Brain processes and individual experience

[Dancing David]

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I would think that materialism could not logically posit this. If each brain were to be unique, then the physical processes would also have to be unique, and if physical processes are what we know as consciousness, then each consciousness is unique.
Yes, similar but unique.Materialism is not a logical stance it is an observational stance, my POV

The only fundamental principle you could posit from here is just mere form and mere substance of the brain itself.
You could not say that this or that is consciousness since in each instance, it could only be potentially true of only one particualr consciousness.

Most likely true, which is why psychology studies the similarities and the differences, we can discuss what c-word looks like. But as each tree is different yet similar, each c-word will be different yet similar.

If there is identity in the physical process, then how can it produce that which is unique
Could you clarify that statement, I am not sure which identity you are reffering to?

Well , C-sense I am not sure that Ican explain my beliefs in a way that will change yours. Please understand that this is different from saying that everyones stomach is different. Each stomach is different, the cells are different, the size of the cells is different, the molecular composition of the cells is different. But the function is the same. Just as avery ones bones are different, yet similar.

What I am stating is that the brain developes and grows and creates the associative netweorks that create the 'brain events'. Even though each person who is not color blind can point to a color and say that they are red. There is not going to be an exact mapping of the process the way thier would be in a computer.

Each brain develops along certain structures but the way that those structures relate in process to each other is going to vary from person to person. So while the visual cortex is going to respond to the stimulation from the optic nerves, the exact location of a specific visual response in the visual cortex is going to vary from individual to individual.

Each process is unique but convergant, the structures of the brain are designed to grow in certain paths and then develop in response to the continuing flow of stimuli. So there is an underlying purpose to the whole thing, they are similar in structure but unique.

The brain has certain tasks that it can preform, say recognise patterns and store patterns. Each brain can preform those functions and sort out which area of the brain will do what during developement. But while we all use the left motor strip area to deal with language, how and where I store the word "red" is likely to be similar to yours but in different areas and with different patterns.

So while it does lend itself to the idea that qualia are irreduible, our brains develop in response to the perceptions we have. So if exposed to the same perception, our brains will learn to recognise them in similar but unique fashions.

Qualia are learned and developed in the neural networks. We have them because we are exposed to them.

Clear as mud right?

 

[Yahzi]

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Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ?

I believe several people have explained why. Under materialism, brain processes are attached to brains, and since experiences (including the expierence of self) are brain processes, they are attached to specific brains.

Your question can only be asked in some other framework than materialism. But if you start to illuminate that framework, we'll probably object to its validity or soundness, and never get to the question itself.

It's like asking why is 1 = 1: the question only makes sense in maths that don't have identity as an axiom. But any math without identity is probably so confusing that we'll far more important problems with it long before we get around to your specific problem.

 

[Suggestologist]

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To put it crudely, why am "I" me and not you. Both brain processes from me and you manifest as experiences yet my experiences somehow have been "selected" to manifest to one particular physical loci. (By the word "selected" I'm not implying any intervention by any god or higher force or such notions)

Personal evolution seems to act as selector here. Materialism is irrelevant to the question. Everything changes over time.

 

[csense]

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[similarities and differences] we can discuss what c-word looks like. But as each tree is different yet similar, each c-word will be different yet similar.

By tree I assume you mean what you refer to as associative pathways within the brain. Each branch might be considered a particular physical process, with the tree representing a set of these processes.
If it is true then that we each have a different tree to code an objective event, then differences in structure are irrelevent to differences in conscious experiences. Uniqueness must equal something other than structural differences.

 

[davidsmith73]

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You can imagine being me, but you cannot duplicate my experience; the two processes are entirely different.

That is not really what I am describing. I am trying to conceive of the notion that I could actually be you and have your experiences.

I can imagine being my dog, but all my inferences are based on my own experience, not hers. The physical separation of my brain (and associated sensory inputs) from yours is all that is required, logically, to insure a personal experiential existence.

The physical separation of brain is all that is required to describe a separate experiential existence but why am I any particular one of the separated experiential existences rather than the other. Why am I not actually you instead of me ?

 

[Interesting Ian]

I have a problem with the idea that experiences are brain processes. If we consider any particular experience existing in the universe or set of experiences and the claim that they only have an objective existence in the form of a brain process then one fundamental question poses itself - where does the "self" come from ? In other words, why do "I" only experience certain brain processes that exist in the universe and not others ? The other brain processes that objectively exist such as Bob's or Jane's brain processes are not experienced by me, yet I see no logical reason for this segregation to exist. I only say this because the idea that experiences are brain processes gives no hint as to why my experiences are bound to my particular brain processes but not someone Else's.

David,

Let's suppose materialism is correct. Now imagine if someone were to create a "matter duplicator", and made a precise copy of a person's body. So what we have here is a bit like something such as the transporter in star trex, except the original doesn't get destroyed. Now after making a duplicate of someone's body, would they then exist 2 streams of consciousnesses, although (at least initially) with identical personalities? Or alternatively would they just continue to be one stream of consciousness which simultaneously experiences out of both the original body and the duplicates body, so that the person sees simultaneously out of 4 eyes etc? Or some other possibility?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Locality. You experience only your own brain processes because your mind also is a brain process that resides in the very same brain. Or at least, this if materialism is correct.

But that's just meaningless. You're saying that I am associated with certain brain processes because I am those brain processes rather than other brain processes. But what sort of an answer is that? What logically necessitates I am certain brain processes but not other brain processes? What is it about brain processes occurring in my head which makes them special?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Bob and Jane's brains are separate from your brain. Couldn't that be a logical reason why you don't experience Bob and Jane's brain processes?

No I don't see how. Could you elaborate on this Richard?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Materialism? That's so old people. Last time I checked we abandoned those outdated philosophies in favour of naturalism. Your mind (or concious self) is a by-product of your individual brain processes.

That's materialism/physicalism or epiphenomenalism, not naturalism.

Jane and John's mind is a by-product of their individual brain processes.

But why isn't David a by-product of their brain processes?

 

[Mercutio]

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That is not really what I am describing. I am trying to conceive of the notion that I could actually be you and have your experiences.

The physical separation of brain is all that is required to describe a separate experiential existence but why am I any particular one of the separated experiential existences rather than the other. Why am I not actually you instead of me ?

Because you are asking the question from the perspective of where you are now. Any of a billion slightly different life experiences and you are a different person from who you are now. It's a bit like asking "why did life arise on earth and perhaps not anywhere else?" The only way we get to ask the question is if life has, in fact, already developed. We're not asking this question on Mars, not because it couldn't have happened, but because it [/i]didn't[/i]. You could have had my personality, but you didn't. And if you had, you'd be (perhaps) asking the same question as now, wondering why you didn't have yet a different personality. Another example; evolution. We did not have to end up where we are; we are just an ape that got lucky. But because of the accidents that happened to put us in the position of being able to ask the question...well...we ask the question. Again, nothing special, nothing predestined; you did not have to be you. You could have been me. No reason, other than our different histories.


...And regarding Ian's "matter duplicator" post just above, the thread "transmogrified zombies" in the science forum presents that scenario, if you want to see what some people's reactions were...

 

[Interesting Ian]

I was refering to the "self" merely in the sense that I do not experience someone elses brain processes. In order for my point to be valid I don't think that I need to think of the self in terms of an actual "thing" in its own right. Lets call the self ("I") a set of experiences correlated with a particular individual person's brain processes.

I may not be articulating my point very well here. If you say that your individual experiences are no more than your own brain's reaction to the stimuli around you, this creates a problem thus. Someone elses individual experiences are no more than their own brain's reaction to the stimuli around them. So the question is:

Why should "I" (illusionary or not) be me and not you ? Both sets of brain processes from me and you that manifest our respective "I" qualify as existing as an experience yet "I" finds itself locallised to me rather than you. To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be your "I" instead of my "I" ?

I think I understood your first post and I think it's a huge problem for materialism. I haven't seen any relevant replies to your question at all yet. Saying things like the mind doesn't exist is obviously irrelvant because then it just shifts to the question of the illusionary mind or self. Makes no difference to your point.

 

[Interesting Ian]

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Because your brain is in you and mine is in me. Pretty simple, really.

Richard, that's not an answer and I suspect you know it. Do you acknowledge there's a huge problem for materialism here?

 

[Interesting Ian]

As I understand it, in order for you, as an independent multi cell ogranism to exist and flourish, a self operating regulatory mechanism or set of mechanisms must exist. In this case, brain and spinal cord. From before conception, DNA to produce these mechanisms in a viable body (self-defeating mutations not taken into account) is present. Life, simplified, comes in two flavors: self preservation and self replication. It is easier and far more conducive for Bob and Jane to have their own brains each. If they shared a brain and consciousness, if the mutual brain were damaged, at least 2 otherwise healthy people (present psychological and physical disorders not withstanding) would be lost/damaged at the same time. At the least, if Jane suffered some sort of concussion, wouldn't it traumatize Bob?

People simply aren't connected on a conscious brain-to-brain level. They are results from their own X and Y chromosomes, self contained units of DNA that developed independently of other humans, even twins.

Dang it's late. Night folks!

Well that was completely irrelevant! A hint: science doesn't help you here. It's a problem with materialism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

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Whats your point ?
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Same point others have made here, essentially--the separate "selves" develop quite simply as a function of 2 separate bodies--I don't experience your brain's function any more than I experience your stomach's.

No you don't. But the question is why don't you?

Let's make it even more difficult, or easier,depending...Say that we have conjoined twins. Same genetics, same in utero environment, very similar environment out in the world. You can't find people with more similarities in genetics and environment; still, a mechanistic viewpoint will demand that they will develop separate "selves". Why? If our thinking (and our "minds" or "selves") is developed through interaction with the environment (probably the best explanation of this is in behaviorism, although other views will also make this claim), then any difference in environment may have an effect on thinking. The slightest difference may eventually have enormous effects (think "butterfly effect" in chaos theory). Our conjoined twins do have differences in what they see. As they walk along, one head looks left, the other right, at a particular moment. As a result, one sees a smile that the other has missed, or any visual stimulus you can imagine. The association of that smile with that walk down the pathway is a difference between the two twins; one we cannot undo. Our two paths diverge, to paraphrase Frost, and that has made all the difference.

I would say that different experiences do not alter the self one iota. It only affects our personality.

 

[davidsmith73]

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Because you are asking the question from the perspective of where you are now. Any of a billion slightly different life experiences and you are a different person from who you are now. It's a bit like asking "why did life arise on earth and perhaps not anywhere else?" The only way we get to ask the question is if life has, in fact, already developed.

The only way we get to ask any question is from the fact that consciousness exists. But I still don't think this addresses the issue.

Remeber that I am asking this question from the perspective of materialism which states that any experience is the same thing as a brain process. So if this is true then any brain process that exists in the universe has an equivalent ontological existence which seems to me to suggest that every brain process in the universe should simply express an experience regardless of its spatial location. In other words there should not be any reason for a segregation of experiences into these closed units we call "selves".

Think about it. The physical universe is cannot really be composed of truly separate entities in the same sense as individual experience is. Matter is always connected, never separate. So why, when experience is matter, do we conceive of these separate and closed experiential consciousnesses that depend on the history of only a subset of the connected physical universe ?

 

[Mercutio]

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Remember that I am asking this question from the perspective of materialism which states that any experience is the same thing as a brain process. So if this is true then any brain process that exists in the universe has an equivalent ontological existence which seems to me to suggest that every brain process in the universe should simply express an experience regardless of its spatial location. In other words there should not be any reason for a segregation of experiences into these closed units we call "selves".

Think about it. The physical universe is cannot really be composed of truly separate entities in the same sense as individual experience is. Matter is always connected, never separate. So why, when experience is matter, do we conceive of these separate and closed experiential consciousnesses that depend on the history of only a subset of the connected physical universe ?

You say you are asking this from a materialist perspective, but you still speak of conscious experience as if it is different. If "any experience is the same thing as a brain process", then it is tied to the brain that is processing. There is no need to suggest that this local process produce some free-floating "experience" which is accessible to all. Matter may all be connected, but right now the gravitational pull of my brain on yours is infinitessimally small. The electrochemical signals hopping from one neuron to another in my brain cannot make the leap out of it to your brain. Seriously, if you are asking this from a materialist perspective, why not switch it to digestion, to get rid of the mentalistic baggage you have unintentionally left in. If all matter is connected, why can you not digest the food in my stomach? When you figure out the connection between the process of digestion and the separate location of stomachs, that will be a nice materialist metaphor for the process of thinking and the separate location of brains.

 

[Dancing David]

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[similarities and differences] we can discuss what c-word looks like. But as each tree is different yet similar, each c-word will be different yet similar.

By tree I assume you mean what you refer to as associative pathways within the brain. Each branch might be considered a particular physical process, with the tree representing a set of these processes.
Actualy I meant a tree with bark and leaves, but the analogy would work.
If it is true then that we each have a different tree to code an objective event, then differences in structure are irrelevent to differences in conscious experiences. Uniqueness must equal something other than structural differences.

I am afraid that I don't follow your second statement, can you elucidate how you reach that conclusion. Differences in structure would mean that we do actualy percieve the same event differently. Unique yet convergant.

 

[Dancing David]

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But that's just meaningless. You're saying that I am associated with certain brain processes because I am those brain processes rather than other brain processes. But what sort of an answer is that? What logically necessitates I am certain brain processes but not other brain processes? What is it about brain processes occurring in my head which makes them special?

That's correct, from the materialist POV, your c-word is the physical process in your brain.

Your question is like asking why your emissions from your car are not the emissions from another car, or why your poop is not someone else's poop.

The mind is the product of the brain, just as emissions are the product of the engine in the car.

As to what necessitates why you are linked to a single brain:
from the materialist POV
1. We develop the ability to percieve based upon brain development in exposure to stimuli.
2. We develop the ability to form associations from a similar process, as we develop we can learn to move our muscles, there is a sloppy feedback process that allows children to learn to coordinate thier bodies.
3. Through the magic of cognition, the brain creates associations between external events and the internal event of cognition.
4. Through the magic of memory our brains develop associative patterns that allow for recognition of events that are similar to prior events.
5. As the brain continues to develop throughout life it will be shaped by, genetic encoding, exposure to events, associative patterns that organise events and the results of aging and trauma.

So: in essence you are you because of the history of development of the neural pathways and association. While 'you' is a fiction imposed by thought on seperate events, the answer is that you are you because of the history of exposure to external and internal events that your brain has experienced.

But logical nessecity, sorry....

 

[davidsmith73]

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Matter may all be connected, but right now the gravitational pull of my brain on yours is infinitessimally small. The electrochemical signals hopping from one neuron to another in my brain cannot make the leap out of it to your brain.

But they do. The electrochemical signals in your brain will affect mine to a very small degree in various ways. Experiences are said to have an objective existence in the form of a brain process. But we have just established that a physical brain process is not a truly separate thing because all matter is connected. Yet, experiences are said to be a closed system as evidenced from our individual experiences.

Seriously, if you are asking this from a materialist perspective, why not switch it to digestion, to get rid of the mentalistic baggage you have unintentionally left in. If all matter is connected, why can you not digest the food in my stomach? When you figure out the connection between the process of digestion and the separate location of stomachs, that will be a nice materialist metaphor for the process of thinking and the separate location of brains.

Do you view digestion to be the same thing as the physical processes of the stomach in exactly the same way that experiences are the same thing as the processes of the brain ?

 

[Dancing David]

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But they do. The electrochemical signals in your brain will affect mine to a very small degree in various ways.

Uh, dude, check your facts, the electrical part of the signal is not anything like a radio or anything. It is a potential created by sodium, calcium and potasium. It is not an electrical signal like emr or electrons in a power line. It is more like a biological osmotic filter driven by the very small charges associated with the ions. The actual signal is at the synapse and it is totaly chemical.
So your statement is like saying that a reaction in a vessel in a lab will have an effect on the chemicals in another vessel.

Experiences are said to have an objective existence in the form of a brain process. But we have just established that a physical brain process is not a truly separate thing because all matter is connected.
That is true all matter is connected in different ways, the burden would be to demonstrate that there is a significant or meaningful effect. So do quazars at the edge of the unverse effect your behavior? They are connected to you through gravity and entropy, how do they effect you?

Yet, experiences are said to be a closed system as evidenced from our individual experiences.

They are closed in the sense that they do not have meaningful impact on others except through our actions.



Do you view digestion to be the same thing as the physical processes of the stomach in exactly the same way that experiences are the same thing as the processes of the brain ?
It would be silly to say exact because you are talking about two seperate organs with two different forms and function. But , duh, the brain events are similar to stomach events , in that they are tied to the organ that produces them.

This is more of the c-word as privileged 'event', there is nothing anymore special about the c-word than there is to digestion. A plant makes sugar from sunlight, can you? Do a plant require some special realm of 'photosyntesis' to do this thing.

In materialism there are no 'special' or privileged events, you seem to elevate human awareness to some special realm, it is not special, it is as important as farting. It is a product of biological existance.