• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Blitzkrieg - How's that work?

I meant of course that 'It' was designed in WW1. I on the other hand was designed in Dundee by D.C. Thompson and company in 1964.
 
SpitfireIX said:
So what, if any, lessons did the French and Americans learn?
Click to expand...

To understand the French lessons from WWI, you need to understand that the French Army suffered appalling losses in the first two years of the war, and degenerated into mutiny after the failure of the Nivelle offensive in spring of 1917.

French offensive spirit was re-kindled, but they were overwhelmingly at great pains to avoid massive casualties.

This resulted in what became known as the doctrine of the methodical battle - a carefully planned and coordinated battle utilising firepower to save blood.

Hence the French notably did not place great emphasis on rapid communication at either the tactical or operational level, which of course played directly to German strengths in 1940.

While individual French units often fought extremely hard in smaller actions (see Billotte's Wild Ride or the action fought by the 4th Dragoons at St Eloi), lack of joined up command meant that these actions rarely had any impact on the operational level.
 
Last edited:
HansMustermann said:
Poland may not have given every German soldier extra experience, but it was thoroughly studied by HQ and caused some revision of doctrine and organization. E.g., the Panzer divisions in Poland were a lot heavier on the tanks and lighter on the infantry and support part. After Poland this ratio was pretty much turned on its head.

I mention that specifically, because if you look at the organization of a British tank division as late as Africa, it mirrors a pre-Poland German one, not a post-Poland one.

Look, I'm not saying that British soldiers were bad individually, or even at regiment level. But doctrines and organization get revised as new experience is available. Germany got that experience early, Britain not yet. As they got more data about how it works on the front line, they too came up with better stuff. But before France that wasn't the case.
Click to expand...

This. Poland might seem like one-sided curb-stomp, but OKH were not happy with the way things had gone.

After Poland, the Heer underwent a systematic overhaul to address shortcomings.

Hence the relatively high quality of the Germans in the early part of the war.

The British had other problems - as well as being squarely on the back foot after the fall of France, the British had a serious manpower shortage. And one way to get around a manpower shortage was to motorise, mechanise and use as much armour as possible.

Hence British armoured units were chronically tank-heavy, and by Normandy, Monty is having to commit tanks en masse knowing they had nowhere near enough infantry support, because there just wasn't enough infantry period.
 
Garrison said:
Fundamental problem with Blitzkrieg is that required a fairly tight set of constraints to work. It needed to be executed over a relatively short distance, so as to allow logistics to catch up and even in France this proved difficult. It needed a high grade infrastructure to allow for swift movement and it needed some barrier to pin the enemy against to finish them. When they had this in France it worked, in the USSR against an enemy that could trade space for time and the infrastructure was utterly inadequate it was basically wishful thinking on the part of the Germans to believe they could crush the Red Army before the Wehrmacht outran their supply lines.
Click to expand...

Not exactly. Blitzkreig (in as much as it was ever really a Thing) was an evolution of traditional Prussian Bewegungskrieg and Kesselshlacht but with modern weaponry.

As such, there was no requirement for a geographic 'anvil' upon which to strike the enemy.

The Key difference between France and the Soviets is not so much space as reserves.

France had no strategic reserve, and thus after the initial 'suck punch' had nothing left to fight back with.

The Soviets had an enormous strategic reserve, and had the ability to create new reserves at a rate that was quite beyond anything the Germans anticipated. Thus, far from crumbling like a rotten edifice, the Soviets were able to continue to fight after the initial 'sucker punch' of Barbarossa while the Wehrmacht found itself somewhat out of ideas....
 
British Tank Divisions in Normandy were tank heavy, this was from experience and lessons learned in the Western Desert.
Tank to infantry strength was re-balanced as the campaign progressed.
 
I hunted around and found some info on Italian tanks and their use in Africa. Fast light tanks. ( relative for tanks if that time ) against the bigger and slower British units. It helped put into perspective that the Matilda really wasn't that bad at first.

It had enough armour and gun to be useful. Later when it faced a bigger stick with more nails the Lee/Grant was an improvement and nobody claims that was impressive. Not later in at least.

The evolution of machines of war moved fast. Three years was the useful life of the best of them before another bigger or better one came along.

The Italians seem to have tried to use a version of blitzkrieg themselves which is why they had an idea of how to counter it.
 
SpitfireIX said:
So what, if any, lessons did the French and Americans learn?
Click to expand...

The Americans became the first major power to adapt a semi automatic/self loading rifle as the standard shoulder weapon for it's military in 1937 as a result of what it learned from World War One (though for budgetary reasons the Garand only really begun to reach combat units in 1939 when, after World War 2 started, congress was finally willing to spend some money on the military).
 
8enotto said:
I hunted around and found some info on Italian tanks and their use in Africa. Fast light tanks. ( relative for tanks if that time ) against the bigger and slower British units. It helped put into perspective that the Matilda really wasn't that bad at first.

It had enough armour and gun to be useful. Later when it faced a bigger stick with more nails the Lee/Grant was an improvement and nobody claims that was impressive. Not later in at least.

The evolution of machines of war moved fast. Three years was the useful life of the best of them before another bigger or better one came along.

The Italians seem to have tried to use a version of blitzkrieg themselves which is why they had an idea of how to counter it.
Click to expand...

What did they 'counter' In North Africa they hunkered down in forts and were rounded up by the division.
 
8enotto said:
I hunted around and found some info on Italian tanks and their use in Africa. Fast light tanks. ( relative for tanks if that time ) against the bigger and slower British units. It helped put into perspective that the Matilda really wasn't that bad at first.

It had enough armour and gun to be useful. Later when it faced a bigger stick with more nails the Lee/Grant was an improvement and nobody claims that was impressive. Not later in at least.

The evolution of machines of war moved fast. Three years was the useful life of the best of them before another bigger or better one came along.

The Italians seem to have tried to use a version of blitzkrieg themselves which is why they had an idea of how to counter it.
Click to expand...

The British Christie cruisers were plenty fast. Italian tanks were just horribad and their armoured warfare doctrine was inchoate.

I detest the characterisation of the Italians as poor soldiers, but their equipment and leadership were often extremely lacking.
 
Italian light tanks were in part based on Lloyd carrier and Christie technology,but they were always a step or two behind in the evolution of main battle tanks and in too small numbers.

The main problem with Italian forces seems to be they were never presented with the enemy they prepared for. Being valiant but poorly prepared and equipped wasn't a win.
 
Even worse for the Italian solders, they were fighting the wrong side. Many of them would rather fight the Nazis. Hence many gave themselves up, rather than fight.
 
Well, I'd say the main problem for the Italian army was that their industry wasn't even within the same order of magnitude as Il Duce's delusions of grandeur. They literally couldn't even produce enough rifles for all soldiers, or artillery ammo that actually exploded most of the time, and it had nowhere near the kind of automotive industry to match the Brits for armour and motorization. It's easy to blame the army in one way or another, but it really couldn't do much better with the industrial capacity and logistics capacity that was feeding it.

And that gets me back to my previous claim that they kinda had the right idea for blitzkrieg, with their war of rapid decision. But before judging their doctrines or officers, remember that they ended up with a mobile warfare doctrine and foot infantry to actually do it. Turns out that no matter how rapid your decisions are, if you're on foot and the enemy is motorized and can run circles around you, it just doesn't work.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Back
Top Bottom