Brain processes and individual experience

[Mercutio]

Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Whats your point ?

Same point others have made here, essentially--the separate "selves" develop quite simply as a function of 2 separate bodies--I don't experience your brain's function any more than I experience your stomach's.

I may not be articulating my point very well here. If you say that your individual experiences are no more than your own brain's reaction to the stimuli around you, this creates a problem thus. Someone elses individual experiences are no more than their own brain's reaction to the stimuli around them. So the question is:

Why should "I" (illusionary or not) be me and not you ? Both sets of brain processes from me and you that manifest our respective "I" qualify as existing as an experience yet "I" finds itself locallised to me rather than you. To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be your "I" instead of my "I" ?

Let's make it even more difficult, or easier,depending...Say that we have conjoined twins. Same genetics, same in utero environment, very similar environment out in the world. You can't find people with more similarities in genetics and environment; still, a mechanistic viewpoint will demand that they will develop separate "selves". Why? If our thinking (and our "minds" or "selves") is developed through interaction with the environment (probably the best explanation of this is in behaviorism, although other views will also make this claim), then any difference in environment may have an effect on thinking. The slightest difference may eventually have enormous effects (think "butterfly effect" in chaos theory). Our conjoined twins do have differences in what they see. As they walk along, one head looks left, the other right, at a particular moment. As a result, one sees a smile that the other has missed, or any visual stimulus you can imagine. The association of that smile with that walk down the pathway is a difference between the two twins; one we cannot undo. Our two paths diverge, to paraphrase Frost, and that has made all the difference.

By simple virtue of two separate sets of eyes, we guarantee separate individuals.

 

[RichardR]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Ok, so why is your brain your brain and my brain my brain?

Well, if my brain wasn't my brain, it wouldn't be my brain. Would it?

 

[Pyrian]

Why should "I" (illusionary or not) be me and not you ? Both sets of brain processes from me and you that manifest our respective "I" qualify as existing as an experience yet "I" finds itself locallised to me rather than you. To put it crudely, why didn't I grow up to be your "I" instead of my "I" ?

This question works only when applied subjectively to your own self. Trying to express it in any sort of objective fashion results in very simple answers, since there is no objective reason why you should be anybody but you.

 

[RichardR]

why is your conciousness yours and my conciousness mine in the first place?

Perhaps because your consciousness arises in your brain.

Is this going anywhere?

 

[ImpyTimpy]

The problem is this becomes a circular discussion. It's a great philosophical concept, it's just a b**ch to describe it... For example, I know my conciousness comes from my brain, but the question is why is it mine? The best possible answer to that particular question would be that you're the only thing that exists... Of course, that is absurd, but if you can understand why that answer makes sense in the context of this question, you'll understand the actual meaning behind the question

Sorry, I can't put it any better then that...

Perhaps because your consciousness arises in your brain.

Is this going anywhere?

 

[Dancing David]

I think that from the materialist or nihist the question boggles the mind. Why am I I and not you?

factoid one: there are a trillion neurons(1,000,000,000) in the brain they do not grom in any thing other than a somewhat chaotic one. Influenced by reverberations and esperience. each brain is unique.

factoid two: if the 'self'(illusiory construct like temperature) is created through the interaction of genetics and enviroment, then each self is going to be unique, in that each experience is unique.

I think that the question is a good one because it points out the guld between a mechanistic materialism and idealism. I think that the better question is:
Why under an idealist system would there be individual self, if we are all embedded in a great mind?

I don't really understand why a materialist would even think that two brains would be the same, they aren't. They are all similar and convergant, but unique.

 

[Yahzi]

Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

yet my experiences somehow have been "selected" to manifest to one particular physical loci.

Like, for instance, your brain. Your expierences are local to your brain. Why wouldn't they be? Why did you read "brain process" and then somehow think that could be separate from a particular brain to process in?

What is so difficult about this?

 

[ImpyTimpy]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Yahzi, that's not what he's asking. I'm not sure how to put the question in more simple terms (or more complex) then what David has written up... Here goes though..

I know my experiences exists in my brain, but why are they in my brain in the first place. The word "select" is the key here, that is, why was my brain selected as the creator of my conciousness. Why am I me?

Yes, I realise the above sounds a bit woo-woo but I can't convey this philosophical problem any better...

Like, for instance, your brain. Your expierences are local to your brain. Why wouldn't they be? Why did you read "brain process" and then somehow think that could be separate from a particular brain to process in?

What is so difficult about this?

 

[crocodile deathroll]

The big "Wow"

I am of the view that davidsmith73 is not so much the consciousness of an individual person but the consciousness of the universe at the phase it achieved a critical level of complexity for consciousness to be possible, the big wow. All the other expressions of consciousness have been temporarily masked out until davidsmith73 plays out his/her life.

All the other people that davidsmith73 observes are just expressions of davidsmith73. When davidsmith73 dies he/she will just regress back to that phase when to function of consciousness in the universe first flashed into existence. Then a gestalt will switch davidsmith73 to someone else's brain and will only experiences the life through the eyes of that person.

CDR

 

[Pyrian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

ImpyTimpy:
Yahzi, that's not what he's asking. I'm not sure how to put the question in more simple terms (or more complex) then what David has written up... Here goes though..

I know my experiences exists in my brain, but why are they in my brain in the first place. The word "select" is the key here, that is, why was my brain selected as the creator of my conciousness. Why am I me?

Yes, I realise the above sounds a bit woo-woo but I can't convey this philosophical problem any better...

I believe I know what you're trying to express, and I believe that it in fact cannot be sufficiently expressed, since expression relies on common experience, and the experience of being oneself is uniquely singular.

 

[crocodile deathroll]

I believe I know what you're trying to express, and I believe that it in fact cannot be sufficiently expressed, since expression relies on common experience, and the experience of being oneself is uniquely singular.

IMHO it is acquired our memories that make us feel unique but our initial first person experience is not so unique as it all obeys the same genetic programming.

If we all emerge from one unified principle for consciousness and it works then why the need to complicate it any further by trillions of possible individual sources for contingent personal consciousness? Individuality can come later as we acquire things like language ability when brains develop little further beyond the fetal phase.

CDR

 

[davidsmith73]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Because your brain is in you and mine is in me. Pretty simple, really.

Because you have been exposed to different things than I have. Because your "self" (however you define that) has had a different set of stimuli thrust at it. [/B]

I don't think this addresses the issue. I can understand that if an individual brain and its associated physical processes that correspond to experiences is physically separate from another brain, each brain will be expected to produce a set of experiences that can be regarded as separate from the other set although I'm not sure in what sense.

However if we have two brains that are physically separate and therefore produce two sets of conscious experiences locallised respectively to each brain, then we still have the problem that I posed in my original post:

Why do I experience only one particular set of physical brain processes and why that particular one rather than the other ?

Both brains in a sense are equivalent in their capacity to manifest these things we call experiences. The materialistic notion that certain physical processes in the brain are the same thing (in a fundamental ontological sense) as the experience they are correlated with, does not provide us with a logical reason why the above question should be posed in the first place. As ImpyTimpy has said, this is a hard concept to put across. Does anybody else understand what I am trying to say ? Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ?

 

[davidsmith73]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Well, if my brain wasn't my brain, it wouldn't be my brain. Would it?

seems like circular reasoning to me. "My brain is mine because it is"

 

[davidsmith73]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Same point others have made here, essentially--the separate "selves" develop quite simply as a function of 2 separate bodies--I don't experience your brain's function any more than I experience your stomach's.

I can see why you would get two separate "selves" if construction of the self is dependent on a physical process, because we have two seprate physical processes. However, that does not give us an explanation for why my partcular brain should be selected to expose itself to the my realm of experience rather than yours. Why am I me and not you ? Again, I am fustrated by the difficulty in expressing what I am trying to say. I hope you can understand.

Let's make it even more difficult, or easier,depending...Say that we have conjoined twins. Same genetics, same in utero environment, very similar environment out in the world. You can't find people with more similarities in genetics and environment; still, a mechanistic viewpoint will demand that they will develop separate "selves". Why? If our thinking (and our "minds" or "selves") is developed through interaction with the environment (probably the best explanation of this is in behaviorism, although other views will also make this claim), then any difference in environment may have an effect on thinking. The slightest difference may eventually have enormous effects (think "butterfly effect" in chaos theory). Our conjoined twins do have differences in what they see. As they walk along, one head looks left, the other right, at a particular moment. As a result, one sees a smile that the other has missed, or any visual stimulus you can imagine. The association of that smile with that walk down the pathway is a difference between the two twins; one we cannot undo. Our two paths diverge, to paraphrase Frost, and that has made all the difference.

By simple virtue of two separate sets of eyes, we guarantee separate individuals.

But this is not the point of my question. A little bit of introspection will reveal the problem which is why each twins conscious experience will find itself correlated with one particular brain and not the other.

One can at least imagine actually being someone else and having their experiences rather than yours. This thread reminds me of the film "Being John Malkavich", if that helps!

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

Both brains in a sense are equivalent in their capacity to manifest these things we call experiences. The materialistic notion that certain physical processes in the brain are the same thing (in a fundamental ontological sense) as the experience they are correlated with, does not provide us with a logical reason why the above question should be posed in the first place. As ImpyTimpy has said, this is a hard concept to put across. Does anybody else understand what I am trying to say ? Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ?

But both brains are not equivalent (in any sense) in terms of their perspective. Certainly, each person can imagine, and there is no reason to think that the imagined experiences are different (no reason to think they are the same, either)...but much more importantly, the experiences that the brain `manifests` are tied directly to its sensory apparatus. Our personalities, our sense of self, comes about through interaction with our environment, and this interaction must take place through our senses. Even if the hardware (brain) is identical in its capacity to manifest these things we call experiences, the programming (learning) cannot be identical. (I hate computer analogies to the brain, but it works in this case.)

I think you are underestimating the extent to which our environments influence us, and overestimating our common elements (brain structure, nonspecific environment).

I can see why you would get two separate "selves" if construction of the self is dependent on a physical process, because we have two seprate physical processes. However, that does not give us an explanation for why my partcular brain should be selected to expose itself to the my realm of experience rather than yours. Why am I me and not you ? Again, I am fustrated by the difficulty in expressing what I am trying to say. I hope you can understand.

Why my brain gets my experiences? My retina is directly attached, through the optic nerve. My basilar membrane, olfactory bulb, taste buds...all feed into my brain, not yours. I think you are embracing some dualistic view of experience that creates problems where there are none...

 

[davidsmith73]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

But both brains are not equivalent (in any sense) in terms of their perspective.

Of course, they are not physically indistinguishable, but they are equivalent in the sense that they are capable of producing experiences. Each brain process of two people can be described in terms of an equivalent objective reality which is the respective experience, if we are to believe materialism.

I think you are underestimating the extent to which our environments influence us, and overestimating our common elements (brain structure, nonspecific environment). Why my brain gets my experiences? My retina is directly attached, through the optic nerve. My basilar membrane, olfactory bulb, taste buds...all feed into my brain, not yours. I think you are embracing some dualistic view of experience that creates problems where there are none...

I'm actually posing this question from the perspective of materialistic monism. Of course, two peoples brains will produce different processes and that is what you say leads to separate sets of experiences. That I understand, but the problem remains that we do not have any logical reason as to why your own experiential existence happens to be you and not someone else. I can after all imagine being you. Both "selves" from me and you are the product of the respective brain processes so why do I experience the "self" from my brain rather then yours ?

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

I'm actually posing this question from the perspective of materialistic monism. Of course, two peoples brains will produce different processes and that is what you say leads to separate sets of experiences. That I understand, but the problem remains that we do not have any logical reason as to why your own experiential existence happens to be you and not someone else. I can after all imagine being you. Both "selves" from me and you are the product of the respective brain processes so why do I experience the "self" from my brain rather then yours ?

You can imagine being me, but you cannot duplicate my experience; the two processes are entirely different. I can imagine being my dog, but all my inferences are based on my own experience, not hers. The physical separation of my brain (and associated sensory inputs) from yours is all that is required, logically, to insure a personal experiential existence. For you to think otherwise, you would need to demonstrate the functional equivalence of imagining and experiencing. Moreover, you would have to have person 1 imagining he or she was person 2 for an entire lifetime...On top of that, you would need to somehow make sure that person 1 did not know that what was happening was imagination... I think we have no logical reason to think that we could experience someone else`s reality.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

I don't think this addresses the issue. I can understand that if an individual brain and its associated physical processes that correspond to experiences is physically separate from another brain, each brain will be expected to produce a set of experiences that can be regarded as separate from the other set although I'm not sure in what sense.

However if we have two brains that are physically separate and therefore produce two sets of conscious experiences locallised respectively to each brain, then we still have the problem that I posed in my original post:

Why do I experience only one particular set of physical brain processes and why that particular one rather than the other ?

Both brains in a sense are equivalent in their capacity to manifest these things we call experiences. The materialistic notion that certain physical processes in the brain are the same thing (in a fundamental ontological sense) as the experience they are correlated with, does not provide us with a logical reason why the above question should be posed in the first place. As ImpyTimpy has said, this is a hard concept to put across. Does anybody else understand what I am trying to say ? Perhaps this is an ill-posed problem, in which case could someone explain why ?

As I tried to say earlier, each brain is different, from the atomic, through the moelcular and the cellulaur. Each brain forms different sets of associations.

To a materialist your question doesn't make sense, because each brain is unique.

The question I would ash is why under Idealsim would brains be different.

Try using an analogy,maybe that will hope convey your questions. In another post i compared brains to boat and minds to wakes.

 

[csense]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

"...because each brain is unique."

I would think that materialism could not logically posit this. If each brain were to be unique, then the physical processes would also have to be unique, and if physical processes are what we know as consciousness, then each consciousness is unique.

The only fundamental principle you could posit from here is just mere form and mere substance of the brain itself.
You could not say that this or that is consciousness since in each instance, it could only be potentially true of only one particualr consciousness.

If there is identity in the physical process, then how can it produce that which is unique

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Brain processes and individual experience

... I think we have no logical reason to think that we could experience someone else`s reality.

Welcome to the world of qualia.