientific evidence. If you were to ask me, a skeptic atheist, if I believe in gravity, I'd say yes, I believe gravity exists and it behaves in a certain way.

Human rights are, broadly speaking, concepts about how humans should behave relative to other humans. People have made statements about these concepts at various times throughout the history of humanity.

We can definitely make a statement of fact that humans have discussed the concept of human rights. We can also state the fact that different humans have made different statements about what they think those rights are or should be, and about how governments should behave with regard to those rights. Those are all facts.

Stone Island is discussing whether the statements made about human rights are statements of fact. If someone says, "People should have the right to speak freely" or "people should have the right to seek a redress of grievances from the people who govern them", are they stating a fact about nature itself, or are they stating an opinion about how they think humans should live?

If they are stating a fact about nature, then there is no way to verify whether it's true. The are no scientific tests you can carry out to determine whether a particular government is more in accord with nature than any other. These "natural rights" aren't like the laws of nature studied by science, because humans have a choice about whether to recognize them or not. If they were laws of nature, we wouldn't have a choice about how to behave with regard to them.

The only fact statements we can make are the ones I have a couple paragraphs above. So if you were to ask me, a skeptic atheist, if I "believe in" human rights, I would answer yes, I know human beings have formulated a concept of the rights each human should have, and I believe governments that operate based on that concept are more likely to allow their citizens to live freely while protecting them from other people, which is what I value in a government. But it doesn't make sense to talk about human rights using scientific language, any more than it would make sense to talk about the laws of motion in the language of morality and ethics.
 
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How are they not natural? How is human behavior not natural?

I was wondering that myself. We see play, recreational sex, infanticide, deception, cooperation, retribution, altruism and all manner of things humans variously consider good and evil all over the animal kingdom. There's nothing we do which I can'y think of which some animal somewhere does not also do in a similar way - besides express abstract concepts.
 
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The laws of nature are descriptions of how nature behaves. Force equals mass times acceleration. First law of thermodynamics.
*shuffles through old notes*

Isn't that the one that states that "The Universe sucks?" (Nature abhors a vacuum) (I stretch too hard at times for a laugh, I know.)
Human rights are, broadly speaking, concepts about how humans should behave relative to other humans. People have made statements about these concepts at various times throughout the history of humanity.
I'll counter, in a slight digression, that human rights are at best wishful thinking unless regularly backed up by will, force and/or significant leverage of some sort. Believing in human rights (quote mine from below, admitted) is a dangerous step toward the dreaded magical thinking so frequently chided here. Danger Will Robinson! :eek:
We can definitely make a statement of fact that humans have discussed the concept of human rights.
So much so that I'd like that discussion added to the possible causes of global warming. :D
These "natural rights" aren't like the laws of nature studied by science, because humans have a choice about whether to recognize them or not. If they were laws of nature, we wouldn't have a choice about how to behave with regard to them.
*claps*
But it doesn't make sense to talk about human rights using scientific language, any more than it would make sense to talk about the laws of motion in the language of morality and ethics.
*stands and applauds

May I interrupt this excellent discussion to ask Stone Island the following PhD level question?

Hey, Stone, can an atheist be a good citizen? Your own opinion.

Please.

Thanks.

(Crib sheet previously provided in post #9)

DR
 
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Play that line of thought out for a bit. It seems to me that if what you're saying is true, then any loyalties or associations that are to any entity other than the state are cause for inability to be a good citizen.

Not exactly. That's what YOU seem to be saying. I'm saying by your criteria, that a theist who puts religion before country ain't a good citizen.

Me, I've served in the military, got a small collection of injuries and a few artificial parts due to that, I pay taxes, I support my community, state and nation, I volunteer, I give, I help others, I am proud of my nation -- proud enough to call foul when it does stupid things, and I try to live my life in such a way as to be a credit to my family, friends, students, co-workers, neighbors and to my country. I'm also an atheist.

Anyone claiming that I'm not a good citizen is wrong. Flatly so. And they're displaying a certain stupidity (willful ignorance), that tells ME that they're probably promoting a version of citizenship that has some severe and debilitating limitations.
 
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May I interrupt this excellent discussion to ask Stone Island the following PhD level question?

Hey, Stone, can an atheist be a good citizen? Your own opinion.

NB SI: ABD PhD

Does that mean he has yet to get his just desserts?

Anyhoo... as PhD -level might induce one of them interweb head-asplode moments, how about this:

Hey, Stone, can an atheist be a good citizen? An opinion espoused by anyone other than Neuhaus.
 
As I said before, until thought crimes become a reality, good citizenry is defined by action not thought.

This is irrelevant. Saying you hold to a set of governing axioms because they work in your best interests is not hypocritical or inconsistent. You keep attempting to create a staw-atheist and claim that atheists in general can't be good. This is just bizarre.

I was just leafing through my copy of Michael Martin's Atheism: A Philosophical Justification and I found this line:

It could be argued from a more inclusive utilitarian perspective, however, that the decision to base belief on beneficial reasons is problematic. Maintaining one's belief in the light of clearly negative evidence because of the benefits that result could have a profound effect on one's entire belief system. Indeed, in order to keep a system of beliefs intact in the face of negative evidence, it may be necessary to change other beliefs in the system that in turn have profound and damaging psychological effects. Moreover, if change in a belief system is allowed when there is a clearly worthwhile social goal, it could set a precedent for change when there is no obvious and immediate social benefit. Further, one person's example might induce others to maintain or change their beliefs for the slightest whim or the most selfish motive.

It is perhaps because of the potentially dangerous implications of believing for beneficial rather than epistemic reasons that some philosophers have argued that it is always morally wrong to believe in anything unless one has adequate epistemic reasons.

From Barro (pg. 779), and I'm quoting the version published in American Sociological Review, which obviously differs from yours,

Our results show that, for given religious
beliefs, increases in church attendance tend
to reduce economic growth. In contrast, for
given levels of church attendance, increases
in some religious beliefs-notably belief in
hell, heaven, and an afterlife-tend to increase
economic growth. There is some indication
that the fear of hell is more potent
for economic growth than is the prospect of
heaven.
We stress that these patterns of growth effects
apply when we control for reverse caufrom
the one plotted on the x-axis. We then normalized
the resulting value to have a mean of
zero-hence, the average value of the variable on
the y-axis is not meaningful. The line shown in
each diagram is a least-squares fit between the
variable on the y-axis and the one on the x-axis.
sation by using the instrumental variables
suggested by our analysis of the determinants
of religiosity. The results remain intact
when we enter the composition of religious
adherence into the growth equations. Based
on the arguable exogeneity of the instrumental
variables, we think our estimates reflect
causal influences from religion to economic
growth, rather than the reverse.
Our conjecture is that stronger religious
beliefs stimulate growth because they help
sustain specific individual behaviors that enhance
productivity. An interesting extension
of our study would examine the links between
religious beliefs and individual behaviors
or values, such as those we previously
mentioned: honesty, thrift, work ethic, and
openness to strangers. These characteristics
can be measured using survey responses in
the World Values Survey and the International
Social Survey Programme.
We argue that higher levels of church attendance
depress economic growth because
greater attendance signifies a larger use of
resources by the religion sector, and the
main output of this sector (the religious beliefs)
has already been held constant. The results
do not mean that greater church attendance
has a net negative influence on economic
growth-this net effect depends on
the extent to which an increase in attendance
leads to stronger beliefs, which in turn encourage
growth. Thus, another interesting
extension of our study would be to estimate
the influence of church attendance on religious
beliefs.
 
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My wife acts as if she really loves me. She does everything you would expect from someone who loves someone else.

But, is acting as if she loved me the same as loving me?
 
James Otis expressed the essential belief of the founding generation when he writes that Kings and Parliaments cannot give...

the rights essential for happiness. We claim them from a higher source--from the King of kings, and Lord of all the earth. They are not annexed to us by parchments and seals. They are created in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws of our nature. They are born with use; exist with us; and cannot be taken from us by any human power without taking our lives. In short, they are founded on the immutable maxims of reason and justice.

Quoted in Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution pg. 187.

On the next page Bailyn writes,

Ultimately, the conclusion to be drawn became obvious: the entire legitimacy of positive law and legal rights must be understood to rest on the degree to which they conformed to the abstract universals of natural rights. Not all were willing, even in 1775, to go as far as Alexander Hamilton, wrote in bold, arresting words that "the sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." But if some found this statement too enthusiastic, few by 1774... disagreed with the calmer formulation of the same idea, by Phillip Livingston... Legal rights are "those rights which we are entitled to by the eternal laws of right reason"; they exist independent of positive law, and stand as the measure of its legitimacy.
 
I was just leafing through my copy of Michael Martin's Atheism: A Philosophical Justification and I found this line:



From Barro (pg. 779), and I'm quoting the version published in American Sociological Review, which obviously differs from yours,
your point? And how does that answer the question I asked?
 
My wife acts as if she really loves me. She does everything you would expect from someone who loves someone else.

But, is acting as if she loved me the same as loving me?
No, but acting like she loves you would mean that she is being a good wife. Her being a good wife is independant of whether or not she actually loves you.

Using your analogy. If she loved you so much, that she kills you that know one else could have you, Is she being a good wife or bad wife?
 
No, but acting like she loves you would mean that she is being a good wife. Her being a good wife is independant of whether or not she actually loves you.

I disagree, her loving me (whether I can know it for sure or not) is essential to her being a good wife.

People who do the right thing for the right reasons are more laudable than people who do the right thing for the wrong reasons.

Whether we can know someone's reason for doing something or another is besides the point. I'm sure there is a lawyer here who can speak to this, but someone who through negligence runs over a pedestrian in their car is punished less harshly than someone who from malice aforethought does so.

Whether we can know for sure that a citizen of this country is able and willing to offer a morally compelling justification for her citizenship that does not conflict with her other principles is almost besides the point; if we did know we would say that one who can offer that justification is, everything else equal, better than one who cannot.

It does make wonder if someone clever, who could offer a morally compelling justification of their citizenship, and believes it to be true, but acts in all ways contrary to that belief and justification is, in any way, a better citizen than someone who cannot or won't give a justification for their citizenship, but does act in a morally and politically exemplary way. Of course, being able to give a justification is a necessary but not sufficient component of good citizenship.

And I thought about what I said before, that perhaps an atheist could be a good citizen of a country based on the principle of utilitarianism. I think this begs the question, because, given the manifold problems of utilitarianism as a moral philosophy, it's not clear to me that a society based on a utilitarian principle is itself good. I guess some atheist would have to offer the justification and I would then have to judge whether it was morally compelling. I've read some justifications of Communist regimes and other kinds of regimes not based on natural right and I have to admit, I did not find them morally compelling.
 
I disagree, her loving me (whether I can know it for sure or not) is essential to her being a good wife.
This is an assertion and not born on any reality. You may WANT her to love you, but if she treats you as though she does, she is being a good wife.

Who is a better husband

1.) Man A who loves his wife but has an affair
2.) Man B who doesn't love his wife but has never cheated on her?

Note that in both relationships, the husband and wife are friends who have peaceful happy interactions.

People who do the right thing for the right reasons are more laudable than people who do the right thing for the wrong reasons.
I agree. But doing the right thing regardless of the reason makes you GOOD at that thing.

Whether we can know someone's reason for doing something or another is besides the point. I'm sure there is a lawyer here who can speak to this, but someone who through negligence runs over a pedestrian in their car is punished less harshly than someone who from malice aforethought does so.
The person who drove negligently and killed someone was being a bad citizen. plain and simple. They caused a death due to their actions and we punish it. We may lessen the punishment if there wasn't intent, but this has more to do with our compasionate court system vs. whether or not we view a person as a good/bad citizen. We punish in both cases, and are therefore sending the signal that both cases represent bad citizenry.

Further, do we lessen the reward based on intent?
Do we punish a person who avoided hitting a black pedestrian because they didn't want a black person touching thier car?

As you can see, we do not have thought crimes. It is impossible and disengenious for us to define citizenship on thought.

Whether we can know for sure that a citizen of this country is able and willing to offer a morally compelling justification for her citizenship that does not conflict with her other principles is almost besides the point; if we did know we would say that one who can offer that justification is, everything else equal, better than one who cannot.
It isn't beside the point, it is your point, your argument. Your argument requires to know what is in the heart of man. You are claiming to know what is in the heart of an atheist and you define it as being less than a theist. That's simple absurdity.


It does make wonder if someone clever, who could offer a morally compelling justification of their citizenship, and believes it to be true, but acts in all ways contrary to that belief and justification is, in any way, a better citizen than someone who cannot or won't give a justification for their citizenship, but does act in a morally and politically exemplary way.
No it doesn't. that logic leap requires belief that your definition of good citizen is true. It isn't. Citizenry is defined by actions not beliefs. Of course, being able to give a justification is a necessary but not sufficient component of good citizenship.


And I thought about what I said before, that perhaps an atheist could be a good citizen of a country based on the principle of utilitarianism. I think this begs the question, because, given the manifold problems of utilitarianism as a moral philosophy, it's not clear to me that a society based on a utilitarian principle is itself good.

Because your straw-atheist can only begood in your straw-society which you say isn't good, then the straw-atheist can't be good and therefore atheists can't be good citizens?

Not a very convincing argument. Indeed, it's rather silly.

I gave you an example of a secular humanist society. Could an atheist be good in such? Could you functionally distinguish between a secular humanist society and western governments of today?

I guess some atheist would have to offer the justification and I would then have to judge whether it was morally compelling.
I see. You are the final arbiter on what is good and bad. :rolleyes:

I've read some justifications of Communist regimes and other kinds of regimes not based on natural right and I have to admit, I did not find them morally compelling.
And this straw-society is bad, therefore, atheism is bad?

You ignored my secular humanist example. Why?
 
Whether we can know someone's reason for doing something or another is besides the point. I'm sure there is a lawyer here who can speak to this, but someone who through negligence runs over a pedestrian in their car is punished less harshly than someone who from malice aforethought does so.

Whether we can know for sure that a citizen of this country is able and willing to offer a morally compelling justification for her citizenship that does not conflict with her other principles is almost besides the point; if we did know we would say that one who can offer that justification is, everything else equal, better than one who cannot.

It does make wonder if someone clever, who could offer a morally compelling justification of their citizenship, and believes it to be true, but acts in all ways contrary to that belief and justification is, in any way, a better citizen than someone who cannot or won't give a justification for their citizenship, but does act in a morally and politically exemplary way. Of course, being able to give a justification is a necessary but not sufficient component of good citizenship.

I don’t think it’s beside the point.

You can’t know for sure if she’s really loving you or just pretending to love you. Pretending could be a part of giving the picture of her being a good wife. She might even fool herself into thinking se really loves you. Although I’m sure she really does, I hope at least.

But the bottom line is that we can only judge such things via behaviour. We cannot know for sure what the motivations really are. Thus the whole point you’re making is pretty much moot. It’s just a silly though experiment about potentials.

We must therefore judge good citizenship via actions, not according to potential mental positions.
 
I disagree, her loving me (whether I can know it for sure or not) is essential to her being a good wife.

I guess it all depends on what your definition of "good wife" is.

People who do the right thing for the right reasons are more laudable than people who do the right thing for the wrong reasons.

Why ?

Whether we can know someone's reason for doing something or another is besides the point.

No, it's not. If you can't possibly know their reasons, then you have to trust their actions.

Whether we can know for sure that a citizen of this country is able and willing to offer a morally compelling justification for her citizenship that does not conflict with her other principles is almost besides the point; if we did know we would say that one who can offer that justification is, everything else equal, better than one who cannot.

Still wondering about what all that means. A justification for my Canadian citizenship is this: I live in Canada.

And I thought about what I said before, that perhaps an atheist could be a good citizen of a country based on the principle of utilitarianism.

How about one based on humanism ?
 
None of that is relevant because, as we have already shown, atheist citizens of the US can offer a morally compelling defense of our form of government without conflicting with any of our principles.
 
... morally compelling defense of our form of government without conflicting with any of our principles.

I take it you're not including the way your federal justice system washes its hands of and/or turns a blind eye to debacles like the voting laws in Florida where "individuals convicted of a felony are stripped of their civil and voting rights, even after completion of their sentences. Loss of civil rights takes away not only the right to vote, but also the right to hold public office, serve on a jury, and qualify for certain types of state licenses necessary for many jobs, such as those in the construction and medical fields." (Source: aclufl.org)
 

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