I believe that failure is not an option in Iraq. But it is also true that failure is not an excuse for more of the same.
Here is how we must proceed.
First, we must create a stable and secure environment in Iraq. That will require a level of forces equal to the demands of the mission. To do this right, we have to truly internationalize both politically and militarily: we cannot depend on a US-only presence. In the short-term, however, if our commanders believe they need more American troops, they should say so and they should get them.
But more and more American soldiers cannot be the only solution. Other nations have a vital interest in the outcome and they must be brought in.
To accomplish this, we must do the hard work to get the world’s major political powers to join in this mission. To do so, the President must lead. He must build a political coalition of key countries, including the UK, France, Russia and China, the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, to share the political and military responsibilities and burdens of Iraq with the United States.
The coalition should endorse the Brahimi plan for an interim Iraqi government, it should propose an international High Commissioner to work with the Iraqi authorities on the political transition, and it should organize an expanded international security force, preferably with NATO, but clearly under US command.
Once these elements are in place, the coalition would then go to the UN for a resolution to ratify the agreement. The UN would provide the necessary legitimacy. The UN is not the total solution but it is a key that opens the door to participation by others.
In parallel, the President must also go to NATO members and others to contribute the additional military forces and to NATO to take on an organizing role. NATO is now a global security organization and Iraq must be one of its global missions.
To bring NATO members and others in, the President must immediately and personally reach out and convince them that Iraqi security and stability is a global interest that all must contribute to. He must also convince NATO as an organization that Iraq should be a NATO mission—a mission consistent with the principles of collective security that have formed the basis of the alliance’s remarkable history in the pursuit of peace and security.
To bring others in it is imperative we share responsibility and authority. When NATO members have been treated with respect, they have always – always – answered the call of duty. So too with other key contributors. Every one has a huge stake in whether Iraq survives its trial by fire or is consumed by fire and becomes a breeding ground for terror, intolerance and fear.
I know that some will say that this is an impossible task, but I believe it is doable with the right approach. We must lead but we must listen. We must use every tool of diplomacy and persuasion to bring others along.
I also understand that perhaps NATO cannot undertake the entire Iraq mission right away. But it could possibly take control of Iraq’s borders, take responsibility for Northern Iraq and/or the Polish sector, and train Iraq’s army. If NATO did this, it would free up as many as 20,000 American troops, and open the door for other countries outside of NATO to participate.
The immediate goal is to internationalize the transformation of Iraq, to get more foreign forces on the ground to share the risk and reduce the burden on our own forces. That is the only way to succeed in the mission while ending the sense of an American occupation.
We must take these steps because there is greater strength in greater numbers and stronger alliances. And failure to move forward will be seen as a failure of American leadership.
Second:
The second key element is the High Commissioner. Backed by a newly broadened security coalition, he should be charged with overseeing elections, the drafting of a constitution and coordinating reconstruction. The Commissioner should be highly regarded by the international community and have the credibility to talk to all the Iraqi people.
This Commissioner should be directed to work with Iraq’s interim government, the new US Ambassador, and the international community after June 30 to ensure a process that continues to move forward on the path toward sovereignty, while focusing on the immediate needs of the Iraqis themselves.
The Iraqi people desperately need financial and technical assistance that is not swallowed up by bureaucracy and no-bid contracts, but instead goes directly into the hands of grassroots organizations. They need to see the tangible benefits of reconstruction in the form of jobs, infrastructure, and services. And they need to be able to communicate their concerns to international authorities without feeling they are being insulted and disrespected in their own country.
Third:
We need a massive training effort to build Iraqi security forces that can actually provide security for the Iraqi people. We must accept that the effort to date has failed: it must be rethought and reformed. Training cannot be hurried. It must be done in the field and on the job as well as in the classroom. Units cannot be put on the street without backup from international security forces. They cannot be rushed into battle before they are ready.
This is a task to do in partnership with other nations, not just on our own. This is a task which must be successful. If we fail to create viable Iraqi security forces – military and police – there is no successful exit for us and other nations.
But why would others join a cause that they did not support in the first place? For one simple reason: it’s in their self-interest. For the Europeans, Iraq’s failure could endanger the security of their oil supplies, further radicalize their large Muslim populations, threaten destabilizing refugee flows, and seed a huge new source of terrorism.
And for Iraq’s neighbors, a civil war in Iraq could draw them in, put moderates in the region on the defensive and radicals on the rise. And a civil war could threaten the regimes in Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
These compelling interests have always existed and they must now be the central piece of a diplomatic effort long overdue. Will a new approach in Iraq be difficult to achieve? Yes.
Is there a guarantee of success? No.
In light of all the mistakes that have been made, no one can say that success is certain, but I can say that if we do not try, failure is all too likely.
If the President will take the needed steps to share the burden and make progress in Iraq – if he leads – then I will support him on this issue.
http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2004_0430.html
