Better the illusions that exalt us ......

[Robin]

<yawn> Utilitarianism denies the existence of human dignity.

Any evidence for this absurd statement? Any?

 

[Robin]

Thanks slingblade. This is exactly what I say.

You cannot treat a cab driver as a person entitled to your money, and then jump off and not pay him any. The only way you treat somebody as if he had a certain entitlement, is to actually grant it.

As I point out above, this is simply not the case. Granting the right would also entail treating yourself as the sort of person who respects rights.

I am really sorry if that sounds mean, but honestly, to argue against this is ignorant idiocy.

Don't be sorry, it doesn't sound mean at all.

It sounds childish.

 

[rocketdodger]

What harm does the moral agent cause?

When someone breaches *my* dignity, it makes me feel lesser than I did before in some way. This net negative emotional gain over time, from a given source, is known as harm.

How does this compare to the happiness he also causes?

I dunno. That isn't at all an easy question, but one can make some headway. For example, we know that empathy typically swings to the side of the victim in such situations. This, in turn, means that whatever harm is caused will typically be amplified much more than whatever pleasure is caused. It is up to the people involved to decide which is greater. Personally, I would rather outlaw comatose patient rape, because the pleasure the rapist receives doesn't mean diddly squat to me in comparision to the possibility that it could happen to a good person in the world I inhabit.

Compiling a balance of happiness against harm, how does your moral agent behave?

To maximize happiness and minimize harm, like all moral agents behave. The only difference is the metric they use.

Or, do you obey negative consequentialism disregarding anything (happiness included) but harm as moral predicate?

I do not differentiate between happiness and harm -- they are simply opposite ends of a continuum in my view.

How could your moral agent breach an intrinsic moral value like 'human dignity' at all while you deny any such moral values even exist in your monstrous dystopia?

I denied no such thing.

If people wish to define something called "human dignity," then they are free to. And if they tell me I am harming them because of "breaching" that, then I will pay attention and see what I can do. In fact, I may find the phrase so useful that I might use it myself. Alas, I happen to have "human dignity" as well!

The only assertion I made was that if "breaching human dignity" is in fact a bad thing (and I think it is) then it is because it causes harm. The fact that you disagree with that assertion illustrates just how preposterous your self-righteous ideas of morality actually are.

Your moral agent walks home and pushes heftily a young lady who crosses the street
1) in order to save her life by preventing a collision with a car dashing towards her
2) because pushing young ladies makes him horny
Both scenarios lead to the same harm (mild crushing injuries) and, hence, have to be judged as ethically equal within your ethical system.

If they indeed lead to the same harm, then yes they are equivalent. I would point out to you, however, that this means the woman and any observers must be unable to distinguish between the two scenarios.

How can you justify this? Are both actions good or are they both bad? Why?

If I could tell the difference, then I would proclaim 1) to be good and 2) to be bad because the idea of a) random good gentlemen who sometimes save idiots who walk in front of cars is much less damaging to my sense of well being I.E. does less HARM to me than the idea of b) random perverts who may in some way harm a woman I care about whether she is an idiot or not.

As I said earlier, your notion of harm is extremely limited.

How can you apply an ethical system based on an arbritrary variable like 'harm'?

It is not arbitrary -- far from it. It is subjective. And I can apply such a system because I happen to respect the autonomy of individuals. I do not presume to know what is good or bad for someone else -- I let them decide.

How do you know everybody has the same understanding of the harm you just happen to 'define' adhoc upon your convenience?

I don't ... which is why I rely on the definition of harm given by the person who claims they are being harmed.

You, on the other hand, seem to think that some people are not harmed when they think they are, and are harmed when they think they are. This is an unavoidable consequence of moral absolutism given that not all humans are identical. It is also the reason I think it is bunk.

How do you rank different types of harm?

I dunno. I guess based on how bad it makes me feel?

How else should could I rank it?

How can you at all build any ethics on what you should NOT do, to prevent harm, instead of what you SHOULD do?

Why would you assume that to be the case?

Given that the human body requires volition to move, how can there be a difference? A decision is a decision.

What should your moral agent do if all his options don't create no harm, with harm being his only decisive criteria?

That situation is impossible, given that one can always find way to measure the outcomes such that one is harmful compared to the other.

Really what we are talking about here is the expected reward of an outcome. Harm is merely a negative reward.

But lets play your pointless game -- what should he do? I don't care. How about that? I don't know where you live, sir, or in what culture you were raised, but in mine we respect the right of individuals to do whatever they darn please if they aren't bothering anyone.

Why have you not analysed your ethics whatsoever before obeying this crap?

Huh?

How would a world look like, with your ethics applied worldwide?

Exactly like it does today. Surprise!

Why?

Because just as we can find a definition for {a,b, ... ,z} such that a + bx + ... zx^n is equivalent to <some arbitrary polynomial> we can find a definition of "utility" such that utilitarianism is equivalent to <some arbitrary ethical system>.

Can you quote any society that has ever applied your ethics? Why not?

Yes -- all of them have.

How do you know such a society will be better? Or even be possible?

The above answer makes this question invalid.

But perhaps what you are asking is whether I think it would be better if everyone adopted my personal view that one should respect others' definitions of harm. And if that is what you are asking, then my answer is "I don't know for sure because I am not a supercomputer, but I suspect so."

Given universal rejection of your ethical crap system, what method do you suggest to implant it, other than brute force?

If you are referring to the idea that all ethics should be based on harm and nothing else -- too late, everyone has already accepted it. They always have. By definition humans can't do anything else. Yay me!

If you are referring to my personal idea that people should respect other's definitions of harm -- the answer is selfishness. Most people realize, over time, that to get what they really want it is easier to work with others than go it alone, and working with others is more productive when there is an atmosphere of mutual respect.

In the other thread you suggested denying any science based services (like medical treatment) to those you don't understand those sciences (don't know how exactly a medicin works).

Understanding something does not require knowing exactly how it works. Not even close. Try again, and next time without lying about what I said.

Are you insane?

I am not the one who considers breaching a human's dignity to be harmless.

 

[Herzblut]

I am not the one who considers breaching a human's dignity to be harmless.

Utilitarianism denies human dignity.

 

[Robin]

No. I suggest that he simply avoids passing judgement.

No, he has only avoided passing judgement to their face. He is quite happy to pass that judgement behind their backs.

As I understand it, part of respecting other people is that you treat them as equal, which would include acting as if they are reasonable and know what they do, regardless of your opinion about their state of delusion. You can expect the same respect from them.

An unavoidable part of respect is honesty. Holding an opinion that somebody is in a state of delusion and hiding that opinion from is not respect. It is at best patronising them. At worst it is humouring them.

However the "teensy-weensy problem" I was alluding to was that if he really and honestly wants to keep a secret his opinion that their beliefs are ridiculous then he has made a bad start.

Announcing something on a widely-read internet site does not strike me as a particularly effective method of keeping it secret.

This would tie in nicely with the 'possibility of being wrong' too.

Why? Dawkins and Dennett also explicitly state the possibility that they are wrong. There is no contradiction in saying to someone "I could be wrong about this, but I find that particular belief of yours ridiculous".

I say it to my brother all the time and he to me. It does not mean we don't respect each other. It means our respect has reached the level that we can be this honest.

There is nothing wrong with educating people about possible inconsistencies in their beliefs though, and you are of course as entitled to preach your worldview,as the next christian fundamentalist is to preach his beliefs.

I certainly would not presume to preach, nor to educate anybody except in the small field wherein I am formally qualified to do so.

What I do, what Dennett and Dawkins do, what Collins, McGrath and Plantinga do is to engage in open, honest debate.

 

[Robin]

Utilitarianism denies human dignity.

Again, do you have any evidence for this absurd statement?

 

[Herzblut]

Again, do you have any evidence for this absurd statement?

If you claim utilitarianism respects human dignity as an indicator for the morality of decisions, then you have the burden of proof. That's because, per definition, utilitarianism only respects one indicator, namely utility.

 

[Robin]

Herzblut,

I know how much you dislike misrepresentation, so how about finally coming clean here:

Assuming that making sex without consent to a person uncapable to express consent would honour that person in any kind is irrational. It's ignorant idiocy.

I never even remotely suggested that it did honour that person.

Yes, you did. You said that morality based on Kant's imperative leads to the conclusion that raping a comatose woman was a sign of special honouring. I demonstrated the opposite and called your rubbish ignorant idiocy. Because it is ignorant idiocy.

Really? Quote me where I said this.

...(cricket chirrupping sound effect)...

You have twice called me an ignorant idiot on the basis of this alleged comment of mine. I have twice asked you to justify it and twice you have failed to do so.

If you send a gift and then fail (twice in a row) to provide accurate delivery instructions, to whom, then, does the gift belong?

 

[Herzblut]

You have twice called me an ignorant idiot on the basis of this alleged comment of mine. I have twice asked you to justify it and twice you have failed to do so.

If you send a gift and then fail (twice in a row) to provide accurate delivery instructions, to whom, then, does the gift belong?

I have not said anything about you as a person ('idiot'), I said something about what you said ('idiocy'). You understand the difference?

Secondly, my value judgment does not base on the one statement you mentioned above. Actually, this one statement is not very important, such that I happily admit that I might well be mistaken in this one case.

 

[Robin]

If you claim utilitarianism respects human dignity as an indicator for the morality of decisions, then you have the burden of proof. That's because, per definition, utilitarianism only respects one indicator, namely utility.

You have this problem, don't you, when it comes to backing up your claims?

Until you explain what you mean by this assertion I cannot help you with it, and I am completely puzzled by this claim. Are you suggesting that people are not the best judges about their own dignity?

Utility is defined as what any individual would regard as useful. Utilitarianism respects people's dignity and recognises that the very best judge of what comprises a person's dignity is that person himself or herself.

A dignity that is defined for you by another person is not dignity at all.

 

[Herzblut]

Kant does not place his morality at the level of society, but rather he focuses on the individual, and founds on "duty". One way of summarising his position is to say that one must accept the full moral agency of the other: and therefore it is not permissible to use the other as an object but to respect them as subject instead. But the main thing which Kant gave us was the idea that morals must be universalisable. At least that is how I see it, and I do accept this. "What would the world be like if everybody did that" is a good thought to have when considering what principles to adopt; and I take this from his position.

This is an excellent summary of Kantian fundamentals! "What would the world be like if everybody did that" - a very nice and catchy formulation of his Categorical Imperative.

The idea to promote his idea of human dignity to a fundamental Law was due to the horrible experience of the holocaust, where humans were treated like cattle being killed by an industrial machinery.

After WWII, the UN Charta of Human Rights was ratified, and many European post-war constitutions were geared towards the concept of an inviolable human dignity.

The German constitution is a perfect prototype to see the pros and cons of a very forceful implementation of that concept. It can be very nicely followed by looking at different decisions of the German Constitutional Court.

If you're interested I can mention some examples.

 

[Robin]

I have not said anything about you as a person ('idiot'), I said something about what you said ('idiocy'). You understand the difference?

Oh pullease!

Secondly, my value judgment does not base on the one statement you mentioned above.

Yes, I have noticed you sprinkle the term rather liberally instead of actual intelligent argument.

Not that I mind. I is rather charmingly reminiscent of the way my own children talked before they turned five and grew up a little.

Actually, this one statement is not very important, such that I happily admit that I might well be mistaken in this one case.

I am sorry, if you are going to bandy round the charges like "ignorant idiocy" then you will really have to do a lot better than this.

If it were not important, why did you repeat it when challenged? If it were an honest mistaken then what was it I said that could have been so interpreted?

And as a matter of record you did not "happily" admit anything, I had to drag it out of you with three separate requests. And even then I only got a weaselly "might" when you cannot even show where I have said anything remotely like it.

You would do well to heed the old sailor's advice - don't piss to windward!

 

[Robin]

This is an excellent summary of Kantian fundamentals! "What would the world be like if everybody did that" - a very nice and catchy formulation of his Categorical Imperative.

And how is that not consequentialism? The statement: "What would a be like if b did c" seems to be the very definition of a consequence.

 

[Herzblut]

The example you have been discussing of nurse and the coma patient is interesting.

Maximising the happiness is immediately seen to be useless in this case since we can only measure the happiness of the nurse and so his decision is trumps by definition. So utilitarianism as commonly presented does not bring us to what seems to be the agreed moral outcome (if anyone is arguing that this is the correct outcome I have missed it and I apologise)

No objective harm can be demonstrated, as Herzblut has pointed out. In order to bring in the concept of harm you have to spread it so wide it loses meaning and this cant be good. It seems to me that those who are bringing in the concept are working from some other moral intuition and then trying to make the situation fit with the concept of harm reduction. That does not fly, I think
Again we do seem to have an agreed moral outcome and this negative utilitarianism does not get us there

Treating the other as a subject not an object does seem to get us there and so Kant is more helpful in this case: and his concept of duty is very apposite here, too. Insofar as this example goes I think Kant is sufficient

Kant is inevitable for German Criminal Law.

Chapter Thirteen Crimes Against Sexual Self-determination
Section 179 Sexual Abuse of Persons Incapable of Resisting
(1) Whoever abuses another person who is incapable of resisting:
1. because of a mental or emotional illness or disability, including an addiction or because of a profound consciousness disorder; or
2. physically,
in that he, by exploiting the incapability of resisting, commits sexual acts on the person, or allows them to be committed on himself by the person, shall be punished with imprisonment from six months to ten years.

A crime against sexual self-determination is a crime in itself, even without any objective harm caused. Harm is not mentioned here at all. The very same can be found in

Section 176 Sexual Abuse of Children
(1) Whoever commits sexual acts on a person under fourteen years of age (a child), or allows them to be committed on himself by the child, shall be punished with imprisonment from six months to ten years, and in less serious cases with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine.

No "harm" is mentioned here, the mere fact of a sexual act with a child is a punishable crime."Whoever commits a sexual act.." Whoever. However. Whenever. Causing whatever.

It is inherently clear, that causing objective harm adds to the guilt of the culprit. But not causing harm does not make him innocent. This fully contrasts any ethical/legal system based only upon harm. It often clearly and plainly contradicts such system.

 

[Robin]

As I understand it, some are either arguing for utilitarianism, or that is being attributed to them. I cannot really sort out which. Utilitarianism is usually summarised as the pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number. If that is a fair representation of the position it is clearly absurd. The idea is dealt with in Ursula K LeGuin's story "The ones who walk away from Omelas" and for me this settles it. It does leave open the question of whether walking away is enough (live and let live or some such form) and the issue of resistance remains. But Utilitarianism won't do for me for this reason

Yes, LeGuin's story is the most cogent critique of Utilitarianism to date, just as The Dispossessed is the cleverest treatment of the idea of Radical Libertarianism.

But the problem is that we cannot walk away from Omelas, nor can we guarantee that no child will, as a consequence of our society, live in suffering.

Also, Omelas is not really an instance of Utilitarianism because it assumes that people could be happy after they have seen the child. If not, then the system would not deliver happiness.

Finally it is no good walking away from Omelas unless you can walk to some circumstance that would help the child.

That is the messy circumstance we find ourselves in - Omelas everywhere.

Also in this thread there seems to be a strand which bases morality on "harm reduction" and this seems to be a variation on Utilitarianism. It seems to say that maximising happiness is inadequate, but minimising misery is better.

Not at all, the two are inextricably entwined. If there is harm then happiness cannot be maximised unless the harm is reduced. Would not the family of the comatose patient be happy knowing that strict procedures were followed within the nursing home to ensure that abuse of patients can never take place?

Both of those kinds of utilitarianism seem to focus on society as the unit to which morality is to be applied. If that is correct then therein lies a big problem, as I see it. Societies do not cry: people do.

This is plain wrong, Utilitarianism focusses on society as a collection of individuals, Bentham's shopkeeper for example.

Kant does not place his morality at the level of society, but rather he focuses on the individual, and founds on "duty". One way of summarising his position is to say that one must accept the full moral agency of the other: and therefore it is not permissible to use the other as an object but to respect them as subject instead. But the main thing which Kant gave us was the idea that morals must be universalisable. At least that is how I see it, and I do accept this. "What would the world be like if everybody did that" is a good thought to have when considering what principles to adopt; and I take this from his position. Problem I have with Kant is that although he discusses what we should do he does not consider what we should be. This seems to me to be a big part of what we should be considering, because like it or not we do think about it when making moral decisions.

How is asking "what would the world be like?" focussing morality at an individual level???? Is the world an individual?

If you say we should focus on individuals and not focus on consequences then we should certainly never ask "what would the world be like?"

The example you have been discussing of nurse and the coma patient is interesting.

Maximising the happiness is immediately seen to be useless in this case since we can only measure the happiness of the nurse and so his decision is trumps by definition. So utilitarianism as commonly presented does not bring us to what seems to be the agreed moral outcome (if anyone is arguing that this is the correct outcome I have missed it and I apologise)

No objective harm can be demonstrated, as Herzblut has pointed out.

I wish people would stop saying that sexually abusing a comatose patient does not result in harm.

Or at least I wish they would back up this statement with some kind of rational argument.

As I have pointed out, the nurse could only get away with his actions by going to extreme measures to keep it secret. So he knows that objective harm would be revealed if the act were revealed. If revealing the act would reveal objective harm, then, clearly and unambiguously, objective harm would be done.

As I have also pointed out a society that was trying to maximise happiness would have this man doing hard time. It would enforce procedures in nursing homes that would prevent this from happening.

This is all clear an unambiguous.

So I am utterly bewildered as to how anybody could suggest that any version of Utilitarianism would condone his actions any any way.

n order to bring in the concept of harm you have to spread it so wide it loses meaning and this cant be good.

No, Utilitarianism explicitly refers to individual happiness. It also accepts that you will never have a society in which everybody is happy.

It seems to me that those who are bringing in the concept are working from some other moral intuition and then trying to make the situation fit with the concept of harm reduction. That does not fly, I think

I am puzzled as to why you think you could disentangle the idea of happiness from harm reduction.

Again we do seem to have an agreed moral outcome and this negative utilitarianism does not get us there

Utilitarianism gets us there fine, as I have demonstrated.

Treating the other as a subject not an object does seem to get us there and so Kant is more helpful in this case: and his concept of duty is very apposite here, too. Insofar as this example goes I think Kant is sufficient

Again, it is not enough to merely state this is so. You have to explain it. As I pointed out before the nurse can fully universalise his maxim, just so long as he does not personally mind being insensately buggered.

If you say "you are not treating her humanity as an end in itself" then the concept is so vague and nebulous that the nurse could easily just say "Yes I am" and even think that he means it. Sex offenders are, as I pointed out before, known for their capacity for self-deception.

The litmus test is that if the nurse were caught and asked the question "who has been made unhappy?" it could be very easily and convincingly answered with empirical evidence. If you asked "did you universalise your maxims and treat her humanity as an end in itself" you would just be at the start of a long metaphysical debate and we all know how quickly metaphyscally debates are settled, don't we?

Do you really think that it is realistic for the man in the street to base his moral decisions on the the understanding and acceptance of the treatment of ends and means by an 18th century metaphysician that most moder philosophers do not completely understand, less accept?

The objection to the principle was raised in the context of the plumber, and it was suggested that the use of the other as object is necessary, or at least acceptable, in that kind of situation. I do not wholly agree, because I am persuaded by experience in the work place and also by the concept of alienation, People are not just their role, even when performing their role, and it is perfectly possible to get the work done while recognising this. But it is true that is not entirely clear if we just take kant's ideas and there is a real problem here

People are indeed more than their role, and we often treat them as such - I personally know a great deal about the hopes and dreams of my preferred plumber. But this is not necessarily the case. If the taxi driver cannot get me from a to b then I will quickly find another taxi driver rather than explore any layers of his humanity that do not encompass taxi driving.

And if I treat the taxi driver as merely a means to an end, and he treats me the same, then it would not be true that we were as morally culpable as the nurse in the example.

Again it seems absurd and certainly meaningless to say that we necessarily treat a taxi driver's humanity as an end in itself or the plumber's humanity as an end in itelf.

For me that problem is resolved by addressing the agent and not just the action. We cannot just look at the outcome for those we act on nor just at the intrinsic properites of the act itself: we must always also think about the implications for the self of acting in such a way. We have a notion of who we want to be, and actions that we take impact on that too. This seems to be missing from this whole discussion so perhaps this is a silly point and everyone will immediately explain to me why it is irrelevant. But morality is for me as much about my own standards of behaviour as it is about the effects of those standards on other individuals or on society

On the contrary it is not missing, I have introduced it, you only have to understand that it works both ways. The person I want to be might not be the person I ought to be.

People have been suggesting that if I cheat a taxi driver of his fare then I have treated him as though he did not have rights. They have insisted that to say otherwise is ignorant idiocy.

But they have forgotten one part of the deal. Me.

I am treating the taxi driver as a person who has a right to payment, and treating myself as a person who avoids the consequent obligation. The actual fiduciary outcome of the transaction will then depend on how quick and big he is.

If we are only to care about whether my treatment acknowledges the humanity, the rationality, the rights of the taxi driver then I have done nothing wrong.

 

[Robin]

It is inherently clear, that causing objective harm adds to the guilt of the culprit. But not causing harm does not make him innocent. This fully contrasts any ethical/legal system based only upon harm. It often clearly and plainly contradicts such system.

Hmmm... Quick quiz.

Sexual abuse is against the law because:
a) The grass is green
b) The square of the length of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the square of the lengths of the other sided
c) Sexual abuse causes harm and suffering.

The German law states that the reason we have rights is because they are :

"... the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world"

In short, because of their utility.

 

[Herzblut]

I am treating the taxi driver as a person who has a right to payment, and treating myself as a person who avoids the consequent obligation. The actual fiduciary outcome of the transaction will then depend on how quick and big he is.

Would you like negotiating the payment of a cab ride in this way to become a universal cab ride law?

 

[Herzblut]

Hmmm... Quick quiz.

Sexual abuse is against the law because:
..snap..

it explicitely is a Crime Against Sexual Self-determination.

Why is the attempt punishable? Because the mere attempt causes harm? How so? What harm?

Edit: What if the comatose patient isn't comatose at all, but actually the wife of the male-nurses. They both get their kicks from a certain role play, where she acts as if she was comatose. Their consensual sexual acts might have consequences identical to the case of the comatose patient. Please explain why the couple should be punished for their role play as if it was not a role play, just because you fantasize that harm is all that matters.

 

[Robin]

Would you like negotiating the payment of a cab ride in this way to become a universal cab ride law?

Are you suggesting that there might be a bad consequence of my actions? Or that a valid criteria might be how much I would like those consequences?

But aren't you absolutely denying that the happiness or otherwise that might be consequent upon an action should be the basis for my decision?

 

[Robin]

it explicitely is a Crime Against Sexual Self-determination.

And why is sexual self-determination good? Because the lack of it causes suffering.

Why is the attempt punishable? Because the mere attempt causes harm? How so? What harm?

The attempt is punishable because it is an attempt to cause harm. We punish any attempt to cause harm because that is a good way of preventing harm.

I am not even sure why you think that tolerating an attempt to minimize utilty would be consistent with the goal of maximising utility.