Brain Transplant

[John Bentley]

I refer you to a recent Sci-Fi series by David Weber and John Ringo. They refer to such devices as "toots". (I forget what it's shorthand for), and "toots" do much of what you have identifed.

The can also act as translators... provide hardware reactions to force the body to move quickly without thought in combat situations; and all sorts of other interesting things.

Weber and Ringo also have suggested that "toots" could lead to "toombies" - people who's bodies are taken over by hacked "toots", to the horror of their proper owners.

March Upcountry (Prince Roger Series)

Great set of books. I don't believe the "toot" label was ever explained, but from the context when they were introduced and explained in the book, I believe it stands for inTegrated compUTer. The dangers of such technology were also explained rather graphically during that same scene, as you have pointed out.

 

[Brown]

I'm not surprised that the notion of implantable brain enhancements have made it into science fiction. Although I have not seen the books in question, I have seen the issue touched upon in a few other works. If I remember right, there was some discussion of brain-mind distinction in "Godel-Escher-Bach," and possibly in essays by Dr. Oliver Sacks.

Anyway, what makes the idea appealing today is that we are rapidly improving the interfaces between electronic components and neural tissue, as well as the signal processing associated with particular natural signals. The notion of electronic brain augmentation is no longer quite so far-fetched.

It is quite another matter, however, to encode a person's "mind" or "being" in electronic form. That technology, if it ever develops, is probably a long way off.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I read a speculative article in OMNI years ago about a possibly more practical approach; uploading your personality into a computer.

This would imply vastly more capability than we have now, of course, but if quantum computing becomes a reality, that might be do-able.

I speculated at the time that at best you'd just be creating another "you", but the author (sorry, long since forgotten) said that the individual would essentially switch "viewpoints" back and forth from the physical body to the computer, so that at some point it would be the same.

Lots of sci-fi guys have had fun with the idea, notably Fred Pohl.

Assuming that it is possible to transfer your memories to some sort of machine, and that, somehow, that machine will become "conscious", it will not be "you".

I believe we lack the appropriate concepts to deal with this idea.

 

[John Bentley]

Assuming that it is possible to transfer your memories to some sort of machine, and that, somehow, that machine will become "conscious", it will not be "you".

Interesting. Why would you say that? I believe Asimov's wife dealt with this very subject in a book she wrote. Can't remember the title, but I remember the main character believing the same thing, until he met his own "upload" on his deathbed. It was a good book.

Interestingly, I remember another SF story in which a sentient computer believed that copying itself would not result in immortality, "because the copy would not be me!" The scientist talking to the program told it that he would give anything he had for that kind of immortality, IIRC. I agree with him. Another good book.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Interesting. Why would you say that? I believe Asimov's wife dealt with this very subject in a book she wrote. Can't remember the title, but I remember the main character believing the same thing, until he met his own "upload" on his deathbed. It was a good book.

Interestingly, I remember another SF story in which a sentient computer believed that copying itself would not result in immortality, "because the copy would not be me!" The scientist talking to the program told it that he would give anything he had for that kind of immortality, IIRC. I agree with him. Another good book.

Because I believe current "models" about what consciousness "is" are completely wrong. In order to "upload you" to a different brain we should consider ourselves as objects, instead of processes. Damn, Im tired, I hope this makes sense!

 

[John Bentley]

Because I believe current "models" about what consciousness "is" are completely wrong. In order to "upload you" to a different brain we should consider ourselves as objects, instead of processes. Damn, Im tired, I hope this makes sense!

I assume you are speaking of "objects" and "processes" in the computer modeling sense of the words? If so, you are probably going to get over my head rather quickly, but give it a go, and I'll see if I can wade through it.

Would "objects" in your sense of the word be related to Marvin Minsky's ideas about conciousness being created by several "objects" working together to give the illusion of something we call "I" or "me"?